
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
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THE GREEK QUESTION

By AUGUSTE GAUVAIN

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PREFACE

It is not altogether easy, when the whole world is making such sacrifice and enduring such suffering in the cause of liberty, to dwell upon some of the happier accomplishments of the war for a new world. It is beyond question, however, that the pressure of military necessity has brought the people of the Allied nations into much closer and more intimate relationship than ever before and has forged new bonds of mutual confidence and understanding between them. Such a bond is the American Hellenic Society, recently founded, which aims to do for the people of the United States and those of Greece what similar societies, earlier established, have done for the people of Great Britain, of France and of Japan.

Greece is a name to conjure with. No man or woman who knows the history of Western civilization can fail to respond with a thrill of interest and appreciation when the name of Greece is heard. The place of Ancient Greece is secure. Her achievements in art, in letters and in science will never be seriously challenged. Modern Greece, however, is not alone the descendant of the Greece of ancient days, but also in no small part the product of forces and conditions which have influenced it, and before which it has sometimes been almost helpless. It appears that a happier day for Greece is about to dawn. Under the inspiring leadership of M. Venizelos, whose statesmanlike qualities are one of the ornaments of our generation, Greece has taken its natural place with the friends and defenders of liberty and in opposition to the forces of autocratic power and the rule of military might. The stimulus of this conflict and the satisfaction of these associations bid fair to

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unite the whole Greek people through a new spirit of patriotic fervor and devotion. Modern Greece will then come to occupy the place in the world of to-day which is due to a people of its traditions and its characteristics.

The American Hellenic Society will constantly aim to make known the position, the interests and the ambitions of Greece, and to promote sympathy with them. It will aim to make the people of Greece and those of the United States more intimately acquainted one with the other by promoting in America the study of the ancient and modern language and literature of Greece and by promoting in Greece the study of the English language and of American history, literature and institutions.

Surely this aim is a noble one and one that will call forth and receive widespread sympathy and support. To this cause the series of publications, of which the present volume is the first, is dedicated.

NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
December 1, 1917.

INTRODUCTION

The series of articles on the Greek question by M. Auguste Gauvain well deserves to be made accessible to all thoughtful Americans who are interested in the problems connected with the great European war. Its author, because of his extensive political and journalistic experience, is splendidly qualified to treat of this extremely complex question. With a clearness and frankness which does M. Gauvain the greatest credit he casts light upon the responsibility which rests on the different nations, and upon the errors committed by them.

The essay reveals facts as yet unknown to the general public, facts that are incontestably true in that they are authenticated by documents the publication of which has been rendered possible only by the recent solution of the Greek crisis. It permits the reader, as he follows the startling events that succeeded one another in this crisis from which Greece has happily emerged, to understand the attitude taken by the Greek people. Because of their inactivity and their nonresistant attitude the Greeks were credited, in the judgment of many foreigners, with approving the pro-German policy of their king and with condoning all those abuses of power by which Constantine sought to impose his will upon the people.

M. Gauvain at the very beginning shows the fundamental error which characterized the policy of the Entente toward the Balkan powers. The sentiments of the Greek people and of the Greek government were at the beginning of the war decidedly friendly toward the Allied powers, while the attitude of Bulgaria on the other hand was, to say the least, doubtful. In the vain hope of drawing Bulgaria to their side the

Allies conceived the idea of the cession of Greek and Serbian territories to Bulgaria. Such a ceding of national domain is repugnant to any people, but it was even tragical in this case, for it was a question of surrendering territories which were inhabited by more than a million Greeks and Serbs, who had just gained their freedom as a result of the victorious wars of 1912-13.

The attitude of Bulgaria did not disabuse the Allies of their false point of view. Even the loan negotiated by her in Germany did not serve to dissipate their illusions. They obstinately insisted on demanding sacrifices on the part of Greece.

The masses in a country never make any effort to understand the psychological basis of actions; they prefer to pin their attention to the brute facts. Greek public opinion was therefore deeply stirred upon learning that the friends and protectors of Greece wished to lessen her territories and her influence, and at once the feeling was aroused in the national consciousness that Greece was being cruelly wronged. This bitter feeling was all the more increased and intensified by the fact that these sacrifices were demanded for the benefit and advantage of a people who were obsessed, as the Greeks had come to know by centuries of fighting with them for their own freedom, by the wild desire to dominate the near East.

It is easy to understand how Constantine and the agents of the German propaganda could profit by this error so as to present Germany as the defender of the territorial integrity of Greece. An attempt was thus made to create an anti-Ally sentiment in the minds of the Greeks.

M. Gauvain next examines the attitude of these same powers toward Constantine after he had dismissed Mr. Venizelos in October, 1915, and had begun, through the agency of ministers subservient to the royal will, his

provocations of the Allies and his machinations against their military forces at Saloniki, as well as those acts of espionage practiced against these same troops by his personal agents.

The Entente powers continued to preserve the same friendly attitude toward Constantine as in the past. Conference succeeded conference; the representatives of the Allies came forth from these interviews completely charmed, and their impressions were purposely spread abroad so as to hoodwink the people and hinder them from seeing whither they were being led.

Constantine was, moreover, at that time extremely popular in Greece. As a result of the victories of 1912-13, which had been cleverly exploited so as to give him the whole credit for the success of the Greek arms, the people had come to regard the king as that Constantine XII of Greek legend who was destined to liberate Constantinople, the city of the Byzantine emperors, thus restoring to Christendom the national Greek sanctuary, Saint Sophia, and to unite under his scepter all the Greeks, whether subject to Bulgar or Turk. It was, then, not to be wondered at that the people should have implicit confidence in their king.

This confidence of theirs was naturally strengthened by the attitude of the Allies toward him, for their friendliness was set before the people as a convincing proof of the sincerity of the king's declarations.

Some of his acts, however, which were not fully in accord with his words, finally began to provoke a certain restlessness in the minds of the people and to arouse in them a feeling of distrust. Constantine became aware of this, and foresaw the possibility of resistance. He instigated a reign of terror in order to prevent criticism of his acts. By virtue of a law passed by the Venizelist government, which prescribed the surrender of all arms in the possession of private citizens, the government, as the servile tool of the king, disarmed all citizens of whose

abject submission it was not sure. The last step in this policy of intimidation was the organizing of the League of Reservists, who were immediately equipped with regular army rifles.

The result was that nobody dared to utter a word of criticism. Enlightenment finally came, however, through the fight begun by the liberal party, for, as soon as the liberals felt themselves protected by the Allied fleet which anchored off Salamis in June, 1916, they hastened to make their will known. The people of Athens in a huge mass-meeting with one accord declared that Greece proposed to fulfill her duty as an ally toward Serbia and demanded that the king respect the oath that he had taken to support the Constitution.

The people of Athens presented their resolutions in a respectful form, for they hoped that Constantine would be induced to think and act as a Greek and would follow the decision of the people. But the Entente powers, far from supporting the stand taken by the people, continued through their official and obliging representatives in Athens to overwhelm Constantine with civilities and to treat him as a sincere friend who was anxious for one thing alone—the strict preservation of Greece's neutrality.

We are now in a position to understand fully how this whole attitude of the Allies was exploited, and thus to appreciate what anxiety and perplexity it must have produced in the minds of the Greek people, who were utterly misled by these strange contradictions.

The time finally came when Mr. Venizelos, despairing of his ability to bring Constantine to a full realization of his duties toward Greece and the Constitution, determined to have recourse to a revolutionary movement in order to save his country. The effect on the people of Mr. Venizelos' departure for Saloniki was enormous. If the Allied powers had at that time recognized the government of Saloniki as the only legal government

in Greece, Constantine would long since have yielded or abdicated.

Indecision, however, still characterized the policy of the Allies. Recognition of the government of Saloniki, even as a separate government, was long delayed, while friendliness continued to govern the relations between Constantine and the Allies. They carried this solicitude to such a point as to guarantee the king against any liberal propaganda in the territories which had not been able to free themselves from his jurisdiction, and Mr. Venizelos was even obliged to make reassuring declarations as to the non-antidynastic nature of the liberal movement.

Even after the criminal outrages of the king against the Allied troops disembarked at Athens, the attitude of the Allies continued to show the same contradictions. Furthermore, although some of the Allied governments were to all appearances fighting the Venizelist movement, yet it was the people alone that were made to suffer by the coercive measures employed against Greece.

It was in a chaos of this sort that the Greek people lived for a long time, and it was in the midst of all these contradictions that the liberal movement arose. It ought logically to have failed, but it did succeed. Do you ask why? Because it was in fundamental agreement with the deepest convictions of the Greek people, whose true sentiments and whose real aspirations it reflected. The most striking proof of this lies in the attitude of the Greek people toward the liberal movement.

Mr. Venizelos, applying to the letter his political motto, "The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," impressed upon the people that, in spite of their bereavements in the Balkan wars, in spite of their financial bankruptcy and the war-weariness of the nation, the march of circumstances imposed on Greece far greater efforts and more costly sacrifices. Mr. Venizelos knew as well as anyone that when men are called

upon to make personal sacrifices their ardor is likely to cool, for selfishness is a dominant element in human nature. He dared to make this appeal to the Greeks because he understood their way of thinking, their fundamental good sense and their love of country. He did it although he knew that Constantine, in opposing his policy, was appealing to the lower and more selfish instincts of men, declaring that there was no need of the Greeks subjecting themselves to sacrifices of their blood and treasure, but that it was rather their duty to enrich themselves and enjoy their acquired wealth.

The Greek people may well be proud of the proofs they have given the world of self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of an ideal. Rejecting the doctrine of a king whom they loved, they chose the *via dolorosa.* More than 30,000 volunteers replied to Mr. Venizelos' call to arms and hastened to Saloniki to offer their most precious possession, their lives, for no other object than to save the nation's honor, compromised by the arbitrary acts of Constantine and a handful of bullies that had terrorized the people. When one beholds a spectacle like this, when one sees so many men rushing into a frightful struggle for the sake of an ideal, the only possible explanation is that the surroundings in which these men lived, the very atmosphere which they breathed, was surcharged with these same ideas. Only thus are sentiments like these aroused and exalted to such a pitch that the individual is led to make the supreme sacrifice. The French Revolution is the most striking example of this truth. This is the proof positive of the actual feelings which dominated the Greek soul in spite of the king's teachings, in spite of the privations and humiliations which were imposed upon Greece as a result of a long-continued failure to understand her aims.

These sentiments were and are to-day an ardent love for the ideals of justice and liberty, a craving for national honesty and political uprightness, an attachment to the

democratic principles which form the groundwork of Greece's Constitution, and along with these a feeling of intense gratitude and affection for the nations that have contributed to the Greek renaissance in the nineteenth century.

After a blockade which lasted for ten months and which resulted in untold suffering on the part of the people, the soldiers of France and England on disembarking at Pireus in June, 1917, were received as brothers. Constantine did not fail to grasp the situation. He abdicated, without attempting the slightest resistance. He knew that he would find few Greeks disposed to attack the Allied troops, and he understood that the people as a whole did not share those sentiments which he had never dared to reveal and which have only recently come to the knowledge of the Greek people through the publication of documents of state.

Upon the departure of King Constantine and his courtiers, all apostles of the Pan-German idea, the Greek people once again breathed an atmosphere purely Greek. They began work at once in preparation for the fulfillment of their whole duty.

The day is at hand when all Hellas will take the part that by right belongs to it in that struggle for grand ideals pursued by the noble nations of the world. It cannot be otherwise. It is incredible, nay impossible, that the people who gave the world ideals of supernal beauty and of sublime thought that have never been surpassed should fail to share the great fight against base materialism and brutal might.

American Hellenic Society.

THE GREEK QUESTION

PART I

The deplorable turn which Greek affairs took toward the close of last year is the consequence of the weak policy which has been pursued by the Triple Entente in the Balkans ever since the beginning of the European war. The errors committed during this period by the Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd have been numerous and grave. They may, in the last analysis, be traced back to two fundamentally wrong conceptions. In the first place, the governments of the three Allied countries misunderstood the nature of the great struggle that had just broken out and failed to make use of the appropriate means to end it according to their real interests. Secondly, they, at the start, interpreted the intentions of Turkey in a sense diametrically opposed to the facts of the case and at a later period committed the same blunder with regard to Bulgaria.

The ministers who directed foreign affairs in France, England and Russia during the second half of 1914 were all men of extended experience. In the course of their careers, they had had many matters of the greatest importance to arrange. They were personally acquainted, were in confidential relations with one another and could easily unite in a course of action. They were represented, each in the others' countries by ambassadors who loyally supported their policies. All conditions seemed united to permit them to conduct the diplomacy of the Entente with a firm and steady hand. They gave at the very beginning an evidence of clear-sightedness by signing the agreement of September 5, 1914, which bound

the three states together under reciprocal obligations for the duration of the war, and for the conclusion of peace. Unhappily in all that concerns the Balkans, they thought and acted as a Metternich would have acted. Attached as they were to a policy to be pursued simply for the good of the state, preoccupied rather with the end of the war than with the logical means of bringing it to an end, taking into account the maps of countries rather than the wishes of their peoples, they set themselves to pursue solutions which were based on the arbitrary re-distributing of territories. They imagined that by cutting the Macedonian provinces into shreds and by thoroughly recasting from top to bottom the Treaty of Bucharest of the 10th of August, 1913, they could succeed in satisfying all the Balkan States and in uniting them for a common purpose against our common enemies. In trying to nullify the Treaty of Bucharest, M. Delcassé, Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof acted against the most elementary political morality. Moreover, they undertook a rôle that did not belong to them. The Treaty of Bucharest was the just penalty for the sudden attack of Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece at the end of June, 1913. It certainly contained no clause that was harsher for Bulgaria than were the penalties contemplated by the three ministers against Austro-Germany for her sudden attack of August, 1914. It gave to Bulgaria more than it took from her. Except for the portion of Dobrudja ceded to Rumania, it deprived her only of hopes. These hopes were, it is true, great hopes, but they actually aimed at the establishment of the Bulgarian hegemony in the peninsula.

Certainly it was not for the interest of France, England or Russia to encourage or rouse these hopes. It was to the common interest of these three powers to interpose, in the Balkans, Serbia and Greece on the one side and Rumania on the other between Germany

and the Aegean Sea so that Germany might not control the routes to the Orient. The creation of a Greater Bulgaria, the declared rival of Rumania, Greece and Serbia, imperiled our influence from the Danube to the Persian Gulf. The historical and linguistic arguments invoked by the Bulgarians in support of their contention were not enough to make us approve designs contrary to our interest.

Besides, these arguments were specious arguments. They closely resembled the arguments advanced by Germany to justify its claims to the right to expand. The regions arrogated by the Bulgarian agents as having belonged to the Bulgarian Empire had belonged also to the Serbian and the Byzantine Empire. The historical rights, a never-failing source of conflict, balanced each other. The use of a language in a country gives to a neighboring country which speaks the same language no rights over it. Furthermore, the dialect used by the inhabitants of the greater part of the disputed Macedonian territory was closer to the Serbian language than to the Bulgarian. The Greek language confessedly preponderated in many villages claimed by the Bulgarians. There remained to be considered the desires of the inhabitants. In the eyes of liberal and constitutional states like France and England, this ought to have been taken into serious consideration. There is no evidence that the Cabinets of Paris and London troubled themselves about it at all during the first year of the war. In offering to Bulgaria certain territories, they forgot that their inhabitants had been living and acting as faithful subjects of Greece and Serbia since August, 1913. In common with the Cabinet of Petrograd, they left the moral aspect of the question entirely out of account. In the summer of 1913, with the complicity of Austro-Germany, Bulgaria treacherously attacked her two allies with the avowed purpose of despoiling them and, after subduing them, turning upon Rumania. Her calcula-

tions and her course of procedure were analogous to those of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Belgium, France, Russia, Serbia and England and were just as inexcusable. Politically and morally the sudden attacks of 1913 and of 1914 are closely allied. How, then, could the states that were the victims of the second have dealings with the authors of the first? How did they dare to exercise in Bulgaria's favor a pressure on the lawful victors of 1913? In virtue of what principle did they wish to suppress the just terms of the Treaty of Bucharest. Their conduct is to be explained only by the fact that at this moment they were guided by no fixed principle. They had in view only expedients. We must acknowledge that from the declaration of war by Germany to the intervention of the United States, the diplomacy of the Triple and then Quadruple Entente was one of expediency only. It drew its inspiration from unmoral diplomatic combinations. It busied itself with the allotment of Europe on the basis of plans decided on in the secrecy of the Cabinets. Apportionments were made in accord with desires rather than in accord with right. As a theoretical principle, there was much talk of the rights of nationalities, but these are susceptible of quite different interpretations, and it was perhaps just on this account that they were put so much in the foreground. There was less talk of the right of civilized peoples to dispose of themselves, for the application of this principle would have cramped these architects of the new Europe. They carried on their negotiations in the dark because they feared that broad daylight would disclose ugly facts. They thought themselves clever, but this very cleverness came near compromising the triumph of the cause of the civilized world. In short, at the most critical moment of modern history they gave themselves up in the diplomatic arena to such intrigues as are customary in parliamentary lobbies. Instead of taking their place fairly and squarely at the side of our friends

and against our enemies, the attempt was made to seduce an accomplice of our enemies by making a place for him at the cost of our friends. It is in some such way as this that a Prime Minister, when compelled to reform his Cabinet, sometimes tries to find a place for an adversary in the hope of rendering him harmless, instead of strengthening his ministerial majority by the addition of a reliable friend. He sometimes succeeds in prolonging in this way a poor existence as minister, but at other times he simply hastens his fall. In any case, he cuts no great figure in the world.

There would have been no great glory in obtaining a provisional success by winning over for the time being a Bulgaria which would without doubt a little later have seized the opportunity to put all in question by a course of blackmail. But to every attentive observer of the affairs of the Orient who lived in the sphere of realities and not in that of imagination, Bulgaria was riveted to the Central Powers by iron bonds. I shall have occasion to say later and at greater length in what these bonds consisted. I shall show also how no reasonable statesman of the Triple Entente ought to have given credence to the Turkish government's protestations of friendship. But contenting myself at present with the examination of the relations of the Entente with Greece, I shall try to prove that it was impossible in 1915 to satisfy Bulgaria without delivering continental Greece a mortal blow. From the entrance into line of Turkey in the autumn of 1914 up to the Bulgarian mobilization in September, 1915,—that is to say, during all the period of negotiation between the Entente and the Cabinet in Sofia,—not once did the latter formulate any precise conditions, the acceptance of which would have been followed by the signing of a lasting treaty. It veiled its replies in vague phrases and awaited proposals. Not only did this general attitude show clearly that it had no intention of treating and that it sought only to gain

time, but numerous indications in detail revealed clearly the purposes which it was very anxious to conceal.

At the very beginning it affected to consider as of no importance any enlargement of the country's territories at the expense of Turkey. Now the plan of the Entente was actually based on the possibility of compensating Bulgaria at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, which had just attacked Russia. The idea was a good one. If Bulgaria, in order to ally herself with us, had been contented with the annexation of Ottoman territory and rectification of her frontiers in Macedonia, no exception could have been taken to the affair. It was our business to try to sound her by negotiations in order to know where she stood. The mistake lay in following the negotiations up after we had discovered that the Bulgarian government demanded the hegemony in the Balkans. As a matter of fact, Bulgaria, without defining limits, let it be clearly understood that she must have the whole of Macedonia, and that she wanted to enter into possession of the Serbian and Greek territories, claimed by her immediately after the signing of the treaty, before Serbia and Greece should have received any compensation. It is what M. Ghénadief, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a time when the Cabinets of the Entente flattered themselves with having won him over to their cause, expressed as follows: "We must be paid. We want Macedonia to become once more Bulgarian, for it is inhabited by our sons. France had to recover Alsace-Lorraine, just as Italy had to recover Trieste. We have, you may as well understand, four Alsaces to recover—Turkish Thrace, Serbian Macedonia, Greek Macedonia and the Dobrudja. We wish to occupy at once the part of Macedonia held by Greece and Serbia." This declaration emanated from a man whom the governing parties in Sofia accused of lukewarmness in the national cause. It dates, it is true, from June, 1915, but it reproduces faithfully the aspirations of

the Bulgarian people, and the purposes of its government since the autumn of 1914 and even since the year 1913. The language of the press and of statesmen in Sofia leaves no doubt as to this point.

Hardly had the Treaty of Bucharest been signed, when at the instigation of Baron von Wangenheim, Ambassador of Germany at Constantinople, the Cabinet of Sofia entered into an arrangement with the Turks, and this too in spite of the fact that the latter had a few months before taken advantage of the embarrassment of Bulgaria to reoccupy and hold Adrianople. From this moment, the Bulgarians were dominated by the passion for Macedonia. They reconciled themselves with the Turks, sharing their hatred of Greece. In the hope of conquering Saloniki and Cavalla, they promised the Sultan all Thrace and the islands of the Cyclades. On their part, the Turks were roused by the desire to regain Mitylene and Chios. The Austro-Germans knew how to inflame these desires and the arrangement was actually consummated in October, 1913. It was agreed that comitadjis would on every occasion foment trouble in Macedonia and Albania and that they would always hold in readiness some cause for an intervention either by Turkey or by the Central Powers. In fact, comitadjis, armed with Bulgarian weapons, did not cease to terrorize now Albania and now Macedonia. It needed all the patience of the Serbian government to prevent the outbreak of a third Balkan war. The drama of Serajevo at the end of June, 1914, furnished Austro-Germany an unexpected pretext for the European conflict. The struggle in the east was for the time relegated to the background, but all its elements continued to subsist.

In more general ways, too, the Bulgarians have never made any secret of their intentions. They signed the Treaty of Bucharest under protest, because they were constrained and compelled to do so. Even in the treaty

itself, a paragraph records their mental reservations. Serbia had left them free to choose either the district of Kotchana or that of Strumitsa, and they preferred the latter, though less populous and more remote, because it projected out toward the railroad line of the Vardar. This became the base of operations for the comitadjis, who sallied forth again and again from this bastion to cut the railroad line in the valley of the Vardar, a line which formed a vital artery of communication for Serbia. According to the statesmen of Bulgaria then, who passed as friends of the Entente, Greek Macedonia was thus one of the four Alsaces of Bulgaria, a country whose official independence went back to 1908, and whose real independence began with 1878. It comprised all the territories situated between the Kara Sou on the east and the mountains of Albania on the west. In speaking of the cession of Cavalla, they were not serious. If it had been a question of this district alone, Greece would finally have yielded, for even Venizelos himself at one time (January-February, 1915) had been disposed to yield on this point. But Cavalla formed a little piece of Greek Macedonia. If the Bulgarians were particularly desirous to get it, this was due to its exceptional richness and in particular to its strategical importance in any move against Saloniki. The Greek government had acted very wisely at Bucharest in 1913 in insisting on keeping this in spite of the Russian protests, for it knew that Bulgaria, intent on getting its revenge, would make use of this as a base for the conquest of Saloniki. Furthermore, Cavalla is a city almost exclusively inhabited by Greeks. The Cabinet of Sofia in their brief occupation of the city in 1912-13, could not, according to the avowal of King Ferdinand's agents, find in the place a Bulgarian capable of discharging the duties of mayor. The Cabinets of London and Paris obstinately persisted, none the less, in their unpractical plans. They refused to listen to the Greek and Serbian statesmen in

spite of the fact that they knew their Bulgarian neighbors far better than M. Delcassé and Sir Edward Grey. As for Russia, she was a perfect M. Perrichon in her policy toward Bulgaria. Having contributed to create Bulgaria, she constituted herself her protector against all and sundry, although her protégé had passed over to Austria ever since the time of Stamboulof. She was possessed by the idea of bringing back the prodigal to the Slav fold, while he, freed from his leading-strings, lavished fair words on his old guardian, but in secret sought means to break away more completely from her guardianship.

Not to go into the details of the negotiations that were carried on in secret, and that are still imperfectly known, the account that I have given serves to show the underlying cause of that uneasiness of mind on the part of the Greeks which permitted our enemies to mock at our intentions and to turn against us a part of the population of the country. The desire to be truthful obliges us to confess our errors, and these errors that we have made will help us to understand, though we cannot excuse, those errors of a far more serious nature of which King Constantine has been guilty toward us.

The Greek question would not have arisen if the assassination of King George I at Saloniki in March, 1913, had not prematurely brought the Crown Prince Constantine to the throne. This prince, the husband of Princess Sophie, the sister of William II, had ideas as to the royal power that were diametrically opposed to those of his father. The former had respected the constitutional régime and had adapted himself to parliamentary customs, leaving the direction of affairs now to the leaders of one party and now to those of the other. But his son despised the democratic form of government. Educated at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, he admired William II's way of keeping things under his personal

control, and regarded as a family fief the kingdom over which George I had been called to reign under fixed conditions by the protecting powers and the will of the people, and he acted as the Lord's Anointed, although it must be said that his mind had no religious bent. He and his brother had adopted the principles of the old dynasties. During the life of George I they had enjoyed little prestige. They had even been excluded from the army after the revolution of 1909. It was Venizelos who brought the sons of George I again to power. At the time that he assumed control in 1910 he was convinced that Greece was not ripe for a democratic form of government, that she needed a dynasty, and that the thing to do was to strengthen the one that existed. He recalled the princes, restored to them their rank and set himself to increase as much as he could the prestige of the Crown Prince so as to facilitate later his royal task. He brought into prominence his military successes during the first Balkan war and followed the same course after the change of reign. Quite unlike ministers who try to eclipse their sovereign, Venizelos neglected no opportunity to enhance the glory of Constantine. This was not the flattery of a courtier, for at this time he was the uncontested master of Greece. It was done in the interest of a dynasty the strength of which seemed to him necessary to the maintenance of order in the country.

During the early part of the new reign the differences in temperament and tendency between minister and sovereign called forth no serious clash. Venizelos possessed within and without the country an authority which impressed itself even on his enemies. In less than four years he had transformed Greece from a disorganized and discredited country into a well-ordered state, glorious and prosperous, and with an area twice as large as before. Wherever he had gone in other countries he had been regarded as a statesman. His judgment was admired and his character respected. He inspired feel-

ings of confidence. Within Greece, the old leaders, jealous though they were, had to bow before the restorer of their country. The liberal party, created by Mr. Venizelos after the revolution, rallied to itself the majority of the people. It became a real force in the state and was a decided novelty. Before that time the kingdom had been divided into fiefs dependent upon families that had taken a prominent part in the war for Greek independence in 1821. Although the state was essentially democratic, a sort of feudalism had established itself. An oligarchy governed the country, but an oligarchy without a program or fixed principles. Each clan had its chief and each chief wished to get into power in order to satisfy his followers and his own ambition. There had become established among the different chiefs of clan a way of "taking turns" at being leader. Spoils were divided in alternation with one another. Laws were passed to suit the circumstances of the hour, and the administration was entrusted to a personnel chosen because it resembled in its point of view the chief then in power. Charilaos Trikoupis was perhaps the only exception in this staff of prebendaries. Venizelos upset this rotten system and built up a real party founded on the deeper sentiments of the people and the permanent interests of the country.

Up to that time the people had submitted to the oligarchic régime, trying to profit by it. But they were not attached to it. Those who could go away to pursue fame and fortune did not fail to do so. Thus in both hemispheres, but notably in Egypt, France and England, there were established vigorous colonies of Greeks, disgusted with this succession of parties, and desirous to adorn Hellas with a new order and a new glory. Keeping up a regular contact with the land of their birth, they continued to exert an influence there. They recognized at once in Eleutherios Venizelos the man who could accomplish the work of regeneration. They encouraged

and supported him. Immediately after he had taken the reins of government into his hands, the former Cretan leader revealed what he really was. Though he was the product of a military revolution, he sent the officers back to their barracks and forced them to submit to discipline. He re-established the constitutional régime, which had been warped by misuse. He guaranteed an honest administration of local affairs, stimulated the productive power of the country, lightened the burden of taxes, had laws passed that protected labor and restored the independence of the courts. In the Chamber of Deputies he rallied a devoted majority. The old parties disappeared. None of the old leaders could gather solid supporters about him. Only an impalpable residuum of objectors was left. To the regret even of the Prime Minister, who would have liked to find before him a constituted party to discuss measures, there was no longer any opposition in the parliamentary sense of the word. The government had not suppressed it by the means in use in other countries—Rumania, for example. It had simply disappeared like the mist before the sun. Venizelism represented not a dictatorship, not the preponderating influence of one man, but a régime with methods and ideas shaped according to the reasoned will of the upper classes of the citizens and the instinctive desires of the masses.

At the moment when the European war broke out the liberal party was all-powerful and the king could not dream of imposing his personal political views. It was due to external events that the design to substitute personal for constitutional government took shape.

Mr. Venizelos was at Munich, en route for Brussels, where he was to meet the Grand-Vizir in order to settle the question of the islands, when he learned of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. He at once took his stand. On the 25th of July, right from Munich, he

telegraphed instructions to Athens, to the following effect: "It is of supreme importance not to allow any doubt to exist as to the intentions of Greece. Greece cannot stand with arms folded in the presence of a possible attack on Serbia by Bulgaria. She could not tolerate such an attack, for it would lead to an aggrandizement of Bulgaria and would put in question the Treaty of Bucharest. This attitude is imposed upon her alike by her duties as the ally of Serbia and by the instinct of self-preservation." At the same time, he sent a dispatch of like import to Mr. Theotokis (junior), minister of Greece in Berlin, begging him to inform the German government that if Bulgaria attacked Serbia it would be impossible for Greece to remain neutral. While still in Munich, he received a dispatch from Mr. Pachitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, begging to know what attitude Greece was to take. He replied at once that being, as he was, at a distance from Athens, he could give no official pronouncement, but that on returning to the capital he would support the following opinion: Greece must hold her forces ready to oppose Bulgaria in case she attacks Serbia; she must protect the latter against the danger of an attack in the rear and guarantee respect for the Treaty of Bucharest.

On August 2, after a meeting of the Cabinet, Mr. Venizelos addressed to Mr. Pachitch an official dispatch of which the tenor was about as follows:

> The fact that the independence and territorial integrity of Serbia constitute a capital factor of the Balkan equilibrium, created by the Treaty of Bucharest, to which Greece is resolutely attached, is enough to dictate to the Greek government the measures that it must take for the present in order to come to the aid of Serbia, a friendly and allied country, in the most effective way. The Greek government thinks that it can best fulfill its duty as friend and ally by holding itself ready to repulse every attack against Serbia on the part of Bulgaria. An immediate armed intervention by Greece would be fatal to Serbia. In fact, Greece could send only weak forces to succor

Serbia against Austria-Hungary, and besides, her situation as a belligerent state would expose Saloniki—the only route open for supplying Serbia with food and munitions—to a decisive attack. The duty of Greece is to hold her forces intact in view of a possible Bulgarian offensive that might endanger the safety of the two countries.

The same day Mr. Venizelos caused dispatches of the same purport to be sent to London, Paris, Petrograd and also (*mutatis mutandis*) to Sofia. With the clear view of a man who took in the whole political horizon, he decided without losing an instant, and made known his decision. At this moment William II, having determined to array the maximum of strength against the enemy, urged Constantine to give him his active support. He sent him several telegrams in German, attempting to dissuade him from joining in with the *Meuchelmörder* of Serbia, and warning him that if the policy of Greece was opposed to that of Germany the family relations of the king would suffer for it. Constantine I at that time resisted this pressure because his Prime Minister wished him to do so, and because he knew, from personal experience, that his imperial brother-in-law cared little for Greece. In the spring of the preceding year he had secretly sounded William II, without the knowledge of the Greek government, through the agency of Mr. Theotokis, former Prime Minister, who had been sent to Berlin to announce the accession of Constantine I. At the bidding of the king, Mr. Theotokis had asked William II if Greece could, come what might, count on the permanent friendship of Germany. At the time the emperor was unwilling to answer, but he later caused the following reply to be sent to the king through Count Quadt, his minister at Athens:

The imperial government finds itself unable to adopt the Greek point of view. The alliance which unites her to Austria-Hungary and Italy prevents her from entering into negotiations

on subjects that touch the interests of her allies. Germany regards it as her duty to second these interests without any evasion, and this duty hinders her from taking any initiative in a question that lies within the sphere of influence of her allies. Unfortunately, Germany can do nothing for Greece. All the interests of the empire push her toward states whose views do not accord with those of Hellenism.

This billet-doux was sent before the sudden attack of Bulgaria on Serbia and Greece. No matter how much of a Germano-maniac he was, Constantine must have experienced a shudder in connecting the last words of his brother-in-law's rebuff with the Bulgarian treachery of the 29th of June.

After the Treaty of Bucharest the German ill-will toward Greece persisted. In the month of January, 1914, in London, Mr. Venizelos sounded the British government as to the pressure that the great powers would have to exert upon Turkey, in order to impose upon her the decision of Europe in the matter of the islands. Sir Edward Grey replied that England would go so far as to make a naval demonstration in order to enforce respect for the decision of the Conference of London, with the distinct understanding, however, that Germany's consent should first be obtained. Germany, when sounded in her turn, " refused to co-operate or even to consent to any action against Turkey that had an avowedly unfriendly character." Nay more, she refused later to take part in what was a merely formal warning sent by the great powers to the Sublime Porte. She persisted in the same attitude throughout the whole of the Eastern crisis. In the month of April, 1914, Von Bethmann-Hollweg and Baron von Wangenheim, who accompanied William II to Corfu, declared peremptorily to Mr. Venizelos and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Streit, that Greece could not count on the help of Germany in her relations with Turkey and that if the islands were to pass under the control of Greece in con-

sequence of the weakness of Turkey, this state of things could not be regarded as permanent or definitive. According to Von Wangenheim the islands, following the natural law, would pass under the control of the master of the Asiatic coast at the time of the settlement of the Eastern Question. No political influence and certainly no Greek political influence could be admitted in the neighborhood.

Thus in what concerns Greece, Germany declared that she was inspired not only by her formal alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy, but also by a secret alliance with Turkey. At bottom she sustained the Cabinet of Enver Talaat, whose bloody accession she had helped to bring about in January, 1913. She urged him on in his policy of forcing the subject populations to embrace Mohammedanism, and to become Turks. She approved the war against the privileges of the Greek patriarchate. Far from thinking of facilitating or tolerating the dismemberment of Turkey, she tried her best to galvanize the sick man of Europe. From a military point of view she needed his aid against Russia and England; from the point of view of economical advantage she wished to keep for herself the commercial and industrial exploitation of vast regions destined to a great future. In short, she was fundamentally anti-Greek. If she had in August, 1913, voiced her opinion that the Treaty of Bucharest be not submitted to the revision of the great powers, it was not for the sake of showing herself friendly to Greece; it was in order not to offend the king of Rumania, who meant to keep what he had gained by his intervention and who had declared to his two Germanic allies that he would not stand for a Greater Bulgaria. William II had at that time soothed Austria-Hungary by promising her a fine revenge at no distant time for her last disappointments in the Balkans. Meanwhile, he had not ceased to sustain her claims in Albania and Epirus as against the interests of Greece. In all these questions,

as in that of the islands, the Cabinet at Athens found support only in the Triple Entente. In spite of certain failures the Entente had as its guiding principle that the Christian peoples under the Ottoman domination had a right to certain liberties and that if the Ottoman Empire was to be broken up in whole or in part, these peoples ought to be called upon to form independent states. On the contrary Germany was for denying these peoples any autonomous existence. The only reason she excepted Albania was because the autonomy demanded for this lawless country effectively concealed an Austrian protectorate. Prince William of Wied, appointed *bret* of Albania by the Conference of London, was simply a lackey of Vienna and Berlin. He was charged with the duty of thwarting with all his power Serbian and Greek influences.

Under these circumstances, Venizelos must have had little difficulty in the first days of August, 1914, in getting Constantine to support his views. With his habitual frankness he explained his position plainly to Count Quadt. He set forth to him that in the war which was beginning, it was inconceivable that Greece should take part against the three protecting powers whose interests were in accord with her own. Consequently, she would remain neutral as long as the Balkan equilibrium created by the Treaty of Bucharest was not compromised. In an official dispatch of the month of August, the German government recognized the soundness of the position taken by the Cabinet of Athens, and Bulgaria, since she was willing not to intervene as long as Greece guaranteed to remain neutral, kept out of the war for the time being. William II did not insist on her acting because the staff in Berlin, fully engaged with more important operations elsewhere, did not yet wish to commit itself deeply to any Balkan movement. It put into play other means.

In the second fortnight of August Mr. Venizelos in-

sisted on defining before the Entente the attitude of the government which he directed. At the very height of the German onset against France, he thought it proper to inform the Cabinets of Paris, London and Petrograd that he was in sympathy with them, and that Greece could put her forces at their disposal for future operations in the Balkans. France and England acknowledged the receipt of this offer and replied that they would take advantage of it as circumstances required. Further George V sent a telegram to King Constantine to thank him and to inform him that he had ordered the British Admiralty to come to an understanding with the Greek staff on the method of co-operation of the forces of the two countries. Constantine I replied with a friendly telegram, stating that the Greek naval staff was prepared to confer with England's representatives. This exchange of dispatches took place through Admiral Kerr as the intermediary.

At this time a significant incident took place. The Greco-Turkish conference which was to have occurred at Brussels in order to settle the differences between the two countries was transferred to Bucharest. There, Talaat Bey was not content with formulating unacceptable claims as to the islands; he strove to form a coalition of the Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks and Rumanians against Serbia. In spite of his finessing, he betrayed the game of Germany, whose cards he held. Mr. Venizelos refused downright to have anything to do with the plan, and recalled his two delegates, Messrs. Zaïmis and Politis. William II was not discouraged. Realizing that as long as Mr. Venizelos was in power, he constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the realization of his Balkan plan, he undertook with the aid of the old parties to overthrow him. Mr. Streit, Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose competence in international affairs Mr. Venizelos had thought he could utilize, never thinking of the possibility of treason on his part, became the tool of this plot

and recommended war against Serbia. Mr. Venizelos at once foiled the scheme. He requested Mr. Streit's resignation and rejected the German proposition in these words: "Greece is too small a country to commit so infamous an act." He maintained 120,000 men under arms and furnished Serbia every facility that she desired for renewing her supplies of munitions and war materials by way of Saloniki and the Vardar railroad.

Even as late as the end of autumn, 1914, the Berlin staff did not seem to have decided on action in the Balkans. There is every reason to believe that it was not in favor of the second Austro-Hungarian offensive against Serbia. But General Potiorek, who was in command of the forces of the Dual Monarchy on this front, was impatient to win his laurels. Full of contempt for the Serbians, he thought that he could easily gain the victory over them. He entered upon the campaign before the Berlin Cabinet had arranged for the co-operation of Bulgaria. Czar Ferdinand, always a deceiver, did not put his armies in movement. He pretended that he was observing an official neutrality so as not to provoke a counter-intervention on the part of Greece. But he mobilized his comitadjis, furnished them with arms and even with cannon, and permitted them to make an inroad right into Serbian territory. In December, when the Serbs were in a nearly desperate condition, the Bulgarian comitadjis invaded Serbia and blew up the bridges on the Vardar and near Zaïtchar, which formed the only routes of communication by which Serbia was connected with friendly countries. The Cabinet at Sofia washed its hands of the matter, pretending that these raiders were Macedonians. Macedonians or not, these men were armed and paid by the famous Interior Organization of Bulgaria, which was in close relations with the government and could only operate with its connivance. If Serbia, contrary to

expectation, had not by a superhuman effort recovered herself, Bulgaria would have rushed upon her so as to be in at the death. But the armies of Potiorek were finally completely defeated. They were forced back over the frontier after having been subjected to enormous losses in men and material. The Interior Organization recalled its comitadjis and Bulgaria awaited a more opportune occasion.

For fear that she might be discouraged and be tempted under the pressure of Russophiles to go over to the Entente, Germany concluded with her, in the early days of 1915 a financial arrangement complementary to the loan-contract which had been signed shortly before the war but which owing to circumstances had not been executed. The syndicate of German and Austro-Hungarian banks which had undertaken to lend five hundred million francs to Bulgaria agreed to advance to her, in exchange for treasury notes accepted at par, one hundred and fifty million francs at seven and one-half per cent., of which seventy-five millions were payable at once, and the rest at the rate of ten millions every fortnight beginning with the 14th of April. By means of these fortnightly payments Austro-Germany held in leash the Radoslavof Cabinet.

About the same time, after long delays, the Triple Entente decided to undertake against the Dardanelles a movement designed to reopen its communieations with the Black Sea and to checkmate Turkey. Desirous also of protecting Serbia against a new offensive she was eager to secure Greece's material aid, which was valuable to her for the sake of the intimidation of Bulgaria, the use of her fleet for purposes of transport and patrol and the occupation of bases of operation in the vicinity of the Dardanelles. On January 24 Sir Francis Elliot, Minister of England at Athens, communicated to Mr. Venizelos a telegram from Sir Edward Grey suggesting to Greece a concerted action in the Balkans, "in return

for very important territorial concessions on the coast of Asia Minor." At this time the Cabinet in London still cherished illusions as to Bulgaria. In spite of all that had happened, it hoped that she would yield to its solicitation and would consent to align herself on the side of the Allies. Mr. Venizelos was so captivated by the prospect of re-establishing Greece as she had once existed in Asia Minor, that he showed himself disposed to cede to Bulgaria the districts of Cavalla, Sari-Chaban and Drama (*c.*2000 square kilometers) and also not to oppose the cession to her of a part of Serbian Macedonia. He laid down conditions for this which appear to have been finally agreed upon by the council of ministers and the king. But the hostile attitude of Bulgaria and the decision of Rumania to hold off hindered the execution of this first project.* It was taken up a little later in connection with the Dardanelles expedition alone. It was on this occasion that the first clash between Mr. Venizelos and Constantine I occurred.

The Cabinets of Paris and London at that time renewed their offers as to Asia Minor, demanding in return only the co-operation of Greece against the Dardanelles. After some rather hurried negotiations, Mr. Venizelos was in a position to present a definite proposition, which was discussed March 3 and 5, in two Crown Councils in which the ex-Prime Ministers took part. According to the terms proposed and agreed to by Paris and London, the whole Greek fleet was to co-operate with the Anglo-French fleet, but the participation of the land forces was to be limited to a single division (15,000 men), the rest of the army being required to overawe Bulgaria. Many objections were made. Attention was called to the fact that the proposals came from France and England alone, and that Russia was opposed to the entrance of Greek troops into

* The detailed account of these negotiations will be found in M. Leon Maccas' book, *Ainsi parla Venizelos,* pp. 34 ff.

Constantinople. Mr. Venizelos was able to reply that Russia had given her consent, and that the Cabinets of London and Paris undertook to reconcile in matters of detail the Greek and Russian points of view. As another argument a great deal was made of the adverse opinion of the Greek staff. According to this the Dardanelles could not be forced by an isolated naval action. As a result of profound study of the question, the staff had reached the conclusion that it was necessary to land at least three divisions on the shores of the Gulf of Saros. This objection was only too well founded. But it could be countered by directly recommending to the Allies the action on land in the indicated region, a region which was, as a matter of fact, very well chosen. Difficulties as to the delimitation and administration of the territories promised in Asia Minor were also raised. Mr. Venizelos met all these arguments, and devoted himself to showing how immensely important it was for Greece to appear in the Orient at the side of the Western powers, and incidentally to assure herself a magnificent domain of 120,000 square kilometers inhabited by flourishing Greek colonies. This would in a marvelous degree supplement the present possessions of the realm and would strengthen Greece's hold on the islands. The king broke off the second session without reaching any decision, but on the following day he made known his refusal. Mr. Venizelos submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Mr. Gounaris was charged with the duty of forming a new Cabinet with power to dissolve the Chamber. He associated with himself as Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Zographos, former High Commissioner in Epirus.

Mr. Venizelos did not think it proper at this time to provoke a struggle as to the constitutionality of the king's action. In an interview granted to the correspondent of the Havas Agency (March 13, 1917) he thus justifies his course: "In February, 1915, the action

of the king might have been regarded as constitutional, at any rate, formally, for a disagreement as to policy having arisen between the king and myself, it was possible to hold the opinion that, inasmuch as the last elections dated back to three years earlier and New Greece had as yet no parliamentary representatives it was possible, I say, to hold the opinion, that it was the duty of the country to decide the point at issue. I might well regret this procedure and might even find it injurious, but I could not rebel." He did not rebel, but he immediately exposed the critical situation created by his fall. Calling to his house the deputies of the liberal party, he showed them the consequences of the decision of Constantine I. "We have let a unique opportunity escape us. The harm done is irreparable. Nothing can make things right again even supposing that our government should be recalled to power and invited to enforce the decision taken by it." When attacked later by his successor and the court, he published two communications which he had addressed to the king in the last days of the crisis. These two letters have an historical interest. With prophetic lucidity the minister explained to his sovereign that the fate of Hellenism was deeply involved in the success of the Triple Entente, and that if Austro-Germany should triumph, Bulgaria would seize all Macedonia with Saloniki included, Turkey would again take possession of the islands, Hellenism in Asia Minor would be rooted out and Greece would fall back into the stagnant condition in which she had been prior to the first Balkan war. The consequences to Greece could not possibly be more disastrous if, in alliance with the Triple Entente, she were to be defeated along with her. Her vital interests bade her take advantage of the state of war which existed between Turkey and the Entente in order to deliver the hundreds of thousands of Greeks living on the shores of Asia, to permit the 200,000 refugees of

Asia Minor to recover their homes and to double again the extent of the kingdom which had already been doubled once since 1912. "Your Majesty," said Mr. Venizelos at the end, "is in the very prime of life for creating by your sword a Greater Greece, and for firmly establishing this military exploit by a complete political reorganization of the new state. You can pass on to your heir and successor, when the hour comes, an achieved task of superhuman grandeur, such as is given few princes to consummate."

The question had been precisely put, and had been decided against the convictions of Mr. Venizelos and the general sentiment of the people. The former Prime Ministers who had been invited to attend the Crown Councils had recognized that the government was in accord with public sentiment, and Mr. Theotokis, though he was in the opposition, had declared to the king that he could not undertake to follow out his policy. We do not know to what extent Constantine I was then committed to William II. He could hardly at this early date appeal as an excuse to the danger of Greece's being crushed. The Russians were still in the Carpathians and Przemysl, completely invested, was to surrender a few weeks later. Negotiations were being carried on to bring about the intervention of Italy. At all events, during the Gounaris ministry negotiations between Athens and the Entente were again taken up and Mr. Zographos did not cease to affirm his friendly feelings toward the protecting powers. On April 14, in reply to a request of April 10 that Greece should participate in the war against Turkey, he proposed that Greece should give military aid on condition that the Entente would guarantee the continental and insular integrity of Greece during the war and for a certain time afterward, that a naval and military agreement between the staffs should govern the conditions under which they should operate and that a treaty should fix the extent of the territorial

concessions promised in Asia Minor. It would have to be understood that the definitive object of the war was to be the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Were these proposals made in good faith? It would be bold to affirm it. In any case, they deserved to be taken into serious consideration. They contained no unacceptable demand. The clause about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire raised, it seems, some anxiety. It was, however, very natural that the Greek government should wish to protect itself against a spurious solution which would have left her, at the peace convention, face to face with a Turkey eager for revenge. If the diplomats of western Europe took fright at the vista thus opened before them, it was because they had a less clear comprehension than the Orientals of the elements of this distinctly Oriental question. The guarantee of territorial integrity was clearly due. It was this, however, that seems to have hindered the negotiations from coming to a head. Still possessed with the idea of winning over Bulgaria, the diplomats of the Entente wanted to keep it in their power to offer to her eastern Macedonia and Serbian Macedonia. They permitted the proposals of the 14th of April to fall through, and this decided Mr. Gounaris' career. This politician, ambitious to become a party leader, would have been flattered to direct an intervention policy and to substitute himself for Mr. Venizelos. Repulsed by the Entente, he turned toward the pro-Germans and created an anti-Venizelist party. He proceeded to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, headed a furious campaign against the Venizelist candidates, bound his ministers to the king in a real solidarity, and proclaimed to the electors that they would have to choose between the policy of Mr. Venizelos and that of the king. Constantine, being seriously ill, interfered neither with his words nor his deeds. His protracted illness gave him, free as he was, by virtue of the Constitution, from any

personal responsibility, a convenient excuse for not breaking away from a shameful campaign.

The general elections of the 13th of June gave the Venizelists 184 seats as against 130 for the Gounarists. This was not a crushing majority, but the districts of the Greece of the time before 1912 had supported him almost in their totality. The Gounarist successes, on the other hand, had been won in New Greece, especially by Mohammedan and Jewish candidates. This was due to an intense pressure which was easily exerted by the government on heterogeneous populations which had been freed from the Turkish domination only three years before. The liberal party thus issued victorious from a very difficult test. Parliamentary custom required that Mr. Gounaris should retire and that Mr. Venizelos should be recalled to power. Nothing of the sort took place. Mr. Gounaris did not budge, and the king did not ask him to resign his place to the victor. The ministerial press continued with impunity to calumniate Mr. Venizelos. The calling together of the new Chamber was postponed under the pretext of the king's illness. If any doubt existed in the month of March as to the sentiments of Constantine I, such doubt could no longer exist in the month of July. His attitude can be explained only by his desire to resist the wishes of the people and by his faith in the victory of Germany.

It was probably in the month of July that the pact was made between the brothers-in-law. At this time, the Russians had been thrown back from the Carpathians and the Italian offensive had been stopped. The staff in Berlin had resolved to destroy Serbia. William II informed Constantine I that he was about to attack the Serbians with 400,000 men, that Bulgaria was in accord with him, and that he counted on Greece's remaining neutral. This notification was accompanied by a threat in case he was disobeyed and by a promise guaranteeing

the territorial integrity of Greece if Constantine followed his advice. The king yielded. His staff, which, up to that time, had shown itself hostile to Bulgaria, was willing to be convinced that, after all, they might just as well come to terms with her at the expense of Serbia; the main thing was to protect themselves against the Slav peril, springing from the union of two Slav neighbors; it made very little difference which of the two was crushed, provided one of them was put out of the way. This reasoning was fundamentally wrong, in view of the fact that Serbia desired no Greek territory, while Bulgaria wished to annex eastern Macedonia. Unfortunately, at this very time, in a note dated August 3, the Triple Entente demanded of the Cabinet in Athens that Greece should consent under certain conditions to cede eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria in order to permit the reconstruction of the Balkan confederation. This false step at such a critical time had deadly results. It cast into the shade the distant Bulgarian peril and brought into high relief the immediate sacrifices that were demanded. There was, it is true, no comparison between the extent of the districts that Bulgaria coveted and that of the districts which the Entente wanted Greece and Serbia to cede. But William II assumed responsibility towards Greece for the behavior of Bulgaria, which was moreover to be so generously compensated by her gains in Serbia that she would not claim anything elsewhere. This was without doubt an idle guarantee, but in the eyes of courtiers and intriguers it was quite enough to protect a sovereign and ministers who were disposed to permit themselves to be convinced.*

* Germany's bad faith in the matter seems established by the publication (October 9, 1915) in the Venizelist newspapers *Patris* and *Hestia* of a Germano-Bulgarian treaty dating from the previous July 17. This treaty, concluded at Sofia, gave Bulgaria all Albania, all New Serbia, Monastir, Gucvgheli, Doïran, Cavalla, Seres, Florina and Castoria. The tenor of this document was said to have been communicated by the English Legation in Athens. The German Legation denied its authenticity. But, on the other hand, it was maintained that the information was exact. If this is the case, we may well ask how England, knowing of this treaty, could have kept up her negotiations with Bulgaria until the beginning of October, 1915.

In the interview mentioned above, Mr. Venizelos estimates the importance of the incident as follows:

> Between the elections and my return to the leadership of the government an important event had happened. The protecting powers had proposed to Greece to cede eastern Macedonia to Bulgaria. This proposition, apart from the fact that it did not satisfy Bulgarian ambitions, as was seen by what followed, was treacherously exploited by the pro-German propaganda and helped the cause of the royalists, who at once took the stand that Greece's territorial integrity must at all costs be maintained. I do not exaggerate when I say that if it had not been for this step the king would never have dared to repudiate the obligations imposed upon us by our treaty with Serbia. You ask me whether all this is simply an impression of mine. It is more than this; it is an absolute certainty based on facts and documents of which I had cognizance at that time. Further, it was only three or four weeks later that Mr. Gounaris let Rumania know that in case of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, Greece would not go to the assistance of her ally.

One thing brought on another. The failure of the Greek government carried with it that of the Rumanian government. Although it was even more to Rumania's interest than to Greece's not to let Serbia be crushed, because this put her vital communications and consequently her very existence at the mercy of Germany, she committed the same sin, the same crime against herself.

It was under these circumstances that the king recalled Mr. Venizelos to power without making him aware of his personal dealings with his brother-in-law. Some days later Bulgaria signed a treaty with Turkey by which the latter allowed her a very appreciable improvement of her frontiers, in particular at the very gates of Adrianople. This agreement was the counterpart of the one that followed the Treaty of Bucharest. It indicated that the time to act had come. The Turks had no notion of dispossessing themselves of valuable territories, without the certainty of material aid against the holders of Chios and Mitylene. Instead of determining the

Allies to take energetic precautions against Bulgaria, this arrangement moved them to show themselves more generous toward her. On the 14th of September, after long and painful pressure upon Serbia, they offered Bulgaria the spoils of Macedonia. Those were gloomy days for Mr. Pachitch and Mr. Venizelos. Yielding to the insistence of the Entente the latter resigned himself to Serbia's cession of Monastir to Bulgaria on condition that Albania should be divided between Greece and Serbia in such a way that these two countries should have a common frontier. Bulgaria answered by decreeing a general mobilization. Some Western Europeans suggested that this mobilization might perhaps be directed against Turkey; their blindness bordered on insanity. A man like Mr. Venizelos could not be deceived even for an instant. He submitted to the king and made him sign a decree ordering the mobilization of the Greek army (September 23).

Was harmony between minister and sovereign to be once more established? Mere spectators might have supposed this to be the case, for the evidence of the nation's peril was before all eyes. People who had been initiated into the ways of the Greek court were not so sanguine. They suspected that the pro-Germans had advocated the general mobilization so that the men under arms might be prevented from making any manifestations in Venizelos' favor and from supporting him by force in case a new disagreement with the monarch should cause his removal. This explanation seems too complicated to be right. At any rate, it was not to the taste of Bulgaria. When he learned the news of the Greek mobilization, Mr. Radoslavof made a scene before William II's minister: "You have cheated us," he cried, and launched into reproaches. William II was deeply interested in safeguarding his reputation and his interests. With furious intensity he put into operation every means that he had of influencing Constantine I.

The Gounarists who had lost their positions, the former ministers who were in retirement, such as Mr. Streit, the staff officers imbued with the spirit of the Kriegsakademie, the snobs of the court and the people who were paid salaries by the German propaganda, joined with Queen Sophie and the king's brothers against Mr. Venizelos. This statesman who sought only the good of his country was a thorn in the flesh of all these people. The pressure of the Entente in the opposite direction was insignificant, formal and uncoördinated.

On the 29th of September the new Chamber met. Mr. Venizelos set forth the situation in the most gloomy light. However, since Bulgaria still pretended at this time that her mobilization had as its only object an armed neutrality, he contented himself with declaring that he returned to his earlier program as thus formulated. "The government is held by the obligations imposed upon it by its alliance with one of the belligerents, Serbia, and is determined to fulfill these obligations if the *casus foederis* arises." Mr. Gounaris maintained that the mobilization ought to serve only to protect the vital interests of the country, to the exclusion of any obligation imposed upon the country by the treaty of alliance with Serbia. On the 3d of October Russia, at last undeceived, called upon the Bulgarian government "openly to break inside of twenty-four hours with the enemies of the Slav cause and Russia" and to proceed at once to the discharge of officers belonging to the armies of states which were at war with the powers forming the Entente.

On October 4 the Greek Chamber held an exciting session, which was prolonged far into the night. The former leaders, Messrs. Dragoumis, Rhallis, Theotokis and Gounaris, made violent attacks on the Cabinet in connection with the dealings with Bulgaria. Taking advantage of a speech of the 28th of September, in which Sir Edward Grey, while threatening the Bul-

garians, again made proposals to them, they claimed that the Entente was manipulating things so as to renew negotiations at the cost of Greece. Mr. Venizelos replied that formal and official assurances had been given him that the promises concerning concessions to Bulgaria, even those on the part of Serbia, could be considered from now on as having lapsed. He added, "I am really convinced that if latterly there had not existed in Bulgaria a misunderstanding as to our policy, a misunderstanding due perhaps to the fact that in the last days of the government of the Hon. Mr. Gounaris, the ideas of the government underwent a certain alteration or a certain unsettling, if, I say, Bulgaria had not found herself misled as to the declarations of Greece touching this question, I have reason to believe that she would not have decided to mobilize, thus running the risk of lighting a conflagration in the Balkans." This was a thrust delivered straight at Mr. Gounaris. The former Prime Minister recoiled and dodged. When pressed by his successor, he did not dare to deny that a change of the nature indicated had taken place in the last days of his ministry. His connivance with Germany was thus clearly established. As it was only in accord with the king that he had acted, the conflict between the crown and the government became inevitable.

This came about *à propos* of the *casus foederis.* Mr. Venizelos declared categorically that Greece was bound to succor Serbia in virtue of the treaty of June 3, 1913, which had been concluded for a period of ten years. As to this point, I quote here the extract from the official record of the session:

> At this time I no longer regard myself as justified in concealing from the representatives of the country and the country itself the fact that our treaty of alliance with Serbia is a general defensive treaty, on the basis of which each of the states binds itself to aid the other if one of them, without provocation on its part, is attacked by a third.

Mr. Popp.—By any third whatsoever?

Mr. Venizelos.—There is no "whatsoever"; the word is "third"! It was on the basis of this treaty, gentlemen, that when in May, 1914, our relations with the Ottoman Empire reached an acute stage, we addressed ourselves to Serbia, explaining to her the motives on account of which we were about to face a new war against Turkey, a war which we regarded as defensive, even though we were the first to attack, because the provocations on the other side had become intolerable. It was on this basis, I say, that we turned to Serbia to invoke her aid in case, during the war, we should be attacked by another state.

The Prime Minister might have stopped at that point. But consistently with his character and perhaps also to anticipate by a formal vote of the deputies the resistance that he foresaw on the part of the king, he tackled at once the eventuality of hostilities with the Central Powers. His words were these:

I certainly do not propose to you that we should declare war on Germany and Austria; but, gentlemen, if, in putting into execution our national program, if, while discharging what is for us a debt of honor, while fulfilling our duties as Allies, while defending the vital interests of the state, we find ourselves brought face to face with powerful nations, I am certain that, while expressing our regrets, we shall do our duty. [Applause!]

Before the manifest danger that comes on us from the north, threatening to rob us of what we have gained in the course of the last two wars, I should have proved myself irresolute and cowardly in not hastening to take such decisions as duty, honor and the highest interest impose on the nation. [Prolonged applause!]

After a passionate debate, these declarations were approved by the Chamber by 147 votes out of 257. If we add the nine ministers who abstained from voting, the effective majority was forty-six votes. This was not enormous, but if we take into account the conditions under which the dissolution of the Chamber and the new elections had taken place, and the vehemence of the debates, the majority was large. It would certainly

have approached being unanimous, if there had not been a feeling that the king was behind Mr. Gounaris. So the king's intrigue against Mr. Venizelos had failed. Constantine I ought to have recognized this. He could have cleared himself in the sight of his accomplices in Berlin by saying that he had done for them all that he could, but that being a constitutional sovereign he was absolutely prevented from going any farther. Now, Constantine, in lack of other qualities, is obstinate. He decided to override the vote of the Chamber. Making a pretext of the allusion to hostilities against the Central Powers, of which apparently there had been no mention in the Council of the Ministers held before the session, he informed Mr. Venizelos that he had gone beyond his rights and demanded his resignation. It was the plainest possible avowal of secret agreements with Germany. The king would never have dared to decide on such a stroke if his personal obligations had not run counter to the fulfillment of his duty as a constitutional sovereign. He gave the preference to the former. The minister thus affronted might have resisted, but he preferred to yield.

These two decisions of the 5th of October, 1915, were responsible for tremendous consequences. That of the king is not to be justified or excused from any point of view. It was a violation of his oath of accession, and it constituted an act of treason to the country. The soundness of the minister's decision is open to question. The Greeks of future ages will perhaps excite themselves about this as those of past ages have turned over again and again the question as to what would have happened if Alexander the Great had not died prematurely. What would have happened if Mr. Venizelos had kept the power in spite of Constantine I? Naturally this will never be known. Mr. Venizelos has developed at length the reasons for his docility in his

interview of the 13th of last May. He affirms that, left as he was to his own resources, he could not have resisted the king effectively; not being able to count on the support of the army, whose officers were for the most part devoted to the sovereign, he would have provoked the annihilation of the liberal party if civil war had broken out. These attempts at self-justification show as much as anything can that the old Cretan revolutionary had developed, that he had become more inclined to counsels of reflection than to the daring of inspiration, and that he counted more on time than on force. They show also that if Mr. Venizelos had not been left to his own resources, he could have triumphed over the king.

Since his second dismissal, Mr. Venizelos has not indulged in any recriminations against the three protecting powers. He has climbed his Calvary without a word of complaint. He is sustained by an invincible patriotic faith. His hope is in the reparations of the future. But the responsibilities of France, England and Russia are none the less great. During an entire year the three Allied Cabinets had meddled in Balkan affairs only to muddle them. They had permitted Turkey to give refuge to the German warships, to close the Dardanelles to commerce and to organize the defense of the straits through the agency of German officers who replaced those of the British naval mission. Then when their friends in Constantinople tricked them, they had been hard put to it to stir up enemies against them. Instead of forming once more against Turkey the league that had in 1913 been so successful against Bulgaria, who was now Turkey's ally, they had persistently offered to Bulgaria the territories of members of this league, especially of Serbia, their ally in fact, and of Greece, their prospective ally. They had compromised the warmest and surest friend that they had in Greece and when this friend, whose support was indispensable to them in the realization of their plans, was attacked by

his sovereign, they deserted him. At the moment when the Anglo-French troops were landing at Saloniki to hasten to the defense of Serbia, France and England suffered the minister who had invited them there to be driven out, and left the fate of the expeditionary force in the hands of a sovereign who had perjured himself. What a strange aberration, and how imprudent!

It was during these early days of October that the fate of Greece and of the Saloniki expedition hung in the balance. The two questions were bound up together. From the 23d of September, the date of the publication of the decree authorizing the Greek mobilization, Mr. Venizelos had requested from the ministers of England and France the dispatch of 150,000 troops intended to replace the same number of troops which Serbia, according to the terms of the treaty of June 3, 1913, had been expected to put in line on her southern frontier in order to benefit by the *casus foederis*. The Cabinets of London and Paris had agreed. Desirous of making amends for their previous errors, they had actively taken the necessary executive measures. Constantine I had sought to avoid responsibility, and Mr. Venizelos on October 2 had had to address a purely formal protest * to M. Guillemin, who had just notified him of the prospective arrival at Saloniki of a first contingent of French troops. The debarkation began October 5, at 3 P.M.† Mr. Venizelos had handed in his resignation at one o'clock. Is it conceivable that at such a critical moment the Cabinets of London and Paris and their representatives at Athens, forewarned of the hostile intentions of the king, should not have made every effort to minimize their effect? It was of no use to organize a military expedition, if measures were not taken to assure it a friendly reception and free play in the country which was to serve as its

* "To preserve neutrality up to the time when the *casus foederis* should present itself."

† On October 5 at Karaboroun, and on October 13 at Saloniki.

base of operations. The whole arrangement presupposed, if not the active co-operation of the Greek army, at least the political support of Greece. That being so, how could the originators of the enterprise sit quietly by with their arms folded when Mr. Venizelos was dismissed? If the Cabinets of Paris and of London had acted as energetically as that of Berlin, Mr. Venizelos would have found in their support the strength necessary to checkmate the king. They alleged that they had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of a foreign state. This excuse, which the official organs repeated *ad nauseam,* is a wretchedly poor one.

The excuse would not have amounted to anything, even if England, France and Russia had not been bound to Greece by a treaty. As it was, the Greek ministry had just come through general elections which had given it an imposing majority, after a campaign in which its opponents, at that time in power, had taken neutrality as their program and the name of the king for their party-emblem. The country, solemnly consulted by means of a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, had declared itself in favor of political accord with the Triple Entente as against the policy of Mr. Gounaris and the king. According to the Constitution, the government ought to be freely administered by the leader of the victorious party. In once more dismissing this leader from power for the identical reason that had determined his first discharge, the king became guilty of an unfriendly act toward the Entente. He at one and the same time deliberately rebelled against the Constitution and antagonized the three powers who possessed the declared sympathy of the country. These powers found themselves, therefore, quite legitimately on the defensive against the king.

But they possessed another right. In virtue of the treaties of July 6, 1827, February 3, 1830, May 7, 1832, July 13, 1863, and March 29, 1864, they had been made

"protecting powers of Greece," sureties for her independence and her constitution. The treaty of 1863 was especially in point. It had been concluded after the decree of forfeiture had been pronounced against King Otho on account of his misgovernment and anti-constitutional attitude, and had stipulated that the three powers were calling to the Greek throne Prince William of Denmark (George I) in order to realize the wishes of the Greek nation. Article III was thus conceived: "Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the guarantee of the three courts, forms a monarchical, independent, constitutional state." Article X established for the new king a personal endowment consisting of the sum-total of the credits on the Greek treasury which each one of the three courts therewith resigned. In accordance with Article XI the three courts were to see to it that Prince William was recognized as king of the Greeks by all the sovereigns and states with which they were in relations. Never was the right of intervention better established.

In the first days of October, 1915, Constantine I had not yet committed that series of acts outraging the independence and Constitution of Greece which characterized the following eighteen months, but all these acts were latent in the decision of the 5th of October. It was evident that if the king discharged the minister whose policy the electors and the Chamber of Deputies, acting in full cognizance of the case, had just approved, it was done to inaugurate with all its consequences the absolutist régime, which had been repudiated by the treaty of 1863. On ascending the throne Constantine I had pronounced the following oath before the representatives of the people: "I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity, consubstantial and indivisible, to protect the dominant religion of the Greeks, to observe the Constitution and the laws of the Greek nation and to preserve and defend the national independence and integrity

of the Greek state." On the 5th of October he had broken this oath. He had abused the country and its legal representatives. He had compromised the national independence and integrity of the state. Were the protecting powers to delay protesting till the country was crushed under foot, till its independence was suppressed and its integrity violated? It was not only their right but their duty to intervene immediately between the people and the king. Their inertia was in great part the cause of the catastrophies that followed.

Some authorities have claimed that Constantine's *coup-d'état* ought to have determined France and England to abandon the Saloniki expedition rather than to attempt to break down the resistance of the king. This is strange reasoning. These two powers, in accord with Russia, had thought it necessary to go to the rescue of Serbia, their common ally, making use of the territory and the help of Greece, which was also in alliance with Serbia. The treachery of Constantine I rendered this help even more necessary and more urgent. Instead of changing their plan the guaranteeing powers ought to have followed out its execution with redoubled energy. By lowering their flag before the king, by withdrawing from Saloniki the troops that had just arrived, by abandoning Serbia, they would have covered themselves with shame. Furthermore, they would have abandoned all the Orient with its resources and its coasts to Austro-Germany. Right soon they would have been unable to maintain their commerce in the eastern Mediterranean and through the Suez Canal. They knew it. Unfortunately they lacked reasoning power and conscience. They abandoned the Greek people to a despot and trusted to luck.

PART II

No sooner had Mr. Venizelos been dismissed by the king than the three protecting powers became aware of the consequences of their inaction at the time of the *coup-d'état* of Constantine I. It was no longer a question of the participation of Greece in the hostilities against the Central Powers, but of the execution of the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece. The king had demanded the resignation of Mr. Venizelos on the pretext that as president of the Council of Ministers he had brought Germany and Austria into the case, without being authorized to do so. But the Greco-Serbian treaty subsisted as an indivisible whole, the Chamber had called for its fulfillment and the new government ought to have conformed to the obligations assumed toward Greece's ally and to the express commands of the Chamber. This was so clear that Mr. Zaïmis, the new Prime Minister, did not dare at first to take his stand against it. In appearing before the Chamber on October 11, he did not repudiate Greece's obligations toward Serbia. He simply reserved for himself the power to adapt the policy of Greece to events, "in order better to assure the vital interests of the nation." He even declared that his policy "rested on the same basis as the policy followed by Greece since the beginning of the European war." He said not a word of what he would do if Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria. In fact, he permitted the allies of Serbia to transport their troops over Greek territory in order to help the armies of King Peter. Mr. Venizelos, therefore, did not regard it as his duty to break at once with his successor. He maintained that he did not want to cast the country into internal difficulties and promised to give his support to the government "just

so long as it did not overturn the fundamental principles of the Venizelist policy."

Thus this œcumenical ministry * could take its place without any opposition and get possession of all the instruments of power without difficulty. On his part the king had a free field for carrying on his negotiations. Thanks to the extreme scrupulousness of Mr. Venizelos and the inertia of the Triple Entente, he cleared without accident the dangerous part of the road which led him toward a dictatorship. From that time he had no need to worry. Master of the staff and the army, freed from all control, he felt himself in a position to resist all parliamentary or constitutional pressure. Furthermore, his prestige was increased by the very success of his authority as exerted. His praises were sung in a tone almost of adoration by a chorus of journalists richly paid by the propaganda of Baron Schenk. Mr. Zaïmis could then, without provoking a new crisis, reject outright the obligation to help Serbia. On the day but one after the session in which Mr. Venizelos had accorded him a provisional parliamentary support, that is, on the 13th of October, he notified Mr. Pachitch that the Greco-Serbian treaty had in view exclusively the hypothesis of an attack by Bulgaria alone, and that owing to the lining up of Germany and Austria-Hungary against Serbia, the treaty no longer applied.

This interpretation, contrary to the actual provisions of the treaty, which established no such distinction, was insulting not only to the Chamber which had expressed the opposite opinion but also to Serbia and to the protecting powers, her allies. The Cabinet of Pachitch drank the bitter cup to the dregs without any recriminations. Probably in the hope that friendly relations with Greece would be resumed later, and in the desire

* The ministry was thus christened by public opinion because it comprised five former Prime Ministers—Messrs. Zaïmis, Theotokis, Dragoumis, Rhallis and Gounaris.

not to offend a state whose position on her southern border was of great value to her, Serbia did not break off diplomatic relations with the perjured government. It did not even publish the text of the treaty, the divulgation of which would have exposed the bad faith of the Cabinet of Athens. As for the protecting powers, they flattered themselves that they could win back Constantine I by offering new advantages to him. England offered him as the price of aiding Serbia the cession of the island of Cyprus, which she had held since 1878 in virtue of the treaty concluded June 4 of that year with Turkey. At other times the prospect of acquiring Cyprus, that large island with 285,000 inhabitants of whom 235,000 are Greeks, would have roused the enthusiastic approbation of Greece. Sir Edward Grey in all probability imagined that this would either suffice to bring the king back to their side, or would at least permit public opinion to exert upon him a decisive pressure. He had not correctly estimated the full extent of the damage done by the Entente's weak policy and the success of the German propaganda. Mr. Zaïmis refused in a disdainful way this unexpected gift, which was subject only to the condition that Greece should give military aid to Serbia regardless of what the issue of the war might be. In a note of October 22 to the Cabinet in London he declared that the Austro-German attack released Greece from the obligation to interfere by force of arms, since the treaty of 1913 had had exclusively in view a Balkan war. This refusal is virtually a proof in black and white of the connivance of Constantine I with Germany. That the Greek government did not eagerly jump at the chance to incorporate in its realm such a valuable island as Cyprus must be due to the fact that it had other more alluring promises. According to men in the confidence of Mr. Venizelos *

* Interview with Mr. Diomedis, former minister, in the *Gazette de Lausanne*, June 6, 1917.

these promises consisted of an extension of Greek territory in Albania, of the annexation of the Cyclades and of the island of Cyprus. Now, although the fate of Albania depended in some measure on Austria-Germany, that of the Cyclades and of Cyprus depended on the great maritime powers. These would require to have been destroyed, therefore, before the promise of William II could have been fulfilled. But Constantine's faith in the victory of Germany was so strong that he preferred the emperor's two birds in the bush to England's bird in the hand. Without troubling themselves further about the consequences of this situation, France and England pursued in Macedonia the task imposed on them by circumstances.

The Greek Chamber of Deputies, however, took offense almost immediately. The new Minister of War, General Yannakitsas, acted in a way so lacking in respect toward the Chamber that Mr. Venizelos provoked a political debate in the course of which he delivered two great speeches (sitting of the 3d of November, prolonged till 4 A.M. of the 4th). General Yannakitsas having refused to express his regrets, and the Cabinet having rallied to his support in spite of the adverse vote of three of its members, Mr. Venizelos raised the question of a vote of confidence in the government. Unmasking the ministry, he denounced the unconstitutional nature of its power. He maintained that the Greek constitutional monarchy was a republic with a king at its head. As the name of the king had thus been mentioned he explained his position as to the sovereign's intervention in the following words:

> I admit as justifiable a disagreement between the Crown and the responsible government when the Crown believes that the latter is not in harmony with the opinion of the people. It was under such conditions that in February, 1915, the change in our policy was made. It was in this spirit that the Crown and the government disagreed in February. But this disagree-

ment was decisively ended by the vote of the people. If you think that the Crown is excusable, according to the spirit of our parliamentary régime, for disregarding this will as expressed by the people in their free elections, free at any rate as far as the manner in which the opposition carried on the contest is concerned, though not free in view of the means employed by the government; if you believe, I say, that the Crown has the right, after appeal has been made to the people and the people has expressed its will, not to follow this expressed will of the people but to proceed to a new dissolution in order to demand the so-called verdict of the people again and again, then this means that you admit that the liberal régime in Greece, under which we have lived for a half-century, has become worse than a scrap of paper, the term which has been used by some people to describe international treaties.

Messrs. Gounaris and Theotokis undertook then to show that the schemes of Mr. Venizelos were leading Greece to her ruin and that the *casus foederis* with Serbia was not applicable. As this was the last sitting of the Chamber and therefore gave Mr. Venizelos his last chance to defend his policy before the legally constituted representatives of the country, it is interesting to reproduce several extracts from his speech which have a historical importance and of which the dispatches from Athens gave at that time an incomplete and obscure analysis. In reply to the charge of having been willing to concede to Bulgaria at the beginning of 1915 the districts of Drama, Cavalla and Seres, he gives the following explanation:

It was a question only of the three districts of Cavalla, Drama and Sari-Chaban, that is to say, of an area of about 2,000 square kilometers. I proposed the cession of these three districts on the following conditions and presuppositions: First: that we should receive the districts of Doïran and of Guevgheli, with an area of 1,000-1,200 square kilometers,—that is, of an extent equaling about half of the territory to be ceded in eastern Macedonia. From the point of view of richness, they were certainly inferior in value, but from a strategical point of view they are of far greater value. Further, our concessions to Bulgaria were made

not in order to purchase Bulgaria's neutrality but to enlist her active help against Turkey, so that she might attack Turkey from Thrace while we would make our attack from the Asia Minor side, thus making the destruction of the Ottoman Empire more rapid.

Further, we were ceding the 2,000 square kilometers on condition that the powers of the Entente should recognize that the vast territorial concessions which they had promised us should have the extent that I outlined in my second communication to the king. . . . If you wish to know the probable area which the cession of Smyrna and the principal part of its hinterland would carry with it, you must take into account that the Hermos and Meander rivers naturally belong to this hinterland and that their valleys reach 275 kilometers into the interior of Asia Minor.

Further, I demanded the appointment of an international commission which would have proceeded to an exchange of populations as soon as the boundaries of Greece and Bulgaria had been definitely traced. Bulgaria, moreover, would have bought the property of such inhabitants of the ceded regions as might have preferred to emigrate to the New Greece, the Greater Greece, which my policy would have created, this policy that you have not followed.

Mr. Theotokis cannot rightfully say, because we were at that time disposed to cede Cavalla and Sari-Chaban, that "a man must be blind not to understand that Bulgaria, if she had received these regions as well as all the Serbian possessions in Macedonia, would have become colossally powerful and dangerous to our existence." For Bulgaria would have received from Serbia only the non-contested zone which was to have reverted to her by the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty concluded before the war.

This non-contested zone had an extent of about 10,000 square kilometers. This, added to the 2,000 square kilometers that we would have ceded in eastern Macedonia and the 14,000 square kilometers that she would have received in Thrace by the rectification of the Enos-Midia line, would have made an increase of about 25,000 square kilometers; she would have had then a total area of 140,000 square kilometers. How can you then maintain that this Bulgaria could have been dangerous as ever against a Greece which by her increases of territory in Asia Minor would have had an area of 250,000 square kilometers?

As to the Greco-Serbian treaty, Mr. Venizelos declared that far from having been unwilling to apply it

at the beginning of the war, as his opponents contended, he had eome to an agreement with the Cabinet in Belgrade on this point in the month of August, 1914. He affirmed that it was equally inexaet to say that Serbia in similar cireumstanees (in May, 1914) had refused her aid to Greece.* Passing on, then, to the question of the contingent of 150,000 men that Serbia was bound, by the terms of the treaty, to put in array against Bulgaria in order that the *casus foederis* should eome into play, Mr. Venizelos made these two points: 1—Franee and England had promised to send 150,000 men to take the plaee of the Serbian eontingent; 2—Serbia had herself put in line 120,000 men against Bulgaria, so that taking into aeeount what Serbia alone had done, she lacked only 30,000 men of having fulfilled the stipulation of the treaty. Finally, leaving out of aecount the interpretation of the treaty, Mr. Venizelos undertook to prove that, treaty or no treaty, Greeee ought to hasten to the aid of Serbia.

Mr. Theotokis thinks that the salvation of Greece is to come from the Central Powers. I say to him, with the deepest conviction, that Greece not only cannot grow, but that she cannot even continue to exist within her present confines, if she finds herself opposed to the powers that control the sea. . . . I am justified in telling you to-day that you do not see clearly if you maintain that in case Serbia should be destroyed and Bulgaria should occupy a large part of her territories, it will be easy, regardless of the final result of the war, to dislodge her from the territories that she will have seized. Do you believe that at the close of the European war the peoples that have taken part in this exhausting struggle will for an instant permit their governments to mark the signing of the peace by beginning a new war, a war against Bulgaria to compel her to withdraw her armies from the regions that she claims? I repeat once more that in pursuing your policy you are making sure of only one thing: the creation of a greater Bulgaria which before we shall

* Later, in his weekly journal, the *Keryx*, Mr. Venizelos told how Mr. Pachitch in May, 1914, had informed the Porte that if war broke out between her and Greece, Serbia would not remain indifferent.

have celebrated the centennial of our independence will rush upon us, weakened militarily and without friends and allies.

Next, Mr. Venizelos compared the two Greeces that were thus in conflict:

We have the former world of Greece represented by the new Cabinet and the new world of Greece, the world of the time following the revolution of 1909, represented by the liberal party. The old conception, which the present Cabinet represents, is that which believed that Greece could not produce an army of more than 60,000 men; it is that which believed that Greece could never contract an alliance that would help her to realize her national aspirations; it is the Greece whose views about our national aspirations were nebulous, and as undecided as they were indefinite; it is the Greece whose preparations were as insignificant as its aspirations were magnificent. We did not then realize how far our just and legitimate aspirations might extend. We let them reach so far oftentimes that statesmen who were content with extending them only as far as Kroussovo were accused by us of betraying the rights of Hellenism.

It is, then, natural that to-day too, when once more circumstances analogous to those of 1912 present themselves, it is natural, I say, that our political conceptions should be as far removed from each other as are the poles. Now as then, you do not wish a war which necessitates the help of allies, and when I tell you that the cup has not been finally taken from you, that it will be brought again to your lips that you may drink it to the dregs, you say, "Well, it is your fault, for having brought us as far as the Nestos." * [Applause.]

Do you not think, then, gentlemen, that the New Greece is justified in saying to the Old Greece: "In the presence of the great difficulties which are before us, you ought once more to step aside and to give place to the New Greece which has the courage necessary to meet the new situation." [Shouts of "Bravo!" and prolonged applause.]

By 147 votes against 114, with three blank ballots, the Chamber adopted the program of the liberal party, judging the declarations of the government unsatisfactory and censuring the conduct of the Minister of War.

* The river Mesta, which empties into the sea in the district of Cavalla.

The first move of the king was to appoint General Yannakitsas his aide-de-camp. Then he accepted the resignation of Mr. Zaïmis and charged with the formation of the new Cabinet a Mr. Scouloudis, an octogenarian who had served in the ministry only once, and then for but five months, when in 1897 he had been minister with the portfolio of foreign affairs in Mr. Rallis' Cabinet. Mr. Scouloudis took this portfolio once more into his own hands and retained most of the members of Mr. Zaïmis' Cabinet, including Mr. Gounaris and General Yannakitsas. The only new colleague whose co-operation he secured was Mr. Michelidakis, a Cretan, and an obstinate rival of Mr. Venizelos. This series of acts constituted a declaration of war on the Chamber, the liberal party and Mr. Venizelos. It was followed by a decree of dissolution of the Chamber. In one month Greece had reached the last stage on the road toward absolutism.

The royalists concealed the sinister aspects of this evolution as well as they could. According to their views the Constitution conferred on the king, without any limitation, the power to dismiss his ministers and to dissolve the Chamber. Consequently Constantine I kept within the limits of the Constitution in changing his ministers and dissolving the Chamber as often as he thought necessary. In fact, the Greek Constitution contained no reservations as to the exercise of the power to dismiss ministers or to dissolve the Chamber. But this is the case generally in all parliamentary governments. Custom corrects textual omissions. No text can settle in advance all the clashes that may possibly arise between the different branches of the government. If the power to change the Cabinet and to dissolve Parliament were actually unlimited, a constitutional régime would be equivalent to a government at the king's good pleasure. In the last resort, it is the people who decide; that is to say, when the sovereign makes use of his pre-

rogatives in a way that is obviously contrary to the spirit of the government the people makes known its will by effective measures. This had been done in Greece in 1863, as in France in 1830. Nothing of the sort took place at Athens in November, 1915, because the leader of the majority did not wish it and the protecting powers did not encourage it. In November the difficulty of triumphing over the king was greater than in October. The leader of the last legitimate government no longer controlled any of the elements of public power; they were all in the hands of his opponents. It was then only logical that, having yielded in October, he should yield again in November. In politics events are irresistibly linked up one with another.

The same logic compelled the three protecting powers to trust the formal protestations of friendship made by the king and his ministers. Mr. Scouloudis certainly did his duty along this line. In a note of November 9, addressed to the Entente Powers, he gave them "the most formal assurances of his firm resolve to continue a most sincerely benevolent neutrality" toward them. "The new Cabinet," he added, "adopts as its own the declarations of Mr. Zaïmis as to the attitude of the royal government in its relation to the Allied troops in Saloniki. It is too fully conscious of the true interests of the country and of what it owes to the protecting powers to depart in the slightest degree from this line of conduct." At the same time the confidential representatives of Constantine I in the capitals of the Entente were telling all who were willing to listen to them that the king had been misjudged, and that from now on all that was needed to establish the most perfect harmony between the court of Athens and the Entente was to rid him of Mr. Venizelos. It was on the basis of these fair words that the Anglo-French force that had landed at Saloniki a month earlier began operations in Macedonia.

Gloomy months followed. While our expeditionary force spent itself in vain efforts to help the Serbians, driven back by superior forces, the royal dictatorship extended its hold over all Greece. The protecting powers raised no protest. Their excuse was that they desired to avoid interfering with the internal affairs of Greece. Constantine I heaped compliments and marks of favor on such members of the French and English governments as visited Athens. M. Denys Cochin and Lord Kitchener were successively the recipients of signs of friendship. And yet, notwithstanding all this, less than fifteen days after his appointment Mr. Scouloudis announced his intention to disarm and intern Allied troops, whether Serbian or Anglo-French, who might be driven back on to Greek territory. Emboldened by unexpected complacency or even by encouraging confidential statements on the part of personages of the Entente who were opposed to the Macedonian enterprise, he pretended to apply strictly in the matter the ordinary rules of neutrality. It required "commercial restrictions" and a threatening note in order to recall him to a sense of respect for Greece's obligations and his own promises of November 9. On the 24th of November, after a painful discussion, he consented to permit the Allied troops liberty of movement and the use of the necessary ways and means of transport. One of the members of the Cabinet, however, characterized this agreement very exactly in the following words: "The matter has been happily arranged, thanks to the broad views of Germany, who has kindly consented not to place any obstacles in the way of our benevolent neutrality toward the Entente." In Greece, then, the Allies benefited no longer by the benevolence of Greece but by that of Germany! William II advised Constantine to be patient till such time as the armies of these two brothers-in-law could together fall upon ours.

There was no election campaign. Mr. Venizelos

requested his friends not to run for office and advised the electors not to vote. According to his idea, abstaining from voting was the only way for the liberal party to show its strength. As a matter of fact, half of the voters were under arms, including fifty-three Venizelist deputies. The government was ready to give furloughs to its supporters while withholding them from its opponents. This consulting of the electorate was, then, a downright farce, and those elected were not even sure of being allowed to take their seats, because this depended on authorization by the military powers. If the liberals participated in the balloting the government would not hesitate to maintain that the people had ratified its policy. It was better to leave to the old parties, illegally returned to power, the responsibility for events. At a meeting of the liberal party held at his house November 21 Mr. Venizelos had this policy adopted, and on the same day published an explanatory manifesto of which these were the closing words:

> The government wishes to play a political comedy unworthy of a free people. It is in a spirit of mockery that it has called this an expression of the national will. This political comedy is really intended to prevent the expression of the national will by means of a dishonest election, and to cause it to be believed that the Greek people could not only countenance the disgrace of the non-fulfillment of a treaty of alliance, which has made it possible for Greece to extend its frontiers as far as the Nestos, but also could approve of the degradation of our political régime and the estrangement of the natural friends of Greece. In a comedy like this, I say, the liberal party is in duty bound to take no part, in order not to lend an appearance of legality to this action which ought, in conformity with the facts of the case, to be denounced as a violation of constitutional law and morality.
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> The liberal party, in thus refusing to participate in the elections, does not abandon politics nor withdraw from the struggle. On the contrary, by this abstention, it continues to participate in political affairs. It leaves to the government, which has brought us into this situation, full and entire responsibility for

the deterioration of our political régime and for the disasters which this policy is bringing upon the nation. At the same time, our party is also trying to avoid other dangers likely to result from an internal struggle, which might quickly become acute, now that we are in the midst of an external crisis as well.

When this external crisis shall have passed, if the disasters that the policy of the government is preparing for us do not assume such proportions as to shatter our faith in the future of Hellenism, the liberal party will be ready to undertake the struggle into which the country is forced in order to defend its constitutional liberty.

No matter how acute this future struggle may be, it will be continued then under conditions less dangerous than those under which it would be carried on to-day when we are in the midst of the most dangerous national crisis that we have ever experienced.

The restoration of their liberties to the Greek people will be the one indispensable condition of the safety of the state. This alone can preserve her from wasting away and dying an inglorious death, the end toward which the definitive establishment of despotism in our country would surely lead.

On the 19th of December, the day of the election, only 200,000 citizens voted although the voters of the 13th of June had numbered 750,000. This was a little less than one-fifth of the registered voters. And yet the government had used a veritable wealth of means of compulsion: suspension of the rule that certain employees could not be removed, the discharge of men in office, the distribution of lands to the Mohammedans of Macedonia, threats to the directors and editors of the newspapers of the opposition, espionage, infringements on the right to assemble and so forth. It was this Chamber, thus elected, which served as a shield to Constantine's despotic government.

Indeed, the king delegated all his powers to his military council, presided over by General Dousmanis, to whom the Cabinet ministers served simply as tools. With the co-operation of the military attaché of Germany the staff prepared the eventual co-operation of the Greek army with the German-Bulgarians coming

from the north. German pamphlets were gratuitously and profusely distributed in the barracks, where, on the contrary, the reading of liberal journals was forbidden under heaviest penalties. Volunteers recruited in the 1st regiment of the army corps of Athens, of which the Crown Prince was colonel, formed a sort of royal body guard and served as an agency of propaganda. The army was withdrawn from its military duty in order to be employed for political purposes. In 1909 Mr. Venizelos had adopted precisely the opposite method. Though called to Greece by the Military League, he had shortly afterwards proceeded to dissolve it and had sent the army back to its professional duties. He had put an end to anarchy and had prevented civil war by sending each man back to his place and by substituting an ordered democracy for a oligarchy governed by demagogues. Constantine I brought back disorder, prepared the way for civil war, cut the country in two internally and delivered its frontiers to an enemy beyond its gates. The Cretan revolutionary acted as a statesman, while the king behaved like a revolutionary.*

* The *Keryx,* in the month of June, after the crisis was past, described the situation as it had existed as follows:

"The attempt was made to strangle the national soul and to inspire abject terror by any means whatsoever, in order that the people might bow before the deadly results of the policy employed. Whole armies of spies and intriguers were formed, with all their elements eager to sell their very souls. Citizens who had no interest in politics were followed both openly and secretly by detectives without being able to imagine what political calumny was being hatched against them. Those who met in the public centers of the two cities did not dare to ask each other for the news of the day, in the certainty that among the strangers about them were base spies whose business it was to weave slanderous plots. Those who took places at tables in cafés and confectioners' shops looked around in a frightened way and beheld the respectable person, who was about to sit down beside them, listening to their conversation and addressing them with insolent frankness with the intention of provoking a discussion, and of crying out to these innocent citizens that they were insulting the king.

"The most respectable citizens were dragged before the courts on slanderous charges, those who dared to blame the conduct of the government received menacing letters in which they were warned to look out for their lives. Automobiles and carriages were stopped and their occupants asked who they were, where they came from and whither they were going. In front of many houses detectives were placed keeping count of those who entered or passed out, following like 'faithful' dogs every movement of the occupants. Men

The real nature of that "most sincerely benevolent" neutrality, promised by the Scouloudis Cabinet, was shown at once by the ill-treatment of the conquered Serbians, who had succeeded in escaping from the Germano-Bulgarian grip. In order to anticipate the effects of this ill-will, warships of the Allied fleet on January 10, 1916, landed some detachments at Corfu and prepared to receive there the wreck of the Serbian army which had taken refuge on the Albanian coast. By a note of that same day the representatives of the Allied powers informed Mr. Scouloudis of this measure dictated by "a feeling of pure humanity." Reluctantly, Mr. Scouloudis yielded to the inevitable, but he took his revenge by concluding with Bulgaria an arrangement, the existence of which was later revealed by the Hungarian newspaper *Az Est,* which published the following Bulgarian note:

Since the capture of Bitolia (Monastir) and of Resna the Bulgarian army has approached close to the Greek frontier. In consequence of this movement the general staff of Bulgaria is afraid that on the frontier collisions may easily arise between the outposts of the Bulgarian army and those of the Greeks.

Desirous of avoiding the possibility of such accidents the Bulgarian government invites the Greek government to consent to the creation of a neutral zone on the Greco-Serbian frontier *as has been already done on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier* and to be willing that along the Greek frontier the troops be withdrawn on both sides for the distance of a gun-shot.

Some weeks later, in April, the government of Athens flatly refused to let the Serbian troops who had been kindly received at Corfu, and who had now recovered

of all sorts and of the most peaceful character were searched for hidden weapons, while right before them passed quite openly the minions of the government. Every hangman was armed, every individual that would sell himself was bought, every man devoid of conscience was recruited for this work of espionage, calumny and perfidy. The times of Turkish despotism knew no more dangerous organizations. Janissarism lived once more in a different form."

from their trials and had been equipped afresh, to rejoin the Anglo-French expeditionary force in Macedonia by passing over Greek territory or through the Corinthian Canal. It alleged that the passage of the Serbian soldiers would endanger public health, would interfere with the passenger and freight traffic, would violate the neutrality of Greece and menace its independence. The first two objections were in fact unfounded. The third had only an apparent value. As a matter of fact, even if Greece was neutral in the European conflict, she was Serbia's ally in virtue of the treaty of 1913. The alliance was not destroyed by the refusal to give the help provided for by the treaty. The Cabinet of Belgrade had carefully avoided regarding this refusal as a rupture. It did not despair of being able to bring Greece back to the feeling that it was its duty to defend the common interests of the two countries. Now, over and above the auxiliary force of 150,000 men, the treaty of June, 1913, provided for facilitating the transportation of troops of each of the signatory states through the territories of the other. If the ministers of Constantine I had really been animated toward the Allies by the sentiments expressed in their note of the 9th of November, they would have hastened to give them this permission which would have cost Greece nothing and would have formed a poor compensation for their failure to fulfill the clause as to giving aid. As for the menace to her national independence, this was chimerical. It was evident that the Serbian troops would hasten away to Macedonia without delaying in Old Greece. Besides, the route through the Corinthian Canal obviated this pretended danger.

Mr. Scouloudis' ill-will was equaled by his bad faith. This first showed itself in the month of May. On the 23d of this month a column of Germano-Bulgarian troops appeared before Fort Rupel at the entrance of the Demir-Hissar Pass and summoned the Greek gar-

rison to surrender, declaring that they had been ordered to penetrate into Greek territory "in order to occupy certain advantageous positions." The occupants of the fort at first refused. They even fired twenty-four cannon shots against the invaders, but during the night they received the order to withdraw. In the Chamber, on June 5, Mr. Scouloudis thus explained this order: "Being aware on the one hand of the resolve of the invaders to seize the fort and seeing on the other hand that a continued armed resistance might at any moment lead to a general engagement which would result in breaking a neutrality that it had no intention of abandoning, the government issued the following order through the Minister of War: 'First to cease all resistance, and then to declare to the German commander that in view of the general invasion of the German army in the pass of Demir-Hissar, where the fort is, the garrison of the fort is obliged to retire, taking with it the war material in the fort.'"

The explanation was very pretty. In order not to depart from neutrality—always the same old excuse—the Greek government let the Bulgarians, its irreconcilable enemies, seize its territories and occupy a group of newly built fortifications, the construction of which had cost relatively large amounts of money. Mr. Scouloudis declared before the Chamber that he had protested most energetically to Germany and her allies, and he also launched out into pompous denials of the suspected understanding with the Germano-Bulgarians. And yet, this understanding actually did exist. This was proven by documents found later in the military offices of the IVth army corps and published in facsimile. Although at that time this was only a suspicion, several deputies of this shadowy chamber murmured. As a sort of relief for their irritation, Mr. Scouloudis announced that on the Saturday before, June 3, the king's fête-day, General Sarrail had proclaimed martial

law in Saloniki and that the Greek government had at once protested. Thereupon, Mr. Stratos expressed his opinion that all the stir about the occupation of the Rupel Pass was unjustified and that the proclamation of martial law at Saloniki was of far greater importance. He ended by saying that Mr. Venizelos had had in view only the aggrandizement of Bulgaria. A deputy named Mitropoulos shouted "Cannot the man guilty of such crimes be prosecuted?" Mr. Stratos demanded that a prosecuting attorney should be called on to act. That was the way this Rump Parliament made Mr. Venizelos responsible for the capture of the Rupel forts.

Public opinion did not take the thing so calmly. The Macedonians were disturbed. Patriots who were not blinded by hatred for Venizelos and abject devotion to the king were startled at the spectacle of their enemies of 1912-13 firmly established in the lands won by the victories of these two glorious years. They recalled to Constantine I that he had then won the title of Bulgar Slayer and repeated his dispatch to his Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent on the 25th of June, 1913:

Urgent dispatch of His Majesty, the King, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

June 25.

The sixth division reports that Bulgarian soldiers, at the command of a police officer, led into the courtyard of the local Bulgarian school the Metropolitan of Demir-Hissar, two priests and more than two hundred prominent citizens and massacred them there. The division staff ordered the bodies exhumed and established the fact of the crime. The Bulgarians, furthermore, violated girls and killed one girl who resisted.

Protest, by my order, before the representatives of the civilized powers against these monsters with human faces. Protest before the civilized world and declare that I shall find myself forced, to my regret, to proceed to reprisals in order to inspire some fear or some reflection as to consequences before crimes like these are perpetrated.

The acts of the Bulgarians have made all the atrocities of past barbarian invasions fade into insignificance. They prove that the Bulgarians no longer have the right to be included among civilized peoples.

CONSTANTINE R.

If Constantine I showed himself perfectly reassured as to these people whom he had three years before banished from the civilized world, the Allies did not share these sentiments. The right wing of their expeditionary force was menaced. The bulk of the army could be attacked on the flank at a moment when it might be engaged in a serious operation in the northwest. Furthermore, the Bulgarians were not the only ones to inspire apprehensions. The connivance of the Scouloudis Cabinet with them furnished ground for apprehension. Toward the end of May, General Yannakitsas warned his troops that they might soon be called on to fight. But against whom, pray, since Greece was maintaining a strict neutrality? Some days later at the close of a review of troops who had taken part in the grand manœuvers, the king made an address in which he said: "Soldiers ought to be obedient to orders, not to sentiments." Further, Constantine I on the pretext of going hunting went on an excursion of six days in upper Thessaly in the vicinity of that Albano-Epirote region where the Austrian troops were operating. The tone of his speeches, his manner, and his actions themselves should have warned us to be on our guard. On the 12th of June "popular" manifestations against France and England took place in the capital. Since these powers had neglected to act at the moment when a decisive result might easily have been obtained, they were now forced by necessity to take effective precautions against an imminent danger. They at once organized a landing force under the orders of Admiral Moreau and transported it to the Bay of Salamis. Though the instructions given to the admiral and the representatives

of the Entente in Athens have never been divulged, there is reason to believe that the intention of the protecting powers was to settle the Greek affair with one stroke and to re-establish in its integrity the constitutional régime with appropriate material guarantees. Unfortunately, at the last moment, these intentions were modified. Either owing to some diplomatic intervention or because Constantine I, warned of the blow that was threatening him, took the first steps toward submission, the ministers of the three protecting powers contented themselves with sending Mr. Scouloudis on the 21st of June an ultimatum. This document was in truth unusually curt. After having called attention to the "many legitimate grounds for suspecting the Greek government," to the activities of foreigners who were trying to create on Greek territory hostile organizations contrary to the neutrality of the country and tending to compromise the security of the military and naval forces of the Allies, to the connivance of the Greek Cabinet with the Germano-Bulgarians in the Rupel affair, to the violation of the Greek constitution and the evident "collusion of the present Cabinet with their enemies," the protecting powers demanded the immediate execution, without discussion or delay, of the following measures:

1. The actual and total demobilization of the Greek army, which must be put, with the briefest delay, on a peace footing.
2. That the present ministry should be at once replaced by a business Cabinet without political color which should offer all necessary guarantees for the loyal fulfillment of that benevolent neutrality toward the Allied powers that Greece had promised to observe, and should vouch for the honesty of new elections.
3. An immediate dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, followed by new elections, after the expiration of the time-limit provided by the Constitution and after the general demobilization should have restored the electoral body to its normal state.
4. The replacing, after consultation with the Allies, of certain police functionaries whose attitude, inspired by foreign influences, had facilitated outrages committed against peaceable

citizens, as well as insults directed at the Allied legations and people under their jurisdiction.

The king submitted. Many of those who were privy to these negotiations supposed, nay hoped, that he would prefer to abdicate rather than to submit to such mortifying conditions. If he had been guided by motives originating in a feeling of wounded self-respect, he would probably have given up the struggle from this moment. But without any doubt he was advised by William II to bend the neck and to keep his throne while waiting for better times. So he dismissed the docile Mr. Scouloudis and charged Mr. Zaïmis with the duty of forming a new Cabinet. It was Mr. Zaïmis who, on June 23, signed the promise to execute in their entirety the demands formulated in the ultimatum of the 21st. On the 29th of June the general demobilization was decreed, and on the 31st of July the army was once more put on a peace footing. Many functionaries were replaced or discharged, but the Chamber was not discharged, under the pretext that it was impossible, because of circumstances, to decide at that time, as the Constitution demanded, the date of the coming elections. The Chamber was, therefore, simply adjourned. General Dousmanis and Mr. Streit, the two secret advisers of the king, continued to hold their positions. The pro-Entente newspapers were prosecuted for having "defamed and insulted the government and the army," when as a matter of fact they had at that time been indulging in the gentlest sort of criticism. The very life of Mr. Venizelos was threatened, so that he was obliged to protect himself with a bodyguard of his faithful Cretans. This did not, however, hinder him from energetically conducting his electoral campaign in view of the great national election that was approaching. The magnificent resistance at Verdun, the Franco-British success on the Somme, the victorious offensive of General Broussilof in Galicia and Bukovina

gave to his electioneering a turn that was very disquieting to the royalists.

Constantine I resolved at that time on an act that will eternally weigh heavily on his reputation. Fearing, in spite of an unbridled anti-Venizelist propaganda, and the formation of leagues of reservists who put force at the disposal of the election agents of the government, fearing, I say, that the Venizelists would be returned in large majority to the new Chamber, the king wished at any price to postpone the elections indefinitely. To achieve this end he contrived the invasion of eastern and western Macedonia by the Germano-Bulgarians. Descending the valley of the Strouma, the Bulgarians seized all the ports of the valley and the cities of Drama, Seres and Cavalla. They carried away the garrisons and had them transported to Germany. They got possession of war material consisting of 200 cannon of the latest model, 50,000 rifles, great stores of ammunition and different kinds of equipment, etc. The Greek troops had received definite orders not to resist the Bulgarians and to enter into no common action with the French. Those who did not wish to submit to the humiliation of internment were obliged to take refuge as best they could within the radius of action of the expeditionary force of the Allies. Out of 4,500 men and 200 officers of the garrison of Cavalla, 2,200 soldiers and about 120 officers with Colonels Christodoulou and Lelakis crossed over to the island of Thasos; 700 men with 40 officers set sail for the Pireus; the rest with Colonel Hadjopoulos who commanded the 6th division were directed by the Bulgarians toward Drama. In the localities that they seized the Bulgarians gave themselves up to the most savage acts of violence against the inhabitants, who, since their precipitate departure in 1913, had been described to them as hostile.*

* These events took place in the interval between the 20th of August and the beginning of September.

This time the measure had been heaped full to overflowing. It was no longer a matter of a difference of opinion about the Constitution; it was a clear case of treason. Constantine I accepted as a satisfactory guarantee on the part of the invaders the assurance from the ministers of Germany and Bulgaria in Athens that Greek sovereignty would be respected, that the German and Bulgarian troops would evacuate the Greek territory thus occupied as soon as military conditions would permit, and that the inhabitants would be indemnified for all the damage caused. A vigorous movement of protestation took place at once. On Monday, the 27th of August, an immense crowd gathered before Mr. Venizelos' house to cheer for the leader of the liberal party. Mr. Venizelos addressed these 60,000 citizens and proposed to them to elect a delegation which should submit to the king a stirring appeal of which he then and there read the text. He did not break with the monarch; he only entreated him to return to a sense of his obligations as king. On this point, the peroration of his address was particularly significant: "You will see, O King, by the meeting of to-day that the liberal party is not the enemy of the Crown any more than it is of the royal family; nor is it your personal enemy. It is only the respectful guardian of free government and admits no deviation on this point. But just here, too, lies the real interest of the Crown. Only those who exploit the latter can seek to persuade you of the contrary and they are then really your worst enemies." But Constantine I had no intention of receiving a delegation of liberals or of replying to their appeal. He announced that he was ill, and that the publication of the decree of dissolution of the Chamber and of convocation of the electors would have to be delayed for some time longer. During this illness, real or pretended, events came on thick and fast. The intrigues of the German agents assumed such proportions and the acts of the governmental functionaries

were so hostile to the Entente that on September 1 a strong Franco-British squadron, under the orders of Admiral Dartige du Fournet, commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, came to anchor in the harbor of Salamis. On the 2d the ministers of France and England demanded control of the postal, telegraph and wireless communications, the expulsion of hostile agents of corruption and espionage, and penalties for the Greek subjects who had participated in the acts of corruption and espionage above described. Mr. Zaïmis could do nothing else but yield. The disorders, nevertheless, kept on increasing. The leagues of reservists organized meetings of protest against the demands of the Entente. On the 10th of September a band of about twenty-five persons made their way into the garden of the French Legation, and discharged their pistols in the air, shouting, "Long live the king! Down with France!" Mr. Zaïmis had to present his regrets to M. Guillemin, and have them presented at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris by Mr. Romanos. He was obliged to guarantee the infliction of penalties upon the guilty men and to promise to close at once the various sections of the League of Reservists both in Athens and in the provinces.

However, the Bulgarian invasion cut the Greek army in two materially and morally. The soldiers who had escaped from eastern Macedonia and almost the entire garrison of Saloniki formed themselves into an army for national defense and put themselves at General Sarrail's disposal to resist the Bulgarians. A committee for national defense, at the head of which was Colonel Zymbracakis, addressed a proclamation to the people in order to incite them "to cease to obey the authorities who had betrayed the national honor," and another proclamation to the army to urge it to place itself under the orders of the committee with a view to the liberation of the fatherland. These appeals found numerous echoes.

Furious at what he called a defection, the king received in solemn audience the officers of the 5th division (Saloniki) who had refused to make common cause with their comrades of the national defense and he congratulated them emphatically: "You have inscribed your names in the annals of history with a pen of iron. You have shown an example of an iron discipline, of a faith and devotion toward your king and your leader that is proof against every test. By your attitude you have stigmatized as traitors those who have betrayed their oath and among whom, unfortunately, your commanding officer is counted. . . . With such an army and at the head of men like you, possessing your morale, your sentiments and your faith, I am ready to face no matter what enemy." As the officers thus congratulated had been unwilling to fight the Germano-Bulgarians, this "no matter what enemy" that the king had in mind could only be the expeditionary force of the Entente.

In spite of so many disturbing indications, Mr. Venizelos still clung to the hope of winning the king back to the national cause. Rumania had declared war on Austria-Hungary on the 28th of August, an event of great importance to Europe, but of especial importance to Greece. For more than a year General Dousmanis himself had said that the moment Rumania entered the war Greece would be obliged to do the same. Without doubt, he did not believe that King Ferdinand, a Hohenzollern, would turn against Germany, but the opinion that he expressed was a political necessity so evident that Mr. Venizelos thought that he ought to make a supreme effort. He describes the steps he took in the following terms:*

I informed Mr. Zaïmis that if the king, contrary to what his courtiers had declared, was still unwilling to side with the Entente, he would prove by this very act, before the whole world,

* Interview given March 13, 1917, to the special envoy of the Havas Agency.

that he was following a pro-German and not a Greek policy, and I added that I should in that case consider it my duty to revolt.

Mr. Zaïmis, on the basis of this declaration and appealing to the signs of impatience and even of disorder that began to show themselves in the army, obtained from the king his promise to enter upon negotiations with the nations of the Entente looking to an emergence from her neutrality. The king even authorized him to put himself in touch with me so as to keep me informed of all the negotiations as they occurred.

But meanwhile the German Emperor telegraphed to the king to assure him that within a month he would certainly have conquered all Rumania and have thrown Sarrail's army into the sea. He asked him, therefore, to resist the Venizelist policy for four weeks more. With all docility the king obeyed, yielding to the injunctions of his brother-in-law, and ten days after he had seemed to be about to side with the powers of the Entente he threw aside the mask and returned to his self-willed policy.

Mr. Zaïmis, realizing that he was being mocked, refused to play the king's game and resigned. The moment to act had come; the country had seen light; the king never would move.

Admiral Coundouriotis, disheartened by such criminality, joined me along with General Danglis, and we decided at once to raise the standard of revolt.

Mr. Zaïmis handed in his resignation as Prime Minister on the 11th of September. In spite of the solicitations of Messrs. Gounaris and Rhallis, he persisted in his refusal to serve, and it was very difficult for the king to find a successor. He did not dare to recall Mr. Gounaris, his confidential adviser, whose nomination would have constituted a violation of Article II of the ultimatum of June 21. And yet he had to have someone who, under the cloak of neutrality, should ruin the Venizelist policy within and without the country. By the mediation of Mr. Streit, his unofficial Minister of Foreign Affairs, he at once offered the position with this understanding to Mr. Dimitracopoulos. But the latter, upon ascertaining that it would be impossible for him to maintain his position owing to the refusal of the ministers of the Entente to withdraw their insistence on the execution of the conditions of the ultimatum of

June 21, resigned the office. Several days were spent in new efforts. Finally, on the 16th of September, Mr. Nicolas Calogeropoulos, former associate of Mr. George Theotokis and conspicuous member of the aristocratic Germanophile coterie, formed a ministry composed of second-rate men who were notorious anti-Venizelists. His personal sentiments were well known. In June, 1915, he had been heard to say publicly, while speaking of the leader of the liberal party: "We must have this traitor's blood."

The formation of this Cabinet was a challenge to the Entente. The ministers of the protecting powers refused to have anything to do with it. When questioned about this, Mr. Calogeropoulos replied: "According to diplomatic custom, immediately after the formation of the Cabinet, the foreign representatives visit the Prime Minister. If this takes place, in common courtesy, we shall immediately return the visit." The expected visit did not take place. Then Mr. Calogeropoulos published the following communication: "The declarations which have been made by the Prime Minister and in accordance with which the present government is not a Cabinet in the ordinary sense of the word, but has a political character, must be understood as follows: the ministry, composed of persons belonging to the Parliament, assumes before the country all responsibility for its acts, accepting, be it understood, the note of the powers of June 21 in the same spirit as did the Zaïmis Cabinet." In spite of this express acceptance of the ultimatum of June 21, the ministers of the Entente persisted in holding aloof. The tension reached its height. From all the larger islands of the Cyclades came manifestos, approved by large assemblies, urging Constantine I to recall Mr. Venizelos without delay and threatening in case of refusal to establish a revolutionary government. These demonstrations did not shake the king's resolve. Their only effect was to render him more insolent.

On the 20th of September, before the infantry barracks of Athens and in the presence of 5,000 soldiers gathered for the ceremony of administering the oath to the new recruits, the king delivered a speech breathing the purest absolutism. He declared to the young soldiers that they were from now on "soldiers of the king," that they owed a blind devotion "to the will of the king," and he warned them not to yield to suggestions intended to mislead them: "Do not listen," he cried, "to the advice of the profiteers of patriotism, since for them patriotism is only a screen behind which they hide in order to commit crimes." These were the very words of William II. "Voluntas regis suprema lex esto."

On the next day, *Patris,* the organ of Mr. Venizelos, characterized this speech as contrary to the fundamental principles of the Constitution, surpassing the very worst conceptions of absolutism. Mr. Venizelos himself declared publicly that the nation ought at once to take the defense of its interests into its own hands.

On the 22d, Colonel Zymbracakis reviewed on the parade ground of Saloniki the contingents of Macedonian volunteers who were ready to join the army of Sarrail. The same day, Mr. Calogeropoulos decided to institute lawsuits against all the officers, non-commissioned officers and private soldiers "who had adhered to the revolutionary movement." On the 24th, the Congress of Hellenic Colonies assembled in Paris pronounced the deposition of King Constantine. On the 25th, at half-past four in the morning, Mr. Venizelos, accompanied by Admiral Coundouriotis, commander-in-chief of the Greek navy and a group of friends, set sail from Phalerum for Crete. Received with enthusiasm at Canea by the people and by the troops he issued a proclamation to the Greek people. After describing the disorders resulting from the fatal policy of the king during the last year and a half, he concluded:

It is not the time now to try to find those who are responsible for our accumulated misfortunes. The duty imposed on us is to try, while there is still time, to save what can be saved. The surest way to find safety would certainly be to re-establish our broken national unity, in order that this work may be undertaken with the co-operation of all the nation's forces.

But there is only one possible means of re-forming this broken national unity. It is to return without delay to the policy which the national conscience dictates; it is to attempt at the side of our Serbian allies and of the great powers who are battling with them, three of whom are guarantors of our independence, to free our territory from the invasion of this detested enemy; it is to co-operate with these powers so that not only shall Europe be finally and forever freed from the danger of the German hegemony, but that the Balkans too may be freed from Bulgarian pretensions to supremacy.

We shall count ourselves happy if the king decides, at this supreme moment, to put himself at the head of the national forces, so that, in an indissoluble union, we may attempt the realization of this national policy. But if this cannot be obtained, there remains but one means of safety, that is, the isolated action of that part of the nation which believes that if we do not co-operate with our natural allies in the re-creation of the Orient, which is bound to result from the great European war, the Greek government and the Greek nation will go down to ruin.

For this reason taking on ourselves, with a feeling of duty but also with enthusiasm, the mission entrusted to us by the people, we appeal to all Hellenism and demand its help in the work that we are undertaking. Since the government has betrayed its obligations, it is incumbent upon the nation to attempt the realization of the task imposed upon it. We invoke the support of every Greek citizen who feels that a longer tolerance of the disasters and humiliations which the policy which we have followed has caused, would be equivalent to the death of the nation.

We undertake this struggle in the full conviction that the nation, summoned, in the defection of the State, to a rising in mass, will realize once more the miracle which is necessary to bring the nation back to the way from which it has wandered for a year and a half.

Immediately, adherents flocked to the cause. In all the larger islands of the Cyclades, the royalist authori-

ties were deposed and replaced by Venizelists. From Athens itself many officers, followed by non-commissioned officers and private soldiers, set sail for Saloniki. The committee for national defense put itself entirely at the disposal of the government that was forming. The permanent bureau (in Paris) of the Congress of Greek Colonies sent a telegram of adherence to Mr. Venizelos, promising to follow him " on the path of honor and glory " to which he had committed the Greek race. From Canea, Messrs. Venizelos and Coundouriotis sent to M. Briand, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, a dispatch congratulating him on the recent success of the French troops on the Somme and containing warm wishes for the final success of the Allies. It was the first contact of the provisional government with a foreign government. M. Briand thanked the signers of the telegram through the consul of France at Canea.

The miracle, the vision of which guided Mr. Venizelos over the waters of the Archipelago, was accomplished at this moment. New Greece, becoming the guardian of the sacred fire of the fatherland, peacefully conquered the Old, and Hellas began to believe once more in her destiny.

PART III

THE departure of Mr. Venizelos for Canea gave rise to curious and diverse comments. While it was generally interpreted in France, in England and especially in New Greece and the islands as the beginning of a patriotic campaign destined to produce great results, the circles devoted to the king affected to regard it as a confession of weakness, if not as a flight. We may even question whether the government in Athens did not actually look on this move with favor, in the hope that the prestige of the leader of the liberal party would vanish with his departure from the capital. The friends of the Royal Family in Greece as well as elsewhere were inclined to compare his departure to that of General Boulanger for Brussels in 1889. . . . Did Mr. Calogeropoulos wish to pose as the Greek Constant? Certain it is that he permitted the news to spread that co-operation of Greece with the Entente was again possible. He demanded only, so it was said, a definite period of delay, so as to permit the reorganization of the military forces of the country before involving it in the war. Even the attitude of the protecting powers toward this move on the part of Mr. Venizelos was not very clearly defined. It soon appeared that their support of him, a support that was absolutely necessary if he was to succeed in his enterprise, had been subordinated to the condition that this should not take the form of an antidynastic movement.* Now, in order to produce its full effect the movement ought to have started upon the arrival of the liberal leaders at Canea, with a proclamation deposing the king, or at least with the convocation, in a city removed from

* Mr. Venizelos declared later, in 1917, that this condition had actually been imposed upon him.

royalist control, either of the Chamber that had been illegally dissolved or of an assembly of delegates from all parts of free Greece. Embarrassed by the engagement that he had been forced to make, Mr. Venizelos was obliged to restrain the demonstrations of his followers instead of encouraging them. The friends of the Royal Family profited by this false position to insinuate that the grand national movement was a failure. At the same time any allusion in the French press to the possibility of a change of reign was suppressed by the censor. French publicists were forbidden to advocate the formation of a Greek government bent on breaking down the resistance of Constantine I.

Mr. Calogeropoulos decided that the proper time had come for him to withdraw, and on the 4th of October he made known his resignation in the following remarkable communication: "The government having been unable up to the present moment to get in touch with the representatives of the Entente Powers here in Athens, and considering its existence an obstacle to the progress of national affairs, has asked the king to accept the resignation of the Cabinet." The king accepted this resignation all the more readily because he thought that by sacrificing his minister he could renew official relations with the Entente. On the 10th of October, then, Mr. Spiridon Lambros, professor and archaeologist, who had been made Prime Minister with Mr. Zalocostas as Minister of Foreign Affairs, succeeded in re-establishing normal relations between the government and the Entente. This success was all the more inexplicable since the majority of the Calogeropoulos Cabinet had been pro-Entente in spite of their being anti-Venizelist, while the Lambros Cabinet was composed entirely of court favorites. It was just at this time that Mr. Venizelos and Admiral Coundouriotis, after a triumphal tour in the islands, landed at Saloniki. They at once formed there, with General Danglis who had joined them, a

provisional government in the form of a triumvirate, assisted by a ministry of which Mr. Politis was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It was on the 10th of October, also, that Admiral Dartige du Fournet sent Mr. Lambros a note demanding, as a sequel to his note of September 2, certain concessions, including disarmament, sequestration or surrender of vessels of the Greek fleet, disarmament of certain land-batteries and also the control of the police and of the railroads. On the 11th the Lambros Cabinet yielded, and on the following day the transfer of the Greek light cruisers to Keratsini was effected and their disembarked crews were quartered in different public buildings in Athens. But the pro-German intrigues were at that time so far developed, so many armed men thronged the streets, and Mr. Lambros seemed so prone to evasions, that on the 13th the admiral was forced to emphasize and make more definite his note of the 10th. He demanded in particular that all citizens should be forbidden to carry arms of any sort whatsoever and that the embargo on the exportation of wheat from Thessaly should be raised.

Anxious weeks followed. Encouraged by the success of the Germano-Bulgarians in Rumania, the royalists became more and more insolent. The director of the newspaper *Patris* was prosecuted for having published in his paper official documents relative to the surrender of the Rupel forts. The fulfillment of the conditions prescribed in the notes of the 10th and 13th was avoided by subterfuges. The king surreptitiously concentrated troops and war material in Epirus and Thessaly; at one time he was even credited with the intention of taking refuge there. On the 18th he reviewed on the parade ground the sailors who had been disembarked from the vessels sequestered by Admiral Dartige and addressed them in a passionate speech that was full of threatening allusions. During this period the triumvirate was being organized at Saloniki, intent above all on gathering

together the contingents that were not only to battle against the Bulgarians at the side of the troops of the expeditionary force but also to forward the liberating movement in Greece. As to the question of the form of government, Mr. Venizelos refused to commit himself. In a speech delivered at a great banquet given in honor of the provisional government, he only foreshadowed the convocation of a national assembly charged with the duty "of erecting an insurmountable rampart against the assault of the king on the sovereignty of the people." On the 20th of October, in a conference held at Boulogne, the leaders of the French and English governments decided not to recognize officially the provisional government, though lending to it their material aid. France and England guaranteed to share equally the expenses of the Venizelist army and consented to an advance of ten million francs in addition.

At this moment negotiations in Athens took a new turn in consequence of the arrival of M. Bénazet, deputy of the French Chamber, charged by the French staff with a mission in the Orient. Through an Italian friend, a Signor Serpieri, a director of the French Mining Company in Laurium and on intimate terms with the court, M. Bénazet obtained an audience with the king. There followed a sudden change in policy, the details of which still elude the historical critic. The only thing that we can make out with certainty is that the king was clever enough to persuade his interlocutor of the sincerity of his friendly intentions toward the Allies and of his readiness to favor an arrangement calculated to reassure them completely. He suggested the idea of a surrender of batteries and munitions to Admiral Dartige and a transfer of troops. M. Bénazet left the palace with the idea that an amicable arrangement could easily be made and that it would be the height of cleverness to reconcile Mr. Venizelos and the king. He was confirmed in this idea by the friendliness shown him by the queen. Some

days later, Admiral Dartige was himself presented to the king, and seemed to carry away from this interview a similar impression. The king and his brothers went to dine with Prince Démidof, Minister of Russia. Then Admiral Dartige ordered one of the two landing companies which had been installed at the Zappeion since the incident at the French Legation to return to its vessel again. In an account of the Bénazet mission that appeared in the *Petit Parisien* of January 10, 1917, the result of this mission is thus set forth: "The king hoped to reconcile the desire which he felt to remain neutral with his desire to restore peace and harmony to his country. He did not demand any compensation (?) but only requested that consideration for his feelings be shown by the avoidance of any exultation—*especially in the press*—over his concessions to the Entente. Our diplomatic and military representatives were charged with the execution of this agreement, as approved by the government." On the part of the Entente it was carried out to the letter. The press was rigorously censored and could not communicate its apprehensions to the public. In the House of Commons on the 31st of October, Lord Robert Cecil declared that whatever tended to unite all the Greeks would be desirable indeed.

A further diplomatic arrangement was made a little later. In consequence of a slight collision at Ecaterini between the troops of the king and those of the triumvirate (November 4-5) the protecting powers consented to establish a neutral zone between the territories of the provisional government and those of Old Greece, in such a way that the extension of the Venizelist movement was blocked. Thessaly and Epirus, which were devoted to Venizelos and were only awaiting the appearance of Saloniki contingents in order to drive out the royalist authorities, were thus prevented from rising. The creation of this neutral zone coincided with a visit of General

Roques, Minister of War of France, first to Macedonia and then to Athens. The establishment of this neutral zone was hailed as a fine solution. With negotiations at the point where they then stood, the Cabinets of the Entente believed that an acceptable arrangement was about to be consummated with the government in Athens. They permitted, without any protest, the convoking and assembling on the 13th of November of that Rump Parliament on the dissolution of which they had insisted on June 21. The Cabinet in Athens pretended that by virtue of the Constitution the Chamber ought to resume its duties on that day. The reply might have been made that the sole Chamber that legally existed and was qualified to meet was that elected June 13, 1915. To raise no objection seemed preferable, and, besides, the Chamber was dismissed almost immediately without having transacted any business. It had, however, served to break the injunction in force against it. Did Admiral Dartige think that he could then and there demand the reward for our complaisance? On the 17th of November he sent Mr. Lambros a new note demanding the surrender of eighteen field batteries, sixteen mountain batteries with a thousand rounds of projectiles per battery, as well as of 4,000 Mannlicher rifles with 200 cartridges per rifle, of 140 machine-guns and of fifty automobile trucks. On the 20th, without awaiting a reply, he notified the embassies of the hostile states in Athens of the decision of the Entente to expel their personnel from Greek territory within forty-eight hours. On the 22d he proceeded to enforce this expulsion, and this was effected without any notable incident. On the 22d Mr. Lambros replied to the note of the 17th, offering to hand over a larger number of cannon than the Germano-Bulgarians had seized in Macedonia, 191 as against 124. He refused to meet the rest of the Entente's demands. On the 24th the admiral ordered the government in Athens to give over to the Allies ten mountain batteries

on or before the 1st of December and the rest on or before the 15th. He justified this demand by the remark: "The place of the material that I demand is not in your magazines, but on the Macedonian front at Monastir, where the destinies of the Balkan States are to be decided." It was on the 24th, too, that the government at Saloniki declared war on Bulgaria and Germany. Not being able to send a direct notification to these powers, it begged the Allied governments to be so good as to take this duty upon themselves. It is as yet uncertain whether they did this.

During the last days of the month there was extreme confusion. The Military League was reconstituted. The officers stirred up the soldiers in their barracks, the reservists were armed, the disorderly elements were enrolled by the agents of General Dousmanis. Fights broke out in the streets; many Venizelists were roughly handled. On the 26th a detachment of 200 French marines came to reinforce the little contingent encamped at the Zappeion. In the capital an artificial excitement increased hour by hour. In the provinces, where none existed, the government counterfeited it. It pictured an uprising of the peasants in Thessaly, a massacre of the soldiers at Ecaterini. Now, nowhere had the Thessalian peasants stirred, and the very prefect of Larissa himself acknowledged that not a word had been heard about rebellion in his province. As for the evzones (light-armed troops in native costume), not one had been harmed. That did not, however, hinder the Gounarists from ordering a solemn requiem—forbidden at the last minute—to "celebrate the entrance into immortality of the heroes who had fallen gloriously in a battle against the traitors." By dint of these tragi-comedies an agitation was produced which threatened at any instant to be transformed into riots and massacres. During the night of the 27th very many houses in which Venizelists lived were marked with red circles. The leaders of the

reservists proclaimed that they would hinder by force the surrender of weapons even if the government permitted it. Trenches were dug in the immediate neighborhood of Athens, and emplacements for machine-guns and artillery were prepared.

On the 27th Mr. Zalocostas addressed a protest to the representatives of the neutral powers at Athens against the blockade of the straits of Salamis by the Allies, against the control exerted by them over public utilities, against the expulsion of the personnel of the legations of the Quadruple Alliance, and, finally, against the demand for the surrender of war material. He closed his note of protest with this phrase: "I have no doubt, Mr. Minister, that you will offer me, in these painful circumstances the support that I request." On the 28th a Crown Council was held, the conclusions of which were not published; but the correspondents of news agencies and of foreign newspapers telegraphed that the government persisted in its refusal.

In spite of all these unfavorable signs, the confidence of Admiral Dartige and of General Bousquier, the French military attaché, in an amicable solution appeared unshaken. On the 29th the admiral had a somewhat long interview with the king. On the 30th the general too was given an audience by Constantine I. In the course of these conversations both were convinced that the king desired only that they should force his hand and that a simple outward manifestation of force would make it possible to gain all that they had demanded. The king, it was said, had formally declared that the Greek troops would offer no resistance; he had even had this assurance given in writing by the marshal of the court. During the 30th vessels carrying French troops cast anchor in the harbor of Pireus. They had orders to disembark the next morning and, without cannon or convoy of munitions and supplies, to go and occupy certain positions and take charge of a prescribed amount of war material that

was to be handed over to them. The expedition was organized like an ordinary field manœuver in time of peace, with the conviction that it would encounter no resistance. Admiral Dartige, in fact, expressed to some newspaper correspondents "his full conviction" that the cannons would be delivered without any disturbance of the peace. He added that he "had not the slightest intention of resorting to force."

This optimism was not shared by the Athenians. Since the night of the 29th the troops of the garrison of Athens had left their barracks to take up positions in the environs of the city, especially at Goudi and Chalandri. By authority of a decree published on the 29th, authorizing voluntary engagements, an indirect mobilization was effected. More than 10,000 men "volunteered" the first day and were at once incorporated in the force. The instructions given to the military authorities prescribed that they should not hinder the disembarking of the Allied troops, but should follow them in equal numbers and oppose the execution of the orders of Admiral Dartige. The principal buildings of Athens were occupied by Greek marines. The inhabitants of the city who were witnesses of these preparations and of a multitude of little characteristic incidents, got the impression that a conflict was inevitable. The newspapers informed their readers to this effect. The *Messager d'Athènes* bearing the date of the 1st of December, but printed on the 30th of November, wrote:

> Not to mince matters, the government of Athens proceeded yesterday to the first act of hostility against the Entente. It began its mobilization by the system of voluntary engagements, just as Germany had put her army on a war footing at the end of July, 1914, by the system of individual orders. A particularly well informed man in Entente circles said very truly: "We have driven out the ministers of the Central Alliance, we have driven out the Germans, but we are treating with respect the German organization in Greece."

And Athens is not calling the reserves alone to the colors. It is clothing with the regulars' uniform the raw recruits, that is to say, those factors of disorder by which it has terrorized the peoplē, that "people" in whose name the German oligarchy has committed all its crimes against Greece. It seasons with "Attic salt" its declaration of war against the protecting powers.

The idea dominant in most Athenian circles, the idea proclaimed by the pretorian guard of the kingdom of Athens, which has lately been christened "the national army," is that the Entente will not wish to aggravate the difficult situation in which she finds herself here in the Orient in consequence of the defeat of Rumania, by creating a new front on Greek territory. It is an idea which has been kept alive by the policy which the Entente has followed in Greece and which has become deeply rooted through newspaper campaigns in which men came to forget, as Clémenceau did, that party quarrels in time of war reverberate far beyond the frontiers of a country.

If the Entente, by some appropriate act, had taught the heroic camarilla that its anger was as much to be feared as Germany's, Greece would not to-day be hurried at full speed toward the abyss. She would find herself to-day in her place near her protectors, and thousands of human lives would have been spared, thousands of lives whose loss is due solely to the regard of the Entente powers for the sacred persons of their worst enemies in Greece.

For two years they have been shrieking their hostility in the very faces of the Entente. But in spite of this, the commander-in-chief of the Allied naval force continues to talk to us of good intentions and of faithful promises.

On Thursday, the 30th of November, at half-past six in the afternoon, Admiral Dartige received the official reply of the Greek government, elaborated in several successive meetings of the Cabinet. It was a refusal. The admiral was not surprised, for he believed that Constantine I wanted to have his hand forced by a demonstration of military force. Consequently, on the morning of Friday, December 1st, several French detachments, equipped as though for a dress parade, disembarked and advanced in different directions. They soon clashed with troops entrenched along the two prin-

cipal roads that lead from the sea to Athens. The Greek soldiers blocked their way and opened fire. Immediately the royalists posted on the emplacements began to fire volleys with their machine-guns not only upon the Allied detachments but also on the French quartered at the Zappeion and on the annex of the English Legation, which served as the headquarters of the Anglo-French police. The Anglo-French defended themselves valiantly. But, caught by treachery, they endured cruel losses, for which, however, they made the enemy pay dearly. I shall not go into numbers here, nor shall I describe the vicissitudes of this deplorable day.* I shall limit myself to a few statements of fact. The Greeks, whether reservists or soldiers of the standing army took the initiative in firing without the slightest provocation, and even before the Allies had tried to take away a single cannon. They fired on troops quartered in a public building and engaged in peaceful occupations. They fired through the windows at those of the Allies who had taken refuge in buildings where, on the word of Greek officers, they had believed themselves safe, they acted exactly as though they had received definite orders. They were posted in such positions that it was almost impossible to reply to their fire without hitting some of the most celebrated monuments of Athens. They had taken the ground immediately surrounding the Acropolis as their base of operations. If the fleet, moored before Salamis with its vessels broadside toward the Acropolis, had wished to destroy with its shells the batteries or the massed troops, it would have run great risk of blowing up a part of the celebrated temple. Even if the sacred marbles had received only some slight scratches from shrapnel, the Allies would none the less have been denounced to the whole world, especially to hesitating

* See a conscientious and circumstantial account of the events of the 1st and 2nd of December in a letter written from Athens by M. Charles Frégier and published in the *Journal des Débats*, January 8, 1917.

neutrals, as barbarians that had fallen lower than Vandals or Huns.

In lack of preliminary arrangements or of orders issued in the course of the drama, the grand Allied fleet remained almost inert. Only a few shells were fired on the garden of the Royal Palace. Blockaded in the Zappeion, to which he had gone at the beginning of the day, Admiral Dartige was neither able to go out from the Zappeion so as to go directly to the palace, which was near at hand, nor to have orders sent down to the fleet. The ministers of the Entente were no whit wiser or bolder than he. We should like to be able to blot out this page of our history. While our soldiers were falling under the blows of assassins, negotiations began once more. The king proposed to hand over six batteries. From eleven o'clock in the morning until two at night there was an exchange of proposals between the king, Mr. Lambros and the ministers of the Entente. Finally, on December 2d, at two in the morning, the following agreement was signed:

> The ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, having declared in the name of the admiral, commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, that they have accepted the delivery of six batteries instead of the ten that had been demanded on or before the 1st of December, and having furthermore recommended to their governments not to insist on the other demands as to cession of war material, the Greek government declares on its part that it will consent to put the six batteries at the disposal of the Allies.

This was a surrender. Count Bosdari, Minister of Italy, agreed to it only upon the insistence of his colleagues. "It made me blush for France," he said a few hours later to one of our countrymen. Not only were our decimated detachments forced to beat a sad retreat, leaving to others the duty of burying their dead and of caring for their wounded, but our companies, encamped

at the Zappeion, and all our other posts were re-embarked. Admiral Dartige left the Zappeion about seven o'clock in the morning to return on board his vessel. The survivors of the companies who had stayed with him the entire day (December 1) endured the depth of humiliation. As they possessed no means of transport for their material, military trucks were furnished them by the Minister of War of Constantine I on the request of the admiral and the French minister. Along with the soldiers of the different branches of the Allied control, these brave men, among whom were to be seen many who had fought at Verdun or at Dixmude, regained the quay of embarkation under the escort of Greek soldiers.

The 2d of December beheld even worse horrors. According to the testimony of a witness, "the hunting out of the Venizelists was a truly horrible business to which nothing can be compared unless it be the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Eve." The prominent Venizelists of Athens and Pireus were massacred, tortured and imprisoned. Their houses were pillaged from garret to cellar. The offices and presses of the liberal newspapers were destroyed. No help was given to the pursued. They were forced to endure outrages and sufferings of all kinds without having the consolation of hearing or seeing any help coming from the powers who ought to have protected their country. The mayor of Pireus, escaping from torture, said to a Frenchman: "In the whole history of France there is not a single example of a similar abandonment."

It was true. There certainly is not in the history of France an example of a like humiliation accepted so resignedly. After the retreat of all our contingents, the evacuation of all our posts and the abandonment of the control of all public utilities, there was an exodus of our nationals. The French of Attica, the personnel of the French School of Archaeology, our merchants and our journalists fled, with the surviving Venizelists, from

that land where Constantine I ruled in blood. On the 4th of December a cortège of Venizelists in chains marched past the French School. French citizenship, which had been respected for a hundred years in all Greek lands, had become an object of derision.

The negotiations of the 1st and 2d of December had their origin in a mental blindness that was quite unpardonable. They had neither been approved nor ratified by the French government, which at once perceived the seriousness of the affront and the necessity of avenging it. It informed Admiral Dartige that it was inadmissible to settle the aggression of December 1 by the cession of a few cannon, and that any discussion as to the amount of material to be surrendered would be neither more nor less than disgraceful barter. At the same time it took measures imposing an embargo on Greek shipping and a provisional blockade of the Greek coasts until it should come to an agreement as to details with the other Allied powers. Then, on December 3, it submitted proposals to the Cabinets of London, Petrograd and Rome. These proposals have never been divulged. It is possible that some of them were just as radical as those of the preceding months were harmless. When one has been cruelly misunderstood there is a temptation to pass suddenly from one extreme to another. However this may be, for the sake of appearances or for lack of proper means of execution, the four Allied powers contented themselves with announcing a blockade of the coasts and islands of Greece "which were subject to or occupied by the royal Greek authorities" (December 7) and with presenting a series of demands to the Cabinet in Athens.

While these new negotiations were hanging fire, Constantine I and his accomplices gloried loudly in their triumph. The pursuit of the Venizelists, though less savage, continued and the pillage of their houses went

on. Taking the diplomatic offensive, the Lambros Cabinet sent to its representatives abroad a dispatch in which it claimed that it had been compelled to repress an insurrection. "The investigation which is being actively pushed," said this communication, "will show the existence of an antidynastic plot, fomented by the Venizelist party, which took advantage of the riots resulting from the skirmishes in the streets. It was only owing to the measures taken by the government that the conspirators could be arrested and the perfect order that now reigns could be restored." A repression so moderate of a rebellion so criminal certainly deserved congratulation, and the Minister of War actually did congratulate the troops of the Athens garrison and "the other combatants" in an order of the day, of which these passages are worth remembering: "It is with a heart overflowing with gratitude that, by order of his majesty the king, your commander-in-chief, I address to you my felicitations and congratulations on your exemplary conduct during those never-to-be-forgotten days, the 1st and 2d of December. Your loyalty, your spirit of self-sacrifice and your courage have saved our fatherland jeopardized by enemies who hoped to disturb public order and overthrow the dynasty. Our enemies must now realize that such valiant troops are invincible, and I can from now on view the future with confidence."

On their part the royalist newspapers celebrated in big headlines, "the retreat of the Allied forces before the irresistible attack of the Greek troops," and enumerated the prisoners taken on the 1st of December. Others were glad "that the heroes of Kilkish had had the honor of fighting the heroes of the Somme and Verdun." The newspaper *Nea Hemera* wrote: "The 1st and 2d of December have been, we are proud to say, two of the greatest, the holiest, the most splendidly glorious days in all Greek history. They may be regarded as the dawn of the real independence of Greece, delivering her

from the most hateful yoke which has ever menaced the existence of our race." The association of "radical reservists" addressed to all its members the following telegram: "Receive the kiss due to heroes. The rocks of the Acropolis have, thanks to you, regained their old-time prestige. The Greeks of to-day have won laurels worthy of the past. And now, keep watchful guard around the throne of our great king." Another royalist association sent out from the "Central Bureau of the Reservists" the following circular to all its adherents: "On the occasion of the discharge for a time of the members of the Pan-Hellenic Association of Reservists, accept the fraternal kiss of the Central Bureau for the glorious events that have occurred; announce to all our friends to whom you communicate these presents that we shall remain here obedient to the word of command and that as for them, they have now only to return to their families, full of pride in the great work accomplished. Let them wait, though, with bayonets fixed, ready to return, when the exigency arises, and place themselves under the colors in order to fulfill their supreme and sacred duty toward king and country."

The Allies, who had been represented to the Greek people as having confiscated the instruments of national defense,—in particular, the French and English allies (for care was taken not to raise disturbances in the neighborhood of the Italian and Russian embassies),—were denounced, through the machinations of the king, as enemies of the Greek people. Constantine I had cunningly persuaded us to formulate claims that were sure to wound Greek national pride and had urged us to proceed to the execution of our demands by force. He had then thrown against our unsuspecting soldiers bands of highly excited Greeks, and in short, thus killing two birds with one stone, he had suppressed those Venizelists whom he had resolved to hinder, even by fire and sword, from regaining power by legal means.

He was on the point of succeeding. For a while he had fooled the Allies by granting them in an official way concessions which he afterward abrogated in fact by the issuance of secret orders. Then he had arrayed against them the Germano-Bulgarians by opening up to these hereditary enemies of Greece territories which had been won by conquest in 1912-13. Disappointed in not seeing that formidable German offensive which was to pulverize the contemptible Anglo-French expeditionary force, he found himself forced to try to gain time. He made use of the Allics to neutralize the activity of the Venizelists. He had discredited the former by getting them to enter into agreements with him, and had held the latter in check by having their best weapons wrenched out of their hands by the protecting powers themselves. When finally driven to the wall he had broken away over the corpses of the Allicd soldiers. He bclieved himself saved. But the armies of William II still failed to appear before Saloniki. Constantine I had to try once more to gain time. He found the governments whom he had smitten on the one cheek perfectly ready to turn to him the other.

On the 14th of December the ministers of the Quadruple Entente delivered a new note to the government in Athens. They demanded reparation and the immediate transfer to the Peloponnesus, under the effective control of officers belonging to the Allied armies, of the Greek troops stationed on the mainland of Greece. Mr. Zalocostas, interspersing a few pleasantries in his reply, promised to exccute the removal of the troops in question. He begged the four powers to " reconsider " their decision to continue the blockade and offered as " the best guarantee that all misunderstandings would be avoided, the firm and most sincere desire of the royal government and of the Greek people to see confirmed as soon as possible the traditional excellent relations with

the four powers and the renewal of a close friendship based on reciprocal confidence."

Mr. Zalocostas would hardly have dared to use irony like this if he had not felt that disagreements of one sort and another were undermining the action of the Allies. He knew, far better than the public, which was systematically kept in ignorance of the negotiations between the chancelleries of the Entente, that the identity of views among them was by no means perfect. But one factor in the case was self-evident: the Italian press of all parties inveighed bitterly against Mr. Venizelos, while on the other hand it extolled Constantine I. The *Tribuna* wrote:

> The disorders in Athens prove that Constantine and his country are in perfect agreement, that no dynasty was ever a more faithful interpreter of the spirit and will of a nation than his. Hence the dangerous absurdity of those sentimental and magnanimous attempts on the part of the Allies to revivify, or, worse yet, to recognize, as though again existent, another Greece, purely fantastic and imaginary, a direct heir of ancient Greece. Let us leave this "Hellas" out of account and realize that we have only Greece with which we must deal. It is greatly to be deplored, and the events of to-day are the sad results of this error, that in newspapers of a certain tendency, and even in the parliaments of the Entente, this truth has not yet come to be courageously recognized, and that they continue to speak of a Hellas that exists wholly in the person of Venizelos.

On the 22d of December the same journal wrote:

> There were only two straightforward ways of dealing with Greece: alliance or war; an alliance, however, with the recognized chief of the state; with the king, and not with Venizelos, who is looked upon askance by both army and people; or else war against the army, the organized force of the state. Instead of this, what has the Entente done? It has made an alliance with one individual against the king, and has declared war on the Greek people, subjecting it to humiliations and threats. The Entente has put forth all its efforts not to the end that it may

win Greece over to itself, but that it may conquer for the benefit of Venizelos.

So, according to Rastignac (Signor Vicenzo Morello), we ought to have run after an alliance with Constantine as we had solicited that of Cobourg in Sofia, and to have carried on a campaign against Venizelism similar to the pressure we had exerted on Serbia. The *Corriere della Sera,* the most important and influential newspaper in Italy, had no hesitation, in order to damn Mr. Venizelos in the opinion of the protecting powers, to denounce him as an accomplice of Constantine's. On the 5th of December this famous Milan journal said:

> And there, in Saloniki, rubbing his hands with satisfaction, is Venizelos, Constantine's best subject and his most useful minister *in partibus.* If the Central Empires should win the victory, the king would make capital out of the injuries inflicted on his country by the Allies, their oppressors. If the Entente gets the upper hand, Venizelos will come knocking at the door of the peace congress and will show his declaration of war against Germany and Bulgaria. The trick is most astoundingly crude. There is no need even of imagining that the king and the rebel are in secret accord. It is enough to know that the double game exists in reality. But, within the last few days, a member of the English government, in the House of Commons, assured Venizelos of the protection of England; and the righteous indignation of the French press will perhaps not be sufficiently strong to cut short the comedy and to determine the Entente to take measures against those who are committing sabotage on her war in the east. The phil-hellenism of our allies is proof even against bullets. While Greece glories in her hostility to Italy, while she opposes to our rights in the Mediterranean a Pan-Hellenism that is alike grotesque and frenzied, the diplomacy of our allies, so it seems, proposes at all costs to avoid breaking with her, in order to be able, in the future, to count upon her friendship. Phil-hellenism seems an essential element in their program notwithstanding all that has happened in Greece during the last two years and more.

This language furnished an explanation of the fact that the Quadruple Entente persisted in not officially

recognizing the provisional government in Saloniki. It proved that if the protecting powers wished to take any serious action, they would have to resign themselves to acting alone and without the support of the Cabinet in Rome. They appear to have decided to take this step. At the end of December the Cabinet in London appointed Lord Granville, councilor of the British Embassy in Paris, to represent the government of his majesty in Mr. Venizelos' provisional government at Saloniki, with the title of "diplomatic agent." Some days later the Cabinet in Paris appointed M. de Billy, councilor of the French Embassy at the Quirinal, to a like position. On the 31st of December the ministers of France, Great Britain and Russia in Athens, declaring that they were acting as representatives of the guaranteeing powers of Greece, sent Mr. Zalocostas a note formulating a series of demands for guarantees and reparations. The guarantees consisted in the reduction of the Greek forces in continental Greece "to the number of men strictly necessary to the maintenance of order and to the policing of the country"; in the transfer to the Peloponnesus of all superfluous armament and munitions, as well as of all the machine-guns and of all the artillery of the Greek army with their ammunition; in the prohibiting of all meeting and assembling of reservists north of the Isthmus of Corinth; in forbidding every civilian to carry arms; in the re-establishment of the different controls by the Allies. As reparations the three powers exacted the immediate liberation of all persons detained because of political opinions or political offenses, and indemnities for the victims of the 1st and 2d of December (paragraph 4); the dismissal of the commander of the first corps of the army, apologies on the part of the Greek government to the ministers of the Allies, a public ceremony of salute rendered to the Allied colors, and finally, permission to use the Itea-Larissa route for the transportation of troops. No definite time-

limit was fixed, but the blockade was to be maintained "until satisfaction had been afforded on all the points above indicated."

The Allies persisted, then, in their arrangements for the handing over of supplies, the transfers of troops and the system of controls by representatives of the Allies. They even made their blunder worse by making it more precise. In this note in which they were supposed to be exacting punishment for the outrages of the 1st and 2d of December, they offset all that they gained by the following: "On their part, the guaranteeing powers give a formal engagement to the Greek government not to permit the armed forces of the government for the national defense, profiting by the withdrawal of the royal troops from Thessaly and Epirus, to pass over the neutral zone established in agreement with the Greek government." Though it seemed logical, this agreement was really monstrous. It placed in a clear light the fundamental viciousness of the whole arrangement. Under pretext of hindering the Venizelists from profiting by movements of troops made independently of them, the protecting powers sanctioned a provisional arrangement which cut Greece into two parts and protected the king against the national movement. This ought to have been enough to reassure Italy. But in spite of it, she refused to participate in the concerted measures. She instructed Count Bosdari to present a separate note to this purport:

Italy, by this present communication, affirms her joint responsibility with her allies in matters general. She shares in the demands and declarations contained in the aforementioned note, touching the military guarantees that the powers of the Entente deem necessary to exact of Greece in view of the present situation in the Balkans, as well as the reparations that these same powers believe to be due them in consequence of the events of the 1st of December.

As to what concerns the claims in paragraph 4 of the note

of the guaranteeing powers, in view of the fact that these have to do with questions of internal order, Italy believes that she has no right to intervene and declares that she takes no interest in the investigation into said claims.

The three protecting powers did not maintain this distinct attitude of theirs for any very long time. In the course of conferences held in Rome during the first days of January by the Prime Ministers of Italy, France, Great Britain and the representative of Russia, assisted by eminent civil and military personages, they were surprised by a dispatch from the Cabinet in Athens, dated January 6, raising various objections to the note of December 31. After a discussion, of which the public knew nothing, the four governments of the Entente on the 8th of January united in a common declaration. They established as a principle that they had as their end and aim the protection of the army in the east from any and every menace of a flank attack from the Greek side. Then they fixed a limit of fifteen days for the execution of the ultimatum of the 31st of December, specifying that if, after eventual acceptation, any obstacle whatever was willfully raised to the execution of this arrangement within the prescribed time, they would claim against their liberty to act in such a way as to assure the safety of their nationals by making use of their own resources on land and sea. Unfortunately, this desire to be energetic was spoiled by an agreement with Constantine I that was more far-reaching than that of the 31st of December. It was thus framed:

The Allied powers promise not to allow the partisans of the provisional government to take advantage either on land or sea of the withdrawal of Greek troops into the Peloponnesus, with the purpose of occupying any portion whatever of Greek territory that is thus deprived of all means of resistance.

The Allied powers in like manner promise not to let the authorities of the provisional government establish themselves in any territories now in the possession of the royal government

which they [the Allies] may feel themselves called on to occupy temporarily for military reasons.

When Baron Schenk was expelled from Athens with a pack of agents of the German propaganda, he replied, it is said, to an American journalist who asked him about the future: "The question as to whether my work in Greece will last depends entirely on the Allies, who up to now have been my best assistants." They continued to be his best assistants.

They became more and more involved in the tangle of negotiations. On January 10 Mr. Zalocostas replied to the ultimatum of the 8th by a note that was at once ironical and full of traps. He began by availing himself "with the liveliest satisfaction" of the "exact guarantees" that the powers had been so good as to give to Greece. Then he expressed his desire "in this case also" to do all that was in his power to avoid all misunderstanding. With this point once established, the rest of his letter simply bubbled over with sources of misunderstanding. He said that in order that the guarantees demanded by the powers might be as little annoying as possible, "they could be determined, in the accord that would come about, without permitting any infringement on the different departments of the administration or with the means of communication in the interior." Mr. Zalocostas deigned afterwards to withdraw an objection that had been raised to the liberation of the persons referred to in paragraph 4 of the note of the 31st of December, but he demanded in return the setting free "of persons imprisoned for not having acceded to the revolutionary government, or arrested on the occasion of the forced conscription carried on by the seditious committee." As to the indemnities to the victims of the 1st and 2d of December, he proposed to refer the matter to the Greek courts and proposed a mixed inquest. Having thus given "a supreme evidence of his sincere

intentions" he declared that "the conditions for the lifting of the blockade might be regarded as already fulfilled." "Finally," said the minister in closing, "while appreciating fully the guarantees of the Allied governments on the subject of the revolutionary movement, guarantees which will reassure the minds of the Greek people, the royal government expresses the hope that, in the spirit which inspired the promise which the Allied governments had been good enough to make in the next to the last paragraph of their note of January 8, 1917, they may be willing to apply analogous measures to the territories at present occupied by Allied troops and notably to the islands which they had occupied after the 1st of December.

Evidently, Mr. Zalocostas must have felt encouraged in his policy of subterfuge. The *Idea Nazionale,* a newspaper very much in favor at the Italian Embassy, wrote: "The Greeks now regard Italy with friendly feelings, one may almost say, with gratitude. The government of Athens seems to put all its confidence in the Italian Minister." This journal considered all appeal to the special rights of the guaranteeing powers as absurd formalism and as outworn partisanship. It characterized as a serious and unjustifiable mistake the attempt to base political action in Greece's case "on treaties of protection that were antiquated and utterly out of date." After the conference at Rome on January 10, it commented thus on the decisions reached: "This conference was convened here in order to show a respect to Italy commensurate with the increasing importance of her rôle as well as in order to recognize her special interests in the Orient." The journal *La Stampa,* Signor Giolitti's organ, said squarely: "Italy is at present the real 'protecting power' of Greece."

In spite of this protection, the three guaranteeing powers could not let the impertinence of Mr. Zalocostas

pass. On the 13th of January their representatives, with the Italian Minister acting in concert with them, addressed a new note to the government of Athens, rejecting all the suggestions of Mr. Zalocostas and insisting on the immediate and unconditional carrying out of the guarantees and reparations that had been demanded. On the 16th of January, after a Crown Council, which had been specially called, the government of Athens decided to yield. It declared "that it had no idea of procuring any limitations to the acceptance of the demands formulated by the powers and that it gave its adherence to the precise terms as announced." On the 24th of January the *Official Journal* of Athens published a decree deposing from office General Callaris, commanding the 1st corps of the army. On the 25th Mr. Zalocostas addressed the following letter to the representatives of the Quadruple Entente: "Conformably to the promise given in its reply to the ultimatum of the Allied governments dated January 8, the royal government presents formal apologies to their excellencies, the Ministers of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia because of the regrettable incidents of the 1st of December, 1916." On the 29th, in the presence of the ministers and before detachments of the land and sea forces of the four powers, in Zappeion Square, the Greek troops commanded by a Greek general and Prince Andrew, the king's brother, marched solemnly by and saluted the Allied colors. On the same day, Mr. Zalocostas informed M. Guillemin that the dissolution of the societies of reservists had been declared and that the judiciary had been charged with the extension of this measure.

Such was the outcome of this long diplomatic duel. We obtained a nominal satisfaction, but in reality Constantine I came out of the conflict not only exonerated but with reputation enhanced. Under the inspiration of his hidden councilors who were always with him, he

continued to elude the effective execution of the guarantees accepted by his government.

This diplomatic bickering was succeeded by skirmishing between the Allies and the administration. The time-limit of fifteen days, set by the declaration of the 8th of January, elapsed, but the prescribed transfers of troops and war material had not been effected, the controls which had been provided for had not been established, and the reparation to the victims of the 1st and 2d of December had not been made. Mr. Lambros and his civil and military coadjutors employed every artifice to avoid the execution of the conditions laid down by the Entente. The soldiers transported to the Peloponnesus made their way back again in citizen's dress or on military leave of absence; or better yet, such men as were needed north of the Isthmus of Corinth were dressed up as police, if indeed they were not turned into comitadjis outright. Lies were told about the contents of cases of weapons, and arms were cached in the earth. Informed of this by the Allied controllers, General Caubone, the new military attaché of France, presented claim on claim. Messrs. Lambros and Zalocostas dissimulated, denied, protested their good-will, evaded the issue and were profuse in promises. Meanwhile, the royalist newspapers invented calumny on calumny against the Allies. Their principal argument was furnished them in the continuation of the blockade; they proclaimed that the Entente was starving the people; they organized indignation meetings, and saw that repeated entreaties and petitions were sent to the king. In order not to permit public opinion to be led astray, the ministers of the Entente, on the 19th of February, caused to be published in the newspapers a declaration to the Greek people summing up the situation as follows:

The representatives of the Allies have already called the attention of the royal government to the hostile attitude of the Greek

press and to the danger that Greece will incur if she persists in fostering public excitement and in making attacks that are as often as not founded on calumny and lies. For example, in the matter of the blockade, certain newspapers are trying to spread the impression that this is unjustly maintained since Greece has, as they say, fulfilled all her engagements. This is manifestly inexact. The military control of the Allies cannot take the responsibility of declaring that the promised guarantees have been given, while there remains in continental Greece a great quantity of arms, the existence of which is recognized by the Greek government itself since it has prescribed to the authorities the date on which they must be surrendered. The Allied control is all the less justified in consenting to leave these arms on this side of the Peloponnesus, since they might be employed by the hostile organizations which continue to exist in all parts of Greece and especially in Thessaly, where they constitute a perpetual menace to the oriental army. Other important facts have been brought directly to the knowledge of the Greek government by the chief of the Allied control,—for example, the laying of mines on the banks of the Corinth canal. In these circumstances the Greek people ought not to be surprised that the Allies in default of that correct attitude which they have a right to expect on the part of Greece, cannot regard the guarantees stipulated in the note of January 8 as having yet been yielded. Nevertheless, far from being indifferent to the sufferings of an innocent people, the Allied powers have already looked into the question of what measures they will take to furnish Greece with food supplies just as soon as circumstances will permit. In consequence, the Allied ministers call the attention of the Greek government once more to the grave responsibility that it would incur if it tolerated any longer the excesses of the anti-Venizelist press, which seems to have no other design than to delude public opinion and thus hinder the re-establishment of friendly relations between Greece and the Allied powers.

This appeal to common sense provoked in Greece a redoubling of recriminations and calumnies. New journals were even created specially charged with vilifying the Allies. Ever since the 2d of December the Venizelist newspapers had ceased to appear. The public could only look for information to the organs of King Constantine. It was thus kept in an utterly abnormal

state of ferment. The Lambros Cabinet took advantage of this to oppose to the demands of the Allies exceptions or contestations that were increasingly irritating. Time went by without the threatening clause of the declaration of the 8th of January being put into effect. In the second fortnight of March, Sir Francis Elliot, the English minister, and M. Guillemin, the French minister, left the warships in which they had lived since the events of December in order to reopen their embassies. Emboldened by impunity, Greeks, disguised as comitadjis, gave themselves up to insulting provocations and even to crimes. A band of these irregulars massacred a patrol of Senegalese in the vicinity of Serbia. By way of reprisal General Sarrail gave the order to shoot all armed individuals belonging to the irregular bands. The order was executed. A troop of cavalry of the Saloniki army, sent into the valley of Vistritsa, discovered in the monastery of Zidani (Zidavrion) concealed weapons and armed comitadjis; he confiscated the arms and shot the comitadjis, among whom was a Greek officer. There arose at once a chorus of maledictions in the royalist press. This extract from *Scrip* of the 5th of April gives an idea of what these were like:

> Ajax in his madness butchered sheep, thinking that he was butchering his enemies. General Sarrail butchers abbots, notaries and police, thinking that he is butchering comitadjis. And for fear that this massacre may give rise to the idea that there are no longer any comitadjis and that he, Sarrail, is from now on useless, he announces that his orders will continue to be executed and that the irregulars will be shot. Is every peasant who does not abandon his wife and his daughter to the "needs of the army," or who manifests fidelity to his country and devotion to his king, regarded as an irregular? . . . The Greek government would commit the worst of errors in making any reply to the general's communication. There is only one reply to make: "The general lied!"

The question of indemnities to the Venizelists who had been injured or had been subjected to damages raised

interminable controversies. After the arrival of the two French and English representatives in the commission instituted for this purpose, Mr. Lambros put forth various unacceptable claims. The pretense was made that they could find no appropriate place for the sessions of the commission. Then they proceeded to stumble around in the tangles of procedure. Finally, the ministerial journals suggested the idea of reconventional counterclaims against the Entente; so, for instance, the *Neon Asty* proposed to demand a sum of six million francs to defray the cost of the transport of troops and war material into the Peloponnesus. Passing frankly to the offensive, the royalists called upon Mr. Lambros to purify the personnel of the university which had been contaminated by Venizelism. They expressed the regret that the cleaning up had not been more complete on the 2d of December. Openly banishing from now on the idea which, with the object of misleading the Entente, had been for a long time lauded, that idea, namely, of a possible reconciliation between the king and Mr. Venizelos, they rejected with horror the possibility of such a rapprochement: "Constantine," cried the *Acropolis,* "has the innocence of a sacrificial lamb."

These actions did not, at the end of the winter of 1917, meet in France and England with the same indulgence as previously. In spite of the tender regard for the susceptibilities of Constantine I which was felt by the Cabinets of Paris and London, public opinion in the two countries expressed itself more and more strongly against the policy of inactivity in Greece. It found a powerful echo in the two parliaments. At the Palais Bourbon the Greek situation was the subject of very lively discussion in secret committee. In the meanwhile, in the second fortnight of March, the Briand Cabinet resigned. Although it had not lost its majority, and the immediate cause of its withdrawal was the difficulty of replacing the Minister of War, who had been forced out,

it is certain that its authority had been weakened by its way of handling the Greek question. The Ribot Cabinet which succeeded it felt that it ought, in this connection, to defer to public opinion. It showed very soon that it intended to settle the question for once and all. At that very time revolution broke out in Russia. After a week or two of uncertainty, it became clear that the forced abdication of Nicolas II was in reality a deposition and that Czarism itself had been overthrown. Constantine I lost in the Petrograd court a valuable support. Some days later, at the beginning of April, the United States intervened in the European conflagration. President Wilson declared war on Germany and proclaimed the right of peoples to dispose of themselves freely. He thundered against absolutism and autocracy. This anathema re-echoed widely throughout all Hellas. The ground began to fail beneath the feet of the "slayer of Venizelists," the constitutional king who had been transformed by the grace of William II into the Lord's Anointed, accountable to God alone.

On the 28th of March two Venizelist newspapers, the *Hestia* and the *Ethnos,* appeared again in Athens. On the 13th of April came the turn of the *Kairi* and on the 22d that of the *Patris.* The others followed after an interval of a few days. At about the same time those of the Ionian Islands in which the Allies were not established gave adherence one after another to the provisional government in Saloniki. On the 7th of April, the anniversary of Greek independence, the ministers of the Entente did not appear at the celebration of the national holiday and the Allied vessels, warships as well as the vessels of the merchant marine, were not decorated with flags in honor of the day. To stimulate the enthusiasm of the crowd, the royalists had spread the rumor that the Venizelists would seize the opportunity of the national holiday to make an attempt on the life of the king and to stir up riots. But all passed off very

calmly. This did not hinder the organs of Constantine on the next day from assuring the "idol adored of the people" that he would be defended against all attempts. The journal *Scrip* in a lyrical outburst put in the mouth of the people this hymn "to the martyr king":

I am there, Sire, at thy side! Guard in thy powerful hands the strength of the state and the honor of the fatherland. I, yes I, will support thy glorious throne. No power in the world shall tear me away from thy feet. Even in chains, with hands in irons, and feet in fetters, even under the tyranny of starvation and the threat of death, I will continue to shout "Long live the king!"

This exaltation of spirit, generously rewarded by the treasury of the German propaganda, succeeded in deluding the neutrals and even some of those on the side of the Entente. It did not deceive observers that were well advised. One of them, M. Charles Frégier, on the 15th of April (*Journal des Débats,* April 28) wrote from Athens:

In the course of the difficult negotiations of these latter times the Entente has surrounded the throne of Constantine with guarantees, destined to uphold it even against the will of his subjects; these guarantees are perhaps, at this moment, his surest support. On the day when the logical course of events shall for once and all abolish them, when the Entente shall decide to support its friends, wherever they may be, in old Greece as well as in the new, we shall perhaps be amazed to see this much vaunted prestige of Constantine sink out of sight in an instant, crushed under the too heavy burden imposed on it.

At the Quai d'Orsay in Paris and at the Foreign Office in London the same opinion began to prevail. The realization dawned on them that, instead of administering in small doses, drop by drop, as it were, their moral and material support to the provisional government, heavily burdened with anxiety, it would have been more profit-

able as well as more clever freely and frankly to facilitate its task. What results might the Allied powers not have obtained, as M. Frégier said in the letter cited above, "if they had devoted as earnest efforts to strengthening New Greece, considered as the eleventh of the Allied states, as they had spent in order to keep the crown on Constantine's head?"

Considerations of this nature found more and more acceptance among serious thinkers. On the 19th of April, in a meeting at Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, Messrs. Ribot, Lloyd George, Boselli and Sonnino discussed, among other subjects, the Greek question. Their decision was not divulged, but a few days later the court at Athens showed symptoms of uneasiness. The rumor of Mr. Lambros' resignation was current. Mr. Lambros, a mere tool of the king, had no special reason for withdrawing nor even any desire to do so. If the power left his hands, it was because the monarch judged it advantageous to sacrifice this minister to the supposed rancor of the Entente. There was some talk of Mr. Zaïmis, who had become once more the governor of the National Bank, as future Prime Minister. These tentative moves had a somewhat cool reception in the French press. The change of person, as proposed, would have brought us no satisfaction. For some time, there was no further mention of it. But another rumor spread. An intention to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince was attributed to Constantine I. The French press observed that neither Greece nor the Entente would gain anything by the change. Since, after the appointment of the Ribot ministry, the censor had allowed greater freedom to the press, it demanded the definitive and radical settlement of the Greek question. It demanded of the powers that had signed the declaration of the 8th of January to reclaim their liberty of action in accordance with the formal clause that had provided for this even-

tuality, and to act vigorously in Attica, or at least to permit the provisional government to act by its own agencies in Thessaly and the rest of the kingdom. These articles in the French journals were much commented on in Athens. People believed that they saw in them signs that were the precursors of grave measures. On the 1st of May the Congress of Hellenic Colonies, assembled at Paris, declared Constantine I and all his dynasty deposed from the throne and from all royal prerogatives. At the same time it "appealed to the benevolence of the Allied powers no longer to hinder any province from giving its adherence freely to the national government at Saloniki" and begged them "to recognize the Greek Republic just as soon as the assembly called to constitute it should have proclaimed it." Then the Zaïmis clique appeared once more, and was accepted on the 3d of May. After long parleys Mr. Zaïmis consented to leave his position at the National Bank to take upon himself once more the prime ministry with the portfolio of foreign affairs. Almost all his colleagues were professed anti-Venizelists.

Mr. Zaïmis had very little support in the press. Treated as a suspect by the royalist editors who had been besought to conceal their sentiments so as not to bring discredit on the new royal cabinet, he was described by most of the Venizelists as a man of straw. The *Makedonia* characterized him as "the Pilate of crucified Greece." In France a marked distrust of him was evinced. Although he declared that his entire program consisted in the re-establishment of friendly relations with the Entente, he was suspected of holding to these friendly relations only in order to permit the king to gain more time and to corner the grain-harvest of Thessaly for the exclusive advantage of the royalists. Besides, General Dousmanis, Colonel Metaxas, Messrs. Streit, Mercouris and Co. kept hold of the power both public and secret, and with it remained in the confidence

of Constantine I. Mr. Zaïmis did, to be sure, immediately put at the disposal of the commission on indemnities a meeting place for which they had up to that time looked in vain. He did, to be sure, announce that measures had been taken against the armed bands that were overrunning Thessaly, and he also let it be known that he was going to send away from Athens seven colonels who were known to be hostile to the Entente. Very small guarantees these to the Entente!

As a matter of fact, during the entire month of May, the agents of control under General Cauboue kept discovering arms and ammunition concealed in the capital itself, or in the suburbs or the provinces. The police continued to dress themselves up as comitadjis, and the comitadjis to disguise themselves as police. The officers of Constantine's staff elaborated as assiduously as ever the plans for co-operating with the Germano-Bulgarians against the day so eagerly longed for, the day when the soldiers of William II would descend on Saloniki. Though to all appearance dissolved, the League of Reservists was reconstituted under the direction of a nephew of Mr. Gounaris by the name of Sayas. In reply to objections on the part of the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Sayas threatened the government "with an explosion of popular anger." As a substitute for the League of Reservists or as a superstructure on it, there was formed, under the auspices of Mr. Livieratos, a retired magistrate, a so-called "Federation" of the syndicates of the different trades and professions and of popular societies. The royalists gave out that this was a union of labor organizations, but the real labor organizations entered a protest. Messrs. Sayas and Livieratos, however, negotiated with Mr. Zaïmis none the less freely, because of this fact, on an absolutely equal footing. They issued a manifesto against the dismissal of the seven colonels.

These were not the only indications of a dangerous

situation. The authorities themselves assumed a provocative attitude. On the 21st of May a decree of arrest issued by the grand jury brought before the assizes the director and manager of the newspaper *Patris* on the score of having published in 1916 some letters that established the part taken by Deputy Callimassiotis, a friend of Mr. Gounaris, in supplying the German submarines. On the 29th of May the navy war-council sent forth an order for the arrest of Admiral Coundouriotis for the crime of high treason. At the end of the same month some Venizelists were beaten and imprisoned on the island of Aegina by the police. During the night of the 30th-31st an attempt was made to assassinate two English officers. A few days later some French officers of the military control, on a tour of search, were obliged to turn back before a party of reservists. The newspaper *Scrip* accused the Senegalese of the expeditionary force of kidnapping little children, killing and eating them.

At the same time the Constantine cult became a sort of idolatry. On the 27th of May the second anniversary of the miraculous cure of the king by the wonder-working picture of the Panagia of Tenos, a thanksgiving service was held at the Metropolitan Church, which the *Embros* reported in the following words: "When the reverend orator, incomparable in the force of his logic and the brilliance of his rhetoric, had affirmed in thundering words that King Constantine was not destined to be dethroned but to be crowned with the imperial diadem in Constantinople, when he had finished chanting the hymn: 'Be victor, thou emperor and king,' the throng rushed forward to kiss the hands of the prelate, while on all sides re-echoed these cries: 'Down with the tyrants! Long live our adored king!'" On the 3d of June, the king's fête, the followers of Constantine were carried away by another ourburst of devotion to their sovereign. The Federation of Workingmen presented

the monarch with an iron cross, begging him to wear it whenever he appeared before the troops with the bâton of a German field-marshal in his hand. After the *Te Deum* at the cathedral Constantine I betook himself to the University to take part in the dedication of his own bust. Two other busts of him were to be dedicated in the course of the month, one at the barracks of the 7th regiment of infantry and the other at the Chamber of Deputies. Fate, however, was reserving for Constantine a ceremony of quite a different nature.

During the month of May the Cabinets of Paris and London had come to an agreement. Their chiefs had held additional conferences in Paris and in London. Assured of the agreement of Russia and the consent of Italy, they had resolved on radical measures. Their decisions, the outcome of secret deliberations, became known only after they had been put in execution, and even then not fully. We may quite certainly say that they had a double object: the sequestration of the harvests in Thessaly so that they would profit all Greece, and the re-establishment of the constitutional régime. Suspecting what was to happen as to the first part of the program, Mr. Zaïmis proposed to yield to the Allies a portion of the Thessalian harvest. As to the second part, the government in Athens did not know exactly in what this re-establisment of the constitutional régime consisted. But it flattered itself that it could bring it to naught. The time has not come to tell what supreme efforts were put forth in order to make the Allies' enterprise miscarry as it had done in the month of June, 1916. This time these efforts failed.

On Wednesday, June 6, the Athenians suddenly learned of the arrival in Greek waters of M. Jonnart, a French senator, invested with the rank of High Commissioner of the protecting powers. Then they noticed a great movement of warships in the bay of Salamis, the Saronic Gulf and the Gulf of Corinth.

The royalists insinuated that it was going to be just the same with the Jonnart mission as with the earlier demonstrations of the Allies. Then they saw the vessel that carried the High Commissioner, after a short stop at Salamis, sail off to Saloniki. What passed between M. Jonnart, Mr. Venizelos and General Sarrail is not known. On the 10th M. Jonnart returned to Salamis. On the 11th, in the morning, the lightning struck. In an interview with Mr. Zaïmis, the High Commissioner of the three protecting powers demanded in their name the abdication of King Constantine and the designation of his successor, to the exclusion of the Crown Prince. What then became of the tens of thousands of heroes who had sworn to defend the king, their idol, to the very last drop of their blood. They raised a hue and cry, turbulent throngs filled the streets, but there was no breach of the peace. What were the thoughts that passed through the mind of Constantine I? After bitter reflections on the vicissitudes of mundane affairs, he decided to submit. On Tuesday between 9 and 10 in the morning Mr. Zaïmis informed M. Jonnart that "His Majesty the King, solicitous as ever of the interests of Greece alone, has decided to leave the country along with the Crown Prince and has designated as his successor Prince Alexander," his second son.

Constantine I did not officially abdicate nor did his eldest son resign his claim to the throne. They hoped without doubt to be restored to Greece by William II, the Conqueror. They left the throne in the meantime to a complacent prince who would keep the crown for them, and they left the political power to a minister who would care for their interests. But they went away without daring to defend themselves or to have any defense made for them. They fled before the storm, carrying with them the curse of Hellas. Embarked for Italy, they had not yet reached the residence of their choice when their hopes were dashed. While they

slipped out of Lugano amid manifestations of public scorn, Mr. Venizelos was starting for Athens. After a brief consultation, the High Commissioner decided, with Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Zaïmis agreeing, that half-way measures would do no good and that the best thing was to restore the power to Mr. Venizelos, who would reassemble the Chamber elected June 13, 1915. No sooner said than done. In consequence of the publication of a proclamation in which he boasted of his desire to follow in the footsteps of his illustrious father, Alexander I was required to apologize and to declare his willingness to respect the Constitution. He is now only the shadow of a king, obliged to content himself with signing the papers that his Prime Minister puts before him. The latter, acclaimed by the crowd, which, according to the statement of the paid agents of the German propaganda, hated him and was sure to tear him in pieces, has taken up with a firmer hand than ever, and with an increased prestige, the direction of national affairs. The people of Thessaly are saluting the soldiers of Sarrail's army as their liberators. The Morea is yielding submission. The army in its entirety is rallying in support of the new régime. General Dousmanis, Colonel Metaxas, the two Mercouris and their acolytes meekly embarked for Corsica. All the thunders of war which for two years had intimidated the Entente with their rumbling died away entirely.

A few days had sufficed to bring about this great change. The decision of two governments, the energy and ability of one man, the mere presence of an armed force capable of breaking down all resistance got the better at once of the extravagant showy boasting of a clique of fanatics. The errors of 1915 and 1916 have not been repaired, for political mistakes always leave behind them something irreparable. But the humiliation of the 1st of December has been avenged and the prestige of the Entente re-established. Greece has been restored

to her natural destiny and respect for treaties has been confirmed. It has been proved to the world that the protecting powers, when they co-operated with the chief of the liberal party in restoring the constitutional régime did not, as the Germans and some neutrals claimed, commit a violation of international law comparable to the invasion of Belgium in August, 1914, but that they acted as guardians of the liberties of a people bound to them by solemn treaties. What could be done in Greece in the spring of 1917 was done, but there is still much to do in the East.

THE END

GREECE—AND TOMORROW

By Z. D. FERRIMAN
Author of "Some English Philhellenes," "Home Life in Hellas," "Turkey and the Turk," etc.

To which is added

An Account of
THE BANQUET
tendered to His Excellency
GEORGE ROUSSOS,
the Minister of Greece to the United States

EDITED BY
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GREECE—AND TOMORROW*

By Z. D. Ferriman

The inhabitants of the kingdom of Greece are only a fraction of the Greek people. This is a truism for all who are familiar with the Near East. Sir Rennell Rodd says: "The Greeks of today form a nation of considerable homogeneity from the Ionian Islands to the Black Sea, speaking a common language." †

A traveler starting from Northern Epirus, at the gate of the Adriatic, and following the coast round to the Euxine, is bound to find himself in agreement with that statement.

But the area of Greek population far exceeds these limits. Perhaps the readiest way of demonstrating this is to take a map of the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean and extend the itinerary. The Ægean is Greek on both its shores and all its islands. The Sea of Marmora is ringed round with Greeks. From the Bosphorus eastward, along the Black Sea littoral, there is a Greek fringe extending to Trebizond. On the western coast of Asia Minor the Greek population is much more than a fringe. It spreads far on the plain of the Hermes northeast, and up the valleys of the Mæander, the Caÿster, and the Lycus, southeast. North of Smyrna it is continuous along the coast to the Dardanelles, whence it stretches across the country through Apollonia, Broussa and Nicæa to the Gulf of Nicomedia. From that city (Ismid today) it is unbroken on the gulf shore to Constantinople. South of Smyrna it is scattered

* Reprinted through the courtesy of the Anglo-Hellenic League of London, from Publication No. 23 (1915).

† *Customs and Lore of Modern Greece*, 1892.

through Lycia to the southern coast of Asia Minor, which is almost harborless; consequently the Greek element is thinner here; but it thickens notably at Adalia, and further on in Cilicia, from whose shores we can descry the peaks of Cyprus, where, out of a population of 237,000 there are 182,737 Orthodox Greeks, and some thousands more of other creeds who are largely Greek in blood, and wholly so in language and tradition. Far north, across the Cilician plain and beyond the snowy Taurus, we shall find Greeks at Nigdeh,* and in many a village until we reach Cæsarea in Cappadocia. From this remote but vigorous center, Greeks in various walks of life spread far and wide. So we may follow the thread westward to the high central plateau, still meriting—for it is treeless—the name of Axylon, given to it by the Greeks of old. It is the heart of Asia Minor, and of the Turkish race—yet there are 73,000 Greeks in the province and 7,000 in the capital, Konia (Iconium).† On the way we have found Greeks at Eragli (Heraclea Cybistra) and Karaman, whose Greek inhabitants still call it by its ancient name, Laranda. Westward from Konia we do not lose touch with them—there is a considerable community on Lake Egerdir—until they join hands with those of the Mæander Valley, a population which grows in density as it approaches the Ægean.

It is impossible, in view of the recent wholesale transmigrations, to estimate the Greek population of what was once Turkey in Europe. M. Elisée Réclus estimated it at 1,200,000 of what he terms "pure Greeks," meaning Greek in blood as well as orthodox in religion. Since he wrote, Greeks have been driven from what was at the time (1906) Eastern Roumelia by the Bulgarians, and from Thrace (1913-14) by the Turks. These are now dispersed through Greek Macedonia. The former sought

* Cuinet: *La Turquie d'Asie* gives 18,000 as the Greek population of Nigdeh, and 25,449 as that of Cæsarea and district—probably understated. 1894.

† The figures are from Cuinet. 1894.

refuge in Thessaly. The writer remembers seeing some thousands of them on the quay at Volo, on their way to found a new Anchialos. The Greek population on the coast lands of the Ægean, now possessed by Bulgaria, has been considerably reduced. Nevertheless, from the Dardanelles to Cavalla the tongue is still Greek. And from Cavalla, whether we strike inland through Doxato, Drama and Serres, or follow the coast skirting the base of the Trident of Chalcidicè on to Salonica, the Greeks are with us all the way. Beyond Salonica, through Naussa, Verria and Edessa, across the plain to the snows of Olympus, or by Florina and Korytza, and south to Kozani, it is the same, until we cross the Pindus into Epirus, our starting point. The fact that one can travel from Corfu to Trebizond with the Greek language is not the point. For that matter, we find Greek traders in all the towns on the Syrian coast until we come to the great Greek community in Egypt and beyond. Gordon found Greeks at Khartoum, and Livingstone discovered one in the region of the Equatorial Lakes. But in the area we are considering the Greek is indigenous. It is his ancestral home. The Ægean is the fount of the Hellenic race—the center from which it radiates to South-eastern Europe and Western Asia. It spread much further in times past. The settlements in Africa, in the Tauric Chersonese, in Italy, Sicily, and Gaul have been absorbed. But in the Eastern Mediterranean the Greek is permanent. The territory now included in the modern kingdom of Greece was called, rightly, the Eye of Hellas. But it was not all Hellas, nor is it today. The Greeks of Constantinople and Smyrna are not emigrant colonists like those of New York and San Francisco. They were colonists when they came to Constantinople from Megara in 658 B.C., and to Smyrna from Cymè in 1100 B.C. Maroneia, now in Bulgarian territory, has been Greek since Xerxes passed by it "on the left hand," * and since

* *Herod.* VII., 109.

Homer sang its wine.* Sinope, the city of Diogenes, has never lacked Greeks since it was colonized by Milesians and later by Athenians sent by Pericles. Samsoun, largely peopled by Greeks today, was the flourishing city, Amisus. The Greeks of Ordu, farther along the coast, do not forget that it is the Cotyara where the ten thousand of Xenophon embarked on their return. The Greeks of Trebizond are the descendants of those who guarded the last shred of empire down to 1460 A.D. The Ægean and its isles, with the adjacent extremities of Europe and Asia, are the domain of the Greek, bound up in the history of the race, steeped in its traditions. Names which current events bring to our lips daily, sound strangely familiar to us, linked as they are with imperishable legends; Lemnos, scene of the deeds of gods and heroes; Tenedos over against the Trojan shore, the plain of Ilion, and rugged Ida; the Dardanelles recalling Dardanus; the Hellespont and Cape Hellè, enshrining the story of the eponymic ancestor of the Hellenes; the Bosphorus, that of Io. The narrow seas are fraught with legends of the Argonauts. Erdek on the Propontis was Cyzicus; Ghemlek was Cius, breathing for all time the melancholy tale of Hylas. Therapia, on the Bosphorus, familiar to our day as the abode of diplomacy, was the Pharmakia where Medea strewed her poisons, its designation changed by that euphemism beloved of the Greeks, which led them to substitute an auspicious name for one of evil omen. Beyond, on the opposite side, Anadoli Kavak was the Hieron where Jason sacrificed to the gods within view of the Symplegades, the dreaded rocks, on which still stands one of the many votive altars which for ages studded these shores, reared by the piety of mariners ere affronting the perils of the Euxine.

Leaving the twilight of myth for the daylight of history, volumes might be filled with the memories from the

* *Odyssey* IX., 196-201.

expeditions of a Darius and Xerxes downward. Take two only. One clings to the Thracian Chersonese, once again the theater of desperate strife. A short way above the narrows of the Dardanelles an insignificant stream falls into a little bay. Its local name is Kara Ova Chai, but as Ægospotamos, the site of the battle which ended the Peloponnesian War, its fame will endure so long as the world reads history. Just beyond the Straits on the Asiatic shore, a more considerable stream, descending from a spur of Ida, falls into the Propontis. A Turkish peasant will tell you it is the Hojah Chai, and the name leaves you indifferent. Ask a Greek schoolboy from Lampsacus or any of the neighboring villages, and you will learn that it is the Granicus, where Alexander gained the victory which led him to the banks of the Indus, the first stepping-stone to the penetration of Asia by Europeans. It may be asked what is the good of raking up old fables of the world's youth, of citing historical events of an epoch dead and gone? What bearing has it all on present conditions and the actual situation? The answer is that the fables are Greek fables, and the history is Greek history, and the Greeks are not dead. We are coming to the consideration of the actual conditions, but in the meantime it is well to define the Greek position, in view of the fact that of late years, in England, there has been a tendency to ignore it, and to minimize Greek claims. From what precedes, it will be admitted that the Greek nation, as at present constituted within the kingdom of Greece, is a term which does not connote the Greek people, considerably less than half of which is included in the kingdom. Apart from this, the Greek element, as a moral, intellectual, and political factor in the Near East, cannot be measured by the mere counting of heads. A writer * of the mid-nineteenth century says: " The rôle of Greece in the contemporary East closely resembles its rôle in

* H. M. Baird: *Modern Greece.* 1856.

antiquity. It is a motive power in the Ottoman Empire, as twenty-two centuries ago it was in Persian Asia." The question of the continuity of the Greek race from classic times to the present cannot be entered on here. The dogmatic assertion of Fallmerayer * that it is extinct, was long ago disposed of by a German of far greater authority, Karl Hopf.† Scholars whose eminence entitles their opinions to profound respect are emphatic on the point. Sir Richard Jebb attests his belief in the undying Greek people, "bound to the old Greeks by ties of race and character and language. The Greek has never been able to strip himself of his Hellenic character, whether the influence was wielded by Roman or Ottoman, Venice or Russia, France or Great Britain, and it will be so to the end." ‡ Professor Mahaffy was told by Athenians that his "Social Life in Greece" was based on studies of the moderns, though the book was written long ere he had set foot in the country. M. Edmond About,§ a Saul among the prophets, in his diatribe, was fain to recognize that "these tall youths of supple gait, oval face, bright eye, and lively spirit, with whom the streets of Athens swarm, are undoubtedly of the same family from which Phidias took his models."

There can be no doubt of a common language and tradition. The continuity of Hellenism is an indisputable fact. Dr. Hogarth, who regards the subject from a dispassionate scientific standpoint, is positive on this: "The Hellenic type of civilization, preserved by the agency of the Orthodox Church, has assimilated by its superiority all others, and given to Slav or Toskh, to Vlach and half-bred Italian and Turk, community of language and creed, and one character as a nation." ‖

* J. P. Fallmerayer: *Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters.* 1830-36. Fallmerayer was Magyar, but he wrote and published in German.

† Karl Hopf: Οἱ Σλάβοι ἐν Ἑλλάδι. 1872.

‡ Jebb: *Modern Greece.* 1902.

§ *La Grèce Contemporaine.* 1854.

‖ *The Nearer East,* p. 149.

Though he argues against purity of descent, he admits the persistency of the Greek type: "fine drawn in body and mind." Travelers in the region all testify to the superiority of the Hellenic character. Pouqueville,* in 1817, wrote: "This people, for thirty centuries on the stage of history, is still the most vital element in the East." Lenormant † found in Greeks the most intelligent of the races inhabiting Turkey. Their family life, united and pure, was closer than that of others to the social ideal of the West. Allard ‡ says: "It has been a passing fashion to disparage the Greeks; yet, in the East, wherever we found signs of a revival of commerce, industry, and civilization, we also found Greeks, and Greeks only." Sir Rennell Rodd § calls the Hellenes "an obstinate nationality, which, several times extinguished in its hereditary seat, has succeeded in reasserting itself, and overshadowing and absorbing the various elements which had threatened to overwhelm it."

As it was under the Turks, so it had been under the Roman domination. But Roman sagacity did not attempt to repress the irrepressible. They welcomed the Hellenic genius as an ally. They adopted Greek manners, and the government recognized the Greek tongue. Sir William Ramsay,‖ in the fascinating volumes summing up his researches in Asia Minor, tells us that everyone who wrote or read, wrote or read Greek. It was the language of all the moderately educated. The most illiterate, if they desired to put an epitaph on a grave, did so in barbarous (sometimes unintelligible) Greek. The desire for an epitaph was the first sign of desire for education and for Greek. The rustics who knew only the aboriginal tongues clung longest to Paganism.¶

* Pouqueville: *Voyage dans la Grèce.* 1820.
† Lenormant, Fr.: *Grande Grèce paysages et histoires.* 1881.
‡ Dr. G. C. Allard: *Souvenir d'Orient. La Bulgarie Orientale.* 1863.
§ *The Customs and Lore of Modern Greece.* 1892.
‖ Sir Wm. Ramsay: *Cities and Bishopries of Phrygia.*
¶ Sir Wm. Ramsay: *St. Paul the Traveler—passim.*

The Greek-speaking city folks adopted Christianity, and were expected to read the Scriptures in Greek—Greco-Roman civilization was the type aimed at by Rome.* Even in the Roman colonies of Galatia, Latin soon ceased to be used except on State occasions. In his treatise on St. Luke the Evangelist, Sir William † bears emphatic testimony to the continuity of Hellenic racial characteristics. "In Luke everyone who knows the Greek people will recognize the true Greek. He was the Greek of his own age, when Greece had been for centuries a power in Asia, when Macedonia had long been the leading Greek country. To appreciate Luke we must study the modern Greek as well as the Greek of the Great Age."

The same thing happened at a later epoch in Constantinople. As the seat of Roman power, it was reconstituted a Latin city, but it became a Greek one, as it had been at the beginning. New Rome yielded to old Byzantium. Hellenic vitality proved invincible, and it has remained so to this day. A few months ago the writer discovered a little Turkish boy in a shop, busied with a book. Asked what it was, the boy replied, "Alpha-Beta." He was going through the same process as those old Phrygians over two thousand years ago. His Greek primer took the place of their epitaph. This was at Edessa, the ancient capital of the Macedonian kings, and their burial place long after Philip had transferred the seat of government to Pella. The same leaven was working at Argyrocastro. Greece, and Greece alone in the Balkans has never interfered with the schools of other races, so there is no compulsion in the case. And there is certainly none in that of European children brought up in Constantinople, whose mother tongue is Greek. Their national language is relegated to the school or to conversation with their parents, but among

* Sir Wm. Ramsay: *The Church in the Roman Empire.*
† Sir Wm. Ramsay: *Luke the Physician.*

themselves and with children of other nationalities Greek is invariably the medium of intercourse. The western stranger in Pera finds Greek the vernacular, notwithstanding the cosmopolitan character of the place. He will have no need of Turkish; as a matter of fact not a few people live all their lives in Constantinople without acquiring it. But Greek he constantly hears in street and mart, and he must perforce use it in speaking to tradespeople and servants. In finance, commerce and the professions, Greeks predominate. With them French will serve him, but not with the people. Some may not be aware of the extent of the Greek population of Constantinople and its environs. Cross the Golden Horn to Stamboul where Europeans do not dwell, and you find the dense Greek area of Phanar clustering round the Patriarchate. Away on the seaward face is the thickly-peopled district of Psammatia. Along the base of the triangular city, from the Propontis to the Golden Horn, there is a ribbon of Greeks clinging to the walls where fell the last Constantine. There are few points where the visitor is not reminded that he is in Byzantium. The writer was startled once at seeing the name Comnenos over a druggist's shop in a remote quarter in the heart of Stamboul. Outside the walls, down the Marmora shore, through San Stefano to Lake Chekmedji and the Chatalja lines, one hears Greek all the way. Up the Bosphorus it is the same. Arnaoutkeuy, Yenikeuy, Therapia, Buyuk-Dere, the four greatest centers of population, are Greek. Chalcedon—Kadikeuy today—is largely inhabited by merchants who transact their business in Europe and sleep in Asia, but it is overwhelmingly Greek. The Princes Islands, Proti, Antigone, Chalkis and Prinkipos, are Greek in population as in name. Even Scutari, held in peculiar sanctity by the Turks, has a Greek population numbering many thousands. In the waters that lave these shores Greek fishermen cast their nets. On the Hippodrome, under

the shadow of Justinian's mighty dome, there is a monument known as the twisted column—coiled serpents in bronze. The three heads which once supported the golden tripod of the oracle at Delphi are broken off, but on the coils are inscribed the names of the states which furnished soldiers at the battle of Platæa when the Asiatic invasion of Europe was repulsed.* An Asiatic invader has held Constantinople for some centuries, but for all that it is the city of Constantine. The Turkish designation, Stamboul, is itself only a corruption of a Greek locution meaning "to the city." Greeks everywhere refer to it affectionately as ἡ πόλις—the city *par excellence.* It may be called Czargrad tomorrow—some among us would have it so—but in heart and soul it will still be Constantinople: ἡ πόλις.

"No cause can be more just than that of a nation which demands back its property. . . . As the Greeks on the day of the occupation of Constantinople by the Turks had the right to expel the victorious Sultan from their capital, so have they to the present hour that right undiminished." These words occur in a pamphlet † translated from German. There is bitter irony in them, considering their source; but they show that, whatever may be the case in 1915, a German could think sanely in 1821.

It might seem unnecessary to assert that ancient Greek is not a dead language. Yet people holding University degrees have expressed surprise when the writer has told them that when he was in Cyprus a boy, calling his attention to an eagle, exclaimed *aëtos* as Homer would have done; that the peasant of Attica talking of the weather calls the clouds *nephelai,* like Aristophanes; that when he invites you to sit down he says *Kathizè* as Socrates did

* Rawlinson's *Herodotus,* Vol. IV., App. 1.

† *The Cause of Greece the Cause of Europe,* translated from the German. James Ridgway, 169, Piccadilly. 1821.

to Strepsiades. Byron discovered this when he began to learn "Romaic" at Athens in 1811. The traveler Douglas * wrote from the same place in the same year that the Greeks of the Classic Age would have less difficulty in understanding the moderns than the contemporaries of William of Malmesbury and Froissart in comprehending the English and French of their descendants. Finlay,† the historian, says there is hardly more difference between the language of Homer and that of the New Testament than there is between the New Testament and a modern Greek review. He cites the tenacity with which the modern tongue has preserved the Hellenic accentuation. As a proof that it is a lineal descendant of the classical language—scholars recognize this as a matter of course—Professor Blackie, who insisted on the study of the modern tongue, said: "It is a mere dialectic variety of ancient Greek, differing not more from the language of Xenophon than Attic prose generally differs from the dialect of Herodotus or Theocritus. . . . Of all European languages Greek is that which has maintained itself for the longest period with the least amount of change. . . . Honor Thucydides by all means, but be ashamed to be ignorant of Tricoupis." ‡ Sir Richard Jebb maintained that the Greek language had an unbroken life from prehistoric times. As a matter of fact the tongue of today contains forms more ancient than the Attic, conventionally called Classical, which was but a phase in its development. The preservation of the language and the traditions enshrined in it kept Hellenism alive. It inspired that thirst for knowledge which has always been a passion with the Greeks. In the words of Finlay: "Education became

* Hon. Fred Sylvester North Douglas: Essay on *Points of Resemblance Between Ancient and Modern Greeks.* 1813.

† Finlay: *History of Greece,* Vol. I., p. 187.

‡ Prof. J. S. Blackie: Introductory lecture at the University of Edinburgh, 1853: *The Living Language of Greece and Its Utility to Classical Scholars.*

the purest and most powerful instrument of national centralization." *

It has been said that wherever there are five Englishmen to form a quorum, they constitute themselves into a committee. In the case of Greeks that committee would certainly set about establishing a school. That is the primary consideration in every community, and it was the first thing they thought about in the work of regeneration. There were schools in the latter part of the 17th century. In the 18th century the number had largely increased, and included notable centers of learning at Bucarest, Janina, and Aivali, to say nothing of Odessa, Jassy, Smyrna, Chios and Ambelachia. In 1785 Lenormant discovered in the Isle of Patmos a school in which were read Homer and the great Tragedians. By the end of the first decade of the 19th century, schools were broadcast wherever there were Greeks. With the advent of liberty the flame leapt up and spread. Gordon, who took part in the war, says: "In general the march of information is slow, but amongst this people it resembled a sudden explosion." † Rhizos, a Greek professor, said: "Those who saw Greece one year could hardly recognize her the next." ‡ The intellectual regeneration of Greece must forever be linked with the name of George Gennadios,§ in whose personality it centered. Scholar, man of letters, patriot, he played a glorious part in the armed struggle for liberty; but he never ceased to strive for what lay nearest his heart,—the education of his countrymen and the restoration of his country to a place in that world of letters, art, and science where once she had reigned supreme.. Freedom won, he refused all inducements to occupy the prominent position to which his services to the State entitled

* Finlay: *History of Greece,* Vol. V., p. 284.

† T. Gordon: *History of the Greek Revolution.* 1832. Vol. I., p. 37.

‡ Jakobos Rhizos Neroulos: *Cours de la Littérature Grecque Moderne donné à Genève.* 1827.

§ See Prof. Thiersch in *Ausland.* 1854. J. J. Ampère: *La Science et les Lettres en Orient.* 1865.

him. Turning from the glare of political place and power, he resumed his labors as an educator. He founded and directed the Central School at Ægina, and eventually, in 1837, had the joy of seeing Athens once more endowed with her Academy. He was not only one of the founders of the University, but one of its first professors, and the creator of the Faculty of Philology. And he watched tenderly over the infancy of the seat of learning, where his memory is still cherished. His death, in 1854, was an irreparable loss to Greece. A passage from a farewell oration pronounced over his grave by M. A. Rhangabè throws a light on his character:

"Nauplia was crowded by refugees from Missolonghi, who were growing desperate and dangerous. But no one had the courage to act. No one had a plan to propose. Then Gennadios, emerging from the crowd, sprang upon the roots of the plane-tree which grew in the middle of the square, and then, turning his flashing eyes upon the multitude, cried: 'The fatherland is being destroyed. There is need of immediate help. Money there is none. Let each man give what he has and what he can. Here is my poor mite. Let him copy me who will,' and he turned out on the earth the slender purse of a scholar. 'But no,' after a pause. 'This is a worthless contribution. Not another obolus have I got. But I have myself, and offer myself to the highest bidder. Who wants a teacher for his children for four years? Let him throw the price down there!' These noble words," continued M. Rhangabè, "kindled a flame of irrepressible emotion." Certainly they had a share in turning the tide of the war.

It is impossible here to do more than touch upon the moving story of the revival of education among the Greeks, in the face of difficulties which only served to augment the zeal and the spirit of sacrifice through which the task was accomplished. Difficulties did not end with

the overthrow of the Turkish domination. The University of Athens was founded in the unhappy period of the Bavarian Regency. The German officials, the magnitude of whose pay was in marked contrast to the trifling nature of their services, looked coldly upon it.* King Otho never showed any love for learning. "The Court," says Finlay, "yielded slowly and sullenly to the force of public opinion." But the latter triumphed and the University became a rallying point for unredeemed Greece, to which more than half of those who matriculated belonged.

Monuments to Greek munificence in the shape of school, college, library, gymnasium, exist in every center. The only learned society in Turkish territory is the Syllogos of Constantinople, which is recognized by academic bodies throughout Europe. Athens is more richly endowed with the means of education than any city of its size in the world. But these are matters of common knowledge to all who are in the least familiar with the country. The spirit animating the people will be better illustrated by taking a region where the Greeks do not predominate in numbers as at Smyrna, or as an intellectual force as at Constantinople. The westernmost corner of the Asiatic continent is known to Turkish administration as the Sanjak of Bigha.† It has an area of 2,250 square miles, and abuts on the Ægean, the Dardanelles, and the southwest corner of the Sea of Marmora. The population is estimated at 129,438 souls, of whom 106,583 are Turks, 17,585 Greeks, and the residue of 5,270 is composed of Armenians, Jews and Levantines. For the 106,583 Turks there are twelve schools, with 681 pupils, of whom 42 are girls. For the 17,585 Greeks (16,413 natives, 1,172 Hellenes) there are ten schools with 910 pupils, of whom 350 are girls. The Caza of Ezineh is a department of the province, a district ex-

* Finlay: *History of Greece*, Vol. V., p. 132.
† Cuinet: *La Turquie d'Asie*. 1894.

tending from Mount Ida to the sea, including the Plain of Troy, and watered by the Scamander. The population is 34,358, consisting of 29,210 Turks, 4,458 Grecks, 450 Armenians, and 240 Jews, the latter mainly inhabiting the town of Eski Stamboul, the ancient Alexandria Troas. For the 29,210 Turks there are three schools, with 109 pupils; for the 4,458 Greeks there are two schools, with 170 pupils. These figures are all the more eloquent when we remember that the Turkish schools receive government aid and protection, while those of the Greeks are due to their own initiative and efforts. Moreover, these are Turkish official statistics, and therefore are not likely to be exaggerated in favor of the Greeks. The region has not been chosen as exhibiting peculiar conditions, but from the fact of the Greeks being a small minority of the population. A similar, or even more striking, disparity might have been shown to exist elsewhere. At Alasheir, for example, where they form about one in four of the population, they count 525 school children against 250 of the Turks. It is significant that whereas the Turkish scholars are all boys, there are 210 girls among the 525 Greeks, who still call the place by its ancient name—Philadelphia.

After all, need we wonder at eagerness for knowledge in the heirs of the race which some 2,400 years ago produced Anaximander of Miletus, who engraved on bronze tablets the first charts of which the world has any records? In a later age, Roman Emperors brought teachers from distant Tarsus,* where the Greeks had established a seat of learning, while Pergamon had a library which long rivaled that of Alexandria, and eventually augmented it. Here one cannot forbear to mention Aivali (Cydonia), near the site of Elea, the ancient port of Pergamon—scene of that remarkable revival in the 18th century, which came to a tragic end in the 19th.

* Athenodorus of Tarsus was tutor to Augustus: Nestor to Tiberius.

Pouqueville * spent two months at the college in 1817. Teaching and lodging were free to those who had no means. He conveys an idea of the spirit pervading the place; of the zeal and devotion of the teachers Gregory, Eustratios and Theophilus; of the almost religious respect in which they were held by the 300 scholars; of the promise made to him by a certain set, and written on the walls of the classroom, to speak only ancient Greek, which they kept. Four years afterwards Raffenel wrote: "Today Aivali is nothing but a heap of ashes." † The college was rebuilt long ago, and Cydonia is still Greek, although its inhabitants are either refugees or in durance. The streets, houses, the demeanor of the people, and the whole atmosphere of the pretty town on its land-locked lake-like bay, speak of the 80 years (1740-1821) when it was a little republic, governed by its elected councilors and elders.

There are no trustworthy statistics of the population of the Vilayet of Aidin, now more generally known as the Province of Smyrna, which covers an area of 25,801 square miles. M. Cuinet's elaborate work ‡ is based entirely on Turkish data. He gives the total population as 1,396,477, out of which 208,283 are Greeks. The last item is manifestly absurd. The refugees seen by the writer on the islands and in Macedonia alone exceeded that figure.

The Statesman's Year Book for 1915 gives the population of the province as 2,500,000, and that of the city of Smyrna as 375,000, but it does not subdivide it into nationalities. The *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1911) gives the population of the city as 250,000, "fully one-half Greek." M. Cuinet has 200,000, of whom 77,000 are Greeks (including 25,000 Hellenes) and 89,000

* Pouqueville: *Voyage dans la Grèce.* 1821. T. v. p. 137-9.
† C. D. Raffenel: *Histoire des Événements de la Grèce.* 1822. p. 193.
‡ *La Turquie d'Asie.* 1894-1900.

Turks, thus making the Turkish population superior in numbers. This is all the more remarkable since in 1868 M. Slaars,* in a painstaking and conscientious work, computed the Greeks at 75,000 and the Turks at 40,000. But M. Cuinet's figures are self-condemned since in the subdivision of nationalities they fall short of his total by 7,708, in spite of the improbable estimate of 6,400 Italian inhabitants of Smyrna.

As a vital element of the population the Greeks are predominant. The German ethnologist, Phillipson, presumably not inclined to favor them, says: "In towns and villages the Greeks occupy a considerable place both as regards numbers as well as wealth and industry, even where, as sometimes, the Turks outnumber them." On the intellectual side their position is more marked. In fact, they stand alone. Attached to the principal Greek school at Smyrna is a library † of 20,000 volumes and 145 manuscripts, as well as a museum holding 500 pieces of statuary, and more than thrice the number of ceramic objects. No other nationality in the province would accomplish this, or even dream of it—least of all the lords of the soil, the Turks.

Is it needful to say that there is much Greek blood in this region unaccounted for by the most careful statistics? Dr. Hogarth says that seven-tenths of the "Turks" of Asia Minor have no Turkish blood.‡ He is speaking generally. In this western district the proportion would be greater. Dr. Hogarth makes a further statement with reference to the Ottoman population:—"The type of civilization and the fundamental cult beliefs are not those of the true Turk. They come from the immemorial culture of the Ægean." This is an opinion based on expert knowledge. But the ordinary observer who knows the country and its inhabitants cannot fail to remark the

* Bonaventure F. Slaars, notes and appendices to the *Étude sur Smyrne*. 1868.

† See D. Georgiades: *Smyrne*. This was in 1885.

‡ *The Nearer East*. 1912. p. 174.

similarity of type in the Greek and Turkish peasants of the interior. M. Cuinet could not establish a difference. He notes this especially in the descendants of the old feudal families round Aidin, one at least of which has preserved its Greek name—Saganos. He sees in the Zeibeks a remnant of the Thracians who colonized Tralles. Texier thought he traced in them a vestige of the Lydians.* Phillipson † found in the Turks of Budrum (Halicarnassus) a type manifestly Greek. Of another Turkish area he concludes that the people are of Hellenic stock Ottomanized. M. Cuinet notes a difference between the Greeks of the interior and those of the coast, among whom he met "types like those of antique statuary," though not so frequently as in the islands. Naturally, since on this strip of coast and its broidered fringe of islands Hellenic blood is probably purer than anywhere else, reminding us that it is the earliest seat of Hellenic civilization, poetically expressed by a distinguished French *savant* ‡ as "The Springtime of Greece." At the dawn of history it produced the first historians. It was the birthplace of epic and lyric verse. It was the nursery of philosophy and science, and it taught the sculptor's art to Attica, whose perfection it closely rivaled. Here, in this marvelous Ionia, was shaped that Greek alphabet which became the medium of enlightenment to the West, and here—Dr. Hogarth § reminds us—"The city state of Hellenic type first grew to adolescence."

One might fill a page with the catalogue of imperishable names from Homer downwards. Take a map and pitch upon the places at random; you will scarcely find one that is not linked with a name that belongs to Humanity as well as to Greece:—Thales of Miletus, Pythagoras of Samos, Heraclitus of Ephesus, Anaxagoras of

* Texier: *L'Asie Mineure.*
† *Reisen und Forschungen im Westlichen Kleinasien.*
‡ Perrot: *L'Art dans l'Antiquité.*
§ D. G. Hogarth: *Ionia and the East.*

Clazomene, Hippocrates of Cos, Sappho and Alcæus of Mytilene, Herodotus of Halicarnassus. Colophon was the birthplace of Apelles, Ephesus of Parrhasius and of Agasias, the sculptor of the Warrior of the Louvre. The Laocoön was chiseled at Rhodes by Agesander and his sons. The group of Dircè and the Bull was the work of Apollonius and Tauriskos of Tralles. It is needless to prolong the list, but since we are at Tralles let us journey a few miles farther up the pleasant Mæander Valley to Sultan Hissar, where in a shady dell on the slope of ruddy Messogis, there is a remarkably well-preserved ancient theater. We can rest on the gradines where Strabo probably sat, for Sultan Hissar was Nysa, where he went to school. With this illustrious name of a later age than those before cited, we close an imperfect list of the renowned sons of what is now the Province of Smyrna. Dr. Seton Watson, in a recent book, insists that the division of territory should be adjusted on lines of nationality. For this portion of it the claims of Greece are so patent that they should need no advocacy. But the war has let loose a flood of covetousness, blinded to any sense of justice. England at least covets nothing, and, to put it on no higher grounds, it may be in her own interests to see that Greece is not balked in her legitimate aspirations. The end of the war will almost certainly be attended by a display of appetites and pretensions perhaps little suspected at present. Circumstances may arise in which Greece would be a very useful ally. Greeks are the only people in the Near East who really like us. It should not be forgotten that in the South African war the Greeks raised a corps of volunteers which fought with us, when all in the rest of Europe fulminated against us. The schemes of politicians notwithstanding, the Greek people are on our side today. Nobody who really knows them can deny it. When the writer was with the Greek fleet in the Ægean in 1913, he constantly met seamen who had

passed a great part of their lives in English merchant ships. They were always glad of a yarn in English, and every one of them looked forward to sailing in English keels again when his term of service had expired. The bond of the sea brings with it mutual understanding and sympathy. Both nations have the salt of it in their blood. There exists a curious fly-sheet * dated 1705:—"The Case of the Greek Seamen." It calls attention to the arrears of pay of those who were killed and who died at sea in the British Navy. It seems that very often the pay did not reach their relatives. In pressing their claims, it states that "though they might have considerable advantages in divers respects in serving the Turks, they chose rather to serve Christians," and mentions the fact of English merchants at Smyrna hiring Greek seamen. This shows the relations which existed 210 years ago. The fact that a small country like Greece has a mercantile marine aggregating 997,118 tons is one point of contact between the two nations. Another is the widespread knowledge of the English language. Throughout the campaign of 1913 the writer never failed to find plenty of soldiers speaking English. This is due, however, to the large emigration of Greeks to America.† On the other hand, no other nation of the Near East has recourse to the same extent to our public schools and universities. This is not due alone to merchants and financiers established in our midst. At least two families ‡ of Aivali in Asia Minor have sent sons to Cirencester and Wye for their agricultural education.

Those to whom other claims loom so largely that those of the Greeks are ignored would do well to remember that the seed of freedom was planted in Serbia by Rhigas

* Brit. Mus., c 53, c 49 (7).

† Note of the American editor: During these wars upward of 30,000 Greeks in America returned to fight for their country, almost all of them meeting their traveling expenses from their own savings.

‡ Gonatos and Eliopoulos.

and Constantine Ypsilantes long ere the Slav movement became general. Wallachia and Moldavia were the first to throw off the Ottoman yoke. Why? Because they were inspired by a century of Hellenic education. Bucarest was a center of renewed Hellenic life ere Greece won her own again, and the Rumania of today owes its beginnings to the Greek Hospodars.

The story of Serbia's heroic struggle and that of indomitable Montenegro need no retelling. They are plain for all to read, like that of Greece who struck her blow for liberty and gained it laboriously. In the first stages, to quote a German historian,* "three hundred thousand Greeks lost their lives in order that six hundred thousand should be free."

While these great events were being enacted what was Bulgaria doing? Who ever heard of her until the day before yesterday, when she was created by Russia? Pitchforked into the arena, this newcomer developed an insatiable appetite and a cynical disregard for the rights of others who had shed their blood for that freedom which came to her as an unearned gift. "The Greeks will have to swim now in order to get to Constantinople," said General Ignatieff, when he had wrung from the Turks the treaty signed at San Stefano which threw Big Bulgaria in the face of Europe. That astute diplomatist knew well enough the composition of the population of Macedonia, and he thought he had dealt a deathblow to the Macedonian Greeks. People in England who know nothing about Macedonia would still deal the blow. Even up to the eleventh hour there was a section ready to fawn upon Bulgaria and offer her other people's property if only she would abstain from helping the enemy. She has given them her answer. Apparently Germany and Austria have offered her more. The twist which has been given to the opinions of a large number of people may be partly explained by the

* Herzberg: *Geschichte Griechenlands,* Vol. I., p. 590.

fact that a vigorous and misleading propaganda has been at work among those whose knowledge of Greece is derived from their newspaper, a class which lacks the information necessary to form a judgment, and believes what it reads in the journal of its political party. It must be admitted also that Greek does not occupy so large a place in our system of education as it did once. Classical scholarship is more exact, perhaps more profound, but it is limited to a smaller area. When Greek was an essential element in our national culture, it was understood by men in walks of life far removed from that of the professional scholar. Captain (afterwards Vice-Admiral) Spratt, whose business in life it was to navigate and fight ships, found time amidst his work of surveying to write a treatise on the survival of classical words in the dialect of Crete.* Naval officers of our day, and for that matter those in other professions, have not the leisure for work outside their own. Specialization in multiple departments of education has made it impossible to all but the very few to devote much study to the language which "remained for a thousand years the great instrument and symbol of civilization." † The wider knowledge of it which obtained formerly had a large share in creating the enthusiasm which greeted the rebirth of Greece. Leicester Stanhope, afterwards Earl of Harrington, wrote: "I feel for and speak about Greece as if it were my country." ‡ That was in a letter from Athens in 1824, when he was busied in founding a journal which earned for him Byron's epithet of "typographic Colonel." The glory enshrined in Greek letters influenced not Byron only, but a host of others whose names are forgotten. The present representative of Greece in London, speaking many years ago at the graveside of a great English Philhellene,§ described that

* See Spratt: *Travels and Researches in Crete.*
† Gilbert Murray: *Euripides and His Age.* 1913.
‡ Lewis L. J. Bowring, 4th March, 1824.
§ Sir Richard Church. 1873.

awakening in singularly happy words: "A mother that was thought lost, dead, perhaps never really in the flesh —such was the enchanting, the fairy-like beauty of her image, as dreamt of by them in their college days. They hastened as if to witness a miracle." That springtime of eager enthusiasm is of the past, but amid the disparagement of people belonging to a category that was then inarticulate, we have the calm and measured judgment of the few who know. Sir Richard Jebb, a thinker as well as a scholar, who did not use words lightly, in a work written towards the close of his life,* expressed himself thus:

"Everyone admits now that it was a mistake to make the Greek Kingdom so small. Europe set Greece to make bricks without straw. The Greek race offers, on the whole, the best hope of settled order, of constitutional government, and of high civilization in those countries which were once Hellenic. This may be said without any undue disparagement of its competitors. Let us concede everything that can be advanced in favor of Ottoman or Muscovite rule by the admirers of either. At least it cannot be said that either Russia or Turkey represents those blessings which subjects of the British monarchy have learned to associate with the name of constitutional freedom and which they believe to be inseparable from the highest and most beneficent forms of civilization. The Greeks have won constitutional freedom by patient effort, and have proved that they can use it. As regards the new principalities, the type of nationality and civilization which they represent is, speaking broadly, the Slavonic. Now the efficacy of Greek civilization as compared with Slavonic has already been tested on a large scale and with a definite result. In the middle of the 9th century the Slavs seemed likely to permeate Greece, though, as Karl Hopf has finally demonstrated, and as all learned students of the question are

* *Modern Greece.* 1902.

now agreed, the strain of Hellenic blood was never at any time lost in Greece. What happened? In two hundred years the Greeks absorbed and Hellenized the Slavs. How was that done? By the superiority—intellectual, political, social—of Greek civilization. If we are sincere in believing that constitutional freedom and the diffusion of sound education are good things, then we must desire to see the influence of the Greek race extended and strengthened in Southeastern Europe."

They confirm the words uttered 22 years earlier by a statesman who has never allowed his judgment to be affected by the intrusion of merely political considerations. Lord Rosebery, in a speech at Manchester in 1879, called Greece "the Piedmont of the East, the only hope of reorganization in the future, to those who look for freedom."

In these times, when so much is in the crucible, and surprises certainly await us, it is not ill to end on a warning note. And nothing could be more fitting than that of another scholar—Professor Blackie, spoken so long ago as 1853, but well suited for today:—"Keep a keen eye lest some secret conclave of cold calculating diplomatists shall spin some base inhuman compact."

THE FIRST ANNUAL BANQUET

OF THE

AMERICAN-HELLENIC SOCIETY

(Being an account of the dinner tendered by the American-Hellenic Society to His Excellency, George Roussos, the Minister of Greece at Washington, together with his and other addresses delivered on that occasion.)

The first banquet of the American-Hellenic Society, inaugurating what will become, it is hoped, an important annual event in our city, was held at the Hotel Biltmore on the evening of January 25th, 1918, when the Society gladly embraced the opportunity to do honor to the newly appointed Minister of Greece, His Excellency, George Roussos.

Arrangements had been made to give representative publicists, clergymen, journalists, educators and business men, both American and Greek, the privilege of coming into an individual and personal relation with the Ambassador from Greece, who stands committed to the new régime so ably administered by the great statesman, Eleutherios Venizelos. The sympathy of Americans goes out so fully to this New Greece that the response to the invitations of the Society was most spontaneous and enthusiastic. Not only were the faculties of Columbia University, Hunter College and the College of the City of New York represented in the gathering, but professors from Vassar, Princeton and Yale shared in the Society's first fête. Our own ex-Minister to Greece, Mr. George H. Moses, came from

Washington in order to be present, and John H. Finley, President of the University of the State of New York and Commissioner of Education of the State, came from Albany to address the Society and its guests.

The dinner was preceded by a short reception in the foyer of the "Music Room" of the hotel, where an effort was made by the officers of the Society to introduce to our distinguished guest the Philhellenes of our city and the diplomatic and consular officials of foreign Governments resident in New York and vicinity. A complete list of those present will be found at the end of this account, but the following guests of honor at the President's table may be mentioned here: Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of the Society and Toastmaster, and alternating from right to left,

His Excellency, George Roussos
(Minister of Greece)
Hon. Gaston Liebert
(Consul General of France)
Miss Abby Leach
Dr. Edward Robinson
Miss Virginia D. Gildersleeve
Prof. Thomas D. Goodell
Hon. F. Cunliffe Owen
Dr. Theodore P. Ion
Hon. Henri Goiran
(Consul of France)
Hon. Charles Clive Bayley
(Consul General of Great Britain)
Mrs. Isaac F. Russell
Hon. John H. Finley
Hon. Henri LaFontaine
Hon. George H. Moses
Miss Edith M. Thomas
Hon. Isaac F. Russell
Mr. Constantine Voicly
Mr. Constantine A. Panagopoulos
(Consul of Greece)
Major De Mayo
Lieut. David

The scene was brilliant and animated. On a dais, slightly raised, were the speakers and the Society's most honored guests, while at more than twenty round tables little groups of the Society's friends, who were already acquainted, formed new and friendly relations with many of the foremost Greek residents of the city who have become known as leaders in the intellectual and social life of the Greeks of New York or who have distinguished themselves in the financial and commercial world. Our banquet was thus most truly an American-Hellenic ban-

quet, and the Society hopes that it will be the auspicious precursor of many such occasions when those who love Greece as their source of inspiration or as their teacher may meet those who love her as their fatherland.

Amid united American and Greek flags, and to the strains of the national hymns of both lands played by the orchestra, the guests seated themselves. When the excellent dinner had been served, a moment's pause permitted a photograph of the gathering to be taken and soon afterward the speeches were begun.

The President of the Society, after briefly extolling Ancient Greece's contribution to the intellectual and æsthetic life of the world and explaining the aims and objects of the American-Hellenic Society, proceeded in felicitous phrases to introduce the different speakers of the evening, who made their addresses in the following order:

Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of the American-Hellenic Society.

His Excellency George Roussos, Minister of Greece.

Hon. John H. Finley, President of the University of the State of New York.

Dr. Theodore P. Ion, Director of the American-Hellenic Society.

Dr. Edward Robinson, Director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art of New York.

Mr. Constantine Voicly, President of the Panhellenic Union of America.

Hon. Isaac F. Russell, Ex-Chief Justice of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York.

Miss Edith M. Thomas, "A Poem on Hellas."

Four of these speeches and the poems read by Miss Thomas are printed below.

At the close of the banquet by a rising vote the thanks of the Society and its guests were unanimously extended to the speakers of the evening, and the following cablegram was sent to the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr.

Eleutherios Venizelos, by the President of the Society, Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler:

(Translation): "The members and guests of the American-Hellenic Society, gathered at a banquet to inaugurate its activities, have charged me to convey its sentiments of admiration to that eminent statesman who by his loyal and sincere policy has saved Greece from the abyss toward which she was being dragged. He has restored her to that life in which she belonged by virtue of those democratic traditions, from which the attempt had been made to make her deviate. Happy as we are to see Greece resolutely defending those great principles, which the genius of her ancestors first proclaimed,—those principles of which the American people is today one of the foremost champions,—we desire to assure Your Excellency and through you the Hellenic people that we shall not cease to fight for the triumph of the rights of Greece and to endeavor to secure the liberty of her children."

(Signed,)
NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

The following cablegrams were intended to be read at the banquet but were delayed in transmission and arrived "after the feast," as the Greeks say:

"Be so good as to convey to the American-Hellenic Society my grateful sympathy for the fruitful work that it has just undertaken, and at the same time to express my prayers for the full success of its efforts. There is nothing that we have more at heart than to enlighten the American public as to the program of liberty and justice for which the Greek people, prepared to make every sacrifice, is struggling, in absolute conformity with the noble principles laid down so exactly and with such deep conviction in the recent message of President Wilson.

"Greece will thus deserve the active sympathy of the American Democracy and can with other small nations rely, for the realization of her just aspirations, on the powerful aid of the United States, which as a living example of liberty, justice and progress will along with the democratic Powers of Europe guarantee to the world a peace founded on right."

VENIZELOS.

Mr. Politis, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, also sent a cablegram, which is herewith presented in translation:

"I beg you to express to the American-Hellenic Society the feelings of joy and satisfaction that its establishment has called forth in Greece. By making known our national aspirations, it will not only contribute to the defense of our interests but it will render signal service to the general cause from which Hellenism does not separate its own cause.

"The sincere love of liberty and justice which vibrate in the last great speech of President Wilson has never ceased from most ancient times to inspire our race. Like our glorious ancestors we are ready to sacrifice all for this. We do not desire the conquest of other peoples, nor domination over them, for only thus shall we realize for ourselves, along with the liberation of our enslaved kinsmen, our desire to live with the other Balkan nations in relations of friendship and increasing solidarity. It was in this spirit that Venizelos, the faithful interpreter of the Greek soul, endeavored in 1912 to effect a close union of the Balkan states. This ideal, which is shared by our heroic Serbian and Rumanian allies, has met a repeated hindrance in Bulgaria's violent schemes for the hegemony. It can only be realized when the Bulgarian people renounces definitely the dominating tendencies of its rulers and gives substantial pledges of its sincere submission to

law. We demand the liberation of our national territory which has been invaded, and the emancipation of our kinsmen whose families have been scattered, whose fortunes and property have been destroyed or confiscated and whose very existence has been compromised under the barbarian yoke. Closely united to Serbia and Rumania we will struggle with all our strength for the defense of our historic traditions and our national independence. We are convinced that the democracy of the United States, informed as to our purposes by the American-Hellenic Society will, with its well-known generous sympathy, accord us its powerful and invaluable aid.

"With these feelings we offer our ardent prayers for the complete success of the work of the Society and we express in advance our warmest gratitude."

POLITIS.

ADDRESS OF HIS EXCELLENCY, GEORGE ROUSSOS

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I thank you from the bottom of my heart for your invitation to this banquet. I consider the regard in which you hold me as a great honor, for it permits me to congratulate those who by founding the American-Hellenic Society have undertaken to make clear to the American people the rights of Hellenism.

You are preparing to render a great service to Greece, but you are rendering another service just as precious to your own country.

By force of circumstances, and owing to the disinterestedness of the American democracy in the quarrels between the European peoples, the United States has become their arbitrator.

It will, therefore, assume the greater part of the responsibility in that final settlement which is either to secure a long era of peace, with right and liberty in the ascendant, or to cause a recurrence of these tremendous events of which we are the terrified spectators.

The noble voice of the eminent man who presides over the destinies of the great American Republic has already laid down the rules which must constitute the basis of rightful regulation.

But words alone have no magic power, for right in itself is an abstraction; the facts constitute a stern reality. The rules of right serve only to regulate facts; consequently, you must examine every claim, establish the truth of the facts advanced, determine their reason and their legitimacy and put yourselves thus in a state to render a just decision.

The people of all the warring nations alike affirm that they are fighting for right, justice and liberty. On which side is the truth? That is the question, and you must solve it.

The questions placed before you are complex, but they can be solved by perseverance, good-will and fairness. The fighting armies of our allies are preparing the means to bring about rightful decisions. We are sure that you will profit by the respite given you by their sacrifice to examine these questions which are pending, in order to be ready, when victory permits it, to impose decisions based upon truth and consequently upon right.

Acting thus, the American Democracy will render to humanity the greatest service that a nation has ever rendered to the world.

You have undertaken the task of explaining to your countrymen a part of the famous Eastern Question which has provoked many a war and which is, today, the principal cause of this universal conflict. Your purpose is to defend the rights of the Hellenic nation, which is deeply interested in the solution of this question. This will be easy for you, for if any nation has accepted without reserve the great principles proclaimed by the American Democracy, this nation has been Greece. She has adopted these principles because they coincide with the Hellenic way of thinking, as countless centuries have fashioned it.

Greece has never been a dominating State. She has never tried to enslave other people, but has fought again and again to assure the freedom of Hellenism and in order to forward the cause of civilization. I do not need to recall ancient history to prove this affirmation, for you will find the proof in the events of the recent past.

As is well known, from the capture of Constantinople by the Turks to our own days, the Government of all the Orthodox Christians, living in the Ottoman Empire, was confided to the Orthodox Patriarchs, their Bishops and

other dignitaries of the Orthodox Church, who were always Greeks.

Up to the Greek Revolution against the Turkish tyranny, the ministers, provincial governors and other officials of these countries were often Grecks. In Rumania and Bulgaria many of the statesmen and many of the educated men and higher classes bear Greek names which have come down from these ancient officials of the Ottoman Empire.

Hellenism has thus had at its disposal in these regions a vast religious power, and a considerable portion of the civil power as well. It might therefore easily have controlled the intellectual life of the races that it ruled, and might have tried to absorb them.

But these priests and officials chose, on the contrary, to conserve the language, the traditions, the national spirit of these peoples and permitted them, when the hour of their liberation finally came, to regain their existence as nationalities. This attitude of mind, always the same, has permitted the Greek people to accept with enthusiasm the war program of the United States, which advocates the freedom of all peoples, large or small.

In this task of liberation it does not expect a selection to be made from among the enslaved peoples, but it expects a complete and general deliverance of all.

Nations have always the right to be free, no matter how long they may have been enthralled, so long as they preserve their national spirit, so long as they claim their formal will to be free. Freedom does not admit of limitation.

This attitude of mind has always imposed on our Government a unique policy, based on the principle of nationalities.

A great part of the Balkans was formerly Greek; but successive migrations have changed their ethnological constitution. Recognizing this fact, we have claimed only the parts in which compact groups of Greeks live. We

have gone further. Having foreseen German ambitions in the Near East, we have tried, since 1884, to create an intimate union among the Balkan peoples, by a distribution of territories which barred out from the Greek portion thousands of our own people. We had hoped that this intimate union would end in a confederation of all these States, strong enough to defend their independence.

Our first attempt failed on account of that Balkan State which is today among the predatory nations. This nation betrayed Greece by informing Turkey of our project.

Mr. Venizelos later attempted the same thing once more. Coöperation was begun, but at the end of the war against the Turks, Bulgaria showed her ambitions again; in spite of her apparent acceptance of the arbitration of the Czar of Russia, she ordered a criminal aggression against her allies and provoked the second Balkan War. Her acts since then have been instigated by Germany, whose interests coincided with the Bulgarian ambitions.

Some progress, however, has been made. The common struggle has created between Greece, Serbia and Rumania bonds of close friendship, which promise in the future a still more intimate union. We have the firm resolve to reach our goal; but this union is directed against no single nation. Should the Bulgarians abandon definitely their dreams of domination they can be sure of their existence as a nation. Neither Greece nor her friends have any intention to make an attempt upon them in spite of their repeated treacheries.

You will explain to your fellow-countrymen that this has been the constant Greek policy. You will also dispel erroneous beliefs disseminated by a continuous and skillful propaganda.

Acting on the psychological principle that a false affirmation, repeated to satiety and in an appropriate manner, becomes for the masses a proven truth, our enemies, leagued in the purpose to enslave the world, have taught,

during long years, that they were the only powerful agents of civilization and were consequently justified in ruling humanity. They have even affirmed that all the peoples living in their neighborhood were of *their* race. A dialect containing a few words of their language, a matter of physical constitution, any and every unimportant detail was invoked with great seriousness just to impress the masses and to create in their minds a conviction in accord with German interests.

Thus history has been falsified. Alexander the Great has been made a Bulgarian and similar assertions have often been made in their books of history; but fortunately the wishes of these Balkan peoples are now well known.

Hundreds of thousands of Allied troops have been living among the Macedonians for more than two years. They have had the means of knowing exactly the national spirit and the real desires of these people.

In Eastern Macedonia occupied by the Bulgarians, notwithstanding persecutions and the attempted extermination of the Hellenic populations undertaken by them, the will of these people as manifested proves what race it is that lives there.

I shall be proud to aid you in your endeavor. I desire it because I want to bring to you substantial evidence that justifies our claims. We want your conviction to be based upon reason, not upon feeling. Your love for ancient Greece must not affect your decision and your opinion must be established after a thorough examination of the facts. I offer you my services only with this understanding.

The position that you have already taken has been encouraging to my country. Greece has passed through a terrible crisis. A handful of men, foolish to say the least, has tried to lead her into treachery and dishonor by the abuse of power and by the abolition of her liberties. The revolutionary movement of Salonika fortu-

nately freed her from these misguided men, though her sufferings, moral as well as material, have been intense. Notwithstanding the humiliations to which she has been subjected, she has remained faithful to her traditions, her friendships, and her obligations. She is today fulfilling her duty and she needs your esteem and your affection. Every word of encouragement that comes from this noble country gives her new power, raises her morale and strengthens her will to carry out her obligations.

Greece has engraved in letters of gold the names of the American Philhellenes who, in great numbers, helped her at the time of the struggle for her independence. I am confident that the marble of Pentelicon will not suffice for the inscription of the names of the new Philhellenes, for Greece hopes that all America will help her in her just aims.

This will be your achievement.

In the name of my country, I thank you.

ADDRESS OF HON. JOHN H. FINLEY

Mr. Chairman, Your Excellency, Greeks Who Are Meeting Greeks Again, Americans Who Are Meeting Greeks for the First Time, and Lovers of Greece All:

When I received the invitation from President Butler to take part in this Hellenic Festival, I responded instantly, as if it were a call from Olympus. I assumed that both Hephæstus, the smithy-god, and Hermes, the expert in transportation, would be propitious. I assumed also that the leaves of the oracular oak would whisper with intimations of content for my address from the Jovian chairman. Hephæstus Garfield and Hermes McAdoo have, however, put obstacles in my way. I have been as Prometheus on snowy Caucasus, and am late therefore in arrival. Moreover, when it became necessary to make preparation for my address, I became suddenly conscious that the oak was a deciduous tree, which led me to wonder how Zeus communicated his wishes to mortals when the oaks of Dodona were not in leaf,—when they stood silent as that great *telefunken* tree out at Sayville, Long Island, now stands, which before the war could hear and communicate what the Kaiser said in Berlin.

Two or three leaves, however, did hang upon my oak, the memories of last year's philosophic foliage, the prophecies of next year's public doctrine. They were those epigrammatic leaflets of President Butler on "Peace," "The International Mind," and "The Great Struggle," which have in them a Jovian tremor of suggestion. With that slight guidance, so slight that what I say can hardly be regarded as "inspired," I venture to bring a word

from my Albanian Caucasus to this, the Piræus of our perilous commerce and the Acropolis of our cosmopolitan worship and defense.

The theme caught from one of these tremulous leaves which whispered that "peace was but a state attendant upon the achievement of an ideal," is that Greece first gave the little world the "ideal of human liberty, justice and an honorable conduct of an orderly society" which animates our world struggle for democracy and that, therefore, we would hold Greece in the immortal company of those who have that same ideal.

The world in which that ideal first blossomed in marble, music, poetry and politics, was a little world. I have called its age the *peri-nikian* age in contrast with the televictorian. [Comparison of words in Greek lexicon. Telebolos, telemachos (far throwing), teleplanos (far traveling), telekleitos (far famed), telescopes (far seeing), teleboas (far shouting), telegonos (far born), telothe (far, far away).]

We have grown from this narrow-horizoned, perinikian, horizontal, Ptolemaic, Hellenic earth into a Copernican, televictorian cosmos, in which we of America who, though we were baptized under the Ptolemaic system, have from the first days had a cosmic subconsciousness, are now leaping to cosmic action. We have come into the "international mind," into planetary thinking. And in doing so we want to have all that Greece *was* and all that *Greece* is, fighting with us for the same freedom on this planet—a planet on which there are no longer two distinct hemispheres and which cannot remain "one-half despotism and one-half democracy."

* * * * * * * *

I have imagined Cadmus, our reputed Father of Letters—who brought the alphabet to Greece and so to Europe and the New World—I have imagined his surveying this televictorian war-mad world and saying to himself:

"When I contemplate the ravage
Of my alphabetic lore,
See the mechanistic savage
Waging culture-loving war;
Using logarithmic tables
To direct his hellish fire,
Preaching philosophic fables
To excuse his mad desire;
See pure science turned to choking,
Shooting, drowning, human kind;
Hear a litany invoking
Hate in God's benignant mind;
See the forest trees transmuted
Into lettered pulp, while man
With a brain deep-convoluted
Takes the place of primal Pan,
And instead of finding pleasure
In a simple life with song
Spends his planetary leisure
Reading how the world's gone wrong—
Seeing, hearing this I've wondered
'Mid this murder, greed and fret
Whether I have sinned or blundered
Giving man the alphabet."

But it is the alphabet given to civilization—and copied even by the uncivilized—the alphabet of Euripides and Socrates, of Shakespeare's plays, of Milton's verse and President Wilson's notes—in which the world is yet to write her televictorian ode of universal freedom, the alphabet in which we cry back across the ages to that hero of my youth, Prometheus—Prometheus who brought fire to man, freedom from enslavement to the cold whose tyranny now and then creeps back upon us to terrorize us—we cry in the words of Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound":

"To defy Power which seems omnipotent,
To love and bear; to hope till Hope creates

From its own wreck the thing it contemplates,
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent;
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free,
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire and Victory."

A poet of our age once let his imagination go back into old Greece and write:

"I fancy, though the world seem old enough,
Though Hellas be the sole unbarbarous land,
Years may conduct to such extreme of age
And outside Hellas so isles new may lurk
That haply—when and where remains a dream
Tho' he does picture a place where mist and snow
mass hard to metal
In fresh days when no Hellas fills the world
In novel lands as strange where all the same
Their men and women yet behold as we
Blue heaven, black earth, and love, hate, hope and fear
Over again,—unhelped by Attica!"

But it takes more imagination than I have to think of a civilized place "unhelped of Attica," of Greece, for Greece is the ally of all true culture, and we who fight for freedom in the world may claim her genius as our own and with better reason than Germany claims the genius of Shakespeare and Rodin.

So, Your Excellency, I welcome this opportunity to say this word which I have run a marathon to utter and find myself a breathless messenger in trying to speak—this word of love for Greece which America holds eternally in her heart.

In Paris some years ago when I came to say good-by to the permanent secretary of the Academy, I suggested that he come to America. "No," he said, "when I leave France, I go to Greece. My heart is in Greece." So we say if we leave America we go to France (by way of

England, Mr. Consul). Our heart is in France. But if we leave France we go to Greece and we go by way of Italy. But still we go to Greece.

I walked toward Greece one night in Italy—from Assisi to Foligno. (Mr. Finley here related an experience which led to the mingling of the water of the fountain of Assisi with that of a New England spring.)

But every spring in America has been touched by drops of water from the fountains of Greece—even if not all of them from the Pierian spring—and tonight we lift our glasses with these mingled waters to the new Ulysses who has passed the Gates of Night and braves the perils of the baths of all the western stars to visit the western coast of Hellas!

ADDRESS OF DR. THEODORE P. ION

This gathering of Hellenes and Philhellenes is a symbol of those combined efforts of the Greek people and their friends, through which the modern Hellenic State was created. Every student of history knows the enthusiasm which the Greek War of Independence of 1821 evoked in the civilized world.

As a matter of fact, that was not the only time that the people of Greece had striven to free themselves from the Turkish yoke, but all their previous risings which had received no outside help were mercilessly put down by the Turks.

When the great French revolution broke out, the minds of the enslaved Greeks were prepared for their Renaissance. The principles of the French Revolution had, so to say, filtered through every nook and corner of the Hellenic homes. The Herald or Pioneer of the Greek War of Independence, the poet, Regas Pheræos, was the first victim of that idea, having been beheaded by the Turks after being surrendered to them by the Austrians while he was on his way to meet Bonaparte for a rising of Greece.

The years following the overthrow of Napoleon up to the outbreak of the revolution in 1821, and a little later, were years of a conflict of ideas in regard to government both in Europe and on the American continent. In Europe it was a conflict between peoples striving to secure constitutional liberties and the autocratic rulers of that time trying to curb and crush every liberal movement. It was at that psychological moment that the Greek revolution of 1821 broke out.

Towards the end of the year 1815, the so-called Holy (or, to use the words of Jefferson, "Unholy") Alliance was signed by the then three autocratic rulers of Europe. The mind of Alexander I, who was the soul of that diplomatic instrument, was not at that time as yet contaminated by the evil genius of Prince Metternich, because the Emperor was still under the influence of Capo D'Istria, the Greek statesman who then directed the foreign affairs of Russia. The very woman who inspired that treaty, namely, Baroness Krüdner, was herself an ardent Philhellene and had actually pleaded the cause of Greece with Alexander I at St. Petersburg. Ever since its signature that extraordinary treaty has been a target of all liberal-minded men because they ascribed to it all the evils resulting from the oppressive measures of those times. As a matter of fact, that treaty was nothing but, as Prince Metternich called it, "mere verbiage." The treaty of the Holy Alliance was not the one which was the source of oppression but a subsequent agreement, signed by the same sovereigns, and the resolutions passed by the various famous Congresses which were held between the year 1818 and the year 1822, namely, those of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach and that of Verona which was held in October, 1822. It was during the sittings of that last Congress that the revolutionary Government of Greece sent representatives to Italy in order to plead the cause of the Greeks before the sovereigns and statesmen gathered at Verona. But not only were its deputies not permitted to appear personally before the Congress but they were not even allowed to approach the city where the Congress was held and were ultimately expelled from their landing place, Ancona.

Chateaubriand, the historian of that Congress who was also one of the plenipotentiaries of France, after telling us how he vainly pleaded the cause of Greece with Alexander I, describes in a pathetic manner, in his usual elegant style, the vain appeals of the Greek deputies to

appear before the Congress. As no translation can give the exact feelings of the brilliant writer as to this matter, may I be allowed to read in the original the few sentences in which Chateaubriand expressed his feelings:

"Voilà toutes les grandeurs modernes venues se mesurer à Vérone aux arènes laissées par les Romains.

"Auprès de ces débris, se plaçaient d'autres ruines qu'on n'écoutait pas, les députés de la malheureuse Grèce. Le vieux monument de la ville éternelle leur eût plutôt répondu que ces souverains d'un jour, parce qu'Athènes levait vers le ciel ses mains suppliantes au nom de la liberté!" *

Ninety-three years have elapsed since these memorable words were written.

Compare the situation of Greece in 1822 when her deputies were imploring Europe to lay before the feet of the sovereigns and statesmen of Europe the grievances of the Greek people, with that of the year 1915 when some of these Powers asked Greece to come to their assistance in their war against their enemies. Compare the reception given in 1822 to the Greek deputies who from a little, obscure hotel at Ancona were imploring for an audience in the Congress of Verona, with the almost royal reception given to Mr. Eleutherios Venizelos in 1917 in the European capitals and particularly in London, where he was, one might well say, "lionized," with a dinner at the Royal Palace, with a reception at the Mansion House, and a banquet in his honor by the British members of Parliament. When one compares these two events, one cannot help seeing the great stride made by the Greek nation in the course of less than a century. But who can deny that the creation of the Hellenic State would not have been possible, notwithstanding the heroic deeds of the Greek warriors, without the moral and material help of the Philhellenes? The result of the influence of the Philhellenes of that time

* Chateaubriand: *Congrès de Vérone*, Chap. XII.

culminated in the Battle of Navarino, the landing of French troops in the Peloponnesus and the Treaty of Adrianople of 1828 between Russia and Turkey by which the latter Power was compelled to recognize the independence of Greece. At last, by the Protocol of 1830, the three Protecting Powers of Greece, namely, France, Great Britain and Russia, created the Hellenic State. From that time on the Powers have never ceased to guide, advise, protect and defend Greece and we must admit that without the help of those Powers, Greece could not have existed as a State.

Let us therefore, as a token of gratitude, drink to the health of the armies and navies of the Allies and particularly of Great Britain and France.

ADDRESS OF MR. CONSTANTINE VOICLY

Mr. President and Ladies and Gentlemen:

In a gathering like this, where the rights of peoples are uppermost in our minds, I may perhaps be permitted, without national egotism, and simply as a matter of historic fact, to state that the rights and principles, for the maintenance of which the greater part of the civilized world is fighting today, originated in Greece. Socrates, who refused to escape from his death cell because he preferred to obey the Athenian laws which protested against such an act, and who took the hemlock so bravely and so stoically, in order to obey the laws established by the Athenian people, of whom he formed a part, and Plato, who gives us the description of an ideal state, in which Government and Justice emanate from the people and exist for the benefit of the people, and Pericles, too, who was guardian, so to speak, of these rights during the best period of the Athenian democracy, together with many other statesmen and writers, proclaimed to the then known world the very rights and principles for the vindication of which mankind has been struggling ever since.

Unfortunately, after the fall of Greece, Rome attempted to be her successor in the application of these rights, but Rome, after an unsuccessful trial, failed to carry out these ideals and degenerated into an autocracy of the worst kind; and later on we see these rights and principles vanish, outraged by many usurpers and oppressors, who under the pretense of a so-called "Divine Right" substituted their own will for the will of their people. In the Dark Ages there was so much oppression that the people did not dare to take justice in its

hands and proclaim and impose its rights upon the Government; and so Humanity came down through the ages bearing the burden of autocracy and ofttimes of tyranny, until the dawn of American Independence in 1776.

In this historical year, a comparatively small number of people, in a continent, which they were the first civilized beings to occupy, taking advantage of their geographical position, planted a new tree, the tree of Liberty, which was to flourish and to take root so deeply and so strongly as justly to attract the admiration of the whole civilized world of today.

The dawn of American independence was closely followed by another greater historical event, the French Revolution of 1789, an event as beneficial and necessary as was the Revolution in this country, an event which taught Humanity her rights, a debt which she can only repay by her eternal gratitude towards France; but beneficial as it was, the French Revolution failed to extirpate the roots of the autocratic thistle, which we still see thriving in some parts of Europe so strongly and to such an extent as to encourage the rulers of some countries to conceive the plan of domination over other nations, especially over the smaller and weaker states, and impose upon them their own Kultur. This may be said to be the main cause of the present universal war.

During this war, ladies and gentlemen, even from its very beginning, the Allies have given many assurances as to the fate of the nations after the war, but without questioning the sincerity of these nations, the assurances have been so vague, so uncertain, and of such a nebulous form, that they have left behind them an atmosphere of uneasiness, for every nation, whether or not involved in the war, until the message of the President of the United States came to enlighten us.

This message, in praise of which not sufficient words can be found, and which will pass down to posterity as an intellectual monument and as a masterpiece of

modern ideals as well as of language, has really crystallized those nebulous assurances; it has done more, it has purified and sanctified the war, and, indorsed as it is by the Congress of the United States and having obtained the unanimous approval of the American people, it stands today as a warning to the strong against unjust or ambitious conquest, and as a shield to the weak, assuring his own independence and the amelioration of his fate; and now everybody feels confident that after the Armageddon now raging around us is over, a new era will prevail among all nations, a new era which will stand, to use the expression of President Wilson, " for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Government, for the rights and liberties of the small nations, for a universal dominion of right, by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

To such a noble cause, ladies and gentlemen, and to such a high aspiration, the Greeks, imbued as they are by these ideals, cannot be deserters nor can they ever be indifferent. They are therefore here tonight to join the American people in the approval of this great message and to pledge themselves to the fulfillment of it; they are doing more, they are already fighting in Macedonia and are joining the American army here, upholding every word of the great message, and since the cause and object are one and the same, it is quite immaterial whether they fight under their own colors or under the colors of the United States.

Yes, ladies and gentlemen, the Greek nation is fighting already for every sentence, nay, for every word of the great message, but owing to circumstances which are regretted by all who serve the common cause, and especially by the Greeks themselves, whose opinion I voice, the Greek nation is fighting with her left hand, her right hand having been until lately tied behind her back by a Government which was supposed to exist by the will of

the people and for the benefit of the people, and in order to uphold the honor and the traditions of the nation, but which instead has proved itself to be nothing else than an example on a small scale of the same form of Government that this message condemns, of that form of Government against which the American people and the other Allies are shedding their blood today, and against which we too are anxious and eager to shed our own tomorrow, to fight, that is, with all the vigor of our race and with both our hands free. Fortunately, at the present time, by the intervention of the Allies, and especially by the drastic though benevolent action taken by noble France, we, the people of Greece, have reasserted our rights, and we have intrusted the destinies of our country to a strong man, to the greatest statesman undoubtedly that Greece ever had, and we have also entered the war with full confidence in a final victory, and on the side, we are thankful to say, where our honor, our traditions, our duty and our interest have long been calling us; but war is war, and its fortunes are uncertain. Should the worst happen, we shall have the right, as things now are, to look the world in the face and to tell it with pride that everything is lost save our honor!

This hand of ours we here extend to the American people, and we offer it as Greeks to Americans, and we ask you, after witnessing our pledge, to be the interpreters of our feelings to your people, and to herald all over your country that the Greeks are standing by the principles they have learned from their ancestors, that they join you and the other Allies in the noble fight, and that they will stand by all of you for the accomplishment of these noble ideals, and that they will stand by you to the end.

Finally, from the bottom of their heart, comes the wish that they may see once more, and that right soon, their country united in spirit, so that they may be able

to give to the common cause a more substantial and more valuable assistance than now, assistance that is with both their hands; the very same hands, which in the days of old, raised the trophies of the Persian Wars that saved the world at that time from a barbarous cataclysm; the very same hands which, following the example of the American and the French people, broke the chains of their tyranny, and won their independence; the very same hands which, five years ago, as liberators of their brethren, wrought two successive and successful wars; the very same hands, finally, which through the ages have always fought against despotism and tyranny, whenever and wherever they met them.

And when beautiful Greece, united, shall stand again firmly on her feet, attired in her glorious panoply, brandishing her spear, her face radiating beauty, glory and genius, terrible to her enemies and respected by her friends, then, gentlemen, you must not be surprised if you see even these fair women who sit now at the tables before us running to her like the Spartan women of old, surrounding her and imploring her to let them fight with her for the common cause.

POEMS WRITTEN BY MISS EDITH M. THOMAS AND READ BY HER AT THE BANQUET

"WHO SHALL SAVE HELLAS?"

Who shall save Hellas from impending doom—
She, the belovèd, the revered from eld,
Whose Psyche still behind the world-soul stands,
Voicing the law of Beauty and of Art?
Who shall pluck back the garland of her honor,
Torn from her stately head by ruthless hands?
Who shall restore the azure and the white
Of her loved banner—Truth and Faithfulness—
Redeeming thus her pledges of a friend
To a stript land that held with her the pact
Of mutual aid against inhuman foes?

Who shall save Hellas from impending doom?
Oh, who but weep to see her chained again—
She that could snap the fetters Islam forged!
Shall her young Freedom—not of century's span—
Be taken from her, or those trophies lost
Which precious blood of hers so lately bought—
Kavala, Seres, Drama, be lost as pawns
In a vile game of war played by her foes,
Of whom, in friendship's guise, one bore afar
Soldiers of hers and held as chattel-guests?
Ev'n he who sits upon her throne, inclined
Unto her foe—Europe's Arch-enemy!
Shall he not heed—the "King by grace of God"—
Lest he on Greece should bring a last disgrace?

Who shall save Hellas from impending doom?
Greeks of America, not few are you,
Or cold of heart; and still resides in you
A klephtic spark that can be blown again!

I think I hear you with one voice proclaim:
" He shall save Hellas—he whom Crete leads forth
To be her savior when near lost is all!"
He shall safeguard her dear-bought liberties!
Does not his chrismal name of Freedom ring—
" Eleutherios "—the deliverer?
Greeks of America, do not ye say,
" He shall save Hellas from impending doom—
Zeto, Venizelos!"

THE FREEDOM OF GREECE HAS COME ONCE MORE!

Now has great Freedom come once more to Greece,
For lately was she bound in subtler gyves—
More mordant than the Turk upon her forged,
While all her angry Hellenes, near or far,
(Those most of all within our widewayed land!)
Stormed in their hearts to see her chained so fast.
Rejoice, O Hellenes! All-the-world's Belov'd—
Your native land, of proudest legendry,
Breathes free again, and, stretching her lithe limbs,
Is ready now to meet the Earth's One Foe,
And in the combat join her olden friends!
You had, long since, O Greeks, a Constantine,
Who in the heavens saw a golden cross,
Whence *in hoc signo vinces* rang his cry!
Your latest Constantine beheld a cross—
But other! For an Iron Cross it was,
And in his secret heart its image lay
And there a thousand treacheries it bred . . .
But let him pass—this last of Constantines!
O Hellas, let him pass—without a word:
He that betrayed thee shall betray no more;
Into the dark of exile let him go,
With other crown'd betrayers of their trust!
Dantean is their doom—hateful to God,
And (soon) unto the enemies of God!
Thy wedded traitors, Hellas—let them pass,
And think no more of them; but call thy clans;

And, first of all, the chieftain of the isle
Set in the sparkling sea where free airs blew
And filled his soul with Glory, as the wind
Fills the fain sail that has been sick with calm,
And, now, a larger voyage still must shape—
Call, Hellas, call thy Venizelos home,
And set him over all—who has the hearts of all!

NEWS OF THE AMERICAN-HELLENIC SOCIETY

Two of our officers have recently aided in forwarding the objects for which the Society was formed by lectures on the Near East. Dr. Theodore P. Ion, the Director of the Society and formerly Professor of International Law at Boston University, on March 3rd and March 12th gave two lectures at Columbia University under the auspices of the Institute of Arts and Sciences of that institution. The lectures dealt with the "Eastern Question and Greece." In the first Dr. Ion dwelt on the origin of the Eastern Question and the causes which gave rise to it, and then, after a brief historical sketch in which he emphasized the political and social incompatibility of Christians and Mohammedans, he reviewed the diplomatic history connected with the creation of the Hellenic Kingdom. In the second lecture the speaker treated of various phases of the Eastern Question, beginning with the Egyptian troubles, and, passing next to the part taken by Russia in the Near East, as exemplified in the Crimean War, concluded by explaining the relation of Greece to the present situation, and the part that the Hellenic people is destined to play in the final settlement.

On April 6th Professor Mitchell Carroll of the George Washington University at Washington, D. C., who has been for many years the General Secretary of the Archaeological Institute of America, delivered an interesting lecture entitled: "Greece, in the Wars Between Orient and Occident from Theseus to Venizelos." The lecturer passed rapidly through the long centuries of Greece's contests, as the buffer state, with the hordes of East and North, showing now the portrait of some

great man, whose very name epitomizes the achievements of an epoch, and again some lovely landscape where a great battle or a famous temple once symbolized concretely the glory of ancient and medieval Greece. When more modern times were reached, and the great events of the last hundred years and in particular the occurrences of the recent Balkan Wars were touched upon, events which have brought about the doubling of Greece's territory and the quadrupling of her power and prestige, the feeling was aroused that this alone might well form the theme for another lecture, centering around the figure of Venizelos, whose strong and sympathetic face, when shown upon the screen, called forth the applause of the gathering.

On February 16, 1918, Professor William Scott Ferguson, of Harvard University, a member of the Executive Committee of the Society, tendered an informal reception and tea at his home in Cambridge to His Excellency George Roussos, the Minister of Greece, on the occasion of his recent visit to Boston. Many of the members of the Local Council of Massachusetts were present and among the guests may be mentioned Professors Lanman, Gulick, Chase, Patton and Harris. Our General Council was represented by Dr. Ion, the Director, and Professor Brown, Chairman of the Executive Committee. Mrs. Ferguson entertained her guests most charmingly and hospitably, and the Society's aims and hopes were freely and helpfully discussed.

A meeting was held in Faneuil Hall on Sunday afternoon, February 17th, which was attended by several thousand Greeks of Boston and vicinity. At the close of a stirring address by His Excellency Mr. Roussos, Professor Carroll N. Brown spoke briefly, first in Greek, and then in English, on strengthening the friendly relations of Greece and the United States, and expressed his confidence that the hearty co-operation of the Greeks in America would advance materially the cause of the Allies in this war against Prussian militarism.

DONORS

The following persons have contributed the amounts designated opposite their names to the work of the Society:

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	$7,500.00

NECROLOGY

To the deep regret of the members of the Society, Professor James Rignall Wheeler of Columbia University, a member of the Executive Committee of the General Council of the Society, died at his New York home on Saturday, February 9th. We present herewith the resolutions on his death drawn up by the Executive Committee and sent to Mrs. Wheeler, as well as a brief life of Professor Wheeler, which first appeared in the *Vermont Cynic*.

March 16th, 1918.

My dear Mrs. Wheeler:

At a meeting of the Executive Committee of the American-Hellenic Society, held at its offices on Saturday, March 2, the following resolutions on the death of Professor James R. Wheeler were adopted. It was further voted that they be recorded in the minutes of the Society and that a copy be sent to you.

"Be it resolved that in the death of Professor James Rignall Wheeler the American-Hellenic Society has lost one of its most valued members and friends. His profound understanding of the real significance of Greek art and literature in our modern life, and his associations with the leading exponents of Greek thought in our country were an earnest of the invaluable help that he would have rendered our newly formed Society. The Committee had, indeed, already learned to rely on his judgment, and had found that his knowledge of Greece and her affairs, and his interest in her people and their progress, were equaled only by his willingness to do his part in furthering her cause here in America.

"Resolved that the Society can never forget that among the last acts of a life devoted to Greek idealism, it could claim and so freely receive the self-sacrificing service of one who, we hope,

saw with prophetic vision that Greece still has something to offer America as well as to receive from her.

"Resolved further that we herewith express our sense of personal loss and our deep sympathy with you in your bereavement."

Very sincerely yours,

CARROLL N. BROWN,
Chairman Executive Committee.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Professor James Rignall Wheeler died at his home in New York City on Saturday, February 9, after a brief illness. An attack of la grippe lasting about ten days affected his heart (which for a year or two had not been strong) and Saturday at noon suddenly brought on a critical condition to which he succumbed in a few hours.

Professor Wheeler was born in Burlington on February 15, 1859, the youngest son of President John Wheeler of the University of Vermont, who was president from 1833 to 1849, and his second wife, Mary C. Wheeler. Professor Wheeler was graduated from the University of Vermont in the class of 1880 with the degree of A.B. and received the degrees of A.M. and Ph.D. from Harvard in 1885. After further study in Europe, at Berlin and at Bonn, he became a lecturer at Johns Hopkins and in 1888 was made instructor in Greek and Latin at Harvard. From 1889 to 1895 he was professor of Greek at the University of Vermont. Since then he had been a member of the faculty at Columbia University as professor of Greek until 1906, and then as professor of Greek archaeology and art. He was more closely connected with the American School of Classical Studies at Athens than any other one man. A student of the school at its opening in 1882, he returned to Athens as annual professor in 1892-93, and spent several months at the school on two later visits to Europe. He had been a member of the managing committee of the school since 1891, was secretary of this committee from 1894 to 1901, and from that time until his death was its chairman and a trustee of the school. To his ideals of scholarship and his wise guidance is due in no small measure the high position which the school holds today among the foreign schools of archaeology in Athens.

Professor Wheeler's publications consisted chiefly of scattered articles in the classical and especially the archaelogical periodicals, reviews in *The New York Nation* and occasional addresses. He was joint editor with Professor Fowler of Western Reserve University of an important handbook of archaeology, and he contributed to a work on Greek literature, published by Columbia University in 1912. The soundness of his judgment and his prominence in the academic world led to offers of important administrative positions, among others that of curator of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, but he preferred the life of a teacher. He was acting dean and dean of the faculty of fine arts of Columbia University from 1906 to 1909, had been vice-president of the American Philological Association and associate editor of the *American Journal of Archæology*, and was an honorary editor at the time of his death. For more than two years he had been a member of the Municipal Art Commission of the City of New York. He received the honorary degree of LL.D. from the University of Colorado and from the University of Vermont, and was a trustee of the latter institution, having been elected in 1914.

He is survived by his wife, who was Jane Hunt Pease, daughter of President Pease of the University of Vermont (1851-61). Professor Wheeler was the last of a family of seven children.

Funeral services were held Monday afternoon, February 11, in New York at Professor Wheeler's home and in St. Paul's, the Columbia University Chapel. The body was brought to Burlington, where a funeral was held Tuesday afternoon, February 12, in the College Street Church.

PERSECUTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN TURKEY SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE EUROPEAN WAR

TRANSLATED FROM OFFICIAL GREEK DOCUMENTS
BY
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AND
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INTRODUCTION

The persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey, since the declaration of the European war, are nothing but the continuation of the program put into operation by the Young Turks in the year 1913, with the object of annihilating Hellenism.

In order that those who are ignorant of conditions in Turkey may understand the objects and the mainsprings of these persecutions, as well as the methods by which the uprooting of Hellenism in the territories subject to Turkey was sought, it is necessary, before narrating the persecutions that began with the last months of 1914, to review briefly the occurrences of the preceding period. There will thus be no room for doubt that we have here to do with an intensive continuation of a program which had as its object the annihilation of Hellenism in Turkey.

Anyone who looks into the events that followed the restoration of constitutional government in Turkey becomes convinced that the natural course of history was not at that time to be changed simply by the banishing of a tyrant and the appearance of a supposedly parliamentary government.

A study of the first years of the new government shows that the Young Turks had not the slightest intention of modifying the Turkish system of government, but really entered upon this peaceful revolution in order

* This account of Turkish outrages in Asia Minor, to which it has seemed proper to add two other documents giving confirmatory facts and details, has been translated from a publication of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The barbarous treatment of the subject Greeks which has been cold-bloodedly encouraged if not directly instigated by German officials in Turkey, can only be compared with that accorded the Armenians. The tale of the sufferings of these innocent and helpless men, women and children should certainly arouse the civilized nations of the world to take the power to commit such atrocities out of the hands of the Turks irrevocably and forever.

—*The Translators.*

that they might forestall the intervention of the Great Powers, and might thus be able to accomplish their program, in accordance with which Turkey was to be changed from an Empire of several nations into a single National Empire, unified and compact. It is in this scheme of the Young Turks, by which a Turkey politically and economically independent and nationally united was to be created, that we must seek to account for the dangers to which, from the establishment of the constitution, the nationalities living under Turkey were subjected.

In order to bring about the realization of the schemes of the Young Turks it was necessary that free institutions should be adopted so that the sympathy of the Christian nationalities and of the Great Powers might be secured for the new government, and this in spite of the fact that the great majority of the Turkish people was not ripe for the reception of such institutions.

Naturally, therefore, and without any difficulty those young Turks who were directing affairs almost immediately returned to the Turkish custom of managing things through the use of force, the only available means by which they could maintain their supremacy over the subject peoples.

This tendency, which showed itself at once in active operation, is clearly set forth by Mr. René Pinon in his treatise "Europe and the Young Turks."

"The theories with regard to equality," he says (p. 123), "serve now only as a veil for European eyes and as a fair pretext for depriving the Christians of those old 'privileges' which heretofore had compensated them for their position of inequality with the Turks; as a pretext, that is, for doing away with their courts of special jurisdiction, for destroying their national organizations, for closing their schools and for hindering the cultural development of the non-Turkish populations." This active policy of the Young Turks of the Mussulman

majority which strove to bring about their more complete domination was immediately perceptible in its effects upon the Christian elements of the population and in particular upon the Greek element, which, as being numerically larger and more advanced in culture than the others was at once subjected to the most serious blows. Furthermore, it was against the Greeks that the Young Turks first turned. The immediate result of this movement was that the various Christian nationalities in Turkey combined in order to defend their lives and property.

The war that followed in 1912 encouraged the belief for a time that through the defeat of the Turks the danger that threatened the existence of the Christian nationalities in Turkey had been dispelled. Unfortunately this turned out to be a vain hope.

The results of the Balkan war were a serious blow to the Central Empires and destroyed for once and all the dream of Austrian possession of Saloniki. The traditional anti-Hellenic policy of this power from now on left no stone unturned in order to neutralize the effects of the victorious war by which Greece had been enlarged, and rendered competent through the prestige of her victory, to defend vigorously and effectively those of her sons that were still left beneath the yoke of Turkey. Austria, aided by Germany, the constant enemy of all Greek progress which had the slightest tendency to interfere with her prospects in Asia Minor, succeeded in dissolving the Balkan alliance with the results that are now known to all.

A consequence of this was the predominance once more of the Young Turk régime, which now, under the lead of Enver Bey, who became the blind tool of the Germans, was fully subjected to Germany. In this new manifestation the Young Turk party, encouraged by its success in having so easily recovered the city of Adrianople, considered the time propitious for a return to

its old ideas. With a view to this it decided upon the complete annihilation of the Greek element in Turkey, so as first to make Thrace a purely Mohammedan province, under the pretext of thus securing the safety of Constantinople, and second to establish a united and independent Mohammedan Empire.

If we reflect that the Young Turks, at the time when they had been at the zenith of their power, though then free from all European intervention, had not dared to enter upon a sudden application of their nationalistic policy but had only done this with a certain measure of self-restraint, the question arises how they came to enter upon such a decisive course on the very morrow of a war that had proved destructive for them. This fact is explained, however, when we take into account that at that time they had been held in check by the fear of the destruction of their whole work through the possible intervention of Europe, to which they did not wish to offer any excuse for interference in their internal affairs, while at this later time they had as co-operators and co-adjutors, first the Bulgarians, who were endeavoring even in their defeat to inflict through this activity a fatal blow to Greece, and secondly, what was even more important, the Germans whose obvious interest consisted in smiting Hellenism, for the Greeks have always constituted and to-day constitute a serious impediment to Germany's commercial and cultural predominance in the East. All this is confirmed by the whole course of the persecutions, as narrated below.

Just at the time when the life of the subject Greeks bade fair to be endurable, under the pretext of establishing Mussulman immigrants in Asia Minor and of securing the Asiatic littoral, over opposite the disputed islands of Chios and Mitylene, but actually in order to apply the Turks' scheme of a nationalization of Turkey that should make it purely and simply Mohammedan, a cruel and systematic persecution was begun which de-

prived about 400,000 Greeks of their homes and property, and compelled them, naked and stripped of their all, to seek refuge in Greece. This inhuman persecution, even the recollection of which inspires horror in all, proceeded without interruption up to the declaration of the European War.

The accession of Turkey to the alliance of the Central Empires and her participation in the war marked the beginning of the second period of the persecutions of Hellenism in Turkey, persecutions that were incomparably fiercer and more effective than the first. This period definitively reveals those who were morally guilty of the persecution. Not for a moment did these instigators relax their evil and powerful influence upon the executors of the crimes against the Greeks.

The difference between these two periods is great.

During the first there was a general persecution which might perhaps destroy whole Greek communities, but which did not bring with it the complete and irretrievable ruin of the Greek race, since it, at any rate, permitted those persecuted to save themselves by flight. In the period dating from the participation of Turkey in the war, the persecution assailed the very existence of Hellenism in Turkey.

It is however necessary to call attention to another difference between these two periods, a difference unfortunately that reflects upon the attitude of official Greece. During the first period the official Greek government appears everywhere and always defending the Greeks persecuted in Turkey and acting with all its strength in order to regulate the question of the refugees so as to save Hellenism in Turkey. During the second period, however, those directing things in Greece, basing their much extolled policy of neutrality, in ironical disregard of the facts, on the fantastic and chimerical hope of saving Hellenism in Turkey by this policy, stood by, regarded by those who were ignorant of what was going

on as merely passive spectators, while in the eyes of those who closely followed affairs in Turkey and were cognizant of the wire-pulling behind the scenes in Germany, they were neither more nor less than abettors of the murderers and assassins of our kinsmen in Asia.

One who investigates with some attention the second period of the persecutions, from its very start discovers in its every manifestation German participation and activity. The Turk is a connoisseur in crime; he can kill, he can debauch, but he is incapable of formulating a really scientific system by which the foundations of a nation may be undermined, and under which justificatory reasons for his acts may be found. His cunning does not reach such a point of inventiveness as that exhibited during this period.

Even in the persecutions of 1913-14, the methods of which evidenced the guilt of the Ottoman Government, German activity appears timidly operative behind the scenes, and although Germany was apparently at that time acting in order to forward the Young Turk schemes, which it thus flattered and adopted, it was, as a matter of fact, working in its own behalf. There are very many proofs of this German guilt.

As to the persecutions that took place before the war, German guilt is revealed by the interview which took place in April, 1914, between the Greek Chargé d'Affaires, J. Dragoumis, and the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Von Jagow (Report of the 7th of April, 1914, No. 643, Ministerial Archives, No. 10907). According to this report the latter admits the persecutions and the Turkish outrages, but, forgetting himself, for the moment, and his position, he becomes the advocate of the Turks and attempts to justify the persecutions by using the arguments advanced by the Young Turks with the object of concealing their crimes; first that every Greek in Turkey is an apostle of Pan-Hellenism, as though forsooth, the attempt on the part of the Greeks

to preserve their nationality was a cause that justified their persecution, and secondly, that the question of the islands, the final settlement of which the Young Turks sought, was most serious for the safety of the coasts of Asia Minor.

This pro-Turkish German policy went even further. It forbade the publication in the German press of events which were taking place in Thrace to the disadvantage of Hellenism. A telegram of the 10th of April, 1914, from Mr. J. Dragoumis to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says: "It is impossible to have accepted for publication in the newspapers news relative to matters in Thrace. A general order has been issued that we must not displease the Turks." Even Von Jagow himself, furthermore, confessing to the Greek Ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Theotokis, the critical state of affairs, regarded this as a consequence of Mussulman fanaticism which had been aroused on account of what had happened to its disadvantage, and he maintained further that this fanaticism was fostered by Russia from a Pan-Slav motive with the object of weakening the Œcumenical Patriarchate, so that it would necessarily later become a subservient tool of the Russian policy. (Telegram of the Greek Minister in Berlin, Mr. Theotokis, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Streit, of May 26, 1914. Ministerial Archives, No. 998.)

Even the German Emperor, in order to conceal the truth, did not hesitate to say to the same Minister that only subordinate officials of the Turkish government were responsible for the state of affairs, and not the government itself, which was on the contrary, so he declares, really endeavoring to put an end to the situation which had arisen. But unfortunately for the Kaiser and his Minister Von Jagow, the second persecution came on apace, in the course of which the guilty ones were discovered. (Telegram of the 29th of May, 1914, from Mr. Theotokis, the Greek Minister in Berlin, to Mr.

Streit, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ministerial Archives, No. 1050.)

The actual occurrences leave no doubt as to the guilt of Germany, since it is known that throughout the whole East there were distributed in April, 1915, and even earlier, through the agency of the Deutsche Palestina Bank circular notices in Turkish, through which the fanaticism of the Mussulmans was aroused, and hatred of the Christians and breaking of all business relations with them was encouraged. A French translation of this circular fell into the hands of the Greek consul in Beirut, who describes the indignation against the Germans which its distribution produced in the Christian populations of the place. It is entitled " Manifeste général à tous les adeptes de l' Islamisme, publié par le Comité de la Défense Nationale au siège du Califat, en l' année 1333."

The Germans in June, 1915, were aware of the decisions of the Young Turk committee, adopted in the presence of the Governor of Adrianople and the Bulgarians Kaltsef and Toufexief, and looking toward the formation of closer relations with the Bulgarians as well as toward the persecution of the Greek element. These were as follows:

1). Establishment of a Turko-Bulgarian commercial alliance, complementary to the Turko-Bulgarian Committee.

2). Taking the commerce of the East out of Greek hands.

3). Establishment in the East of Turkish commercial agencies for the importation and exportation of goods exclusively through Mussulman hands, the Turks being expected to stop all dealings with Greeks.

4). Limitation of the privileges of the Patriarchate and of his ecclesiastic jurisdiction; weddings, baptisms, etc., were to be recorded with the Iman (Mohammedan priest).

5). Restriction of instruction in the Greek language and its total abandonment in the future.

6). The Turkification of the Greek element by force, through the establishment of mixed communities, so constituted as always to have a preponderance of Mussulman men and of Greek women, with a view to compelling mixed marriages.

Certainly it is utterly incredible that the Central Powers were unable to impose upon the Turks a different policy toward the Greeks, though this, in an attempt to conceal the truth, is maintained by the German Lepsius, who was sent to Constantinople in July, 1915, on a special mission. Even he, however, acknowledges most cold-bloodedly that the anti-Hellenic and anti-Armenian persecutions were two phases of one and the same program, the annihilation of the Christian element in Turkey, which would thus be transformed into a purely Mussulman Empire. (Report of the Greek Embassy in Constantinople, No. 4415 of the 31st of July, 1915. Ministerial Archives, No. 8477.)

The Minister of Austria in Constantinople, in June, 1915, tried to persuade the Greek Chargé d'Affaires in that city that the intervention of the Central Powers in the matter was very difficult, inasmuch as Turkey regarded the persecutions as a purely internal affair.

The value of these attempts at self-justification is adequately characterized by the following extract of an official report of Mr. Gryparis, Minister of Greece in Vienna, dated September 13th, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 1599), on the occasion of taking steps before Baron Burian to put a stop to the persecutions: "What is the use, anyway, of formal remonstrances to the Sublime Porte, or of appeals to the two empires to intervene with her? Is it not perfectly evident that, as things are now in Turkey, the Grand Vizier is only nominally Grand Vizier, the government being really in the hands of Enver and Talaat, whose ideas and opinions

about Hellenism in Turkey are only too well known, and that, further, the decisions about banishing to the interior the Greek populations of the seacoast, were taken only after coming to an understanding with the German staff in Constantinople."

The truth of this conception is confirmed by a telegram of Mr. Kallerges, the Greek Minister in Constantinople, to Mr. Zalocostas, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated March 28, 1917 (Ministerial Archives, No. 2338). According to this the Minister of Germany, Count von Metternich, was recalled as a result of the direct intervention with the Kaiser of Enver Pasha and the German military circles in Constantinople, because of his interceding in behalf of the Christians, thus touching the pride of the Turks, as well as failing to subserve German interests.

No doubt remained as to the guilt of Germany after the evacuation of Cydonia (Aivali). The Grand Vizier acknowledged to the Greek Minister in Constantinople that the transfer of the Greek population was due to the action of the commander of the 5th Corps, Commander-in-Chief Liman von Sanders. The Ottoman government originally objected to this and only yielded to the threat of the Commander-in-Chief, who declared that only on this basis could he assume responsibility for the safety of the army. Even the Ambassador of Germany tried to persuade the said Commander-in-Chief, for reasons of political necessity, not to insist on his decision but the latter was unwilling to yield, claiming that in time of war military necessity takes precedence over political, and that the great German Council of War, before which he had set forth in detail the state of affairs, had already given its consent.

What were these military necessities? Pretexts of the danger of espionage by the people of Cydonia, who had for a year and more been subjected to the strictest blockade, were advanced as sufficient to justify the de-

struction of this bulwark of Hellenism and its supplanting in this fertile country, in commerce and other activities, by Germans and Austrians.

The scheme of the Young Turks, completed and perfected, was adopted by the Germans and so the blind passion of the Turks and the egotistical aims of the Germans were satisfied.

Thus those morally guilty and those actually guilty were united in their common struggle to deal a deadly blow to Hellenism in Turkey, the annihilation of which they had vowed to complete.

And, in truth, the diabolical nature of the scheme through which they sought the destruction of the Greek element in Turkey and its total uprooting, at this period in particular, is astounding.

In order to understand the vastness of the destruction so satanically conceived, we must investigate as closely as possible all the means that were used. They are the following: First, abolishment of the special privileges; second, drafting Christians into the army; third, taxation and commandeering of Greek property; fourth, Turkification; fifth, assassination and violence against individuals.

In all these ways the preparatory work for the extermination of Hellenism on a broad scale was undertaken.

The examination of these various methods will be the object of the first part of the present study. In the second part there will be treated a sixth means of totally exterminating Hellenism, i.e., the extensive deportations of the Greek population on the feigned ground of military necessity.

PART I

WORK PREPARATORY TO THE EXTERMINATION OF THE GREEK POPULATIONS IN TURKEY

CHAPTER I

THE ABOLITION OF ECCLESIASTICAL AND OTHER PRIVILEGES OF THE GREEKS IN TURKEY

The Turco-Germans attempted first to shake the very foundations of enslaved Hellenism. They knew that Hellenism had been saved in its days of dark and harsh slavery, owing to the existence of these ecclesiastical and other privileges granted to it, by virtue of which alone the Greek language and the sacred traditions of the race had been preserved. They decided therefore immediately to attack these privileges which they mistakenly regarded as a complement to the Turkish capitulations. The privileges which the Christians enjoyed differ in this particular from the capitulations, inasmuch as they constitute a sacred obligation on the part of the conqueror towards the conquered on account of the difference of religion, an obligation which all the civilized Christian nations recognize toward the Mussulmans in those countries under their control in which the Mussulman element exists in large numbers, such as Algeria, Tunis, India, Caucasus, etc. Germans and Turks attempted to abolish this privilege gradually because they

knew that only thus could they realize an assimilation of the Greek element to the Mussulman element, thus making the country completely Turkish.

I. Education

In carrying out their program, they first assailed the educational system of the Greeks.

On the basis of the privileges, the education of the Greeks in Turkey was in the hands of the Œcumenical Patriarchate and was directed by it, a fact formally recognized by the Circular of the Turkish Prime Minister of January 22nd, 1891.

The Circular, in treating of education, reads as follows:

"The programs of the schools shall be drawn up or confirmed by the Patriarchate and the Metropoles,* likewise the diplomas and certificates of the teachers, both male and female, shall be confirmed by the same. Since these must also be known to the Government, when the inspector or the director of public education, while investigating instruction in the schools, shall observe some lesson improperly taught, or shall find some teacher that is not duly provided with a certificate, the Ministry of Education in Constantinople, and the Local Government in the provinces, respectively, acting in concert with the Metropoles, shall come to an agreement, and thus through their agency such lessons shall be stopped and such teachers, unprovided with certificates, shall be replaced."

Through a temporary law which was applied in July, 1915, this privilege was abolished, since by Article VII of this law the schools established and supported by communities and associations were regarded as 'state institutions.' Thus all the schools of the Greek communities in Turkey were put on an equality with the peculiarly Turkish schools and were made subject to the control of

* A kind of superior bishop.

the Turkish Government and rendered immediately dependent upon the Ministry of Education.

A consequence of this law was that the following demands were made upon the Metropoles and the Patriarchate: First, that the teaching of the Turkish language in the Greek schools should be imposed in equal measure with the teaching of Greek, and that it should be introduced into the girls' schools as well. Second, that geography and history should be taught in Turkish. Third, that copies of the schedules and programs of the Greek schools should be submitted to the Turkish inspectors and that statistical tables of the schools should be formed on the basis of the government programs. Fourth, that the teaching of the names of places, cities, mountains, etc., in Turkey should be in the forms officially accepted by the Government, i.e., that Constantinople should be called Stamboul, that the Dardanelles should be called Tsanakale, etc. Fifth, that in future the proper authorities to whom the teachers shall appeal on questions of teaching or other subjects connected therewith, should no longer be the Patriarchate and the Metropoles but the directors of the communal and private schools.

II. Wills and Testaments

Not satisfied with this fatal blow to Greek education, the violation of other privileges of the Patriarchate was aimed at as well. According to the above mentioned Circular of 1891 every difference between heirs or between the guardian of minors and his wards, as well as every dispute as to the legitimacy and authenticity of a will was to be decided by the mixed Counsel of the Patriarchate or of the Metropoles. This right was now abolished even as regards secret wills. As a result of this, after the death of a Mr. Rizou, a Greek, the Sheikhoulislamate * assumed jurisdiction of his will and rendered a decision

* The highest Mohammedan religious court and expounder of Mohammedan law.

which was published in the Official Journal although the will in question, duly drawn up by an official act of a notary public, bore the ratification of the Patriarchate and was prepared in strict accord with legal forms. This fact undoubtedly indicates the prevailing tendency to take away from the ecclesiastical authorities the right to draw up wills.

III. Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction

Apart from this, in the question of proceedings against the Clergy, there was abolished the privilege which they had long enjoyed with regard to being summoned before the Turkish court, imprisoned, etc., and their direct arrest and imprisonment, in the common jails, without the knowledge of the proper ecclesiastical authorities was now legitimized. There are very many cases where this was done. Among them, the imprisonment for nine months of the Archivist of the Patriarchate, the Archimandrite Alexander; that of the Abbot of the Sacred Monastery of St. George in Princes Island; that of the priests of the depopulated villages of Callicratia, Tsando, Phanaraki, in the region of Metra, etc. Besides this, there was taken away from the ecclesiastic courts the right of issuing decisions for temporary alimony on the ground that the ecclesiastic courts were on a par with the Mohammedan religious courts.

Furthermore, with the intention of lessening the authority and influence of the Patriarchate, the Turks paid no attention to the Patriarch's intervention in behalf of the Christians who were compelled to become Mohammedans. Contrary to the recognized rights of the Patriarchate they began, from 1915 on, to deny all right of intervention in the case of these questions, as is proven by an official note dated the 28th of July, 1915. According to this note, which was sent because the Patriarchate had intervened in behalf of the thirteen-year-old girl Sultana Nicolaou of Chrysopolis in Chalcedon, who

had been forcibly abducted by a Turk from the house of her father, the Ministry through the appropriate bureau superintendent declared to the Patriarchate: "The affair concerns exclusively the parents involved, who ought to appeal directly to the Turkish authorities; consequently the mediation of the Patriarchate is superfluous." The same course was followed with regard to the abduction of the sixteen-year-old Helen Photiou Catuma, who lived in the Tatavla quarter of Constantinople. A similar thing happened when the Patriarchate complained of the expatriation of the Greeks of Coutali and Marmora; Talaat Pasha himself * in his reply declared: "The religious authorities are not permitted to intervene in questions foreign to their jurisdiction but must limit themselves solely to their religious duties." A similar communication of the Patriarchate touching on the persecutions was returned in June, 1915, by the Ministry of Justice with the declaration "The Patriarchate has no business to transmit communications about such questions."

IV. Greek Communities in Turkish Cities

Along with the privileges of the Patriarchate there were abolished also the rights of the Christian communities. The election of the Councilors (a board of Selectmen) had always been their inalienable right. Beginning with the year 1915 the government in Constantinople began to select these councilors as, for example, in the parishes of Evangelistria, Vlanga, Xerokrene, etc. At the same time under various pretexts the confiscation of the property of the Greek communities, the Holy Monasteries and other national establishments began. This is confirmed by an official report of the Greek Ministry in Constantinople dated the 14th of April, 1916 (Ministerial Archives, No. 1188), which runs as follows:

* The present Turkish Prime Minister.

"The Ministerial Council on the occasion of a dispute about a piece of property of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the Island of Chalke has decided to declare public property all the monastic possessions on the Island of Chalke which lie outside of the enclosure of the Monasteries, and in accordance with this decision the proper economical ephor has taken possession of these."

In addition to this, the tendency of the Germano-Turks to confiscate the national property of the Greeks is shown by the forced sale of the orphan asylum on Princes Island for £3,000 instead of £30,000, its actual value; the forcible seizure of the trade school in Chalke, and in particular the decision of the Ministerial Council taken in March, 1916, according to which the rights of ownership of the Monasteries are recognized only as covering the ground comprised within the walls surrounding them, while all the property outside of the walls which is claimed by them, whether this be forest land or land of other nature, is regarded as public property owned by the State. The application of such a decision completely stripping the Patriarchate, the Greek communities and the monasteries of their property, which reached a total value of many million pounds, could only have been stopped if the Greek Government had threatened, as a retaliatory measure, to confiscate the property belonging to the Turkish religious institutions in Greece. Unfortunately, it was the epoch at which, far from appreciating the importance of such a loss of wealth, Greece seemed rather to be seeking to make amends, as for instance in that famous decision about the surrender of some disputed Turkish possessions, of a value of twenty million drachmas and more.

CHAPTER II

COMPULSORY ENLISTMENT OF CHRISTIANS

In connection with these measures which shook to its foundations the very existence of enslaved Hellenism, its annihilation was further attempted through military conscription. Such diabolical inventiveness was used to this end that conscription served as a safe means first, to ruin the Greeks as individuals from the point of view of material wealth and, secondly (and this may be called its real object), to reduce their numbers to the lowest possible terms. In order that this may be understood we must know all the historical developments of Greek conscription in Turkey.

Under the absolutist régime, as is well known, the Christians in Turkey had been exempted from military obligations but instead of this they had been obliged to pay a yearly war tax. At the time of the restitution of the Constitution, they were by law regarded as obliged to render military service up to the age of thirty-one, men over thirty-one being regarded as exempt, since they had already paid their exemption fee.

After the participation of Turkey in the war, these men were, however, through legal enactment, regarded as obliged to render military service, and this included even those up to forty-eight years of age, but with the difference that those who were in the reserve were released upon payment of £45 as an exemption fee. The object of this was clear. Men that were not accustomed to military life would surely prefer to obtain a release by the payment of this fee. There was therefore through this conscription an attempt made to bleed

financially even those over whom the Turkish government had legally no right.

But most of those thus conscripted were not in a position to pay the military exemption fee. The Turks bethought themselves, therefore, of subjecting the Greeks who came into the ranks of the army to such deprivations and hardships as to compel them to dispose of their small properties in order to pay the exemption fee and obtain their release, or else not to enter the service at all, in which case they were proclaimed deserters. In this way, the actual object of the conscription, i.e., the destruction of Hellenism, was attained.

In order to succeed more fully in this, they established by law the system of the so-called battalions of laborers into which the Christians were drafted on the ground that they could not be trusted to serve under arms. These divisions of laborers were for the most part sent into the interior of Asia Minor in order to build public roads, to construct Mussulman houses, to work in quarries and to cultivate the fields of the Turkish immigrants and they were, in general, subjected to enforced labor of various kinds. What the situation of these unfortunate men was like is confirmed by various official reports, some extracts of which are here presented by way of proof.

Thus a report from the consular office in Bryoulla of August 15, 1915, Number 319 (Ministerial Archives No. 11536) describes their condition as follows: "One of the causes of the wretchedness of the Greeks in Turkey is, as is well known, the drafting of Christians into the army. For those serving in the army are subjected to such privation and hardship, and their condition, differing not a whit from that of those condemned to hard labor in the galleys, is so miserable, that in spite of all the drastic efforts of the authorities no one of the Greeks here has come forward to enlist voluntarily."

Another report of the Greek Legation in Constanti-

nople, dated July 13, 1915, Number 4099 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7981) is as follows: "The condition of the Christian soldiers is frightful. They are in danger of dying of starvation, since only a modicum of food is given them. Because, forsooth, of lack of confidence in the Christians, orders have been issued for the formation of labor battalions to be used in the construction of roads, etc. To the 3,000 Christians in Tyroloe is given half a sea-biscuit daily. The Greek soldiers of Malgara, working in a quarry, lived for four days on vegetables alone. They are often used by the Turks for private work."

Another report of the Greek consul in Iconium dated March 7, 1917, which reached the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 18th of September, 1917 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7027) states: "That which seriously injures and gradually but certainly exterminates the Greeks in Turkey is the law establishing labor battalions composed exclusively of Christians. As a result of this law these unfortunate men, on being drafted into these battalions are distributed throughout the interior of the empire, from the coasts of Asia Minor and the Black Sea to Bagdad, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia and Egypt, some to construct military roads, others to make tunnels for the Bagdad railroad, and others to cultivate the fields. Receiving absolutely no pay, badly nourished and clothed, exposed to changes in the weather, to the blazing sun of Bagdad and the intolerable cold of the Caucasus, assailed by sickness, fever, eruptive typhoid and cholera, they are perishing by thousands. For awhile those able to pay the exemption fees were released from service, and thus those who were relatively well off were rescued from ruin and sure death, but for the last five months these, too, have been compelled to serve in these labor battalions. While visiting the hospitals of the city of Iconium, I have seen these unfortunates stretched out on their beds or on the ground like living skeletons, waiting

in agony for death as their deliverer from this life of misery and privation. There is a total lack of drugs and food, and the only attention the sick receive is a visit from the doctor twice a day. Those who are able to stand go about the streets of the city begging a piece of bread. In order to give a faithful picture of this grievous situation it is enough to state that the cemetery of Iconium, as a result of the great mortality of the Greeks working in these labor battalions, has been filled to overflowing with graves in which not one corpse, as is the usual custom, is buried, but into which are cast, like dogs, as many as four, five or even six dead."

As a result of this state of affairs it was perfectly natural that the Christians should not come forward to enter the army but should prefer to leave the country secretly in order to escape these dread sufferings. But this is exactly what the Germano-Turks wanted, since they thus obtained a reasonable pretext for all kinds of persecution and for the adoption of Draconian measures which were extended so as to include the families and kinsmen of those who ran away in order to escape military service.

The official decision for the taking of these measures is dated October 21, 1915, and it was issued by the Enlistment Bureau in Constantinople. We use the term "official" since even before its issuance the measures that were announced at this time had long been carried out in actual practice in the provinces. By this decision the heaviest penalties were imposed on deserters and men who avoided service, unless they surrendered within a given time, their families being at the same time sent to the interior of Anatolia; what was worse, no distinction was made between those who were banished by the authorities and those who had for many years been living abroad.

One can easily imagine how certain the complete

destruction of Hellenism was made by this measure, especially if the fanaticism with which it was carried out be taken into account, for naturally these measures were not extended to include the Mussulman deserters. In order to understand this, it is enough to glance at the following extracts of official reports.

Thus the report of the vice-consul of Greece in Cydonia dated December 12, 1914, No. 672 (Ministerial Archives, No. 47298) makes the following statement: "About 5 A.M. soldiers closely invested Cydonia and guards with fixed bayonets beset the Greek houses and even the consulate itself, stopping all traffic in the streets. At the same time the Military Governor, through a proclamation, summoned the deserters to present themselves, and ordered the citizens to hand over all hidden weapons. About midday a house to house search began, executed by officers who did not spare even the churches themselves. During this search many unheard of excesses were committed and upward of two hundred Greeks were seized. In Genitsarochori, in particular, the gendarmes went so far as to outrage women. But what surpasses all description is what took place in Moschonesia, where churches were looted, and men and women were beaten and tortured. Thus a man named Copanos was thrown into a pit and pricked with needles to compel him to betray the whereabouts of weapons and deserters supposedly concealed in Moschonesia. The bishop Photios, various priests and prominent men were seized, beaten and imprisoned in a mill, to be released only after some days had passed. The object of this search for deserters and arms was to diminish the male population, to disarm the inhabitants and to dishearten the Greek element through various oppressive means. During this cruel search crowds of Bashibouzouks surrounded the city awaiting the signal to come in and loot and destroy the place. The Military Governor was heard to say: "One or two more such

searches and the city will be emptied of its men. Then we will kick the women into the sea."

In the above mentioned report from Bryoulla dated August 15, 1915, and numbered 319, appear among other facts the following: "In the afternoon of the 8th of the current month, the clerk of police, who is the scourge and terror of the Greeks here, going out as usual through the various quarters of the city in his search for deserters in hiding, wished to enter into a house in the Bazeli quarter, to make the regular search. One of the gendarmes accompanying him, hurled a good-sized stone at the house-dog, who had attacked them as they came in. The stone, however, missed its mark and struck the police secretary a serious blow on the head, and he was carried off half-conscious to his home. The authorities learning of this accident and thinking that it was a case of revenge on the part of some Christian, the man who had done it failing to acknowledge the deed, issued orders that all the inhabitants of that quarter should be arrested. In fact, shortly afterward, men, women, the aged, the sick, women that had just given birth to babes and the babes themselves, were taken to the police station. The incident spread panic throughout the whole city. That very hour the shops were closed and all, in an agony of fear, took refuge in their houses and awaited the outcome. On the 10th of August a deserter, caught in his house by a soldier, refused to follow. Other soldiers that ran up at the time set upon him with their bayonets, wounding him in various parts of his body. Finally, last night, the authorities, who were intending to draft the Christians who had reached the age of twenty-one, proceeded, without issuing any call, to their immediate arrest."

No doubt remains as to the object aimed at by the Turks in thus drafting Christians into military service, for this is clearly proven by a report from Amissos dated May 19, 1916, in which, among other facts that

inspire horror, is the following, which utterly invalidates the Turkish plea that they had proceeded to take these measures because repeated amnesties had not succeeded in persuading the deserters to join the ranks: "Those of the deserters who gave themselves up were thrown into prison here by hundreds and were left for a month and a half without bread and without any care being taken of them. I asked repeatedly that bread be given them but the Moutesarif refused: Senator ——— visited him, but he paid no heed, so that we have been obliged to feed these prisoners in order to prevent their dying from starvation. Finally, after torturing them in this way, he handcuffed hundreds of them and sent them thus bound, to Sebasteia, a fifteen days' journey, during which they suffered terribly."

The gloominess of the picture presented by the facts above reported is matched by what happened in Kerasounda. From this city it is officially and authoritatively reported, under date of the 21st of April, 1917, that on account of three hundred deserters, eighty-eight Greek villages were evacuated and burned from December, 1916, to February, 1917. The inhabitants of these villages, numbering about 30,000, mostly women, children and old men, were taken by force to the district of Ancyra (Angora), in the harshest winter weather, and at a time when epidemics were rife, without their being permitted to take even their clothing with them. Of this population one-fourth perished on the road in consequence of the hardships, starvation and exposure.

CHAPTER III

REQUISITIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Requisitions

We may regard as complementary to the forced enlistment by which the destruction of the Greek element in Turkey was sought, the measures by which, first, under the form of 'requisitions,' the Greek commercial establishments were literally looted; second, illegal taxes were levied and, third, the property of the ejected populations was confiscated.

It is well known that from the time of the adoption of the Constitution in Turkey the ruin of the material prosperity of the Greeks was assailed through attempts to isolate them commercially. These measures had previously been adopted against the Austrians in connection with the Bosnia-Herzegovina question, and they were later rendered more effective by the distribution of the circulars of the Deutsche Palestina Bank, mentioned above. But this commercial isolation could not bring about the immediate destruction, from a material point of view, of the Greeks, because they had even among themselves a vigorous commercial life; they possessed property to an extent not to be despised, and they controlled a wealth of laborers to work with.

In order to compass the Turkish aims there was adopted therefore in the first place the system of so-called 'requisitioning,' with which was closely connected, to be sure, in a more systematic way than before, the plan of commercial isolation (boycott). Thus the Turks were forbidden to have any commercial dealings with the Greeks, whom they even deprived of the right to import merchandise, and everywhere in the East there were established Turkish trade agencies for the import

and export of merchandise exclusively through Mussulman hands.

The way these requisitions were carried out is sufficiently described in a report from Constantinople dated November 13, 1915, No. 6353 (Ministerial Documents, No. 39904) in which the manner of the destruction of Greek commerce is made evident. The requisitions practically amounted to the confiscation of Greek property and the plundering thereof. For how else can such procedure be characterized, when it is well known that this requisitioning was so widely extended that even common soldiers, without any warrant had the right to enter into houses, as happened in Bryoulla in June, 1915, and by threats to take possession of hay, beans, etc., stored in them, and, taking advantage of the circumstances, to steal whatever they could lay hands on. When military officers and civil officials were permitted to enter Greek shops and take for their private use anything that they happened upon without paying for it or giving any receipt, can such action rightly be called "requisitioning"? Certainly a course of general procedure, according to which the very food in the houses of the Greeks was seized, thus condemning the owners to sure starvation, cannot rightly be thus entitled.

Contributions

These requisitions, thus executed, were followed by imposing, day by day, obligatory assessments, in the name of the Committee for the Relief of the Refugees, or in behalf of the Turkish fleet, or for purchasing military uniforms and other things.

These assessments at first were levied in the form of tickets for compulsory attendance at theatrical performances and voluntary (!) contributions. Yet, in both of these cases, the Greek was not free to give what he was able and desired to give, but there was imposed upon him an amount arbitrarily fixed by the first committee

that approached him. There was also applied the system of the imposition by threats upon every city or village of a given tax for the payment of which the inhabitants were held responsible, the objects being, now, the erection of barracks, and, again, the installation of telephones, and so on, to the point where these violent exactions were levied in order to erect Mussulman schools or to buy threshing machines for the Mussulman villages.

Thus in April, 1915, the village Imbrik-Tepe of the Kessane district was obliged to pay 1,000 Turkish pounds to buy threshing machines. In June, 1915, the larger villages in the district of Proussa were compelled to pay the following sums in Turkish pounds in behalf of the committee for the support of the refugees, Medzetie 800 pounds, Sige 150 pounds, Triglia 700 pounds (Report of the Vice-Consul of Proussa, January 10, 1915, to the Legation at Constantinople, No. 84, Ministerial Archives, No. 3396). The same happened to the inhabitants of Cydonia and Moschonesia, who, through floggings and imprisonment were compelled to pay 2,500 Turkish pounds for the uniforms of the Turkish army and 2,000 Turkish pounds for the construction of barracks; to pay a wheat-tax for the upkeep of the navy, and to buy, at no cheap price, post-cards with pictures of the sovereigns of the Triple Alliance.

The Germano-Turk inventiveness, however, did not reach its limit at this point in the proposed destruction of the Greeks. It went even farther. Through impressment, all those who were able to work were seized, regardless of age, and the duty of cultivating the fields of Mussulman immigrants was imposed on them. Even their very seed-grain was taken away from them, so that they might be unable to use their own fields and to get some profit from their cultivation.

In conjunction with this, all contrivances were resorted to so that the Greek populations might not control any

part whatever of their crops, a fact that is proven by a report as to this from Cydonia of the 18th of August, 1915, No. 257 (Ministerial Archives, No. 1333): "The time for the gathering of the olives has come, but the authorities are endeavoring, in every way, to prevent the harvesting of the crop. Those who dare to go out in the open country are beaten, robbed and arrested as being subject to military service, or are wounded and killed by Turkish bandits, beneath the very eyes of the authorities. All this is done that the Cydonians may abandon the getting in of their crop of olives, and that the Turks may harvest it on their own account."

Furthermore, through special catechising the Mussulmans were urged not to pay any of their debts to the Greeks. The economical results of this measure on the Greeks, who were thus commercially boycotted by this establishment of a Turkish trade-monopoly, are described in a report of 1917 from Kerasounda, transmitted in a communication of the Legation in Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 4901) in which the following characteristic incidents are narrated: "The Committee sent to all the Mussulman villages special delegates who proclaimed that the Sultan had ordered a release of the Turks from all debts owed to Christians, and had ordered the Turks, on penalty of hanging, not only not to pay anything to their Christian creditors, but also that Turkish tenants of the farms should not pay the customary rents to the Christian owners of farm property. In fact they brought it about that from the time of the outbreak of the European War up to to-day hardly a single Turk has paid to the Greeks anything toward his debt or his rent. But since the economical system of the country consisted in distributing to the peasants, up to July, all the available money and in beginning their collection of the debt in the middle of August, the Greeks as a result of this prohibitive propaganda of the Turks were in a critical financial situation and this all the more

since the banks not only held up their credit but even on the other hand insistently demanded back their loans, and, on account of the mobilizations these men were furthermore under an urgent necessity to find money to pay their fees in order to exempt them from military service."

These ways of destroying the material prosperity of the Greeks which were thus directly and secretly pursued, were supplemented by the sale for the benefit of the government of all the property in the villages whose inhabitants had been expelled, as is proven, in addition to other evidence, by what happened in the district of Proussa, from a few villages of which the government received from oil alone 1,500,000 Turkish pounds, as well as by the following which is given in a report dated February 25, 1917, from Amissos (Samsoun): "During these last days the tobacco storehouses of our merchants were released from Government control and the owners, acting through proxies, were allowed to sell the tobacco. Meanwhile the tobacco of the villages which had been evacuated but not burned, as Eliazkioi, Andrianta, Tekekioi, Cadikioi, etc., were put up at auction by the Government and after a few days their final sale will take place and the Government will take over the money, while in the interior of the country the peasant owners of this tobacco are dying of starvation."

CHAPTER IV

CONVERSIONS TO MOHAMMEDANISM

Having thus aimed at and achieved the financial ruin of the Greek people, they sought to decrease their numbers by forced and crafty conversions to Mohammedanism. One who recalls the first years of the government under the Young Turk constitution immediately remembers the turmoil which this question provoked even in the Turkish parliament. Consequently, an age limit for such conversions was fixed and the necessary formalities were decided on.

During the period of the persecutions, as the conversions to Mohammedanism formed part of the system which was planned, it was thought proper quietly to lay aside the laws and regulations and to pursue by every means and in a systematic manner the Islamization of the Christians. One of the most diabolical methods adopted was the creation of the so-called Orphan Institutions at Panormo, the founder of which was General Liman Von Sanders himself, who had the impudence to demand from the Greeks 10,000 Turkish pounds for the maintenance of these institutions. (Telegram from Constantinople of March 17, 1917. Ministerial Archives, No. 3272.) These Orphan Institutions have in appearance a charitable object, but if one considers that their inmates are Greek boys, who became orphans because their parents were murdered, or who were snatched away from their mothers, or left in the streets for want of nourishment (of which they were deprived by the Turks), and that these Greek children receive there a purely Turkish education, it will be at once seen that under the cloak of charity there lurks the 'child collecting' system insti-

tuted in the past by the Turkish conquerors and a new effort to revive the janissary system. The Greek boys were treated in this manner. What happens to the Greek girls? If we review the consular reports about the persecutions from the year 1915 to 1917 we shall hardly find one of them which does not speak of forcible abductions and conversions to Mohammedanism. And it could not have been otherwise, since it is well known that this action, as has been stated above, was decided upon in June, 1915, in order to effect the Turkification of the Hellenic element. This plan was carried out methodically and in a diabolical manner, through the 'mixed settlements' of Greeks and Turks, always with a predominance of Mohammedan males and of Greek females in order to compel mixed marriages. This is evident from a report from Constantinople dated January 14, 1916, in which it is stated that the Turkish Government instructed the Governor of Broussa to place the Greek refugees by groups of ten to thirty families in Mussulman villages with a proportion always of ten per cent. to the Mohammedan population.

Who can give a different meaning to these instructions when one considers the daily conversions in different parts of the country, in which the starvation to which the Greek populations have been condemned plays a prominent part?

The above reasoning is further strengthened by a report dated June 14, 1915, transmitted with the petition No. 4409 of the Greek Legation at Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 8670), according to which the conversions to Mohammedanism are usually due to force exercised by the authorities, who, as soon as the Greek refugees are established in Turkish villages, consider it their prime duty to give the Greeks to understand that food will be given to them only if they become Mohammedans.

In another report from Baloukeser dated April 16,

1915, and transmitted with the above mentioned communication of the Legation of Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 8760), it is stated: "By order of the Government, groups of five to ten Greek families are sent to Turkish villages with strict orders to the local Turkish Mouktars (an official representing the Government in the villages) not to allow the refugees, under any circumstances, to leave the villages to which they are sent. What is the result of this? They will either die of starvation from lack of employment or they will embrace the Mohammedan faith. The first has already begun, the second is impending. Besides that, the aim of the Government is the Islamization of the Greek refugees, as is proved both from the pressure which is exerted in every way against them and the strict orders issued to the Mouktars to give to the 'infidel refugees' twenty centimes a day." From these reports it is evident that the conversions to Mohammedanism are considered as an important means toward succeeding in annihilating the Greek element, which is the cardinal policy both of the Turkish Government and of the people.

CHAPTER V

CRIMES AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE GREEKS

Besides the above mentioned means employed, during this period, for the annihilation of the Greek people, other measures have also been adopted, which vary according to the circumstances and the persons involved, but which are all based on the same fixed and premeditated program, and tend to the attainment of the same end. These are as follows:

First, the system was inaugurated of committing scattered murders here and there, instead of the massacres *en masse* which characterized the first period of the persecutions. The object of this system was either to terrorize the Greek population, so that it would be compelled to confine itself to the cities and villages, and would not go out to look after its properties in the open country and to attend to its other labors, being therefore thus condemned to economic ruin, or to bring about the disappearance of prominent persons, who on account of their standing might keep up the courage of the oppressed people, or aid them financially. Both these means of relief were contrary to the program which was being carried out, one of the aims of which was to compel the Greeks by frightfulness to voluntary expatriation. For how else can these isolated but successive crimes which are being committed with impunity before the very eyes of the authorities be explained? Can they be considered as ordinary crimes committed for the purpose of robbery? In that case why should these victims be arrested openly in the villages, and why should they be taken away afterwards to be tortured and slain? How can one explain the incident mentioned

in the report of the Consul General of Smyrna dated December 12, 1914, No. 9157 (Ministerial Archives, No. 890), to mention a single example out of many. According to this report a Greek who was arrested in the Appa railway station of Denizli, was only released after promising under oath that he would leave the country. Undoubtedly murders form a part of the plan of persecution of the Greek populations. This is evident from the report of the Consulate General of Smyrna, No. 60, dated December 22, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5960), according to which, in the District of Mendessa alone, exclusive of the Sanjak of Mougla, over 200 Greeks were murdered from July, 1914, to the end of December, 1915. Also, a report from Kirk-Kilisse, dated January 5, 1916, No. 16 (Ministerial Archives, No. 2931) verifies the above, from which the following extract is taken:

"At the time of the departure of the unfortunate Greeks from Skopos, a thoroughly Hellenic virile community of Thrace, who were abandoning their homes and properties, with lamentations and wailing, under the funeral peals of the bells of their churches, which the barbarians were ringing to the accompaniment of wild cheers as an indication of the funeral of the village of Skopos, some of their notables and educated persons, such as Papakyriacos, the Constantopoulo brothers, Pelopidas Davajanidi, Zaphirios Zaphiriades and Theodore Kokalas, were seized and after being led a short distance out of the village were beheaded like sheep and their bodies were left there to become the prey of dogs and vultures. Two days before the Turks had arrested another of the most prominent and educated citizens, namely, Simos Simopoulos, whom they beheaded outside of the town, after subjecting him to unheard of tortures.

Flogging and imprisonment formed a second effective means of annihilation. Many of those beaten were com-

pelled to make incriminating statements in regard to other persons, which were entirely false, and in that manner various pretexts were found for the justification of the crimes committed against the Greeks. Others, being imprisoned and condemned by the military court without any cause whatever, were left to rot in jail or to die from various contagious diseases and bad food.

Thirdly, through assaults on Greek women, the destruction of Hellenic homes, and the moral degradation of Hellenism was sought, free play being thus given to the well-known lascivious nature of the Turks and their criminal instincts; for where in the world do policemen when taking innocent women and girls to prison attack and rape them on the way?

The Vice-Consul of Aivali, in his report No. 2905, dated September 16, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 10831), says that a Greek is treated as an outcast and his honor is the prey of the first Bashibouzouk, who has been taught by the Turkish officials to commit the most abominable orgies against him. In another report the same Vice-Consul says that a gendarme had abducted from the village of Ghioumetsi a girl by the name of Despina Stephani and that the latter after having been first assaulted by Nouri Bey, the Chief of the Gendarmes, was then in turn assaulted by other gendarmes and Government employees; that military and civil officials, establishing themselves in houses seized from Greeks, made them centers of debauchery and abomination; that to these dens Greek girls are forcibly taken and assaulted and that already 200 of them are pregnant. Identical orgies are confirmed in a report dated April 1, 1915, from Ganochori, which, after giving an account of the arrest of the wives of the deserters (Greeks) and the beating to which these women were subjected, adds that all the imprisoned women were assaulted at night, and that the gendarmes even assaulted a deserter who was caught. But the true picture of these assaults on

Greek women is given in the report from Panormo, dated June 10, 1915, and transmitted by a communication from the Legation of Constantinople under No. 4406 (Ministerial Archives, No. 8670) which mentions the following incidents in regard to the deported Greek populations: "Women and girls are wandering about the coffee-houses in the villages, being forced by the Turks to dance indecent dances of a kind that I cannot describe."

In the fourth place, various devices are used in order to reduce the Greeks to poverty and want, such as thefts, plunderings, refusal to give them wheat and flour, and forbidding the deported population to carry away with them even the smallest article. Many victims of this kind of persecution have been noted. Thus, according to a telegram from Constantinople, dated July 15, 1915, No. 4116 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7744), "Among the refugees from Madytos, numbering about 1,730, two or three deaths occur daily from starvation; in the railway station next to Panormo, since June 23, six or seven thousand refugees have been living in want of everything, thirty or forty of them dying every day from hunger and thirst, because the Turks do not allow them to procure for themselves bread and water."

According to another report, dated May 26, 1916, transmitted through a communication of the Legation of Constantinople under No. 548 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5079): "All the leading and respectable men of our villages have been and are being pitilessly flogged by the gendarmes, who are wasting the scanty flour which was left for the poor inhabitants; they are killing and eating the sheep and cows belonging to the villages by hundreds and are compelling the villagers, under the lash, to provide them with raki (Turkish brandy), sugar, and things which are very scarce, which are bought by the unfortunate people at unheard of prices, and furthermore, in order to deprive the villagers even of bread, they pre-

vent them from working in their fields, and threaten to kill anyone who shall be caught cultivating his land."

Fifth, expulsion and deportation were legalized. This measure had as its consequence the expulsion from cities and villages of all the leading men and of those who might have been able to assist the suffering Greek population. Thus, according to the report of the Legation of Constantinople, numbered 1246, dated March, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 2866): "Up to the 8th of the current month over two hundred leading men of Constantinople had been expelled to Biledjik, Yeni-shehir and other parts of the interior of Asia Minor."

According to another report from Attalia (No. 67, dated April 6), since the participation of Turkey in the war there have been expelled six hundred prominent men of Iconium and its vicinity, thirty-one of Sparta, and nineteen of Phenix, who were sent to Bazir of the Province of Iconium, which is sixty hours distant from their homes. But we must note that the number of persons expelled from the open country is unknown. Similar expulsions of leading men took place in various parts of Samsoun and elsewhere.

Sixth, gangs of Turks were going about the open country, whose principal business was to prevent the Greeks, by force, from leaving the cities and villages in order to cultivate their lands, so that, being exhausted from hunger and terrorized they might of their own accord leave the country and their homes.

These gangs were led by officers of the gendarmes, and were composed of prisoners undergoing a long sentence, who were released from jail in order to carry out this work, and, generally, of persons of bad character. About the doings of these gangs, which during the persecutions of 1913-1914 made their appearance as irregular bands without any organization whatever, a report from Adrianople, dated March 30, 1915, No. 19 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7278), treats but details as to these

matters were made known by a report from Smyrna, dated January 10, and another dated March 30, 1915, under No. 72 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7278) which shows their entire organization. Thus, for the Province of Aidin, the center of the organization of the gangs was Magnesia, where it was decided that a gang of fifteen members should have its headquarters in the district of Salihli, of ten in that of Demirji, of fifteen in that of Koula and of an equal number in that of Philadelphia (Alashehir).

The first activity of these gangs was noticed in the district of Ghiordes, where, after having attained their end, which was to prevent the Greeks from leaving their homes for the open country, the gangs entered right into the town and plundered the shop of Hadji Emmanuel Athanasoglou.

The work assigned to the gangs of Demirji and Salihli was to act against the Christians who were engaged in business in Mussulman villages. These through taxation, threats, beatings and plunderings of their shops were compelled to close up.

The activity of these gangs was extended to such a point that under the cloak of the military uniform, they harassed the very environs of Smyrna itself where before the very gates of the city, within a period of two months, five attacks were made on Christians who were living on their farms.

The guilty co-operation of the authorities with these gangs is proved by the fact that when the chief brigand Hadji Moustafa imposed a tax of five thousand Turkish pounds on the village of Moursouli of the Province of Aidin and the villagers denounced this act to the Moudir of Demirdji to whom they even gave the letter in which the demand had been made, the Moudir had some of the Christians arrested and imprisoned, accusing them of having actually forged the letter.

As a proof of the havoc wrought on the Greek popu-

lations by these gangs it is enough to say that it was through their agency that the murders of the Greeks were committed and that their members formed, so to speak, the Executive Committee of the whole organization which has been and is still active in the persecution of the Greeks.

In order to prove specifically the Greek persecutions mentioned in this chapter, according to their different categories, a statistical table is given below, based on the reports of our consular authorities in Turkey. This only comprises a very small part of the Turkish outrages which were committed during that time. It is impossible to give a complete list of the names of the Greek victims, because it was exceedingly difficult and often impossible for our consular officials to get information about things happening out in the country. Consequently there came to their knowledge only the names of those victims whose death, either by reason of their prominence or by force of circumstances, could not be concealed by the Turkish authorities, who showed a special zeal in the concealment of crimes committed against the Greeks. It is quite certain, furthermore, that many reports of our consular officials, particularly those of the year 1916, were never received either by our Legation at Constantinople or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Athens.

STATISTICAL TABLE OF THE CRIMES WHICH HAVE BEEN COMMITTED AGAINST THE GREEKS

SMYRNA

July	1914.	G. Paxinos, C. Paxinos, Skyrianos, Ph. Kambiris, A. Loutraris, Lalas, five brothers Tsichla, were killed at Kiosteni.
"	1914.	A. Papaioannou, G. Georgiadis, A. Christodoulou Chalkias, were killed in the village of Askioi; C. Orphanos, G. Tseravellis, were butchered on the road to Vourla.

Aug. 1914. Two Stamatiou brothers and their servant were killed near Ghioulhissar. Mrs. Triantaphylli and Mrs. Zacharoula Aspromati were assaulted by soldiers.

Sept. 1914. The two brothers A. and Z. Kavakioti were killed near Gali-Tekeli. G. Kagritsoglou and his son Elias were killed at Aghiasolouk. The brothers I. and E. Kontoyanni were killed at Develikioi. I. Michalios, I. Tsiniroglou, were killed at Kouroutseshme. Karayannis and Spanoudis were killed at Ouskioi.

Dec. 1914. I. Procopiou, G. Charalambides, G. Mylonas, were butchered in the village of Karaoulani. Constantelli brothers, S. Samios, Karapanaghiotis and his son, Tsemeli, were murdered near Sevdikioi. P. Tsomlotsoglou, P. Kehayioglou, D. Tsilonoglou, were murdered near Salihli; Kirkintsolis, Kaphilis, N. Krassassounis and a certain Demetrios, natives of Macedonia, were butchered.

Jan. 17, 1915. N. Kypriotis, was murdered near Mezikli. The prominent citizen C. Metaxas, was severely wounded at Mylassa. The three brothers Manoussoglou and Karpouzas were butchered in their mills at Hotetou. Constantine Gregoriou was killed at Agatsikioi.

" 19, " P. Sklavounos, A. Karlaghinis, were killed near the village of Gheronta. Th. Corphiatis and his servant were killed at Gheronta.

" 22, " Ch. Tourtsekoushoglou and Ch. Tsomlektsoglou were murdered near the village of Gheronta. Neophotistos Georgiou was killed at Meressi.

" 27, " C. Nikolaou and his wife at Mylassa.

" 30, " Th. Kariotis was severely wounded, also Maria Psalti and her daughter, near Kirtsali.

" 31, " Th. Xenos, V. Salatso, were killed at Bournabat. The priest Mamakis and Chasidakis were murdered at Halicarnassos.

Feb. 1, 1915. N. Balis at Menemen.

Feb. 5, 1915. Marigo Protopsalti was assaulted and severely wounded in the village of Kirtsali. N. Tiliakos, Th. Tomios, were murdered near Nazilli.

" 11, " C. Voudouris, D. Nidraios, I. Melios, at Vayakassi near the village of Sokia. P. Zachariou at Mourtzali.

" 12, " St. Strategos at Mezarlik.

" 13, " Lieutenant Nouri with two other officers assaulted and severely wounded Mrs. A. Koussaki at St. George, a suburb of Smyrna.

" 16, " V. Moustakias was found beheaded in his house at Koukloutsa.

March 8, " E. Saghior was murdered in the village of Mitochori.

" 10, " G. Yiannitakis was killed at Tsapaki. I. Yioules, L. Tsemalis, were murdered at Menemen.

April 10, " V. Kavakiotis, E. Kavakiotis and his son, 12 years of age, were butchered at Yabeni. In the same village the two minor sons of Delimanoli were severely wounded.

May 1915. I. Lagos was murdered at Ephesus. E. Phoutounoglou was murdered near Koula. Karakalpakis and two millers, one named Costas and another of unknown name, were found dead, perforated by bullets, near Nazilli.

" 16, " A. Carmeropoulos was murdered near Yeni-Pazar. Ch. Christodoulou was severely wounded by a bullet.

June 5, " Ph. Namatianos was murdered at Karapounar.

" 15, " After the bombardment at Halicarnassos eighteen (18) inhabitants and one girl, 16 years old, were slaughtered by Mohammedan Cretans.

" 16, " D. Roumeliotis, D. Tagheas, were murdered at Bouyoukli. I. Milonas and his son George Kirkintse.

July " D. Arghyrakis was murdered.

August " A. Spyroglou was murdered at Kirkintse.

Sept. " Ch. Savvopoulos, I. Hadjipetros, D. Broussalis, I. Phetsopoulos were murdered at Aktse.

Oct. 1915. C. Baindirlis, E. Karinas, D. Pathos and I. Baxevanis were murdered at Sokia. V. Karvelas was imprisoned and subjected to terrible tortures from which he died after a few days. G. Gouvelas was imprisoned.

Dec. " Five corpses which had been mutilated horribly were taken from a river near the village of Gheronta.

CYDONIA (AIVALI)

Nov. 23, 1914. D. Ioannou, M. Hadjiyannis and D. Lachanas were murdered. S. Hadjiantoniou, I. Rouvalas, P. Michalios and I. Liscos were murdered near Pagamli.

" 26, " A band of Mohammedan refugees attacked in the suburbs many laborers, both men and women. They committed rape upon many girls.

Jan. 25, 1915. D. Sessypis was murdered at Moschonesia, and his brother was severely wounded.

Feb. 10, " G. Koukoutos and A. Delioglanis while on an excursion outside the city disappeared together with their carriage. D. Maliaros, P. Sideris, I. Tessivassis, P. Hadjicosmas, were arrested and beaten by Bashibouzouks (marauders); they were found naked and half-dead in the suburbs of the city.

" 13, " P. Psaroukis and his son were murdered, and their bodies were thrown into a well by a gendarme.

" 16, " St. Arghyrou was severely wounded, and his brother Panaghis was beaten.

" 17, " Five corpses were found burned near the city; it seems that the victims were burned alive.

" 23, " P. Makris, E. Anestis, I. Chamalis, were slaughtered by soldiers.

March 5, " Forty-two (42) Greek peasants were seized by Bashibouzouks, their fate being unknown.

March 7, 1915. Palaeologos, Apsathas, N. Vloros and the 15-year-old boy, B. Klaromenos, were found beheaded. Their bodies bore signs of torture.

" 31, " The body of a young boy, with a rope round his neck, was found in the water-closet of a Turkish house.

May 11, " Fifty (50) men and women were seized and sent to Smyrna. The women were assaulted on the way by the gendarmes. Despoina Stephanou was taken to the village of Yioumetsi and assaulted by all the gendarmes of the station.

June 12, 1915. A. Maroudis has disappeared.

July 8, " C. Apsatos, I. Comnenos and the 14-year-old Malemchiari were murdered by soldiers.

" 10, " P. Pseftarakos was severely wounded.

" 14, " Papademetriou was murdered.

Aug. 1, " The body of Photios Dala was found horribly mutilated.

" 15, " A. Koulakanis and G. Zariphis were murdered at Moschonesia. Ap. Doudoukas, I. Agelaras, D. Vaphiadis, P. Timakos, D. Orphanos, P. Angelidis from Moschonesia, were thrown into prison and tortured.

Jan. 1916. The fishermen G. Vonelis, G. Tsitsonis and P. Dedoulos were murdered

" 25, " The two brothers Ch. and E. Volivos, I. Koutroumbilas, P. and A. Tages, E. Papoutsis, S. Saltas, D. Roumeliotis, E. Yannios and P. Tsarlimbaris were slaughtered.

Feb. 12, " The body of P. Koukournara was found slashed with sword-cuts.

" 18, " I. Valmos was murdered.

BRYOULLA (VOURLA)

Feb. 1915. E. Hadjiconstantinou and Manatas were imprisoned without any reason.

May " Two shepherds, N. Chloros and I. Paraparis, were murdered. E. Vretos was severely wounded. S. Dimakis, M. Karakyriakos and M. Karanikolis were murdered. Many were

arrested, imprisoned and expelled to Van and Mosul, amongst them being the brothers Vati and G. Bogdanos.

June 1915. G. Niaos, V. Germanopoulos and I. Mitaghis were murdered near Tsirlidere. Twenty-six other Greeks were imprisoned, amongst them being G. Tzanetis, I. Koumassonis and the priests Ioannis Panteleimon and Varlaam.

July " Eighteen (18) Greeks were butchered at Kiosteniou, amongst them being P. Xydias, S. Kapiris, A. Goutaris, N. Valachis, P. Sterghianou and the seventeen-year-old G. Valahis. Seventeen (17) other Greeks were arrested and eleven (11) Greek subjects were expelled.

Dec. " The body of N. Tarnani was found near Kalambaka (of Vourla) horribly mutilated.

ATTALIA

Jan. 1915. A band of Bashibouzouks plundered the house of a prominent Greek near Kemeri, who was afterwards slaughtered with his wife and children. The following were deported to the interior (of Asia Minor): D. Eleutheriou, Timoleon and Charal. V. Lazaridis, Theod. Kolioglou, Ephraim Danielis, I. Arapoglou, M. Kastakoglou, M. Anezoulakis, I. Kadezlis and I. Kolioglou.

March 2, " Ph. Arghyropoulos, K. Kehayioglou, Th. Yiouspazoglou, Eustr. Tousdjoglou, P. Rapitis, N. Hadjianastasiou, Alex. Malaleksoglou, Eustrat. Kotsoglou, P. Hadjisemer, S. Ioannidis, Theod. Skiagoglou, M. Georgiadis, S. Santorides, P. Petrides, N. Kouyiandjoglou, A. Hadjiebeoglou, Theod. Hadjipares, George Michaelis, A. Paloglou and P. Paschalis.

" 4, " Papa-Iakobos, Papa Christos, Papa Nikolaos Apdjoglou, Ieremias Marouloglou, Artemis Tjanoglou, I. Papazoglou, Sp. Papazoglou, Cosmas Hadjigeorgandjoglou, K. Aslano-

glou, P. Aslanoglou, A. Aslanoglou, Phil. Aslanoglou, Char. Sinanidis, Dem. Styloglou, D. Kahrimanoglou, Ph. Kahrimanoglou, Char. Hadjiavramaglou, Sot. Evremoglou. Char. Christides, Dem. Artemiades, Haadjicharalambos, Hadjithanasoglou, Cosmas Hadjithanasaylou, L. Dervishoglou, A. Dervishoglou, I. Kapa-Kioglou, Hadjisavas, Hadjiarslan, G. Yiodanoglou, Eustr. Arslanoglou, P. Hadjioglou, S. Seraphimoglou, Cyrillos Ayiakloglou, L. Seretaroglou, and P. Hadjipandjoglou.

March 28, 1915. Eleven Greeks were expelled to the interior (of the country).

April 6, " Five more Greeks were expelled to the interior.

Aug. 8, " Nineteen more Greeks were expelled to the interior. It is worthy of notice that up to to-day, from the city of Attalia alone, 138 Greeks have been expelled, and on the other hand, that the Greeks who were expelled from the village of Smano were robbed by the gendarmes, who took from them about 1,200 Turkish pounds.

CONSTANTINOPLE

March 1915. D. Koulekli was murdered at Baloukli. The number of the Greeks from Constantinople who have been arrested and expelled to Asia Minor amounts to 200. Among them are the following persons: C. Theodorou, G. Vassiliou, Th. Vassiliou, G. Demosthenes, V. Athanassiou, Th. Karamitsos, T. Vassiliou, Ch. Stylianos, P. Symeon, C. Ioannou, G. Panaghiotou, L. Nikolaou, A. Karakos, P. Vitalis, M. Apostolou, V. Ioseph, E. Anastasiadis, A. Deskosmidis, L. Georgiou, N. Zographidis, E. Manouelidis, I. Papoulis, P. Constantinou, P. Samamas, N. Athanassiou, N. Demou, Ch. Vassiliou, Th. Prodromou, N. Demetriou, V. Saphaidaris, S. Okoumoush, D.

Saphir, Th. Demetriou, S. Gregoriou, G. Photiou, D. Roumounos and Z. Ignatiou. It should be noted that according to the communication No. 1246 of March 2 of the Legation of Constantinople (Ministerial Archives, No. 2866), the total number of the Greeks deported to the interior of Asia Minor is 10,000.

June 1915. Sixty Greeks from the districts of Bouyoukdere, Tyroloi, Tsatadjsa and Selyvria were brought to Constantinople and imprisoned.

July 1915. Archmandrite A. Papadopoulos, the Archivist of the Patriarchate, was imprisoned, and after a few months deported. The abbot of the Monastery of St. George at Prinkipo, the priests Ioannis Oekonomou and Cyrillos, of Bouyoukdere, as well as the Archmandrite Gennadios were also imprisoned.

THRACE

Jan. 1915. Two Greeks were killed in the village of Kerdeli. Seventeen Greeks from Kirk-Kilisse and Vizyi were arrested as suspects for the murder of the son of the Governor. They were buried alive in graves which they were compelled to dig. The teachers and priests of the city of Kessani were thrown into jail.

March " The Rev. Apostolos, a priest of the village of Varnitza, was strangled in the prison of Kessani. Numerous families were imprisoned at Chora. The women are thrown on the ground and beaten by gendarmes with whips on the soles of their feet, in order that they might disclose the hiding places of their husbands. During the evacuation of the village of Skopos the following persons were slain by gendarmes; Papakyriakos, Arist Constantopoulos, P. Valantsanidis, Z. Phloros, Zariphiadis, Th. Kokkalas and Simos Simopoulos. The

greater part of the inhabitants of Malgara are in jail, where they endure great sufferings. The representative of the Bishop and 23 prominent men were taken to Adrianople, and on their way beaten by the gendarmes.

April 1915. Two Greeks were hung in Adrianople wtihout any reason.

PART II

DEPORTATIONS *EN MASSE*

The abolition of the privileges of the Greek Church, the drafting of Christians into the army, the conversions to Mohammedanism, the commandeerings and the murders of the Greeks in Turkey, constituted, so to speak, the work preparatory to their annihilation, and this was completed by the sixth measure which was applied, namely, the deportations *en masse*.

This was designed in order to bring about the complete annihilation of the Greek nation by the devastation of the flourishing Greek communities in the Ottoman Empire.

This measure which was first applied in the Gallipoli Peninsula and the Hellespont, on the pretext of military necessity, was quickly extended to all the settlements along the coast and to the islands in the sea of Marmora, which are inhabited by Greeks. The towns of Cydonia (Aivali) and Amissos (Samsoun) and, generally, the settlements along the coasts, except the two great centers, Constantinople and Smyrna, where there is a compact Greek population, were reduced to ruins.

This measure was taken in consequence of a decision of the Young Turk Committee, and was put into execution in the year 1915. The Greek Legation at Constantinople, by a communication dated June 15, 1915, No. 3501 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7065), informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the decisions which had been taken at Constantinople for the forcible conversion of Greeks to the Mohammedan faith by mixed marriages between Turks and Greek women who had

been brought into these Turkish villages for settlement there.

The same Legation, by another report, under the same date, No. 3500 (Ministerial Archives, No. 6557), announces the beginning of the execution of this decision in the following manner:

"Among the decisions taken by the Turkish Committee is the conversion to Islam of the Greek populations, which is difficult as long as there exist compact Greek settlements. Military necessity affords a most suitable pretext to have the Christians scattered, thus making their Turkification easy. The deportations *en masse* of the inhabitants of the islands of Marmora (Koutali, Kalolimnos, Marmora, etc.), have the same object, because those that are deported are not settled in Christian villages; as for the men, they either imprison or put them to forced labor, while the women and children they send to Turkish villages."

The law about the deportation of the Greek populations was therefore passed, because otherwise the Turkification of the Greek element, as shown by the actual results, would have been difficult, especially where there were compact Greek populations.

From this one can easily conclude what the pretexts repeatedly advanced by the Germano-Turks for these deportations were worth, for they alleged at one time the so-called supplying of enemy submarines by the Greeks, and again that they were in communication with the enemy by signals, and at other times that the Greeks in Turkey were not loyal.

The German Government itself on June, 1915, assured the Greek Minister at Berlin (telegram of the Greek Legation at Berlin of June 18, 1915, No. 2384, Ministerial Archives, No. 6524), that in order to "please the Government of the King it will take steps to put an end to these deportations."

The pretexts of the Turks as to Greek treason were

intended to mislead public opinion and to justify their monstrosities. The human heart is torn in the face of the tragical scenes of these deportations. In order to understand the magnitude of this tragedy it is sufficient to note that the deported persons, after being expelled from their villages, had no right to take with them even things of absolute necessity. Naked and barefooted, without food or water, beaten and insulted by the gangs that escorted them, they were, provided they were not murdered, led by their executioners to the mountains. But most of them died on their way as a result of their sufferings, or were left in the road half dead; women gave birth to children as they marched along and abandoning their newly born babes at once, continued the journey as well as they could, because those that marched slowly were beaten by the escorting gendarmes. The end of the journey of these unfortunate persons did not terminate their sufferings, because the wild inhabitants of the Turkish villages admitted them to their villages only to deal them the final blow.

The deportations from the coast of the Black Sea and the city of Cydonia (Aivali) which were carried out toward the end of the year 1916 and during the year 1917, were of the most cruel and inhuman character. Besides other cruelties, they resorted also to arson and burned all the evacuated villages so that no traces of their existence might be left and that the ethnological character of these most Hellenic regions might be entirely altered.

The crimes there committed are of such a nature that nothing like them is recorded in the pages of history.

In place of any further description of these occurrences the following extracts from the reports of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, show, district by district, the savagery of the persecutions and the annihilation of the Greek population which was brought about by these means.

CHAPTER I

DARDANELLES, GALLIPOLI, MARMORA, KIRK-KILISSE

THE following extracts have been taken from a report of the Greek Legation of Constantinople, No. 4099, dated June 26, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 7981):

"The first deportations which took place are those of the Dardanelles and Gallipoli (March-April, 1915) under the pretext of military necessity and the safety of the inhabitants. The Greeks of the Dardanelles were sent to Artaki, where no care was taken by the Turkish Government for the maintenance of the poor whom the well-to-do Greeks supported, but this could not continue for a long time because the number of the poor amounted to 3,300."

"After the evacuation of the Dardanelles, that of Gallipoli, Madytos, Krithia, and the other villages of Gallipoli followed (April 26). The Christian populations were compelled to embark on steamships, and were forbidden to take anything with them or even to secure the safety of their property. The goods in the shops belonging to the Christians were plundered and sold by the Turkish authorities to two Ottoman companies."

"The deported people, having been scattered in various villages, such as those of Kipsit, Vigadetos, Sintirghi, Soussourlouk, of the district of Baloukesser are in danger of dying of starvation, apart from the fact that the settling of Greek women amongst the Turks carries with it other dangers, such as assaults, conversions to Mohammedanism, etc., etc."

"On April 15, the population of Amygdalia and Maistros, of the district of Enos, was ordered to evacu-

ate these villages within three days, and they were all transported to the Turkish villages of Beyendi and Passait, while the Turks of the nearby villages plundered their properties, churches and monasteries."

"From the 1st to the 15th of May the inhabitants of the villages of Bouyoukdere, Kephalikioi, Kirits, and Yeni-Machala were ordered to abandon their villages within three days."

"Although the Turkish Government maintained that the deportations formed a general measure and were due to military necessity, as both the Grand Vizier (Prime Minister) and the German Ambassador told me when I protested in person about the deportations—still, after the departure of the Greeks, their houses and properties were seized by the Turks."

"The evacuation of Bouyoukdere was preceded by that of Phanaraki, Cavak and of Doumoushdere, of Bazekioi (16 April) and Avaskioi of the District of Derkos. The inhabitants of these villages too were unable to take any of their belongings with them and in some villages, as in Domoushdere, they were compelled to sign a declaration that they abandoned their villages of their own accord and from fear."

"On the first of June the inhabitants of Pyrgos (of the District of Derkos), consisting of 3,000 persons, were ordered at night to abandon their villages and men, women with their babies, children, and old people, in want of everything, after trudging for three hours on foot, reached Bouyoukdere, whence they were taken to the interior of the country and compelled to settle in the Turkish villages of Ik-Kiol and Soulio, of the District of Nicaea, and forbidden to go to Constantinople, where many of them had relatives and friends. The deportations took place exactly at the time of their cabbage harvest, which product was afterwards seized by the Turkish refugees along with all their properties."

"On June 4, the evacuation of Koutali,—an island

in the sea of Marmora,—was ordered and its inhabitants, consisting of 1,800 persons, were deported to the interior of Anatolia. The old men and children were settled in the Turkish village of Soussouglou, but being without any shelter, and, deprived of everything, they endure the worst of sufferings; the rest were sent to the village of Michalitsi of the district of Nicaea, undergoing all the consequences of weather changes. Their properties and houses were seized by the freebooters of the neighboring community of Arapis, who established themselves in their homes."

The inhabitants of Kalolimnos, another island in the sea of Marmora, were compelled, within a few hours, to abandon their island, without being able to take anything with them, and were sent to the villages of Michalitsi and Terbekioi near Broussa, suffering terribly from hunger. The number of the Greeks thus deported was about 1,440.

On June 15, the evacuation of Prokonnesos (an island also in the sea of Marmora) was ordered, its inhabitants being deported to Panormo and Ouktsoukiol (the railway station of Panormo) and from there to different parts of the interior, and exposed to various climatic changes. I have been informed to-day (June 26) that the villages of Peramos, Sighi, Triglia, Eligmoi and Peristasis were evacuated and their inhabitants taken to the Asiatic coast of the sea of Marmora. According to other information the evacuation of Moudania is imminent, as well as that of the villages of Myriophyto. In a word, we have here to do with the evacuation of the whole coast of the sea of Marmora.

According to another report of the Legation at Constantinople, No. 5171, dated September 8, 1915 (Ministerial Archives, No. 10938), all the villages of the District of Kirk-Kilisse have been emptied of their Greek inhabitants. The following is a detailed statement:

"Skepastos, a village of the District of Kirk-Kilisse,

the inhabitants of which, consisting of 3,000 persons, were taken, on September 6, toward Redosto. Sophides, a village of the district of Vizye, which is inhabited by 4,000 persons, was evacuated likewise on the 8th of the same month in the usual cruel manner."

"Samacovo, also of the district of Vizye, and the seat of the Metropolitan, had its inhabitants, consisting of 5,000 persons, deported on the same day."

"Tourlia and St. Stephano of the district of Vizye, which villages had a population of 3,150 persons, were surrounded by Turkish gangs and no inhabitant is now left there."

"Skopos, of the District of Kirk-Kilisse, was surrounded by the Turks, and its inhabitants, consisting of 6,000 persons, were sent to various places, after being compelled to pay to the Turkish Comitadjis 80 Turkish pounds. The Government officials imposed a fine of from 20 to 30 Turkish pounds on Jewish merchants on the ground that they had violated the blockade of the village."

These brief and dry extracts from reports, supplemented from other more recent sources, prove that the Greeks, almost without exception, have been deported. The regions, such as Thrace, the coast of the sea of Marmora, that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus, and the littoral of the Black Sea, which have been completely denuded of their Greek population, were noted for their flourishing condition in commerce, education, civilization and wealth. Having been smitten so heavily by the Germano-Turks, they have been to-day transformed into smoking ruins, upon which Turkish immigrants dance, an element entirely foreign to these Hellenic sites. A mere glance on the map will show the magnitude of the catastrophe.

To sum up, there were destroyed eleven towns and villages in the district of Gallipoli, having a Greek population of 24,636 inhabitants; seven towns in that of

Broussa with a Greek population of 14,632; eight villages in that of Bosphorus with a Greek population of 5,500; three villages in that of Myriophyto with a Greek population of 2,210; the town of Dardanelles with a Greek population of 3,300; the town of Kemelik, and lastly thirteen towns and villages of the coast of the sea of Marmora with a Greek population of 23,450.

The Germano-Turks have not omitted any form of cruelty in order to crush the Greek populations, whose houses they have plundered and burned in order to leave no trace of their existence.

Official consular reports also prove the crimes which have been committed against the Greek populations of Trebizond, Kerasounda, Amissos (Samsoun) and Cydonia (Aivali), and extracts from these reports appear below.

CHAPTER II

TREBIZOND

A REPORT transmitted through the Greek Legation at Petrograd, No. 1570, dated August 30, 1916 (Ministerial Archives, No. 9067), runs as follows:

"On April 15 the Greek inhabitants of the sixteen villages of the district of Vazelon and Trebizond, were ordered by the Turkish authorities to proceed to the interior of Argyropolis (Ghioumoushane), but fearing that they might be slain on the way, like the Armenians, they abandoned their homes and took refuge in the woods, hoping that they would be saved by a quick advance of the Russian army. Of these refugees, consisting of 6,000 persons, six hundred and fifty took refuge in the Monastery of Vazelon, where they found one hundred and thirty refugees from Trebizond; twelve hundred hid in a big cave near the village of Kounaka, and the remainder dispersed in the woods and various hiding places. All their property was looted and their houses plundered by the Turkish army. Those who had taken refuge in the cave of the village of Kounaka, surrendered themselves because they were starving; but twenty-six women and girls in order to escape dishonor threw themselves into a river near the village of Gephyra, and notwithstanding the efforts of their companions to save them, they were all drowned. From April 5 to July 5, Turkish brutality burst out in all its savagery."

The number of those who were tortured and murdered by the Turks can be counted by the hundreds. "After the advance of the Russian army," says an eye-witness, "I was the first to reach Argyropolis (Ghioumoushane).

The sight that presented itself before my eyes was horrible. Everything had been destroyed, both in the Monastery and in the villages, except that the Turks did not set fire to the place. Five decomposed bodies of Greeks were lying unburied in the court-yard of the Monastery, one of them being that of the priest Constantine of the village of Thersa. Five other corpses were found in the interior of the Monastery. In one of the rooms there was lying the body of the twenty-year-old girl Kyriaki from the village of Thersa, naked and beheaded, with a wound on the chest, there being every indication that rape was committed upon her. According to the admission of two Christians that have escaped, the unfortunate girl had been seized in the forest along with others by nine Turks and had been carried into the Monastery. After she had been outraged she had been killed by them."

CHAPTER III

KERASOUNDA

A REPORT of the Greek Legation at Constantinople dated February 7, 1917, No. 119 (Ministerial Archives, No. 4901), concerning the district of Kerasounda, where the Greek element surpassed the other nationalities, both in commerce and wealth, states as follows:

"According to reliable information received from Kerasounda the condition of the Greeks of that district is very lamentable. After the occupation of Trebizond by the Russians, tens of thousands of Turkish immigrants swept down into the district of Kerasounda, where they plundered the Greek villages and departed, leaving behind them cholera and typhus fever. By order of the Governor of Trebizond, a new persecution of the Greeks began, the wealthiest of them being arrested and expelled."

"When the deportation of the Greeks from the littoral of the Black Sea was decided upon by the Turkish General Staff, it was carried out by the Governor of Trebizond and his agents in the most cruel manner. In spite of the assurances given by the Commander of the Third Military Corps, the evacuation of the villages was completed within twenty-four hours, and the deported Greeks, accompanied by a strong escort of gendarmes, were not permitted to take with them either food, clothes or baggage, and spent the night in the open air under a pelting rain."

"The deported peoples of the sea villages were not allowed to communicate with their Bishop. After their departure the Turkish officials and private individuals pillaged their properties. The evacuated villages numbered thirty-eight and the population was 23,000."

CHAPTER IV

AMISSOS (SAMSOUN)

VARIOUS reports, transmitted with a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 548 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5079), dated January 14 and 29, and February 7 and 29, 1917, describe the ruin of Samsoun and of the Greek villages of the littoral of the Black Sea. The following are some extracts from these reports:

"Eighty of the wealthiest Greeks of Samsoun, having been arrested without any reason whatever, were imprisoned on December 27, 1916; they were not allowed to communicate with their families in order to secure clothing, and were taken next morning very early to the interior of the country as if they were the worst of criminals. The foremost Greeks shared the same fate. Being deprived of everything, they will not be able to stand such privations and calamities. On the same day the city was encircled by the Turkish army, and all the population was called to the square of Upper Samsoun (Cadikioi) in order that, as was said, they might listen to the Governor who was to speak to the public. In that manner they were all seized and imprisoned in the barracks. The same thing also happened in the village of Eliazkioi. The men were thus without money and both men and women without extra clothing. The old and sick were taken along, being assisted by their relatives. The Turks did not spare even women who had just given birth to children nor the babies themselves. In such a condition they followed their executioners on foot, all night long, through the snow-covered mountains. This tragic scene had the aspect of a herd of cattle being

led to the slaughter-house. The children were in vain crying for bread and water. We do not know where they rested that day after a journey lasting twelve hours, nor where so many thousand people found bread. Undoubtedly they slept in the open air and had nothing to eat next day."

"In the meantime horrible things happened. As soon as Basil Arnaoutoglou, a merchant of Samsoun, was arrested, his 19-year-old daughter, Ourania, fell dead. The 17-year-old Euphrosini Garouphalidou, whose brother works in the labor battalion in the evacuated section of Cadikioi (Samsoun), having gone back to her home and not finding there her widowed mother,—who had just before been deported with the others,—became insane. As communication with the evacuated part of the city was not possible, the sick who could not be transported, died of starvation in a few days. We buried a woman who had died two days before, and we found babies dead in their cradles. After the deportations, the Turks gave themselves up to plundering. Thus jewelry, furniture, clothing, cooking utensils, and everything that was found in the homes was pillaged and sold in the streets."

"On January 1st Turkish policemen having gone into the church hunted out the rich and prominent Greeks, who had remained there. These they seized during the day, and on the following day sent them to the interior together with others who had been seized in other villages. Unfortunately we cannot fix the exact number of the deported persons, but it is certain that more than forty leading Greeks were arrested. The city now looks like a cemetery, since all the shops in the business part of it are closed. We are unable to find out where these persons were taken to and where they now are, but we are positively informed that those who had been deported from Upper Samsoun reached Kavak the first night in a bad condition; there they buried their dead; from that place

they were taken to Kaphzan, in the Province of Sebastia, a distance of 80 kilometers from Samsoun, having made the journey in four days, without food. During this journey many died from hunger, cold and hardships. I have just been informed that there are many dead in the church at Kaphzan. Notwithstanding the promises which had been given that the authorities would settle those deported in the Christian villages near Kaphzan, all of them have been sent to Tsoroum, in the Province of Angora. On the way the girls of Cadikioi, being sure of the fate which awaited them, sang the song, "Farewell, poor world; farewell, sweet life." What will happen at Tsoroum? How will so many thousands of people live in the midst of a severe winter, deprived of everything? This is a riddle which past experience can only solve."

"On January 10, 11 and 13, other arrests were also made, the arrested persons being likewise sent to the interior and thus the Greek community was completely disorganized; its schools were transformed into barracks, its shops were closed, property was plundered, and the richest villages of the district were burned. Thus the Greeks, whose misfortunes are beyond all description, are now in a most wretched condition."

Another report contains the following details:

"From the day that Rafet Pasha came to Samsoun, the whole place has been turned into a hell. He is 36 years old, fanatic, passionate, and, to a high degree, a hater of Greeks. To him alone are due the various cases of arson and of deportation, which I have described in many of my reports. Having left Bitlis three months ago where he had been promoted to the grade of Pasha, he came here, with full powers. In a short time he has become the scourge of the country and the tyrant of the Christians."

"On January 17 and 18, the arrests and the deportations to the interior were resumed; therefore, Samsoun

is in danger of losing all its male population. About fifty Greeks have been deported up to now from the town of Tsarshamba; the day before yesterday the Greek merchants of Paphra were deported."

"By order of the Government the shops of the Greek merchants deported from Samsoun have been plundered; from the store of Soukiouroglou alone merchandise to the value of 5,000 Turkish pounds has been pillaged. Out in the open country the Christians undergo sufferings the like of which one cannot find even in the darkest pages of history. The army and the Turks of the neighboring country enter the Christian villages, take away the cattle and beasts of burden, clothing, furniture, cooking utensils, flour, coverlets and all the other movable property in the Christian villages, and afterwards they set fire to the houses of the Christians and send them into the interior of the country, half naked, without food, without money, and on foot, over snow-covered mountains."

"Twenty-eight other villages have been burnt within a week from January 15th up to the present time, excluding those that were burnt during the month of December. The women and children have been sent and continue to be sent on foot in the midst of rain and snow to the Provinces of Sebastia and Angora. Babies, girls, women, in child-birth or pregnant, sick people and old men are pushed from place to place; they spend their nights in Khans (Turkish inns) without bread or any other food; they sleep naked on the manure piles or on the floor, and although many of them contract pneumonia or other diseases, on the following day, in the same manner, they are driven on under the lash. Many children having lost their parents are scattered in the mountains or in the Turkish villages; others die on the way of starvation, cold and hardships, and are buried in the mountains or are left a prey to the wild beasts. Those that survive their sufferings, after a journey last-

ing many days, are scattered throughout the Turkish villages of the Province of Angora, where, in the course of time, they will perish."

"Already dreadful news is reaching us about the fate of the deported people; the rich men of Paphra have been sent to the Province of Castamone, while the merchants of Samsoun and Tsarshamba have been distributed among the villages of Tsoroum, Sounghourlou, Medjitouzou and Inglibi."

"Those first deported from Cadikioi and Eliazkioi reached the top of Mount Tsoumbouz without food on the first night; the next day they arrived in Kavak, the third day at Kara-Dag and on the fourth they came to Kaphzan. During these four days they were without food. On their arrival at Tsoroum, they were scattered in various Turkish villages, where they are dying from cold and hunger by hundreds. We do not know exactly the number of the persons who have been deported, but on a rough estimate they exceed 20,000, and the number is increasing every day. Arson, plunderings and crimes continue in a savage manner, and the deprivations and hardships add new victims daily."

A third report states as follows:

"Vehaedin, a special official of the Ministry of the Interior, came recently from Constantinople. He is in harshness emulating Rafet Pasha, the special emissary of the Ministry of War, for he prepares the lists of the persons to be deported, and the latter carries out the decisions which are reached. Thus, this week, another group of Greeks has been deported to the interior and Samsoun is in danger of being left without men."

"The whole male population of Paphra also, where Vehaedin had gone, has been sent to Voivat, and the Turkish Government has ordered the closing of the tobacco warehouses and prohibited any sale of tobacco. The said Vehaedin, after having finished his sinister mission in Paphra, went the day before yesterday to

Oinoi, Tsarshamba and Phatza in order to supervise the execution of his program."

"In the meantime, Rafet Pasha continues his work of annihilation. The villages which had escaped the previous destruction have been burned and their inhabitants sent to the interior. Eight villages of Paphra, which produced the choicest tobacco in Turkey, were burned and their Greek inhabitants sent to the Province of Angora, while the Greek inhabitants of eight other villages of Samsoun have been sent to the interior and Turkish refugees have been settled in their houses. To these the Turks have promised to give title deeds for the houses and lands."

"At this moment smoke and flames are seen in the mountains; undoubtedly fire has been set to other villages. According to positive information, all the Greek population outside of Kerasunda has been also sent to the interior towards Kol-Hissar and Hamidie. If one considers the high and rugged mountains through which the deported women and children of the above villages are compelled to pass in the midst of a very heavy winter, one's mind is appalled and his heart is wrung."

The fourth report is as follows:

"We awaited anxiously the return from Constantinople of the American Vice-Consul of Samsoun, from whom a generous and substantial contribution of money was expected. Unfortunately, these hopes were disappointed, the excuse being given that America cannot send money to Constantinople, the Turkish Government having prohibited the sending of any money to Turkey. One can picture to himself the tragical situation of this unfortunate population, which is deprived both of money and food."

"Recently, the tobacco warehouses of the Greek merchants which had been seized were freed and the sale of tobacco by representatives has been permitted. Still, the tobacco of the villages, which have been evacuated

without being burnt, such as that of Eliazkioi, Adreanta, Tekekioi, Cadikioi, etc., has been put to auction by the Government, and in a few days, it will be sold to the highest bidder; the proceeds of this sale will be retained by the Government, while the owners of the tobacco are dying in the interior from hunger."

"The deportations of men from Samsoun continue. Not a single man is left in Paphra, while the women and children who have been left there are suffering dreadfully for lack of everything. The patriarchal family of Haji-Ioannou Gelkentzoglou, who is the founder and the pillar of the Greek community there, has been exterminated; his three sons, his grandchildren and his nephews have been sent to Castamoni, while he, a man of ninety years of age, who for forty years was a member both of the Municipal Council and the Court, and who has served the Government in various ways, has been deported, poor unfortunate, and is now temporarily living in Samsoun, though he is destined to die in the interior of the country. The Gelkentzoglou family was one of the most prominent of our district."

"The same things happened in the districts of Neo-Caesarea, of Phatza and of Tsarshamba. Consequently, if one takes into consideration that recently even those who have paid the exemption fee have been taken into the army, one can conclude that no male person has been left in the place."

"In the meantime, the destruction continues. The evacuated villages of Ada-Tepe, Yelidje, Karaghiol, have been burned."

"Near Kourouk-Koktje, where the military camp of the Pasha has been established, the villages have suffered severely; many women and children have been killed, the village of Erikli, among other villages, has been burned, and the population has been sent to the interior of the country in very bad condition."

"Worse things have happened at Paphra, where dur-

ing the last few weeks twenty other villages with their churches and schools have been set on fire and after their movable property was plundered and their immovable property burned, the whole population was sent to the interior of the country."

"The damage caused by the burning of these villages, which produced the choicest tobacco of Turkey, may be valued at many million Turkish pounds, and the Ottoman Government will not be long in feeling the injury done to the interests of the State."

"But at all events the damage has already been done and its results continue; the villages have been burned, and in the Province of Angora the inhabitants are dying by the thousands. I am sure not one will survive."

"The prominent men of Samsoun are already dying from diseases in the town of Tsoroum, Aletsa, Sounghourlou, and Medjit-Ouzou. The Greek peasants have been distributed by thousands among the surrounding Turkish villages, where they are living in the stables and barns of the Turks. Deprived of bread, clothing and coverlets, in the midst of a severe winter, with everything at an excessive price, in the total lack of medicines against contagious diseases, they are dying in crowds."

"All this horrible treatment has one object, namely, the annihilation of the Greeks in Turkey, who must disappear as have the Armenians. Already one-fourth of the deported population has died, and the same fate is awaiting the thirty thousand persons who have been deported from our District (Sanjak)."

CHAPTER V

CYDONIA (AIVALI)

THE reports submitted with the communications of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, dated April 24 and May 1, 1917, No. 662 (Ministerial Archives, No. 5219), describe the destruction of the city as follows:

"Before giving an account of the contents of these reports it is necessary to state briefly what sort of city Cydonia was up to that time. It was a city containing over 30,000 inhabitants who, with the exception of a hundred Turks, were all Greeks; it had a gymnasium (college)—whose diplomas had been recognized by the University of Athens since the year 1884;—three grammar schools for boys, three for girls, and a higher institution for girls, numbering in all 2,275 pupils, and a school budget of 4,000 Turkish pounds. The city contained 5,500 houses and 800 shops, the country property consisted of 60,000 (Greek) acres of olive trees, of farms, etc. The inhabitants owned besides 24 oil factories using steam power and 50 using horse power, 80 tanneries, 15 soap factories, three windmills and many quarries of ochre."

"Besides, there were in the city 11 churches, 5 chapels, 72 country chapels, 4 cemeteries, 2 monasteries owning large estates, and an excellent hospital. In all, the value of both the private property and that belonging to the Greek community, amounted to ten million Turkish pounds. The annual oil production was 6,500,000 okas. The Turkish Government collected from the oil tithe alone 52,000 Turkish pounds annually. The shipping activity was proportionate. About 600 steamboats and

2,000 vessels entered the harbor of Cydonia (Aivali) every year."

One of the above mentioned reports describes the passage, through Broussa, of the unfortunate inhabitants of Cydonia, who had been deported, as follows:

"I will not attempt to depict the pitiful spectacle presented by these unfortunate persons. I can only say it was a jumble of large and small skeletons begging for pity. This group has been marching for forty-five days and is to march a good many days to come, inasmuch as it is destined to settle in Yeni-Chehir and Biledjik. They in vain implored to be allowed to stay here, if not permanently, at least for a few days in order to rest, because many of them cannot walk as a result of fatigue and hardships. Their sufferings on the way are truly incredible. Over 180 of them died on the way, their bodies being thrown into ditches; others, half-dead, were left in the middle of the road, and women, after giving birth to children, abandoned their babies and followed the other wayfarers. I had the misfortune to follow closely from the beginning all the phases of this accursed persecution, but in no case have I seen a harsher attitude on the part of the persecutors who were indeed utterly insensate. The number already here consists of 500 to 600 families, and others are coming every day; according to the information given by the latter, those that are to follow are more numerous than those who have already arrived, consisting of from ten to thirteen thousand persons. In the village of Tahtali and Yailadjik of the district of Broussa, 200 families have been already settled."

Another report states as follows:

"For some days the rumor spread that the Greeks of Cydonia, who have been deported, as have been many others from other places, are to make their homes here, while, according to another report, they are simply going through here in order that they may be settled in the

villages of Yeni-Chehir and Biledjik. The place where they are to settle is not known exactly, because the authorities take great care that the displacements of the Greeks be carried out as quietly as possible, but I was informed to-day by a Greek soldier (serving in the Turkish Army) that a good many families from Cydonia are encamped in a plain about an hour's distance from Broussa and that they begged him to notify me that those families which are on their way to Biledjik are dying from hunger and in need of speedy assistance."

"About twenty-five inhabitants of Cydonia came to me in a pitiful condition and told me their unheard of sufferings with sobs and tears. According to their narrative, the persecutions began the week before Palm Sunday; they continued the entire Holy Week and were finally intensified on Good Friday; they had been expelled in small groups and were only allowed to carry with them some clothing which they were selling on their way in order to buy bread; furthermore the gendarmes on the way had been demanding money from them. I asked them to give me information about the Bishop of Cydonia, and a woman who was a neighbor of the Bishop told me that she saw him for the last time on Good Friday in front of the Bishop's home selling his brasier to some Turks, and that he told her that he was intending to go to Magnesia, the city of his birth; I infer from this that he has been left free to select his place of residence. According to their story, the number of the deported inhabitants of Cydonia and its suburbs is from thirty-five to forty thousand; that from the time of their deportation up to to-day 120 persons of the group that has come here, have died, particularly of hunger and hardships. My informants belong to a section composed of 100 families settled in the villages of Yailadjik and Tahtali which are situated two hours distant from Broussa; they came here to ask my aid in their distress both in their own behalf and in that of the others, and

in particular to ask me for bread because many of them had not eaten for 24 hours. I immediately procured, to the best of my ability, the bread which was needed, and I took steps with the proper authorities so that they might be provided with bread cards which are absolutely necessary in order to receive bread. It seems that they will be settled in various parts of the country and many of them will be established in the surrounding villages."

CHAPTER VI

CONDITION OF THE DEPORTED PEOPLE

The picture of the tragedy which has just been described would be imperfect, if one did not glance at the condition of those unfortunate Greeks, who, having been deported, are wandering about the mountains and plains of the interior of Anatolia, this country which is so inhospitable to them. The misfortunes which these victims of Teutonic Kultur and Turkish savagery are undergoing cannot be paralleled even in the darkest epochs. Deported, insulted, ill-treated, they are compelled to abjure their faith. Each becomes the spectator of the destruction of his neighbor and all of them together witness daily outrages committed upon their wives and daughters. They are dying of starvation every day. Who is going to give them medicine? Who will bury their dead?

This situation is pictured in a report dated July 28th and transmitted through a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 5832 (Ministerial Archives, No. 12092) which is as follows:

"In the station of Ak-Sakal we found 200 refugees from Madytos and 150 from Krithia, who, after the evacuation of Mehanion, were scattered in the grounds of the above-mentioned station without food or water. In the station of Oktsi-Ghiol we found 250 other inhabitants of Krithia and Madytos who for fifty days have lived under a burning sun and in the humidity of the night, in a desperate condition. As to the refugees of the district of Prokonnesos who have been scattered in the district of Sousourlouk and Baloukeser, neither is their number known nor the names of the villages in which

they have been settled. A large number of refugees are scattered in Baloukeser, Sousourlouk, Kepsout, Sindirli and in other Turkish villages. Many starving and half-naked women are begging for bread and money; their ragged clothing, which they are compelled to hold tightly together to prevent its slipping off from their shoulders, barely covers their skeleton bodies. I seem to see a picture of Dante's Inferno, for he, while traversing the Inferno, saw ghosts with only skin and bones. What he saw in imagination, one can actually see here. A few days ago a woman outside the station of Baloukeser died of starvation. Her little hungry children who thought that their mother was asleep, were trying to wake her up and crying and begging for bread.

"The condition of the refugees of Prokonnesos is becoming, from day to day, more horrible. Being turned out of the stables of the Turks where they store away their straw, they are now living in the open air. With tears they beg for shelter and bread, and instead of it conversion to Mohammedanism and dishonor are held out before them.

"Hunger, the heat of the sun and the dampness of the night take daily toll of these unfortunate refugees. Within the last few days 50 refugees have died at Ivrik and every day more are dying, some being buried without religious rites."

Another report from Artaki transmitted in a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 884, dated March 4, 1916 (Ministerial Archives, No. 14205) states as follows:

"The condition of the unfortunate refugees is indescribably desperate. Not having anything to sell in order to buy bread, women, old people and children, naked and barefooted, wander about the fields in order to gather grass for food. Others from morning until evening, braving the cold and damp, search along the whole shore, not excluding even the mouths of the sewers,

in order to find shellfish, mussels, clams, limpets, etc., so as to appease their hunger with them. Others less venturesome wander about the different shops, coffee-houses, saloons, and private houses, from morning until midnight, trying by their heart-rending entreaties, which would melt even a heart of stone, to procure something from some charitable person. In fact, whoever goes around in the Christian quarter after sunset can hear the pitiful and tearful voices of the orphans and others begging for charity. But notwithstanding the entreaties of the unfortunate refugees, it is doubtful if they will all succeed in thus appeasing the hunger of their unfortunate families.

"I was an eye-witness to the following incident. George Kourbetis from Gallipoli, with his wife Katherine and his 16-year-old son, not having tasted food for a week, were lying on their backs, looking up to the sky, hardly able to move even their lips and waiting, moment by moment, the most cruel of deaths, that by starvation. All means were employed to bring them to life but it did not succeed for all of them, for Katherine died on the 16th of January. The same day a woman from Madytos came and informed us in an excited manner of the death by starvation of John and Athena Hadgi-Anathasiou Dagdeleni, who left a 17-year-old daughter naked and ill.

"On January 19th, Olga Apostolou from Gallipoli, sick and weakened by starvation, having placed her unbaptized baby to her breast to suck, fainted from complete exhaustion. A woman from the vicinity, no one knows how long after, found the woman unconscious and her baby dead.

"On January 25th, Apostolos Pheidaros from Madytos, aged 60 years, died from starvation. Sofia Athanasiou, Sivri-Kiolafe, 7 years old, and Serafim Evangelou Datsos, 14 months old, met with the same fate. All this happened in Panormo where refugees are considered as

being much better off than those in the interior. If in Panormo three or four die of hunger how many, I wonder, die in the interior?"

A last report from Artaki which was transmitted in a communication of the Greek Legation at Constantinople, No. 884 (Ministerial Archives, No. 14205), confirmed these sad events in the following terms:

"The Greek refugees are only shadows of human beings. The strong feeling of homesickness which possesses them and which is daily expressed by the words: 'Let us go home and die there,' the hardships which they endure during the deportations, the fatigues which they undergo from long walks in their search for food and, generally, the various privations, have taken away from them every drop of vitality and has withered them completely. Recently, the consequences of the winter and the rains, the lying on the ice-cold ground where they had to sleep, for they had sold even necessary clothing, mattresses and coverlets, the excessive prices and the lack of bread, all contributed to the frightful increase in mortality through which the cemeteries were filled. The priests were tired of burying people, and the Christians refused to transport the dead any more. Therefore, the large communities have been compelled to hire four men for the transportation of the dead . . ."

CHAPTER VII

STATISTICS OF DEPORTATIONS

It has been under such harsh and cruel conditions that thousands of Greeks have been transferred from one end of the Ottoman Empire to the other. According to a rough calculation the number of those deported amounts to 240,000, as is indicated by the table of statistics shown below to which should be added those who have been deported from the interior of Asia Minor to other places, but whose deportation did not come under the controlling observation of the Greek Consular authorities. It should be noted furthermore that the crimes and persecutions continue, increasing day by day the number of victims of the Germano-Turkish savagery.

STATISTICAL TABLE OF THE DEPORTED GREEK POPULATIONS *

DISTRICT OF GALLIPOLI		DISTRICT OF BROUSSA	
Gallipoli	3,360	Sighi	1,823
Angelochori	1,885	Triglia	7,000
Kavakli	236	Eligmi	1,370
Taiphir	1,540	Arnoutkioi	210
Plaghiarion	1,900	Yenikioi	633
Pergaz	810	Mesepolis	1,265
Yenikioi	2,370	Paladari	2,333
Bahir	1,600		14,634
Madytos	7,345	DISTRICT OF PROPONTIS (MARMORA)	
Krithia	2,320	Prokonnesos	4,000
Galatas	1,270	Proastia	2,000
	24,636		

* The numbers indicate the total of the deported Greek inhabitants of each town or village.

Klazaki	250
Aphthoni	1,800
Palatia	3,000
Gallimis	1,800
Koutalis	1,800
Pasalimani	2,000
Haloni	2,100
Skoupia	2,100
Kouklia	1,300
Vorreion	1,300
	23,450

DISTRICT OF BOUYOUKDERE

Pyrgos	1,212
Bouyoukdere	1,341
Yeni-Machala	1,325
Doumoushdere	606
Avaskioi	310
Hagiasmati	482
Steni	
Nymphai	73
Saphras	412
Haghioi Pantes	95
Kephilikioi	312
Kirits-Bournou	180
Kalpha	748
	7,096

DISTRICT OF THE DARDANELLES

Dardanelles	3,300

DISTRICT OF ISMID (NICOMEDIA)

Armoutli	920
Yali-Tsiflik	1,496
Arnaoutkioi	950
Tseshair	810
	4,176

DISTRICT OF CYZIKOS

Mousadja	188
Havouzi	262
Koursouli	405
Castelli	860
Michanion	1,745
Peramos	3,500
	6,960

DISTRICT OF MYRIOPHYTOS

Yenikioi	485
Loupida	1,250
Yioldjiki	475
	2,210

DISTRICT OF KADIKIOI (CHALCEDON)

Arvanitochori	1,104

DISTRICT OF KIRKKILISSE

Skopos	6,000
Samakovon	5,000
Skepastos	3,000
Sophides	4,000
Tourlia	3,000
St. Stephano	150
	21,150

DISTRICT OF HERAKLIA

Examillion	1,260
Heraklitsa	1,250
Kesani	1,100
Ivrik-Tepe	2,256
Soultankioi	1,315
Ouzounkioprou	540
Kavadjik	445
Hidirkioi	157
Karadjali	26
Salakioi	236
Kirkioi	455
Varnitsa	159
Hadji-Yeri	1,250
Megarisi	287
Pazardere	475
Saklidere	310
Kouroudjouk	450
Beyendik	1,366
Malkotsi	500
Pharasli	502
Karabounar	450
Kasipasha	341
	15,130

DISTRICT OF DIDYMOTICHO

Lili	520
Dogandji	660
Tsiphlikioi	269
Karali	286
Yiaoup	533
Kavakli	714
Kourtikas	622
Karahamza	281
Tsali	389
Yenikioi	592
Eskikioi	700
	5,566

DISTRICT OF SMYRNA

Ano and Kato Demirdjili	6,000
Transa and Tsesner	5,000
Sevdikioi	3,500
Demirdjik	570
	15,070

DISTRICT OF CYDONIA (AIVALI)

Cydonia (with the refugees from Moschonisi, Yenitsarochori, etc.)	40,000

DISTRICT OF TREBIZOND

Sixteen villages from the District of Vazelon	6,000

DISTRICT OF KERASOUNDA

The number of the deported Greeks up to January, 1917, is 22,356. The following is the list of the villages evacuated up to that time:

SUB-DISTRICT OF TRIPOLI

Tripoli	3,000
Aslanik	179
Agalik-Maden	279
Gozokai	460
Erseil-Maden	660
Kara-Erik	472
Kara-Kaya	157
Kepeklisa	1,035
Kizil-Kaya	274
Kirlik-Maden	255
Kara-Kiounei	227
Monastiri	273
Lahana-Maden	810
Livadia	290
Liamlatino	160
Neochori	620
Nial	340
Armenochori	253
Omalochori	550
Palhan	180
Papakli	650
Peledjik	205
Rakan	292
Sak-Halva	270
Soukouk-Dama	270
Tienem-Roum	174
Tsakaras	1,650
Tselali (Mexen)	450
Tsimahanton	180
Koure-Peli	301

SUB-DISTRICT OF KERASOUNDA

Tsal	2,000
Yolagaz	850
Kassiopi	330
Koush-Kaya	790
Saraidjouk	340

SUB-DISTRICT OF KIORELE

Elevi	800
Satou-Maden	580

SUB-DISTRICT OF KIOVELE

Eseli-Maden	1,750
	22,356

DISTRICT OF SAMSOUN

The number of the deported Greeks up to February, 1917, was 30,000. All the Greek villages on the seacoast up to Aladjan have been evacuated. These villages are as follows:

Assar-Agatz
Kelkaya
Devkeris
Oxie
Tsirahman
Toighar
Kovtse-Bounar
Korkenliyatak
Alankioi
Kertme
Karakiol
Peklik
Kavadouz
Enghiz
Yiagpasha
Phoundoudjak
Phouroundzoglou
Ghiaglakeris
Tekne-Bounar
Karapetsin
Tsimeli
Kavadjik
Tsinaragli
Andreaton
Kato-Tsinik
Kiziloglan
Kapa-Tsokour
Sokou-Tsokour
Kitsilar
Yiagla
Sihlim
Outz-Bounar
Kapou-Kayia
Kizil-Ot
Ano-Tsinik
Ziganton
Kohtse
Trapezanli
Tsiflik
Kouloutsa-Poylan
Taphlankioi
Kodjadag
Kishla
Sari-Yourt
Kesili
Kizil-Ghiol
Kerpisli
Kestene-Aivan
Tsal
Tankarlou
Siamlaton
Tsamalan
Tsimeli
Yel-Kirigni
Kazandjaton
Seitanaton
Kaman
Bayirkioi
Karatouzla
Touzeren
Ot-Kaya
Alexi-Demirdji
Agtsalan
Yiar-Alti
Kirezli
Asmadjan

Ot-Massia
Aladjan
Tsartak-Keris
Kourtalan
Avloudja
Kodjalan
Taptivek
Kourouk-Kodje
Deirmen-Kiounei
Kestene-Saivan
Kaya-Kiounei
Tsevis-Tepe
Touzkioi
Sougouk-Bounar
Kelogloulari
Kelousaghi
Ali-Bey
Tsinaraglou
Tekekioi
Yielitse
Ada-Tepe
Karatoulou
Bagadjak
Dar-Bogaz
Karadja-Kishla
Kal-Pelen
Tsourlar
Pire-Yourt
Oldjekler
Karabounar
Kouzalan
Constanti-Oushaghi
Kosetik
Yirmen-Oushaghi

Yilan-Oren

APPENDIX A

A confidential letter of the Turkish Government to the Governor of Smyrna.*

May 14th, 1914.

To the Governor of Smyrna:

The subject Greeks who constitute the majority of the inhabitants of your district, are taking advantage of the present circumstances to provoke a revolutionary movement, conducive to an intervention of the Great Powers.

The Ottoman Greeks who live along the coast of the Vilayet of Smyrna are working day and night in order to succeed in the attainment of their "Grand Idea." There can therefore be no doubt that the existence of Ottoman Greeks in the Turkish Empire thus imbued with revolutionary ideas is fatal to the state, from the political and administrative point of view.

It is imperative for political reasons that the Greeks dwelling along the coast of Asia Minor be compelled to evacuate their villages in order to settle in the Vilayet of Erzerum and Chaldea. If they refuse to emigrate to the places assigned to them, you should issue verbal instructions to our Mussulman brothers so that they may, by all kinds of excesses, compel the Greeks to leave their homes of their own accord.

Do not in this case forget to obtain from these emigrants declarations to the effect that they are leaving their hearths and homes of their own free will, so that no political complications may later result therefrom.

The Chief of the Bureau of Correspondence,
Ali Riza.

The Minister of the Interior,
Talaat Bey.†

The Director of the Ministry of the Interior,
Ibrahim Hilmi.

* From *Le Temps,* July 20, 1916.
† The present Prime Minister of Turkey.

APPENDIX B

The following cablegram has been received by the Greek Legation at Washington from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece.

Athens, May 13th, 1918.

Many officers and soldiers of the Turkish army who have been captured by the Allies and have arrived at Saloniki, upon being questioned, have told of the destruction of Hellenism in Turkey, begging that their names be not revealed for fear of reprisals on the part of the Turks against their families. They declare in particular that Hellenism in Turkey has been dealt the most terrific blow that it has ever received since 1453. Three means have been used, general mobilization, requisitions and deportations.

Up to the end of 1917 more than 200,000 Greeks between 15 and 48 years of age were mobilized. Large numbers of these have succumbed to maltreatment, famine, exposure and epidemics.

The Hellenic populations that have been compelled to leave their homes in Thrace and Asia Minor number more than 1,500,000. With the exception of the Greek populations of Constantinople, Smyrna and some other cities, all the Greeks of Turkey are suffering martyrdom through deportations, outrages on women and starvation.

Half of the deported populations have perished in consequence of ill-treatment, disease and famine. Many have committed suicide or have been massacred in the interior of Asia Minor. Those that remain are subjected to continual martyrdom as slaves or are forced to become Mohammedans. Turkish functionaries and officers declare that no Christian shall be left alive in Turkey unless he embraces Mohammedanism.

A Greek doctor has been compelled, under threat of death, to circumcise 40 Greek soldiers who had turned Mohammedans in order to save their families. The confiscated fortunes of the deported Greeks surpass in value five billion francs.

Officers have met in the provinces of Romia and Mosul prominent Greeks from Aivali that were formerly millionaires working

in rags on the roads and begging for food. "Smyrna," so an officer says, "is melting like a candle." Forty or fifty deaths occur every day among the Greeks in consequence of exhaustion and disease. The Turks have deported 200 families from Tatavla in Constantinople. The streets of the large cities are lined with Greek orphans begging a living, in spite of the fact that the authorities are gathering them in Turkish schools in order to make them Mohammedans. Under these circumstances, the enslaved Greeks look toward the Allies and Venizelos as their only hope. The officers mentioned above affirm that up to the 17th of March, 1915, Turkey, busied by her operations in the Caucasus, had left the protection of the Dardanelles to the 158th regiment alone. One battalion of this was stationed at Koum-Kale, another at Erenkioi and a third at Dardanelles. It was only on the 17th of March that a third division, hastily formed from troops of the garrisons of Constantinople and Adrianople, arrived.

The return of Venizelos to power in August, 1915, disturbed the Turks so much that on the 10th of September the Turkish Government ordered the Vali of Broussa to put a stop to the deportation of the Greek populations of Ghemlek and the country around it. The second retirement of Venizelos from office and the condemnation of Greece to a policy of inaction emboldened the Germano-Turks anew and they gave themselves up with fervor to the extermination of the enslaved Greeks. The national movement for union in Greece under the leadership of Venizelos has filled the martyred slaves with joy and hope, while it has inspired terror in the Turks who, realizing the disintegration of their army, feared the intervention of Greece.

HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR

BY

DR. KARL DIETERICH

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

BY

CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph.D.

The College of the City of New York

With an introductory preface by Theodore P. Ion, D.C.L., and a brief article on Hellenic Pontus by D. H. Oeconomides, Ph.D.

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A SURVEY OF HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR

Asia Minor is the country which, more than all others, recalls the highest development of Hellenic civilization. Its deeply indented coast formed a chaplet of Hellenic democracies which reached out into the interior and actually attacked the Persian civilization, upon which they imposed their own stamp. These democracies constituted the first rampart of the civilized world of that time, holding back Persian barbarism. Their history is one of continual struggle between these two civilizations, a struggle that was terminated at Salamis and at Platæa, where the Persian ambitions were definitively buried and Greek civilization saved.

The wise men, the thinkers, the philosophers, that these democracies produced, were numerous, and the influence of their teachings was very great. These even today are radiant with a sublimity that has never been excelled.

It was in this Greek element and among the populations Hellenized by them that Christianity first germinated. It was the Greeks of Asia Minor who first offered their blood for the triumph of the new faith. The foremost Church Fathers, John Chrysostom, Saint Basil and very many others, were born there or taught there.

Throughout the Middle Ages the Byzantine-Greek civilization flourished in these lands. It formed the most powerful barrier against the wave of barbarism which threatened to inundate the civilized world. The desperate resistance offered by Hellenism permitted the West, by its contact with Byzantine Hellenism, to acquire those requisite elements which have formed the basis of Western civilization.

When the powerful tide of Turkish invasion, coming after so many other barbarian inroads, completely submerged Greek culture there, the Hellenic idea which this element represented was so strong that it survived everything. It was in vain that the fierce conquerors, as the tradition states, cut out the tongues of the inhabitants in order to cause this people to unlearn its language; it was in vain that they carried away their children to make of them fierce and cruel janissaries, who became exterminators of their own people. The Hellenic idea, the attachment to national traditions, was never submerged.

As soon as the fury of the conqueror was somewhat appeased, and at a time when that part of the Balkan Peninsula where Hellenism first arose and from which later it radiated over the then known world all the brilliance of its beauty was no longer showing any sign of life, the Greeks of Asia Minor founded the first Greek school of modern times, that of Cydonia (Aïvali). This school produced the first real ecclesiastics, the first genuinely educated men. Smyrna, called by the Turk himself "the infidel city," because of its preponderant Greek element, followed her example. The graduates of these schools formed the nucleus from which the idea of the Greek renaissance sprang forth. From this source have come the men that have sacrificed their lives and their fortunes in order that Hellenic culture, which seemed forever to have disappeared, might again be revived.

It is this country of which we are going to study the ethnological composition.

Its boundaries are, on the north, the Black Sea; on the east, the Russian frontier traversing the snow-covered mountain range of the Taurus and Antitaurus and continuing to the Gulf of Alexandretta; on the south, west and northwest, the Mediterranean, the Ægean Sea and the Sea of Marmora.

Its area is 534,550 square kilometers; it is traversed

by numerous watercourses and is one of the richest countries in the world. If well administered, it could support tens of millions of inhabitants.

It is divided for purposes of administration into eight provinces, Sebastia, Trebizond, Kastamuni, Konia, Angora, Aïdin, Broussa, Adana and four independent provinces, Chryssioupolis, Nicomedia, Balukiser, Vizi or Dardanelles.

To determine the importance of the Greek element in the population let us examine each archbishopric from the ecclesiastic as well as secular point of view.

The following table presents statistics as to the numbers of churches, priests, schools, etc., supported by the Greeks of Asia Minor:

Metropolis	Churches	Priests	Boys' Schools	Teachers	Pupils	Girls' Schools	Women Teachers	Pupils
1. Smyrna	40	114	35	241	11,055	27	202	7,651
2. Crine	46	75	34	65	3,965	14	32	2,055
3. Heliopolis	53	77	41	100	4,360	19	49	2,120
4. Pisidia	46	54	18	53	2,685	10	31	1,235
5. Philadelphia	20	22	15	26	1,060	8	16	723
6. Ephesus / Magnesia / Cydonia	126	177	100	286	15,940	65	150	10,150
8. Broussa	24	27	13	40	2,975	7	20	1,045
9. Nicæa	29	41	23	63	3,155	8	25	1,210
10. Chalcedon	43	100	28	99	6,970	25	70	4,230
11. Nicomedia	76	75	77	83	3,479	6	20	1,120
12. Cyzicus	81	128	72	195	8,115	25	67	2,630
13. Proconnesos	26	33	13	48	2,280	8	19	790
14. Amassia	330	441	286	586	17,000	69	87	3,910
15. Ancyra	8	13	5	20	840	2	7	260
16. Iconium	50	102	42	159	6,915	23	50	2,070
17. Cæsarea	44	98	58	133	5,075	16	49	1,778
18. Rhodopolis	65	86	57	120	3,300			
19. Chaldia	211	259	189	380	9,705	2	5	160
20. Trapezus	250	161	95	203	8,535	11	35	1,679
21. Colonia	120	140	93	182	3,840			
22. Neocæsarea	300	400	150	300	11,300	15	36	2,100
	1,988	2,523	1,444	3,382	132,549	360	970	46,916

The administration of the Greek Orthodox Church is in the hands of twenty-two Metropolitans, or Arch-

bishops, having under them a proportionate number of bishops and priests. The Metropoles, or Archbishoprics, are the following: Smyrna, Crine, Heliopolis, Pisidia, Philadelphia, Ephesus and Magnesia, Cydonia, Broussa, Nicæa, Chalcedon, Nicomedia, Cyzicus, Proconnesos, Amassia, Ancyra, Iconium, Cæsarea, Rhodopolis, Chaldia, Trapezus, Colonia and Neocæsarea, under the authority of the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople.*

The number of Greek inhabitants is probably above 2,000,000. The Hellenic populations are chiefly concentrated in the provinces of Aïdin and Broussa, where out of a population of approximately 3,000,000 the Greek element is about 1,300,000, the coast regions, however, being inhabited almost purely by Greeks. The non-Greek inhabitants are largely Catholics, Armenians, Turks and Jews. On the coasts of the Black Sea, too, the Greeks are largely in the majority. It is to be noticed that in many villages of this region the inhabitants speak a language closely approaching the ancient Greek, from the point of view of syntax as well as of verb-formation.

For their religious needs they have 1,988 churches and 2,523 priests, and for the instruction of their children they maintain 1,444 schools for boys with 3,382 teachers and 132,549 pupils, and 360 schools for girls with 970 women teachers and 46,916 pupils.

We must remember that the churches and schools are maintained at the expense of the Greeks themselves, since the Turkish Government only intervenes in order to impede and destroy. Reckoning at $500 a year the pay of a priest or teacher, man or woman, we arrive at the sum of $5,000,000 a year, which must be multiplied by three in order to cover the expenses of the construction of churches and schools, their repair and

* The Metropolis of Tarsus and Adana, although it is, geographically, in Asia Minor, falls under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch and is therefore omitted here.

upkeep, and the salaries of the inferior employees of all these establishments.

The number of pupils of both sexes constitutes nearly nine per cent of the whole Greek population (179,465 boys and girls). This is due to the fact that many of the Greeks, not included in the preceding enumeration, who live mingled with other populations, whether Armenian or Turk, and who do not possess the means of supporting schools of their own, send their children from great distances, in spite of the difficult communications, in order to attend these schools. Often the parents, who have lived for generations among the Turks, have lost the knowledge of their national language, but their national consciousness is nevertheless so strong that they expose their children to countless dangers in order to permit them to learn the language of their ancestors. These Turkish-speaking Greeks live chiefly in the interior of the country, even as far as the Persian frontier, and the greater part of these, lost among other more numerous peoples, are not included in the above statistics.

These numbers show that the people are loyally devoted to their language, their traditions and their religion, for the tremendous sacrifices to which they subject themselves for the sake of the maintenance of Hellenic culture evidence the tenacity with which they cling to their national sentiments.

They show equally that this people is eager for progress in civilization, for the number of educational establishments that it maintains and the large number of children that attend them, show that it wishes to acquire a higher civilization and thus become an agent of progress for the peoples whom the fate of conquest has established among them.

Sober, industrious, intelligent and honest, it demands only liberty in order to be able to give scope to its activity. Though conquered by the Turk, the Greek,

in his turn, won the upper hand by his intellectual superiority. The Turk, who has become accustomed to the Greek way of living and thinking, and has adopted many of his habits, among the most prominent of which is the respect for woman and the sanctity of the home, will be happy to live under the administration of his Greek compatriot, with whom he was perfectly satisfied when the Turkish Government, before the chauvinistic Young Turk party had established its fierce tyranny, renounced the services of the Greek functionaries.

An interesting side of this dwelling together of Greek and Turk is the respect that the Anatolian Turk habitually professes for the Orthodox religion. Sometimes the Mussulman even has recourse to the offices of the Greek priest, either to have a mass chanted, or in order to touch the holy sacraments, the saints' pictures, etc., so as to be cured of some illness, or to obtain some benefit which his ascetic religion does not afford him.

If the Turkish Government by its misrule had not provoked the driving out of the Mussulman populations of Europe (a course which has gradually reduced the territory of the Ottoman Empire), the uprisings experienced periodically would not have been so frequent. These numerous fanatics who had lived since the time of the conquest by exploiting the Christian populations, transported their methods to Asia Minor, and, seconded by a government whose materialism knew no limits, they undertook the extermination of the Christian populations of Asia Minor in order to rob them of their property.

When one realizes that, under an administration which existed only to mulct the worker by taxation, these populations have succeeded, in spite of numberless persecutions, in making so formidable an effort in order to secure their spiritual needs, it is easy to imagine what progress in civilization and wealth awaits this

country, when an era of liberty and security shall be introduced under a paternal administration.

The Anatolian Mussulmans will be the first to profit by this. Patient workers, loving the land, and living in harmony with their Christian compatriots, they will be happy to secure the product of their labor, of which the Turkish functionary constantly robbed them, so that he finally made them dislike all labor, and urged them on into the path of crime.

This living together as friends, on a footing of equality, will perhaps make Christianity flourish anew in this land which was the first to be saved from paganism, and whose fruits, transplanted to the rest of the world, have caused the springing forth of that glorious civilization which Prussian megalomania is now staining with blood.

II. HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR

By Karl Dieterich

Translated from the German
By CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph.D.,
The College of the City of New York

PREFACE

By Theodore P. Ion, D.C.L.

The German dream of dominion from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf has naturally attracted the attention of the world to Asia Minor, a country which has been for centuries in a dormant condition on account of its subjection to a moribund state. Conquered and reconquered by Asiatic hordes, its wealth ravaged and pillaged many and many times, its cities, towns and villages razed to the ground more than once, and its inhabitants having been subjected again and again to massacres *en masse,* Asia Minor has been and will naturally continue to be the reservoir, so to speak, of European civilization for the Great East.

From ancient times the rays of civilization which shone on this peninsula were not Asiatic but European, that is Hellenic, the civilizing influences of the language of Homer and Plato having been kept alive even during the rule of the Mohammedan Arabs.

As is well known, the Arabian Caliphs of Bagdad were always surrounded by Hellenists and considered the books of the Greek sages more valuable than gold.*

* See authorities for these statements in an essay by the present writer, published in the *Michigan Law Review,* vol. VI., 1907-1908, pp. 50-52, and entitled, "Roman Law and Mohammedan Jurisprudence," Part I.

Hence came the great impetus given to Arabian philosophy and positive science through the translation of the writings of the Greeks, which were subsequently transplanted to Europe by the Moors even before the time of the renaissance.

The darkest epoch of Asia Minor began undoubtedly with the advent of the followers of Osman, who, ever since their irruption into that country, have wrought havoc among its people, and within a comparatively short space of time have reduced that fair land to barbarity and desolation. The ancient seats of learning, the theaters, the stadia, the treasures of art and other tokens of Hellenic civilization are now nothing but heaps of ruins, inarticulate witnesses to the ancient glory of Hellenism.

It is a remarkable phenomenon that beneath these smoldering ruins civilization was not entirely destroyed, for in spite of the slowly burning fire Hellenism continued to exist, and toward the close of the 18th century began to show clear signs of that vitality and vigor which blossomed forth so quickly in the following century, and, in our own time, have produced such far-reaching results.

Hence the apprehension shown by the Turkish conquerors during the tyrannical régime of Abdul Hamid. Hence the great efforts made by that potentate to bring from the confines of Russia Mohammedan hordes such as Circassians and other unruly tribes and freebooters in order that they might roam about or settle there according to their fancy, with the view to offsetting the ever-increasing Greek population of Asia Minor. Hence the inrush to that country of Mohammedan emigrants from the territories which have been wrested from the Turk ever since the events of 1878, it being immaterial whether these Mussulman fanatics gave themselves to robbery, murder and massacres of the Christians in the land, or settled there in order to de-

velop the great possibilities of agriculture in the country.

The diplomacy of Europe, having been satisfied with the platitudes embodied in the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 as to the introduction of reforms by the Sublime Porte, both in its European and Asiatic provinces, has let things take their natural course, the first outcome being the Armenian horrors of the Hamidian era, which were continued under the "constitutional régime of the Young Turks" and culminated in the scientific extermination, by starvation, of that highly gifted Armenian nation, carried out under the high patronage and guidance of the Germano-Turanians, whose diabolical activities during the present world war have overwhelmed in a like catastrophe the Hellenic population of the Ottoman Empire and particularly of Asia Minor.*

From the time that the present German emperor resolved to make the Near and perhaps the Far East the great market for Teutonic trade, German scientists of all kinds have been dispatched to Asia Minor to study the country from every point of view, so that the German Government may, at the opportune moment, be ready to seize the "golden fleece."

As a result there have appeared various essays dealing with Asia Minor from different points of view, and in particular the one with which we are here concerned, by Dr. Karl Dieterich, forming the principal part of the present publication of the American-Hellenic Society.†

* See Publication No. 3 of the American-Hellenic Society, entitled *Persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey since the Beginning of the European War*, June, 1918.

† The present writer, in carrying on researches dealing with Asia Minor, came upon Dr. Dieterich's study, and, after reading it, thought that it would be better to publish this essay than to write a new one, inasmuch as he noticed that, with the exception of a few observations which were to be expected from a German writer, the author gives, on the whole, an accurate and impartial account of the condition of things in Asia Minor, and does not seem to share the views of many of the civil and military officials of Germany, who consider that the existence of the Hellenic element there is detrimental to the interests of Deutschtum. It seemed, therefore, that no better testimony could be found than that adduced by a subject of Kaiser Wilhelm on the material and intellectual strength of Hellenism in Asia Minor, which is the latest bugbear of the Teutons and the target of Turkish cruelty.

It is worth noticing that the German essayist describes in a vivid manner the vitality and the potentialities of the Hellenic population of Asia Minor, and, unlike the ruling class of Germany and many of his compatriots, he speaks favorably of the Greek populations of Anatolia.

Dr. Dieterich, referring to the persecution of the Greeks, says erroneously that these "systematic persecutions," as he admits them to be, began with the spring of 1914 (see p. 19), while, as a matter of fact, they commenced on the very day that the Young Turks consolidated their power (1908-1909), when, in spite of their much heralded formula of "equality, justice and fraternity," they designed and instituted a well-organized method for the annihilation of the Christian populations, the Adana massacres of the Armenians in April, 1909, being the precursors of all the subsequent horrors.

Nor did these would-be "reformers," or "constitutionalists," conceal their plans for the Turkification of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, for they openly resorted either to forced conversions to Mohammedanism or to the annihilation of those who seemed unlikely to submit to be "Ottomanized." Thus, as early as September, 1908, one of the moving spirits of the Committee of Union and Progress, namely, Dr. Nazim, during his visit to Smyrna, at a social gathering held in the house of a British subject, spoke freely about this matter.*

The Young Turks having thus initiated, under the very eyes of Europe, a systematic extermination of the Armenians,—whom the bloody hand of Abdul Hamid had not completely destroyed,—turned their attention to the "more dangerous Greeks."

It was this plan for the destruction of the Christian

* See an account of this interview in a Greek pamphlet entitled *How Germany Destroyed Hellenism in Turkey*, by G. Mikrasianou, 1916, and particularly the confidential letter of the Turkish Minister of the Interior, Talaat Bey (now Prime Minister), dated May 14, 1914, to the Governor of Smyrna, reproduced in *Le Temps* of July 20, 1916, and the English translation of it in Publication No. 3 of the American-Hellenic Society, p. 70.

nations that, in 1912, brought together the Balkan States, who saw that under the new régime in Turkey the peoples of these various nationalities would gradually be annihilated, if they did not take some preventive steps. The result was the war of these States against Turkey, the complete defeat of the latter and the freeing from the Turkish yoke of hundreds of thousands of people. As a further consequence of this war, there began on the part of Turkey a wholesale expulsion of the Greek population from the coast of Asia Minor simply because the neighboring islands of the Ægean had been incorporated with the Greek Kingdom. Up to the declaration of the present world war hundreds of thousands of Greeks were expelled from Turkey, having been, at the same time, deprived by the Turks of all their movable and immovable property. All these unfortunate people took refuge in Greece and gave no little embarrassment to the Greek Government.*

It is therefore incorrect to say, as the German writer alleges, that the persecutions of the Greeks began with the outbreak of the present war (p. 19).

The difference, however, between the *ante-bellum* persecutions and those perpetrated subsequently is this, that while in the former cases the Greeks were expelled from their native country and were deprived only of their wealth and their property generally, in the latter not only were they compelled to abandon everything they owned, but they also perished through untold hardships and starvation. (See details about the tragical condition of the Greeks in Publication No. 3 of the American-Hellenic Society cited above.)

Nor did the Turks in carrying out this cruel work care whether Greece was friendly or unfriendly to Turkey. As a matter of fact, these persecutions were in full swing during the "régime of Constantine" (see dates

* Supplement to the Greek White Book, entitled *Ministère des Affaires Étrangers, Documents Diplomatiques, Supplément,* 1913-1917, Nos. 1 and 4.

in *Persecutions of the Greeks,* etc.) when that potentate was in close relationship not only with the Germans, but also with the Bulgarians and the Turks, and consequently the persecutions of the Greeks had nothing to do with the alleged projected territorial compensations to Greece; besides, Turkey was assured by Germany that Constantine, who then had the upper hand in Greece, would under no circumstances attack Turkey.

Therefore it is not correct to say, as the German writer asserts, that one of the reasons for these persecutions was the promise made to Greece by the Entente Powers in 1915 of territorial concessions in Asia Minor (see p. 19).

An indication that even such an evidently impartial writer as Dr. Dieterich cannot divest himself of the German point of view is his statement that in the struggle for life the Greeks were on the offensive, while the Turks were on the defensive (see p. 19). This, in plain words, means that it suffices for a nation to be intelligent, active, frugal, moral (as he too acknowledges the Greeks to be, p. 50), in order to acquire the odium of carrying on an offensive struggle if another nation living side by side with it happens to be stupid, fatalist, immoral and incapable of holding its ground in the struggle for life.

The writer's theory of the existence of a Greek propaganda in Asia Minor, " forwarded by every possible means," is a gratuitous supposition. Dr. Dieterich evidently misunderstands the conditions in which the Greek populations have been living in Asia Minor and trying to promote or revive their national ideals. As a matter of fact, all the existing Greek schools in Asia Minor,—which is also the case with the Greek educational institutions in every part of Turkey,—have been established and supported by the Greek communities themselves, and if, at times, they have received outside financial aid, this was due to the generosity of

persons who were natives of the country, who had emigrated to foreign lands and acquired wealth abroad. The many names of these benefactors appearing on the Greek school buildings attest the accuracy of this statement.* Therefore the allegation of the writer that a Greek propaganda is carried out in Asia Minor is totally incorrect.

Another supposition of the German author that the Greeks of Anatolia intermarried with the "Seljuk Conquerors" is not a historical fact. On the contrary, judging from the general character of the people and their attachment to the Christian religion, it is certain that the Greeks did not intermarry with the Seljuks, since they invaded Asia Minor after their conversion to Mohammedanism.

That many Greeks, abandoning the faith of their forefathers, embraced Mohammedanism, is an incontrovertible and historical fact, but that Turks or other adherents of Islam could not become Christians and consequently could not intermarry with the Greeks is also a truism. For, according to Mohammedan Law, a "true believer" who abandons Islam is liable to be put to death. Therefore, although many Greeks by becoming Mohammedans lost their nationality, no Turks or other Mussulmans could become Christians and, consequently, Greeks. That has been the strongest shield of Hellenism for the preservation of the Greek nationality.

In the same way his allegation that, as the language of the Greeks in the interior of Asia Minor was Turkish, they "did not share in the national and racial consciousness of their kinsmen on the coast" (p. 52) is equally erroneous. Anyone who has lived in that country and intermingled with these people could not have

* Oftentimes the name of the school embodies that of the donor, as, *e.g.*, Marasleion, Zographeion, Theologeion are named from Marasles, Zographos and Theologos.

helped noticing their intense patriotic spirit and their attachment to Greek ideals, the best evidence of these being the creation of schools for the study of the language of their forefathers, namely Greek. Nor is the other statement of this writer that the Greeks "succeeded in introducing the Greek language in their schools alongside of the Turkish" correct, because, as a matter of fact, these schools were established for the study of the Greek and not the Turkish language, the latter tongue being taught as a foreign language, occupying the same place in the curriculum of the Greek schools as foreign languages hold in European or American schools.

The observation of the author that Germany will have to come to terms with the Greek peasant of Asia Minor, because "he is on a higher moral plane," is worthy of especial notice, and his further remark that "it would be just as perverse as it would be foolish to depend on the Turk to the exclusion of the Greek, who has the controlling hand in trade and traffic, as well as in the cultivation of the soil" (p. 50), confirms the favorable opinion of both German and other writers and travelers as to the vitality of the Hellenic element of Asia Minor.

Thus, a distinguished French geographer,—whose statistics, however, on the populations of Asia Minor are not accurate, since they are presumably based principally on Turkish sources,—referring to the Greeks of the Province of Smyrna, says that "among all the Christian communities of the Province of Smyrna that of the Orthodox Greeks is the most considerable and that it is, in a general way, better educated and more prosperous. It is among them,—apart from the merchants who are best fitted for handling large enterprises,—that are found the most clever mechanics, often excelling in their various callings, and the best agriculturists, their well-known characteristics

being industry and activity." (See Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie, Géographie Administrative,* etc., vol. III., p. 355.)

So, too, the famous English historian of the Crimean War, Kinglake, writing in 1845, refers to Smyrna, which the Turks call, as he says, "infidel Smyrna," in the following terms: "I think that Smyrna may be called the chief town and capital of the Grecian race. For myself, I love the race, in spite of all their vices." * (See *Eothen, or Traces of Travel brought Home from the East,* by Alexander William Kinglake, p. 41, ed. 1876).

Another English traveler, who made the tour of Asia Minor on foot, describing the American College in the city of Marsovan and referring to the Greek students there, says: "Like all Greeks, whether of Europe or of Asia, they have a quality which always compels interest. In general intelligence, in quickness of perception, in the power of acquiring knowledge, they are said, as a race, to have no equals among their fellow-students—nor in their capacity for opposing each other and making mountains of difference out of nothing. Watching them, it grows upon the observer that traditional Greek characteristics have survived strongly in the race, and that Asia Minor Greeks of today are probably not different from the Greeks of twenty centuries ago." (See W. J. Childs, *Across Asia Minor on Foot,* p. 55, 1917.)

An English general, who during the administration of Lord Beaconsfield was sent to Asia Minor on a special mission after the conclusion of the Cyprus Convention of 1878, after referring to some of the well-

* A much earlier and well-known English traveler calls Smyrna "the lovely, the crown of Ionia, the ornament of Asia." (See *Travels in Asia Minor and Greece,* by Richard Chandler, ed. N. Revett, vol. I., p. 73, ed. 1825.)

known characteristics of the Greeks of Anatolia as an enterprising, keen-witted people, well gifted with a rare commercial instinct, goes on to say:

"Profuse expenditure on education is a national characteristic, and to acquire a sufficient fortune to found a school or hospital in his native town is the honorable ambition of every Greek merchant. . . . The Anatolian Greeks generally are active and intelligent, laborious and devoted to commercial pursuits. They learn quickly and well, and become doctors, lawyers, bankers, innkeepers, etc., filling most of the professions. They are good miners and masons, and villages are generally found near old lead and copper mines. They have much of the versatility, the love of adventure and intrigue, which distinguished the ancient Greeks, and a certain restlessness in their commercial speculations which sometimes leads to disaster. The democratic feeling is strong; the sole aristocracy is that of wealth, and ancient lineage confers no distinction. The children of rich and poor go to the same schools and receive the same free education" (Sir Charles W. Wilson, *Murray's Hand-book for Travellers in Asia Minor*, 1905, pp. 70-71).

A brilliant French Hellenist and scholar, in referring to the Greeks of Smyrna, gives the following picturesque description of them. "They are," he says, "so numerous in that city, that they consider it as part of their domain. Wide-awake, lively, playfully sly and always interesting, they are here the tavern-keepers, the grocers, the boatmen. These are the three trades that most of the Greeks of the poor class prefer, just as the profession of lawyer and that of physician are particularly popular among the Greeks of the well-to-do class. As tavern-keepers they talk all day long; they keep up with the news, they discuss politics, they run down the Turks, they are always stirring, bustling and struggling, in their way, for the 'grand idea.'"

"As grocers they sell a little of everything. They do business as money changers, an infinite happiness for a Hellene. As boatmen they have the sea, this old friend of the descendants of Ulysses, as their constant companion; they go right and left in the hustling of the port, they see new faces; they question the travelers who come from afar; they dispute with them about the boat-fare, which is yet another rare pleasure for the Greeks. An amusing race, sympathetic, on the whole, notwithstanding its faults; patriotic, persistent, sober, mildly obstinate in its indomitable hope."

"Because of their constant activity and their wit, the Greeks have supplanted the Turks in many places in Turkey." *

The vivid description of Hellenism in Asia Minor given by the German author, and corroborated by numerous other writers and travelers, shows the important rôle that the Hellenic element is destined to play if that unfortunate country is ever favored with the blessings of good government.

The Hellenic State should undoubtedly be the natural inheritor or at any rate the executor of the estate of the Sick Man of the East; if not of all of Asia Minor, at any rate of a great part of it, *i.e.,* western Anatolia. But if the Ottoman sway in Anatolia is prolonged, it is to be hoped that the country will, at least, be under the joint tutelage of some civilized states which will take into consideration the wishes and aspirations of the Hellenic people.

* See Gaston Deschamps, *Sur les routes d'Asie,* 1894, p. 152.

HELLENISM IN ASIA MINOR*

By Karl Dieterich,

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The political unrest in the Near East which preceded the present world war and accompanied its beginnings has turned attention once more to the existence of the Greek element in the population of Asia Minor. Two factors in particular have entered into this feeling of unrest: first, the systematic persecutions of the Greeks by the Young Turks, which have been going on ever since the spring of 1914, and secondly, the recent communications in the press dealing with alleged promises on the part of the Triple Entente to indemnify Greece through extensive territorial concessions in Asia Minor—the talk was of an extent of 100,000 to 120,000 sq. km.—in order to repay her for her intervention in the war. However one may feel as to both these points and their justification, this much is clear, that the Turks believed that they were in the presence of a Greek peril.†

There was thus started, in Asia Minor, a defensive struggle on the part of the Turks that was just as sharply defined as the offensive which this Greek element had for a long time been actually carrying on against the Turks of this region; with this difference, however, that the Turkish defensive has only recently acquired sufficient strength to make its action felt, while

* Das Griechentum Kleinasiens, von Dr. Karl Dieterich, in *Länder und Völker der Turkei* (Schriften des Deutschen Vorderasienkomitees, herausgegeben von Dr. jur. et phil. Hugo Grothe, Leipzig, 1915).

† A political treatment of the "Greek Question" was presented in a pamphlet of the Vorderasienkomitee, under the title, *Die asiatische Turkei und die deutschen Interessen,* Leipzig, 1913, S. 23-26.

the Greek offensive has for decades been quietly at work getting the upper hand economically, culturally and nationally in that land where they once ruled for a period of more than a thousand years. Granted that the Greek propaganda, which has, for a considerable time, been forwarded in Asia Minor by every possible means, has in many particulars been carried on too bitterly, and has injured the sensibilities of the Ottomans, the fact remains that the Greeks in Asia Minor economically and culturally have control of Asia Minor even now, not as an outside or foreign element in the population, though the movement has been forwarded from the outside, but as something that has developed from within on the very soil of the country itself, something that has in centuries of growth become a historic fact and that is only to be understood when one has fully grasped what has gone before.

To do this one must go back into times which are long since past, though their resultant forces, far from having ceased to operate, seem just now, as a matter of fact, to be renewing their strength.

Asia Minor was in prehistoric times a field for Greek colonization. Long after its littoral had, in early Hellenic times (dating back, in fact, to the 10th century B.C.), been bordered with a fringe of Greek settlements, which were the basis of the old Ionic and Æolic civilizations, this coast colonization had, in later Greek times, been extended and developed through the victorious eastern expeditions of Alexander the Great into a real colonization of the interior.

Just as had been the case in the whole of the western regions of Asia Minor, there arose in the 4th to 2nd centuries B.C., in the interior of the country as well, a whole series of new Greek cities, which from that time on have constituted firmly fixed centers for the Hellenizing and civilizing of the land. This began with Byzantine and Turkish times and has extended up to

the present, forming a sure testimony to the stubborn endurance of this late Greek civilization. One needs only to think of towns like Nicæa, Nicomedia, Prusa, Pergamon, Philadelphia, Thyatira, Laodicea, etc., which were all founded in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. and were named after the Diadochi * or their wives. After the fall of the states founded by the Diadochi, the Romans came in and conquered Asia Minor. Without having succeeded in permanently Romanizing it, they gave it a solidity which enabled the Byzantine emperors, after the later Hellenizing of the Eastern Roman Empire, to advance farther and farther into the interior and toward the east, accompanying the victorious advance of Christianity: in Cappadocia, the home of Greek monastic life in the East, there was firmly established in Cæsarea, in the 6th century, a new outpost of Greek civilization.

Thus, throughout the centuries, by a process of colonization that was forwarded now by peaceful means and again by war, Hellenism forced its way steadily eastward, and on the basis of the older indigenous population a new sphere for Greek colonization was opened up which developed its own peculiar cultural strength only after the passing away of the ancient Greek civilization, in Christian, that is, and Byzantine times. Up to the end of the first millennium of the Christian Era, at a time when the Balkan Peninsula, including Ancient Greece, had long since lost its ancient city-life and culture beneath the inroads and devastations of Goths, Avars and Slavs, Asia Minor was still a populous and blooming land with countless large cities, whose inhabitants combined Hellenistic culture with Christian fervor. Intellectual traditions, associated with the names of Arrian, Dio Cassius, Strabo, Galen and Epictetus, were still living and were perpetuated in the writings of the Byzantine historians of the 10th–14th centuries, the

* The successors of Alexander the Great.

most famous of whom came from Asia Minor.* At that time the strongly ascetic ideals of Greek monastic life were still in full vigor, as they had been first preached and practiced by the three great Church Fathers, Basil of Cæsarea, the Cappadocian, and the two Gregories of Nyssa and Nazianzus, and as they had assumed controversial form in the monastic castles of Asia Minor (the forerunners of the monasteries of Mount Athos), built on the Bithynian Olympus, which is still called by the Turks Keshish-Dagh, *i.e.,* Monks' Mount, on the Auxentios (also in Bithynia), on Mounts Sipylus, in Lydia, and Latmos, in Caria. In ecclesiastical architecture, too, Asia Minor was an originator: the so-called "Domed" Basilika, which reached its greatest perfection in St. Sophia in Constantinople and its most perfect reproduction in St. Mark's in Venice, owes its development to Asia Minor.†

Finally there arose in Asia Minor a new folk-poetry that dealt with the deeds of heroes. What the Nibelungen is to the Germans, the Chanson de Roland to the French, and Beowulf to the English, that, to the Greeks of the Middle Ages, was the romantic epic of Akritas (*i.e.,* Count) Basilios. Discovered only a few decades ago, though scattered widely, wherever Greek is spoken, in countless fragments of folk-poetry, it is a sort of crystal precipitate in verse of those struggles which the Byzantine Counts were forced to wage against the Saracens on the eastern confines of their realm, in Cappadocia. The poem has for us a double value: first, as proving that the national center of gravity of Hellenism lay then in Asia Minor, and second, as

* So Michael Psellus (11th-12th century) of Nicomedia, Michael Attaliates (11th century) from Attalia in Pamphylia, Nicetas Acominatos (12th-13th century) from Phrygia, Georgius Pachymeres (13th-14th century) of Nicæa; Nicephoros Gregoras (14th century) from Pontus. The two latter are, also, our chief source of information about the invasion of Asia Minor by the Turks. Cf. K. Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur, 2,* München, 1897, §§ 126 and 128.

† Cf. J. Strzygowski, *Kleinasien, ein Neuland der Kunstgeschichte,* Leipzig, 1903.

enlightening us as to the ethnological relations of the country, for its hero is the son of a Greek woman by an Arab Emir (hence his surname Digenis, that is, born of two races).*

From a political as well as a cultural point of view, Asia Minor formed a center of Hellenism. From here sprang all the great ruling families, which from the 8th century to the 13th constantly renewed the kingdom: the Isaurians (717-867), the Armenians (867-1057), the Comneni (1057-1185), the Laskarides (1204-1261), the Palæologi (1261-1453). They are all rooted in the feudal nobility of Asia Minor, which is comparable with our east Elbe colonial nobility. If it had not been for these powerful and energetic noble families the Byzantine Empire, and with it Hellenism as well, would long ago have been destroyed, and if the Greeks in Asia Minor had not succeeded in these struggles, that lasted 300 years, in stemming the advance of the Turks, their hordes would have poured over the Balkan Peninsula and Hungary centuries earlier than they did. We must briefly review these wars, for in no other way can the present ethnical and cultural constitution of the country and the position of Hellenism in it be fully understood. The annihilation of Hellenism and the coincident erection, one after the other, of two Turkish empires came in two great phases: the first, at the end of the 11th century, in the conquest by the Seljuks, and the second, at the beginning of the 14th century, in that by the Ottomans. The geographical situation of the capitals of these two kingdoms, Iconium (Konia) and Prusa (Brussa), is in itself an indication of the swinging of the Turkish center of gravity from the east toward the northwest.

Although the Seljuk kingdom did not embrace the whole peninsula within its boundaries, it threatened, at

* K. Krumbacher, *Gesch. der byzantin. Litteratur*, 2, § 358.

first, with that terrific thrusting strength of the Mongolian conquerors, to reach out far beyond its boundaries, and to wrest from the Greeks that northwestern part of Asia Minor that was so greatly coveted. In 1080 the Seljuks were already in the extreme northwest in Bithynia, and in possession of Nicæa and Nicomedia, and were ranging the whole coast regions from Smyrna to Attalia (Adalia) as pirates. The Greeks, who were at first purely on the defensive, joined in with the Crusaders, and succeeded, after twenty years of stubborn fighting, in thrusting the Turkish conquerors back of a line which corresponds pretty closely to that of the Eskishehr-Karahissar-Akshehr railroad line of today. This was in the early part of the 12th century (1117). A second thrust by the Greeks (1139) drove them back upon their old base and center, Iconium. Western Asia Minor was thus again rescued to the Greeks and nearly forty years of quiet followed. This time was utilized by the Greek emperors to build a strong line of fortresses against possible further attacks; all strategically important points were defended by strong forts, especially the valley of the Sangarios, which formed the corridor of attack against Constantinople. Even today, as one travels over the railroad from Ismid-Eskishehr, he sees numerous, fairly well preserved ruins of these Byzantine forts which served the same purpose of border-defense as those of today in the valley of the Saal in our own land.* They bear Turkish names, but he who has studied into these things knows that these are only literal translations of old Greek names: Inegeul, shortened from Angelokome = Angelstown; Kupruhissar, from the Greek Gephyrokastron = Bridgefort; Karadjahissar = Greek Melangeia (Turkish, karadja = blackish). They mark, therefore, the boundary between Byzantine and Turkish history.

Thanks to these fortresses, the Greeks succeeded in

* Cf. Von der Goltz, *Anatol. Ausflüge,* Berlin (1896), S. 70 ff.

repulsing the Turkish assaults, so vehemently renewed in 1177, until, by the Latin conquest of 1204, the Byzantine Empire was entirely restricted to Asia Minor, where, in the so-called Nicæan Empire, it experienced such a promising rebirth that it soon embraced the whole northern half of western Asia Minor. This new kingdom secured to the Greeks the mastery in Asia Minor for 125 years more, and it would have secured it to them for an even longer period if the Mongol invasion of 1241 and the consequent weakening of the Seljuks had not tempted the ambitious Greek emperors to stretch out their hands once more toward that fatal Constantinople, instead of using their whole strength in maintaining their hold on Asia Minor; for the Greek Empire of that time was no longer strong enough to hold control over two continents that were so seriously threatened, especially since a new avalanche was already rolling in from the east, the mighty Ottomans, who rose up in the strength of youth among the ruins of the fallen empire of the Seljuks. What the Seljuks in 240 years had failed to accomplish, the Ottomans were destined to bring about in a single generation, the ruination of Hellenism in Asia Minor.

It was in 1299 that the petty Turkish feudal prince, Osman, broke through the fortified region of the Sangarios, and after sixteen years of desperate fighting succeeded in forcing his way through to Nicæa, the chief defensive point of the Greeks, in order to lay the foundations of that great Ottoman Empire that was to be the mighty successor to the Byzantine Empire. He still met with almost invincible resistance; Nicæa with its mighty walls could not be forced, and it was only in 1326, the year of his death, that Prusa, after a ten-year siege, fell, and under the name of Brussa became the first Ottoman capital. In 1330, and after a siege of fifteen years, came the fall of Nicæa, and later that of Nicomedia. The hardest part of the task had thus been

done, the first great breach had been made in the stronghold of the Greek Empire, and the conquerors now turned to the south. Pergamon fell in 1335, Sardis in 1369, and Philadelphia (Alashehr), the last of the Greek cities of the interior, which, according to the expression of a Greek chronicler, stands like a star in a clouded sky, was captured in 1391. Smyrna, the old Greek acropolis, had already fallen a prey early in the 14th century to the Seljuks, who had found in Aïdin, the ancient Tralles, a last support for their sinking power. Apart from Trebizond in the extreme northeast, which up to 1461 maintained itself as the capital of the little coast state which was also called Trebizond, all Asia Minor was now in the hands of the Turks. The Greeks, as a political factor, had ceased to play any part. The question as to whether they had ceased to be of any importance as a civilizing and cultural factor we must now attempt to investigate.

Byzantine sources show clearly enough that Asia Minor, even in the 11th century, was suffering from decrease in its population. This was caused partly by the endless levies of troops, necessitated by the struggles against the Bulgarians in the Balkans, and partly by agrarian conditions in Asia Minor, of which I have yet to speak. The consequences of this systematic depopulation first became evident when the country collapsed under the inroads of Seljuks, Mongols and Ottomans; for the defensive military strength that was for a while maintained could not disguise the fact that the national strength of the Greeks was already broken when the inroads of these peoples began. Furthermore, there was no longer any means at hand to renew this strength which had been for centuries so systematically drained. On the contrary, the depopulation went on from bad to worse, and it took place in different ways according to the varying character of the three conquering peoples.

The Seljuks, who were bent chiefly on gaining new

pasturing grounds, seem to have drawn the Greek population closer to themselves and to have made them of some service, instead of attempting to drive them out by force. This is proven by the accounts of voluntary or forced submission to the conquerors, into which the inhabitants were driven by the unsound agrarian conditions in Asia Minor, which were characterized by an ever-growing tendency toward larger and larger estates, a tendency against which, even in the 10th century, the clear-sighted emperors had vainly enacted the strictest laws. The consequences appeared at the time of the inroads of the Seljuks; evidently with full knowledge of these conditions, they promised the oppressed peasants in the conquered regions complete freedom in return for the payment of a head tax, if they would yield to their control. Thus great masses of the Greek population went over to the Turks and were lost to Hellenism. Emperor John Comnenos, on one of his campaigns against the Seljuks of Iconium (1120), was forced first to fight bitterly with the Greeks of that region, who had either been already half Turkified, or were, at any rate, strongly Turcophile. We see, then, that at that time large intermixtures of the native Greeks (or of the Hellenized native population) with the Seljuks must have taken place, for only through such intermixture is the fact to be explained that the Anatolian population of today, both Christian and Mohammedan, instead of showing a distinct racial stamp, rather presents strongly modified features which cannot be described as either Aryan or Mongolian.*

The Ottomans were less bent on peaceful assimilation than on forcible subjection and extermination. In their character as masters they sought to make the conquered

* As to the type of the Anatolian Turks, see L. Heermann, *Rückerinnerungen aus dem Orient* (Aschaffenburg, 1886, S. 13, 126); A. Philippson, *Das Mittelmeergebiet*, 2, (Leipzig, 1906, S. 197); H. Gelzer, *Geistliches und Weltliches aus dem griechisch-türkischen Orient* (Leipzig, 1900, S. 185); R. Fitzner, *Anatolien* (Leipzig, 1902, S. 19).

as harmless as possible, and they used to this end a means that they had learned from the Byzantine emperors; they transplanted, from the conquered cities that had a large Greek population, large numbers of these Greeks to other cities where the Greeks were less numerous, so that everywhere the Greeks were forced into a minority. Furthermore, the Greeks were no longer permitted to live in the large cities that were at that time still strongly walled, but were compelled to settle outside in the suburbs. From these suburbs there gradually developed later, as the Greek population increased, entirely new towns, which crowded the old city-center from its predominating position and established itself in its place. This system, as we shall see, resulted in strengthening rather than weakening the Greek element. And yet, in this Turkish conquest, a great part of the Greeks in the towns were constantly being forced to leave Asia Minor and to take refuge in the European part of the Empire, for the Byzantine historians of that time (the 14th century) tell of mass emigrations to Europe, of homeless refugees crowded in and around Constantinople, and of growing insecurity in the neighborhood of the capital. This exodus from the towns betokens a second essential difference as compared with what had happened in the Balkan Peninsula. While, in the Balkans, the cities appear as the supporting centers, the bulwarks, of the Greeks against the Slav inundation, forming a base of operations for winning back the open country that had become Slav, in Asia Minor not only the country regions but the towns as well fell into the hands of the conquerors, evidently because the Turks were better trained soldiers and more familiar with the art of besieging towns than were the Slavs, who were accustomed only to campaigns in the open. The degree to which the Greek communities of Asia Minor suffered under the Turkish conquest is shown by the old Church Acts which are still preserved in the

Patriarchate in Constantinople.* While Asia Minor before the Turkish invasion counted no less than fifty seats of Metropolitans (the highest church dignitaries) it has today only twenty.† Of these, twelve alone are distributed in the western provinces, while the other provinces have only eight. Even of these the greater part are maintained only for the sake of the names. These numbers show better than anything else how seriously the Greek town-population in the interior of Asia Minor melted away as a result of the Turkish conquest, for every withdrawal of the seat of a Metropolitan, and every uniting of several such seats in one, presupposes a decided decrease in the population of a district.

The greatest direct losses of the Greeks were caused by the two great Mongolian invasions of the years 1241 and 1402, especially the latter under the much-feared Timur. These hordes found their only joy in burning, murdering and pillaging, and poured forth like a plague of locusts "in separate bands over Galatia, Phrygia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, the coast region of Caria, Lycia and Pamphylia in such a way that it seemed as if the whole Tartar army was billeted in every separate province, so numerous were they." So says one of the last Byzantine historians (Dukas), who pictures also, in vivid colors, the consequences of this predatory incursion in the words, "Timur left neither living men, nor weeping children, nor barking dogs, nor crowing cocks, but everywhere nothing but the stillness of death." Thus every one of these three Turkish inundations had in its own way contributed to decimate the Greek population of Asia Minor.

Only in two greater districts have compact groups of

* On these old Church Acts is based the instructive investigation of A. Wacchter, *Der Verfall Griechenthums in Kleinasien im* 14. *Jhd.*, Leipzig, 1903.

† TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: There are at present twenty-two Metropolitans in Asia Minor, or better, including that of Tarsus and Adana, which is under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Antioch, twenty-three.

Greeks of considerable extent preserved their nationality, their speech and, in part, their religion, that is, in Middle Cappadocia, in the interior of eastern Asia Minor, and in Pontus, in the extreme northern coast region; in the former as a relic of the old church settlements and in the latter as the last remains of that latest Greek effort at establishing a state in Asia Minor, the Empire of Trapezus. The Greek population of these two districts can therefore serve to bring clearly before us the Asia Minor Greeks of the Middle Ages, in their physical as well as their linguistic character.

Before proceeding further I must state that these peoples, like those of the Balkan Peninsula, must already have acquired their present physical stamp in the early Middle Ages, at any rate, before the Seljuk-Turkish conquest, for the modified, ethnically but slightly distinguished type of the western Anatolian peasant population is not characteristic of these Greeks. Rather do the Cappadocian Greeks show unmistakable Armenian influence, especially in the broad and extraordinarily high skull, and the large fleshy nose, as well as in their compact and sturdy build, while those of the mountainous coast region of Pontus have retained the more finely cut features of the Greeks and their more graceful form. Some claim to find a third type in the Greeks of southeastern Asia Minor, a type which shows strikingly Semitic features, and which is probably to be traced back to the numerous Syrian immigrations into Asia Minor during the supremacy of the Isaurian Dynasty of Byzantium, 717-867. In the same way the Armenian type of the inland Greeks is to be traced back to the extensive intermingling of Byzantine Greeks and Armenians during the 9th and 10th centuries, when the Byzantine Empire received a strong quickening of Armenian blood. A dynasty of Armenian origin at that time gave the Byzantine imperial throne a new hold and lent renewed strength to the new kingdom

and a great Byzantine province of Asia Minor was called "the Armenian Province." In any case, we must be on our guard against deriving our present ethnographical picture of Asia Minor directly from the old racial divisions into Hittites, Phrygians and Lydians. The fact that Asia Minor served as a bridge between Asia and Europe prevented such a preservation of the old ethnical relations, as had been the case in the Balkan Peninsula, that great reservoir of people in migration; here as there, in judging of ethnological characteristics, we should, far more than has up to now been the case, start out from Byzantine times, which completely transformed the ancient ethnological nature of both peninsulas.* That we have to do, however, in the case of the Cappadocian and Pontic Greeks with autochthonous remains of pre-Turkish times, and not with later immigrants, is shown not only by their racial type but by their dialect. This belongs to the very oldest forms of the Modern Greek language, if one leaves out of account the still more ancient Tzakonian, and enables us to conclude that it broke away from other Greek at a very early period, and followed a separate development of its own. This is particularly true of the Pontic dialect of Samsun (Amisos), Œnoe (Unieh) and Ophis; there is in the phonetics of the dialect, as well as in the vocabulary, so much that is peculiar that it is almost unintelligible to those conversant with the ordinary Modern Greek. But this holds true also of the dialect of some twenty Cappadocian towns—for with only twenty are we here concerned—a dialect which is still quite on the level of the Greek of the early Middle Ages, evidently going back to the time of the settlements in the country of the old monks, which can be proved, in the region of Cæsarea, to go back in many cases as far

* On the question of the racial characteristics of the Greeks of Asia Minor, cf. A. von Luschan, *Verhandlungen d. Gesellsch. f. Erdkde. zu Berlin,* 15 (1888), S. 47-60; *Archiv f. Anthropol.,* 19 (1889-90), S. 31-53; *L'Anthropologie,* I., p. 679 ff., II., p. 25 f.

as the 4th century B.C. These dialects,* however, are, as compared with those larger and continuous regions where common Greek is spoken, only small and distinct islands of the Greek speech, which are constantly wearing away and giving up ground, more and more, although the proportion of Greeks in these regions is much higher than elsewhere. The ratio is highest in Pontus, where there are nearly 250,000 Greeks (25 to 30 per cent of the population), and where they form a large percentage even of the city population, especially in Trebizond and Samsun. On the contrary, in Cappadocia they are to be found settled only in a large number of villages, comprising altogether something like 40,000 souls.† The number of these Greeks in Pontus as well as in Cappadocia is, furthermore, all the harder to fix accurately, because there are among them many communities of Christians who conceal the fact that they are Christians, and, for political reasons, pass as adherents of Islam (even making use of the Turkish language), but who are really devoted to Christianity and have kept up their Greek national feeling. In Pontus they are especially to be found in the districts of Tonia and Ophis, where in the seventies of the last century they were estimated at about 14,000, while in other districts, as in Krom and Torul, a strong process of Christianizing them anew has taken place.‡

Apart from these two isolated areas of Greeks, the Turks have inundated the whole peninsula, subjecting it to the Turkish nationality and to the Turkish lan-

* Specimens of the Pontic and Cappadocian dialects of today are to be found in A. Thumb's *Handbuch der neugriechischen Volkssprache*, 2 (Strassburg, 1910), S. 294-298. Grothe, in his treatise, *Meine Vorderasienexpedition 1906 u. 1907*, Bd. II., S. 175, calls attention to the dialect of the Greeks of Farash in the southern Antitaurus.

† Exact statistics as to the number of Greeks in Cappadocia are given by R. M. Dawkins, in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 30 (1910), pp. 109-132, 267-291.

‡ For more exact information, see H. Kiepert, *Die griechische Sprache im pontischen Küstengebirge, Zeitschr. d. Gesellsch. f. Erdkde. in Berlin*, 25 (1890), S. 317 ff.

guage, while Hellenism, though not entirely destroyed, has been so seriously broken up and shattered that it has been obliged to give up even its language and its religion, that is to say, has completely lost its national consciousness. The numerous Greek names of rivers, villages and mountains have, with very few exceptions, all disappeared, being replaced by Turkish names.* As far as administration and ways of living were concerned, the Turkish conquest produced very few radical changes. The very towns which under Greek control had formed commercial and administrative centers, continued to be such under the Turks, keeping, for the most part, their old Greek names as a proof of the strength of 1500-year-old traditions. Towns like Smyrna, Prusa, Pergamon, Magnesia, Attalia, Adana, Tarsus, Iconium, Ancyra, Cæsarea, Amasia, Castamuni, Trapezus, Sinope, Amisos and others experienced a new quickening under their old names, which the Turks altered only slightly. Not only did they continue to be the capitals of their various districts for purposes of administration, but their names were extended so as to apply to the entire districts of which they were centers. Practically all the vilayets and sanjaks of Asia Minor received their names from these old centers of city-civilization and comparatively few have Turkish names, the ancient Tralles, Philadelphia and Dorylæum, for example, bearing the Turkish names Aïdin, Alashehr and Eskishehr respectively. On this weighty point, therefore, the Turks, as an unhistoric people, have been as little able to interrupt the continuity of civilization as in the Balkan Peninsula, where the larger towns likewise have kept their Greek names.

Just as the Turks in Asia Minor have taken over the way of living of their predecessors in power, so too

* Only the two largest rivers of western Asia Minor, the Mæander and the Sangarios have, in a characteristic manner, kept their old names in the form of Menderes and Sakkaria.

have they accepted almost unchanged their social relations. Two points alone deserve special mention here, the possession of large landed estates and the feudal system. The Turkish landowners, the Beys, are nothing but the direct successors of the Byzantine archontes, and the Turkish peasants have been forced to render compulsory service to the Beys just as the Christian peasants did to the archontes. That strongly developed feudal system, too, which has existed from Byzantine times, especially ever since the 11th century, with its distinction between the little and large fiefs for foot soldiers and cavaliers, respectively, was taken over by the Turks, and was by them even more highly developed.

In this accommodation to the conditions and institutions of the subject peoples did the strength, as well as the weakness, of the new masters consist: in so far as they found before them fast-bound customs, which they simply took over, they were obliged to accept, along with their advantages, their drawbacks as well. The only real advantage that they received came from their acceptance of feudalism, while the retention of cultural and social conditions in town and country was bound gradually to weaken their power, because these conditions either outlived them or, at any rate, were not suited to them. The first statement applies to agrarian relations, and the latter to commercial relations in the towns. This free shepherd and peasant race (for this they had previously been) lost its free character through taking over the Byzantine provincial nobility without, however, in doing this, developing a genuinely urban civilization, which is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for trade-activity. Thus the Turkish peasantry went backward without a Turkish bourgeoisie arising. At any rate, only a limited town-folk arose which made its living by handicraft but did not know how to conquer economically the regions that it had subdued politically. There existed here, therefore, a twofold, dangerous breach in the social

organism of Mohammedanism, and into this breach sprang the ever-alive and ever-enterprising Greek, first the Greek trader, and then the Greek farmer. Both had in the west coast of Asia Minor and in the islands, regions where Greeks have always lived, a field for their activity that, though at first modest, has slowly but steadily broadened out.

In the first place, Greek trade in Asia Minor was destined to have an awakening. The impulse to this came from the trade policy inaugurated in the Levant by Colbert, the gifted Minister of Louis XIV. A special trade-society was founded for this purpose (1664), the consular system was reformed, French merchants were united in permanent corporations and a state system of control was arranged between the most important harbors of the Levant and Marseilles. An interesting account has been preserved, dating back to the year 1733, which tells of measures taken to increase the trade of Smyrna as over against its rival Constantinople, and one from the year 1778, containing a regulation decided upon by the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce for the French merchants of Smyrna.*

The number of firms there that represented French houses had, in the period from 1752 to 1783, already increased to twenty-nine as against eleven in Constantinople and eight in Salonika. This French trade-policy was systematically based on a strengthening of Smyrna, with the evident purpose of driving the rival trade of Italy out of the field. In this it must have succeeded, for in the forty years from 1750 to 1789 the value of French goods imported from Smyrna to Marseilles rose from 5,629,000 pounds to 12,805,000 pounds and, at the same time, the export from Marseilles to Smyrna rose from 4,250,000 pounds to 9,500,000 pounds. This increase in the trade of Marseilles naturally postulated a

* These texts, so interesting for the history of trade, are reproduced by D. Georgiades in *La Turquie actuelle* Paris, 1892, pp. 197 ff., 218 ff., 224 ff.

similar increase in the trade of Smyrna; this attained even in 1787 no less a figure than 52,750,000 Turkish pounds, in which figures is included the rapidly increasing trade with Russia which resulted from the latter's position as Turkey's protector since 1774. Smyrna thus became a new and important reloading place in the trade of the Levant, and although, at the beginning of the 18th century, it had numbered hardly 30,000 inhabitants, it had, in the year 1803, 100,000, of whom about a third were Greeks. The new blood was mostly to the advantage of the Greeks. In fact, one may say that the new enlargement of Smyrna, which had formerly been the center of Hellenism in Asia Minor and became so in an increasing degree from now on, opened a new period of prosperity to the Greeks of Asia Minor; from all parts of the Greek Orient a stream of enterprising Greeks gathered together here, so that the old capital of Ionia soon became once more an almost purely Greek city; in 1850, of about 125,000 inhabitants, 60,000 were Greeks, in 1880 of about 160,000, 75,000 or 80,000 were Greeks, and in 1910, over 100,000 inhabitants of the city's 225,000 were Greeks. On the contrary, the number of Turks has, in the last 100 years, dropped from 75,000 to 60,000, or, according to some authorities, to 50,000, while the number of Greeks has almost quadrupled.* The trade of Smyrna has correspondingly increased, especially since the opening up of the interior through the railroads that go out from Smyrna into the valleys of the Hermos and Mæander. Though the trade in 1839 amounted only to 53 million francs, it had increased in 1855 to 120 million, and by 1881 had even reached the figure of 220 million francs. It had already surpassed the commerce of Constantinople, and the Turks therefore call Smyrna too, mingling envy and

* The statistical data are based on Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie* (Paris, 1890-95), II. and III., completed from Baedeker, *Constantinopel und Kleinasien*, 2 (1914).

scorn, "the infidel Smyrna" (Giaour Ismir). For Hellenism in Asia Minor, however, it became a new and firm support for its interests and a source of prosperity. Even in the year 1818 the Greek merchants of Smyrna were able to build at their own expense a beautiful casino, intended alike to serve business and social ends. This proved, however, to be a tender blossom that had come out prematurely and was soon destroyed by the storms of the Greek War for Independence (1821-1829), though it did bloom forth all the more strongly after the war's fortunate ending.

For Hellenism began to spread over the west coast in a large number of little places, which were in part old Hellenic sites, and in part places settled during the Middle Ages, or in later Turkish times. Among the very old sites is Phocæa, which through a strange play of circumstances has formed the beginning and the ending of a development that has embraced the world. Famous as the metropolis of Marseilles (Massilia), it was, after a long period of decay, revived in modern times by the reflux movement from her daughter of old, a movement that affected Smyrna first, and then its neighbor Phocæa as well, for this too, in spite of its changing political fortunes, had always been a bulwark of Christianity and was again destined to experience a new, though modest, rejuvenescence. Although, during the first half of the 19th century, the Greeks there were still in the minority, as compared with the Turks, constituting two-fifths of the population (2,000 out of 5,000), the relation has in the intervening decades so changed that now out of 8,000 inhabitants, 6,000 are Greeks, so that these now form three-quarters of the inhabitants. This increase is due to the vigorous local shipping trade which centers here and which numbers annually something like 3,000 ships. The most remarkable thing is, however, that this rejuvenated Old Phocæa has already become once more the mother-city of a young

Phocæa (New Phocæa), which is about ten kilometers northwest of the old and although only a few decades old already has about 5,000 inhabitants of whom about 4,000 are Greeks. New and Old Phocæa then, taken together, already number about 10,000 Greek inhabitants as compared with 3,000 Turks. Working the salt pits and exportation of raisins constitute the chief sources of livelihood of the two cities.

The two other important harbors north of Smyrna are, like Phocæa, of recent origin and are therefore purely Greek; I mean Dikeli and Aivali. Dikeli may really be described as founded by the German archæologist Karl Humann, who in 1869 had the road that led to this place from Pergamon rebuilt, in order the better to transport the Pergamene sculptures excavated by him. Enterprising Greek merchants have taken advantage of this road in the exportation of the products of the country, and have built up here a trading place which in 1880 had 3,000 exclusively Greek inhabitants but which now contains 5,000 such.* Owing to this fact the older harbor of Chandirli, situated more to the north, has steadily diminished in importance. The chief exporting harbor of northwest Asia Minor is, however, Aivali, newly built in the third decade of the 19th century on the site of an older Greek settlement named Cydonia, a name which, like Aivali, means "quince." It is an almost unique example, on Asia Minor soil, of a large, purely Greek and practically self-governing community, with 25,000 to 30,000 inhabitants, a yearly export business of ten to twelve million francs and a shipping of over 3,000 vessels. It has thoroughly modern business institutions as well as a Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture and an Agricultural Bank. It is the seat of three consular agents,

* In a similar way, in more recent times, the German excavations of Priene and Miletus have benefited the neighboring Greek settlements. Cf. H. Gelzer, *Geistliches und Weltliches*, S. 231.

those of England, France and Italy. Through Aivali's growth the ancient Adramit (Adramyttium), which was formerly on the coast but is now further inland away from the bay, has been put into the background and now contains about 6,000 inhabitants. As compared with these three ports, the three that are situated on the west coast, south of Smyrna, are by no means so important, perhaps just because they are older settlements, in which Hellenism has had to force its way against the Turks, who were here numerically superior. This is particularly true of Chesme, which lies on the projecting west point of the peninsula of Clazomenæ.* It is a town of about 6,000 inhabitants, which prospers through its raisin trade. The Turks, to be sure, form the majority of the population (about two-thirds), but the shipping (2,500 ships annually) is entirely in Greek hands. The chief place of export for the products of the Mæander valley is Scalanova, settled in the Middle Ages and named by the Turks Kush-Adassi, by the Greeks New Ephesus. The Greeks, 3,000 to 4,000 in number, are constantly forcing the Turks, who are settled in the old walled town and are about equal to them in number, further into the background, and in commerce they completely control the field. Lastly, Budrum, a Turkish settlement on the site of the ancient Halicarnassus and still inhabited by about 3,000 Turks, has become Hellenized in proportion as the growing importance of the place as a center of export for southwest Asia Minor—the ancient Caria—has been appreciated by the Greeks. Their number, which twenty years ago was a little over 2,200, may since then have come to equal that of the Turks, or may even have surpassed it.

The other little seaport towns on the southwest coast, as Marmaras, Macri, Levisi, Kalamaki and Phœnix,

* Also called Kuru-Chesme, *i.e.*, "dry fountain." The place seems to have a Greek name, Ξεροκρήνη as its prototype, though no place of this name is provable in Byzantine times.

since they are not connected by railroad lines with the interior, are as yet without any commercial significance and are of importance only in connection with local coast-shipping. None of them has more than 3,000 inhabitants, but these are overwhelmingly Greek.

With these constantly increasing Greek settlements on the west coast, settlements which have their economical support in the great islands just off the coast, Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Rhodes, the settlements on the extended, exposed and less indented north and south coasts of Asia Minor can bear no comparison either in number or in importance, and this is true particularly of the south coast. The chief places here are the ancient Adalia (Attalia) founded in Hellenistic times, with about 30,000 inhabitants, and the entirely modern Mersina, founded in 1832, with about 22,000 inhabitants. In Adalia, which was an important station for the fleet in Byzantine times, and is now the chief emporium for the whole interior of the southwest, there live about 10,000 Greeks, *i.e.,* about a third of the total population, while in Mersina they form the majority. This city, too, owing to the fact that it is connected with the Bagdad railroad by the Mersina-Adana line, has obtained the commercial supremacy on the south coast; it had in 1911 an import and export business of some twelve to thirteen million francs, while Adana had a business of only two and a quarter million. Here too, therefore, the more flourishing condition of the cities is in direct ratio with the increasing number of Greeks. On the north coast, which is twice as long as the southern, no new Greek settlements have developed, but those that have existed since antiquity have maintained their importance, thanks to the fact that they have preserved their Greek element, which from these bases has controlled the trade of the Black Sea. Trebizond, Kerasunda (Kiresun), Œnoe (Unieh), Amisos (Samsun), Sinope (Sinop), Ionopolis (Ineboli),

Heraclea (Eregli) are still strong supporting and gathering points of the Greeks, who constitute in Trebizond half of the population (about 25,000 Greeks out of 50,000 inhabitants), while Samsun, the greatest trade center of the north coast, with an export business of about forty million francs, has even a larger proportion of Greeks.

Economically developed in quite another way, because more blessed by nature and more highly favored by its nearness to Constantinople, and on these accounts from of old, more densely populated, is the northwest coast of Asia Minor, the littoral of the Sea of Marmora. Here are situated on relatively shorter stretches of coast, no less than seven important old seaports which also belong completely to the Greek sphere of influence. There lie first, at and on the peninsula of Cyzicus, the old cities of Panormos (Panderma) and Artake (Artaki). The former is the more important as being the chief place of export for the sheep of Asia Minor, the value of which, even in 1893, amounted to fifteen million francs. Since then, the town, which has about 12,000 inhabitants, of whom 2,000 are Greeks, has become the terminus of the road that branches off from Manissa, and will take a sudden jump as soon as it has direct steamer connection with Constantinople. Artaki, an almost purely Greek town of about 7,500 inhabitants, subsists, in great part, from its manufacture of wine, liqueurs and cognac. In particular, the white wines produced here are highly esteemed in Constantinople. In the southeast corner of the Sea of Marmora are situated Mudania and Gemlik, the former, the old Apamea, the point of departure of the railroad to Broussa, having about 4,000 Greek and 2,000 Turkish inhabitants; the latter, the ancient Kios, which the Greeks have once more renamed by its old name, being an almost purely Greek town of 5,000 to 6,000 inhabitants, which, like Aivali, enjoys an almost complete independence. The

chief exports are chromium-ore and tobacco (Kios-cigarettes!). Finally, in the deep bay of Ismid, besides Ismid itself, are at one and the other side of the city Karamursal (the ancient Prænetus) and Gebize (the Byzantine Dakibyza). Both are the capitals of districts in which the Greek population already surpasses the Turkish (1893: 15,000 Greeks and 11,000 Turks), although in the towns themselves the Turks are still in the majority (Gebize has about 4,000 Turks and 2,000 Greeks). Alongside of these places, however, especially along the line of the Haidar-Pasha–Ismid Railway are to be found many Greek places whose Greek population increases, in a very striking way, the nearer one gets to Constantinople. So, for example, Daridsha, the Byzantine Aretzu, which is now once more inhabited exclusively by Greeks, and Cadikioi, the ancient Chalcedon, which now numbers 30,000 to 35,000 inhabitants, who consist in almost equal numbers of Armenians, Greeks and Turks, while at the beginning of the 19th century it was inhabited almost entirely by Turks.

Coming now to the last of these places, Ismid (the ancient Nicomedia), we find that this has lost its old significance as a place of transfer, toward Constantinople, of the products from the rich Bithynian plain, since the Anatolian Railroad has drawn this business in great part to itself, and its exports, which in 1893 amounted to thirty-two million francs, have since then decreased proportionately with the decrease in the number of its inhabitants, which furthermore is fluctuating greatly, being now reported as 40,000, again as 25,000, and again as only 20,000. The number of the Greeks up to twenty years ago, when they numbered 6,000, was constantly increasing, for in the first half of the 19th century they were estimated at not more than 1,000.

The whole Greek population of these sixteen towns is about 240,000, of which number about half are found in Smyrna, so that the other fifteen comprise a number

about equal with that in Smyrna. But the number of Greek inhabitants of the coast has not yet been fully enumerated. For if we add the number of those who are settled in the districts of the various provinces that border on the coast, we arrive at almost twice this number, *i.e.,* 450,000. There must then be living in these coast regions, scattered outside the cities in the country, more than 200,000 Greeks. These make their living by fishing, and grape and fruit raising, and extend in almost unbroken stretches between the towns along the whole coast, so that the whole Greek population of the coast consists in about equal proportions of city and country dwellers, a ratio that we shall also find obtaining in the interior as well.

This fringe or wreath of Greek colonies which extends toward the south as well as toward the north forms not only a strong economical force, but also a no less strong spiritual force. This is usually underestimated, as is too, in general, that idealistic element which is co-existent in the Greeks with that confessedly very prominent materialistic element, and this even in the times of its deepest national humiliation it has never lost. This idealistic element is rooted in a very strong national feeling, which has been nourished by the recollection of a great intellectual past and which finds its finest and most effectual expression in the fostering of Greek schools. This desire for schooling is implanted in the Greek nature from the times of late antiquity, and though it often savors rather strongly of scholasticism, it has prevented the Greeks from losing their national consciousness, as have the Jews and, to a certain degree, Armenians. Even the church is held so sacred by the Greeks only because she has been the bearer of national ideals in the times of slavery and has, at the same time, been a powerful political organ of administration, forming the only means in Turkey of putting through the national demands for schools.

The relation of church and school is therefore, in the Greek Orient, quite different from that in Catholic or even Protestant Christian lands. The church regards itself not as the mistress of the school but rather as her servant and patron. This fact must be clearly understood in order rightly to estimate the relations now to be considered. If, for example, a Greek community wishes to establish a school on Turkish soil, the council of the community informs the bishop of the diocese of this desire and the latter communicates it to the superior bishop, who then acquaints the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople with the matter. The latter is the religious head of the Greeks in Turkey and must therefore represent their educational interests. It is his task then to obtain the Sultan's permission to establish the desired school, and in obtaining this, money plays a not unimportant rôle. The richer the community is, therefore, the more easily does it obtain the permission, and since the Greek communities of the coast of Asia Minor have always been, for the most part, very rich, they were able to proceed to establish their own schools at an early date. The oldest are those in Smyrna, Aivali and Chesme, and those that first came into existence were not common schools but higher institutions of learning, corresponding to the development of the times and the aristocratic character of the Greek merchants. The oldest and most famous of these schools, and the only one which still exists, is the so-called Evangelical School in Smyrna. It goes back to 1708, but the year 1733 is really to be regarded as the year of its foundation. Existing under English protection since 1747, and being therefore absolutely autonomous, it was, in 1810, recognized by the Sultan as a fully authorized gymnasium, and after being twice reorganized—in 1810 and 1828—the Greek Government, too, gave it full recognition. Although supported entirely by the funds of the community and benefactors' gifts, and demanding for

its upkeep more than 100,000 francs, it still maintains in Smyrna two great affiliated schools. Its significance for the intellectual life of Smyrna rests in its ancient museum and in its rich library (30,000 volumes and 200 manuscripts), the only one on Asia Minor soil.*

In Smyrna too is still published the first Greek newspaper to appear on Turkish soil, *Amalthea,* which has existed now for almost seventy-five years. Alongside of this old school for advanced studies there were in Smyrna in 1894 other Greek schools, and in particular seventeen grammar schools, two trade schools (the oldest having existed since 1857), four private girls' schools and one large girls' college with three associated schools and more than 2,000 pupils in all. The largest Greek school community in Asia Minor, next to that of Smyrna, is that of Aivali, the second largest Greek colony of the west coast. It supports more than twenty grammar schools, two intermediate schools, a gymnasium and a girls' boarding school, which in 1892 were attended by more than 1,100 pupils. Then comes Chesme, known for its old advanced-school, which at that time possessed only eleven schools but showed the largest number of pupils (675). Nearly equal to this were Phocæa with nine schools and 560 pupils, Adramit with nineteen schools and about 600 pupils, Artaki with twenty-two schools and 700 pupils, Panderma with fifteen schools and 536 pupils, Gemlik (Kios) with nine schools and 530 pupils, Mudania with eight schools and 330 pupils, Gebize with thirteen schools and 1,000 pupils. Although the wide dissemination, as well as the prosperity and the intellectual development of the Greeks on the north part of the west coast is reflected in the large number of Greek schools, that of the southern part is in this particular far more backward. Apart from Scalanova with five Greek schools and 440

* Details about the history of this school are to be found in K. Krumbacher, *Populäre Aufsätze* (Leipzig, 1909), S. 251 ff.

pupils, Adalia on the south coast is alone worthy of mention with its ten schools and 600 pupils. Taken all together these sixteen cities have more than two hundred schools with more than 17,000 pupils,* a number, the significance of which can only rightly be appreciated when compared with the corresponding Turkish figures, which show, to be sure, that the number of schools is a hundred larger but that the number of pupils is 6,000 less than that of the Greeks. There are therefore nearly three times as many pupils per school in the Greek schools as in the Turkish. The Greek settlements on the north and south coasts are to be distinguished from those on the west coast not only through their smaller number, but also through the fact that only scanty and weak settlements in the inland correspond to them. In the west, on the contrary, as we have already seen, Greek colonization has, since late antiquity, extended up into the interior, and the consequences of this have been felt even up to the present time, or, at any rate, have been made anew noticeable, owing to the fact that the Greeks of the west coast have for several decades been pressing farther and more vigorously into the interior, and have settled there more definitely. This region that has at present been occupied by them only in its chief centers is, in general, bounded by a line which may be drawn from Ismid in the north, past Eskishehr, Afiun-Karahissar, and Isbarta to Adalia. All that lies between this line and the west coast may be regarded as within the Greek sphere. The second phase of these Hellenizing efforts of today begins with this forward push into the interior of this region. Just how far and in what way has this succeeded?

If we start on the basis of the actual facts of the case, we find that in thirty towns of the western interior of Asia Minor of more than 5,000 inhabitants, the Greeks have a share in the population of from 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. Arranged according to the ratio of this

* These statistics about the schools are derived from Cuinet, as above cited.

share in the population, these cities fall into different groups, as follows:

First, a Greek majority is found in only two cities, Michalitsh (about 7,000 Greeks out of a total of 8,000) and Koplu (about 5,000 out of 8,000). Second, in nine cities the Greeks form between one-half and one-third of the population: Baindir (4,500 out of 10,000), Tireh (6,000 out of 14,000), Edemish (3,000 out of 7,000), Menemen (about 3,000 out of 10,000), Bergama (5,500 out of 14,500), Isbarta (7,000 out of 20,000), Sokia (4,000 out of 12,000), Soma (2,000 out of 6,000), Manissa (11,000 out of 35,000). Third, in four cities the Greeks form about a fourth: Inegeul (about 2,000 out of 8,000), Kassaba (6,000 out of 23,000), Kermasti (1,200 out of 4,800), Aïdin (8,500 out of 35,000). Fourth, in five cities they form from a fifth to a sixth part: Kutaiah (4,000 out of 22,000), Dimetoka (1,300 out of 7,000), Alashehr (4,500 out of 22,000), Milas (2,000 out of 12,000), Bigha (1,600 out of 10,000). Fifth, in five cities the Greeks form from a seventh to a ninth of the total population: Kirkagatch (2,000 out of 18,000), Ushak (1,500 out of 12,500), Balukiser (1,300 out of 10,000), Sabandsha (1,000 out of 7,500), Kyrkagatch (about 200 out of 18,000). Sixth, less than a tenth in seven cities: Denizli (1,600 out of 17,000), Soyut (1,500 out of 18,000), Nazilli (1,700 out of 21,000), Brussa (6,000 out of 80,000), Adabazar (1,600 out of 24,000), Eskishehr (1,150 out of 19,000), Nugla (1,100 out of 15,000).

From this combination of facts several interesting conclusions may be drawn as to the distribution of the Greek population in the interior itself, and as to the relation between the Hellenization of the interior as compared with that of the coast regions.

If we group the cities named above according to their distribution in the various provinces and districts, we find that only fifteen of these fall within the province

of Aïdin, the largest province of the west coast of Asia Minor, and the one that is held to most stubbornly by the Turks. Of these fifteen, again, only thirteen come in the district of Smyrna, Sarukan and Aïdin, which form the most populous part of this province. These are Menemen, Manissa, Kassaba, Alashehr; Kirkagatch, Soma, Bergama; Baindir, Tireh and Odemish; Sokia; Aïdin and Nazilli. Now these thirteen towns, with the exception of Bergama, all lie, as the above grouping indicates, on the four railroad lines which go out in four directions from Smyrna, that is in those regions of the province which belong economically to Smyrna. At any rate, the significance for the Greek settlements of the economic factor is clearly evidenced in these towns, for they are, almost without exception, "capitals," so to speak, of smaller districts, and are therefore important distributing and collecting centers for the local trade to and from Smyrna. With the increase of this trade the number of the Greeks in this group of interior cities is bound to increase quickly or has already done so.

Most of the other towns named above are in the province of Hodavendikiar, which lies due north of that of Aïdin; and once more is it true that they are in the most densely inhabited parts of the province, Brussa, Ertogrul and Kutaiah. Of the nine cities that belong here, five, again, are found on the line of the Anatolian Railroad, namely, Biledjik, Soyut, Eskishehr, Kutaiah and Ushak; one, Brussa, on a branch road and three on no railroad at all, though within reach of the Michalitch-Kirmasti-Inegeul Railroad. Here, too, therefore, the cities which are more or less decidedly Greek in their population lie along the main railroad lines, though they are not quite so strongly Greek as those in the province of Aïdin; for we are here in the very heart of Turkey, and its greatest city Brussa, which more than all the other cities of this region has preserved its Turkish character more purely. It is always

to be borne in mind that the Anatolian Railroad goes out from Constantinople and that this, with its strong Greek population, is as important a gate of entrance to the northwest of Asia Minor as Smyrna is for the west.

Although up to this time it is impossible to speak of a Hellenizing of the great interior cities of western Asia Minor, since these are (thus being quite different from the coast cities) very far from succumbing, either numerically or culturally, to the Greek invasion—the number of Greeks is the largest in Manissa—yet, if one looks into the matter narrowly, he gains the impression that in the interior the Hellenizing influence comes from the smaller towns. This supposition, to be sure, is opposed to the view, still broadly accepted, that the Greek element is purely a city element, and that the country-folk consist only of Turks. This view, which, as we have seen, does not hold even in the coast regions, is, however, absolutely false and is only to be explained as arising from the impressions of superficial travelers who have rarely penetrated into the remoter regions with a predominantly rural population. Anyone who has, for example, visited the larger Greek islands of the Asiatic coast, like Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Rhodes, knows that these dense populations live in great measure from grape and fruit-raising or from silk culture, and only in a very small degree from trade. Farming plays no very large part, simply because of the lack of arable land. Since now, as we have said, these very islands for something like fifty years have become very densely populated or even in part overpopulated (as, for instance, Samos), there have been periodical emigrations of the island peasants, in considerable numbers, over to the mainland, where they have, in particular, settled in the fruitful valleys of the Mæander and the Hermos in the western parts of Asia Minor and in that of the Sangarios, farther north. In part, it is the descendants of the former Greek land-

owners who have been reduced to socagers or serfs, who, on getting possession of some little capital, have now, in their turn, driven back the Turks by buying them out or by working the soil more scientifically, a process in which they were helped by the immigrant islanders. If a sufficient number of them is thus found settled together, they try to obtain the Sultan's firman permitting them to settle in a town. Thus the English traveler Hamilton states that the Greeks in a little town of Lydia (Singerli), in which they had settled ten years before, had, in his time (1837), increased to 40-50 families and were busied with building a new market. In this way numerous new and dense settlements came into existence in the midst of the more scattered Turkish populations, and the higher fecundity of the Greek settlers, combined with their industry, their intellectual keenness, their frugality and their community-feeling, helped always by the retrogression of the Turkish population itself, have contributed to extend the Hellenizing process more and more to the country districts.*

In particular have they taken possession of the regions adapted to silk culture, like that of the lower Sangarios Valley, and also of such regions as are adapted to raising grapes. More recently, Greek industrial enterprises, too, especially silk-spinning mills, cognac factories and steam oil mills, have sprung into existence, meeting with no rivalry on the part of the Turks. With this Greek peasant of Asia Minor, who is on a higher moral plane, and who is therefore more congenial to us Germans than the Greek trader or innkeeper in the coast-towns, our German spirit of enterprise which is seeking to get the economic control over Asia Minor, will have to come to terms, and it would be just as

* As to the decrease of the Turkish population of Asia Minor and its causes, see L. Heermann, *Rückerinnerungen aus dem Orient* (Aschaffenburg, 1886), S. 128 Anm.; R. Fitzner, *Anatolien*, S. 20 f.; on the increase of the Greeks: K. Humann, *Verhandlgn. d. Gesellsch. f. Erdkde. zu Berlin*, 7 (1880), S. 249-252; R. Fischer, *Mittelmeerbilder*, N. F. (Leipzig, 1907), S. 401 f.

perverse as it would be foolish to depend on the Turk to the exclusion of the Greek, who has the controlling hand in trade and traffic, as well as in the cultivation of the soil.*

Even to a traveler of a hundred years ago the great difference between the Greeks of the cities and the peasants was especially noteworthy. The former were subservient and cringing like the Armenians, while the latter were energetic and intelligent, irreconcilable in their hatreds and by no means lacking in courage. And it is to these praiseworthy qualities, and not to their much-bruited craftiness, that they owe their progress in the interior of Asia Minor.†

As to the numbers of the Greek inhabitants of the interior of Asia Minor, only an indirect estimate can be made. The whole number of all the Greeks in the interior of the two provinces of Brussa and Aïdin, exclusive of the inhabitants of the coast regions, even twenty years ago, amounted to 200,000, *i.e.,* less than half as many as in the coast regions. About 100,000 of these lived in places with a population of more than 5,000, so that about 100,000 were scattered among the villages and towns. The distribution of this interior population is very uneven. The densest Greek populations have gathered in the Prefecture of Aïdin and here chiefly in the sub-prefecture of Smyrna, with its five districts (Sarukan, with four districts, and Aïdin, with only one). These three sub-prefectures, therefore, in their ten districts, comprised, twenty years ago, a fifth part of the entire population. In the province of Brussa

* Hugo Grothe, too, in *Die Asiatische Türkei und die deutschen Interessen* (*Der neue Orient,* S. 25, 9 Heft), pleads for a closer feeling between the Germans and the Asia Minor Greeks. So, too, Blankenburg, Heft 1 of the *Schriftensammlung des Deutschen Vorderasienkomitees, Die Zukunftsarbeit der deutschen Schule in der Türkei.*

† It is to be remembered that the higher professional places in the towns of Asia Minor are filled almost exclusively by Greeks. Teachers, doctors and engineers are for the most part Greeks and therefore among the higher engineering and administrative officials of the Anatolian and the Bagdad railways there are many Greeks.

the number of districts with a considerable Greek population was only five, in the sub-prefecture of Ertogrul, three; in those of Brussa and Kutaiah, one each. There were the largest numbers in the district of Eskishehr, the ancient Dorylæum, where they comprised two-fifths of the population, and in Michalitch, where they formed one-third of the total. In fifteen of the twenty-five districts of the interior of the two prefectures fifteen, therefore, already contained a considerable part of the population. To speak in greater detail, these districts may be classified as follows, with relation to the proportions of their Greek inhabitants: The Greek population is densest in the districts of Magnesia (Sanjak Sarukan), and Eskishehr (Sanjak Kutaiah), where they constitute a fifth of the population; less dense in the district of Sokia (Sanjak Aïdin), with about a third; next comes the district Michalitch (Sanjak Brussa), with from a fourth to a third; and then those of Bergama, Menemen, Baindir, Tireh and Odemish (Sanjak Smyrna), where they form about a fourth; next those of Alashehr (Sanjak Sarukan) and Yenishehr (Sanjak Ertogrul) with about a fifth; and finally those of Inegeul, Biledjik (Sanjak Ertogrul) and Soma (Sanjak Sarukan), with a sixth to a seventh of the entire population.

What made the estimating of the numbers of these Greeks in the interior so very difficult was the fact that up to a few years ago they spoke Turkish and therefore did not share in the national and racial consciousness of their kinsmen on the coast, and also the fact that they do not essentially differ in physical type from the Ottomans, who have become assimilated to the race type of the conquered people and have lost their special Turkish characteristics. This state of affairs began to change when the Greeks, with the help of their church, succeeded in introducing the Greek language in their schools alongside of the Turkish. Since then, that is,

since the seventies of the last century, the national propaganda has made great progress among them, and the number of schools has greatly increased.

In the thirty cities of the interior of this region (prefectures of Aïdin and Brussa) they possessed in the last decade of the 19th century more than 400 schools with about 25,000 pupils, while the Mohammedans in their thousand schools had only 20,000 pupils. The number of pupils in each Greek school therefore averaged 60, while those in the Turkish schools averaged only 20, a disproportion which is to be explained by the fact that the Mohammedan schools are almost exclusively poorly attended mosque-schools, while the Greek schools are community-schools that are very well attended. The religious character of the Turkish educational system is just as prejudicial to the Turks as the nationalistic tendency of the Greek schools is beneficial to the Greeks. There are towns in which, in spite of the Greeks being in a minority, more Greek children attend the schools than Turkish children. So Sokia, with 180 Turkish and 218 Greek children in school; the same is true of Bigha (125: 140) Alashehr (250: 525), Nazilli (162: 220), Menemen (220: 325), Biledjik (1,100: 1,113). In other towns, such, for example, as Bergama, Magnesia, Milas, Soyut, the number of the Greek pupils almost equals that of the Turkish, and in most of them the number is more than half as large as that of the Turkish pupils, even in that stronghold of Mohammedanism, Brussa, where there are something like 2,500 Greeks, as compared with 5,000 Turkish pupils, although the Greeks comprise here only ten per cent of the population. These are figures which more than anything else are indicative of the activity and capacity for education of the Greek part of the population. The intellectual superiority of the Greeks is set forth in an even stronger light when one compares the sum total of the Greek schools and of their pupils in both prefectures with that

of the Turkish. For we find that even in 1894 there were 540 Greek schools, with about 30,000 pupils, as compared with 1,900 Turkish schools, with about 42,000 pupils. The slight numerical superiority of the Turkish scholars is, to say the least, entirely disproportionate to the large majority of Turks in the population.

According to recent statistics, which are, to be sure, taken from Greek sources * and are, therefore, perhaps a little too optimistic in their tone, the number of Greek schools has since then risen to more than 700 and that of the pupils to more than 100,000 (69,274 boys and 48,468 girls), which leads one to conclude that the Greek population numbers a million, a number which, compared with the 650,000 of twenty-five years ago, does not seem to be too high an estimate, particularly if we take into account the great increase of the Greeks through a higher birthrate and through immigration. Thus, the sum total of the Greeks in both prefectures, which have together a population of about three millions, would be about a third of this number and would, at any rate, not fall far below this.

With this rapidly increasing Greek population of the west coast and interior, the prefectures of Brussa and Aïdin, and that in the mountains of Pontus (prefecture of Trebizond) and Central Cappadocia (prefecture of Angora), which number together a million and a third more, we have not exhausted the list of Greeks of Asia Minor. There are, as a matter of fact, large numbers scattered through the interior and along the south coast, chiefly in the prefecture of Sivas and Konia, where their number in 1890 approximated 75,000. Next comes the prefecture of Adana, with about 50,000, and, least strongly Greek, the prefectures Angora (about 30,000) and Kastamuni (about 25,000). It has, however, been observed that the number of Greeks in the middle and eastern provinces is always decreasing, which is doubtless

* The "Association d'Orient" in Athens.

due to the fact that they wander away into the livelier and more fruitful regions to the westward.* These are in this way becoming more and more solid nuclei for the process of crystallization for Hellenism in Asia Minor, which is thus once more, as it did in late antiquity, shifting its center of gravity toward western Asia Minor, as though it felt that here is ever that original free-flowing source to which it now for the fourth time owes its strengthening and rejuvenation: the first being when in the last centuries before the Christian Era the native Lydians and Phrygians were assimilated; the second, when in early Byzantine times it turned back the Romanizing process which had been going on since the beginning of this era; the next, when in the 7th to the 10th centuries it averted the threatening Arabic peril, and finally when, though apparently defeated by the Turkish conqueror, it has after 500 years of relaxation again regained its vigor and strength in order to fulfill its old historical mission, which consists not in forcing its way on with the wild alarum of weapons, but through the peaceful weapons put in its power by nature, *i.e.*, by material and spiritual civilizing agencies, that do their work quietly. This mission Mohammedanism must meet through appropriate measures in administration and education, if it desires to secure its political control even in the western part of Asia Minor, now and in the future.

* See, for example, E. Naumann, *Vom Goldnen Horn zu den Quellen des Euphrat* (1893), S. 208.

III. HELLENIC PONTUS, A RESUME OF ITS HISTORY

By Demosthenes H. Oeconomides

[Among the most interesting of the irredenta regions of Asia Minor, from many points of view, is Pontus, on the southeast coast of the Black Sea. So strong is the anti-Turkish feeling in this intensely Hellenic land that a strong movement has recently arisen among her expatriated sons to establish an independent Republic of Pontus. Its mountainous inland districts have been so isolated from the rest of the Greek world and its coast regions have so strongly preserved their individuality that language, blood and national feeling have been maintained in quite a different way from elsewhere in the Greek world. It has seemed fitting that Pontus therefore should receive special consideration in this number of the American-Hellenic Society's publications, and we are glad to present this scholarly treatise by Demosthenes E. Oeconomides, a philologian of no mean repute, who is a native of this region and has written amongst other things an authoritative treatise on the Pontic dialect entitled: *Lautlehre des Pontischen*, Leipzig, 1908.]

Pontus is bounded on the north by the southeast shore of the Euxine or Black Sea, on the east by the Phasis River and Iberia, on the south by the Argaeus and Antitaurus mountains, and on the west by the Halys River. The whole country has at several epochs been variously divided and has gone under different names, thus, for example, in the time of the Parthians, the region that extended from the Phasis to the Bosporus was called the Kingdom of Pontus; in the time of the Romans, preserving the same boundaries, it was called the Polemoniac Pontus. The best known cities of Pontus are Rizus, Trapezus, Kerasus, Kotyora, Oenoe, Amisos, Sinope, Inepolis and Heraclea, all of which are coast cities, while in the interior are Amasea, Paphra, Neocæsarea, Nicopolis, Argyropolis, etc. Ecclesiastically it is divided into six, or if Cæsarea be included, into seven Metropolitan districts: Trapezus, Rhodopolis, Chaldia, Neocæsarea, Amasea, Cæsarea

and Colonia. Of the many monasteries in Pontus, the most important is that of Mela (now called Soumela) founded by the Athenian monks, Barnabas and Sophronios, in 376 A.D. in the time of Theodosius the Great.

Since Trapezus, even in ancient times, was the most important of the Pontic cities and in the Middle Ages was, in fact, the capital of the Trapezuntian Empire of the Comnenes, we must give a brief sketch of its history.

Trapezus, which was founded by a colony of Sinopians 756 B.C. on a site peculiarly adapted to the cultivation and development of commerce, is a most ancient and illustrious city. "The city Trapezus," as Eugenicus says, "most ancient and best of all the cities in the East," and "most venerable of all" according to the expression of Besarion (MS. Ven. p. 133). We learn from Xenophon's "Anabasis" (Book V. 5, 10) that Trapezus paid tribute to its metropolis Sinope. Since, according to this historian, neither the Colchians nor Chaldians recognized the Persian sovereignty, we may infer from this that the Trapezuntians never submitted to the Persians. Xenophon also furnishes us historical and geographical information about Trapezus and the countries and peoples round about it, for he was hospitably entertained there for thirty days on the return of the 10,000. The fine coins of gold and silver struck both before and after the time of Alexander the Great testify that it was a free and prosperous city. It certainly maintained its independence and freedom under Alexander the Great, for it is well known that he drove out the Persian satraps and rulers wherever these existed in Pontus and left all the districts and cities autonomous, among which, under Persian rule, Amisos (Samsun) had been deprived of its democratic government. During the time of the Diadochi, (Alexander's successors), there are recorded as ruling in Cappadocia, Paphlagonia and a part of Pontus as far as Trapezus, Eumenes (322-315 B.C.), Perdiccas, Mithridates and in particular Seleucus I, called Nicator (312-208 B.C.), until the Mithridates again gained control up to 63 B.C., when upon the final dissolution of their empire, Pontus, under the Romans, entered upon a new period of life.

From that time there was sent there by them annually a special governor until in 46 B.C. Polemon from Tralles in Phrygia was established as king of Pontus from Bosporus to Colchis. Many of the coast cities which had been the allies of the Romans dur-

ing the wars waged by them from 89-63 B.C. against Mithridates VII, called Eupator, and among them Trapezus, were, however, still left autonomous. The Polemoniac Empire lasted till 63 A.D., when Nero made Pontus a Roman province.

After a short period of decline Trapezus rose again in the time of Julian in 333. It had accepted Christianity from the first apostle, Andrew, who came there from Samsun in 34 A.D. and transmitted it to the surrounding peoples. Its first bishop was Eugeneos, known as the patron and protector of the city, who endured martyrdom in 216 under the reign of Diocletian (a Byzantine church, still existing, preserves his name). He was succeeded by a long line of bishops who honored the Church. In fact, some of them participated in Ecumenical Synods.

In the time of the great Constantine, Trapezus continued to be a provincial city under a pro-consul, as also in the time of Justinian (6th century). As such it belonged, along with Cerasus, to Polemoniac Pontus, the capital of which was then Neocæsarea. From then up to the time of Leo the Isaurian, unfortunately, we know nothing about it, but in the time of the Isaurians it appears as a starting point for political and warlike operations undertaken against the Persians, the Turcomans and the Arabs, having become the metropolis of the large and important "thema" (district) of Chaldia, while it was, at the same time, and even before the time of the Isaurians, a home of learning, as the Siracene Ananias, a trustworthy Armenian writer of the 7th century, testifies.

With regard to the thema of Chaldia (the eighth in Asia Minor), it is to be noted that this originally extended as far as Colonia, Kamak and Keltzene, but in the time of Leo the Wise the two last districts were added to the thema of New-Mesopotamia. We know that the archons and dukes of Chaldia in the 11th century, seeking little by little to free themselves from Byzantine rule, began to call themselves dukes of Trapezus and their country Trapezousia. One in particular, Theodore Gabras, from a noble family in Trapezus, and most skillful in war, saved Trapezus and the surrounding country from two invasions, one by the Seljuk-Turks in 1049 and the other under David, the king of Georgia. He, therefore, regarded the country as his own private possession and held it up to his death, as a prince, independent of Byzantium. Of these Gabrades dukes of Trapezus, Theodore's son Gregory and his grandson Constantine Gabras are

known to us. In the time of the former Trapezus was again made dependent on Byzantium, but in the time of the latter, since the dukes had offered important services to the Byzantine Empire, it gained its independence again and held it till Manuel I (Comnenos) 1143-1180, succeeded in attaching it to his realm by taking advantage of a faction that had risen there against the Gabras family, and from that time on Trapezus continued to be dependent on Byzantium until its capture by the Latins, because at that time the Trapezuntian Empire of the Comneni was established.

From the foundation of this new empire until its fall through the capture of Trapezus by the Turks, that is from 1204-1461, the following rulers occupied the throne:

(1) Alexios I, the great Comnenos, the son of Manuel, Sebastocrator and the founder of the Trapezuntian Empire 1204–1222
(2) Andronikus I. Ghidus, son-in-law of the preceding 1222–1235
(3) John I. Axouchus 1235–1238
(4) Manuel I., the great Comnenos, who built the beautiful church of St. Sophia in Trapezus (still existent) 1238–1263
(5) Andronikus II., oldest son of the preceding ... 1263–1266
(6) George I., brother of the preceding 1266–1280
(7) John II., brother of George I. 1280–1297
(8) Theodora 1285
(9) Alexios II., the great Comnenos..... 1297–1330
(10) Andronikus III., oldest son of Alexios II. 1330–1332
(11) Manuel II. 1332
(12) Basil 1332–1340
(13) Irene, Palæologina 1340–1341
(14) Anna, Comnenos 1341–1342
(15) John III., Comnenos 1342–1344
(16) Michael I. 1344–1349
(17) Alexios III., the great Comnenos 1349–1390
(18) Manuel III. 1390–1417
(19) Alexios IV. 1417–1446
(20) John IV., Kalogiannes 1446–1458
(21) David Comnenos, brother of John IV. and last emperor in the Trapezuntian Empire of the Comneni 1458–1461

The fall of Trapezus which oeeurred a few years after the eapture of Constantinople dealt the final deadly blow to Hellenism as a whole. At this time, in the very nature of things, it was impossible for the Trapezuntian Empire to escape its fate, being compelled, as it was, to fight against innumerable and well organized enemies, while previously, during the 257-year period of its life, it had repulsed many barbarian invasions and had shown great political and military efficiency. But even in her fall she contributed not a little to the dissemination of the seeds of civilization and literature in the West through her illustrious sons, sueh as Bessarion, George the Trapezuntian and other learned men. By a strange coincidenee the two last emperors of Hellenism, Constantine Palæologus of Byzantium and David of Trapezus, fell as soldiers, the first fighting for his fatherland like a hero on the fortifications of his capital, the second for his religion in Constantinople itself, preferring with nobility of soul and true Christian fortitude to see his children fall beneath the ax of the executioner and then to fall himself exclaiming, "Just art Thou, O Lord, and righteous are Thy judgments" rather than to forswear his faith as proposed by the conqueror Mohammed.

As everywhere, so, too, in Pontus, the Greek, though subjected to harsh slavery, did not lose courage and hope, but by uniting the strength left him and taking courage anew, he endeavored, just in so far as he could, to render his living with his conquerors as endurable as possible, an attempt in which he suceeeded by enlisting their sympathy and esteem whenever they made use of him for high positions, or in the arts and trades in whieh they needed his help. Those that had speeial skill in iron-working in Chaldia and others in other plaees were even granted special privileges.


The services rendered to the Ottoman Empire by the Hypsilanti, Mourouzae and Carotsades of Pontus, were indeed invaluable, services which brought honor and profit to their own fatherland and the Greek raee in general. Thus, Hellenism in Pontus partly by its steadily honorable and sincere eharaeter, and partly by its intellectual superiority generally, has made its impress on the conquerors and has succeeded in distinguishing itself in edueation, in trade, in the arts and scienees as the only element that makes for civilization. Unceasingly cultivating Greek letters under the shield of the Greek church, now in the monasteries or under the roof of the church, now in speeial

schools, it keeps alive the national feeling and sentiment, which it has preserved and is preserving in a high degree, with the hope of a more auspicious future and of some day recovering its full freedom.

Never has it forgotten its glorious past. Glorying in this, with beating heart it sings, as it has always sung, of the Greek name and of Greek courage. A clear testimony of this is the preservation of the name "Hellene" and the words "Hellenic spear" in the demotic songs of the period after the fall of Constantinople. Having succeeded in preserving even in the times of slavery its language and nationality and the faith of its fathers, it takes pride in this and cherishes unshaken the conviction that at the proper time the historical rights that it possesses will not be overlooked.

The Greek Dialect as Spoken in Pontus

Of the many dialects of Modern Greek, that spoken in Pontus has taken a prominent place in the investigation into Modern Greek in general ever since linguistic scientists have undertaken to study it. And this is certainly justified, for this study contributes substantially to the elucidation, explanation and solution of many linguistic phenomena in the other dialects and in the Κοινὴ διάλεκτος in general, for many forms and many words which were formerly inexplicable from the point of view of phonetics or semantics have been most happily explained by the comparison of corresponding forms or words in the Pontic dialect. This, too, is derived from the Koine, but owing to an admixture of certain Ionic elements, and to the fact that in taking shape in the Middle Ages it admitted new Byzantine words, it has so developed and grown that its use on the one hand of sounds unknown to the common Greek, and, on the other, the astounding variety of phonetic changes and modifications (which appear in different forms) which it presents, its manifold transformations on the basis of analogy, its not infrequent syntactic peculiarities (which are due especially to the influence of the Turkish language), and the large number of nouns, verbs and adverbs formed from Turkish words or Turkish roots through the use of Greek terminations, render it incomprehensible to many. This evolution and the great difference between the Pontic language and the common Greek are perfectly natural, both on account of the



ASIA MINOR
SCALE OF MILES
0 25 50 75 100 125 150
Railroads
Railroads Proposed
Canals
Capitals
Boundaries of Countries
Size of type indicates relative importance of places
HEIGHT OF LAND
Sea level to 328 ft.
328 to 984 ft.
984 to 1640 ft.
1640 to 3281 ft.
3281 to 4921 ft.
4921 ft. and over
BLACK SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
CYPRUS
SYRIAN DESERT
ARABIA
CONSTANTINOPLE
SMYRNA
ALEPPO
DAMASCUS
BEIRUT
JERUSALEM
ALEXANDRIA
BAGDAD
TIFLIS
TABRIZ
Hammond's 8 x 11 Map of Asia Minor
Copyright, 1916, by C. S. Hammond & Co., N. Y.

Ionic elements which have been preserved from of old, and of the Turkish elements which the language has received through the conquest of Pontus by the Turks, and thirdly from its geographical position which separates its inhabitants from the great masses of the Greek people and thus limits the assimilating influence of modern Greek on the Pontic dialect.

This form of the language has great importance for the reason that in the variety and richness of its vocabulary it has preserved a rich and extremely valuable store of forms and ancient words, some wholly unchanged in form and signification, and some modified, to be sure, but perfectly capable of being reduced to their original form by the philologist.*

* For complete details and examples illustrating these relations, see D. E. Oeconomides' above cited work, pp. vii and viii.

AMERICAN-HELLENIC NEWS

The first anniversary of the entrance of Greece into the great World War was officially celebrated in New York City by a banquet tendered by His Excellency, George Roussos, the Minister of Greece at Washington, to about forty prominent and representative citizens of New York at Delmonico's, and these guests were invited to participate later in an imposing celebration in the Century Theater.

Many thousands of Greeks and Americans formed most enthusiastic and appreciative listeners to speeches made by Mr. Roussos (whose address is given below in full), Francis M. Hugo, Secretary of State of New York, who came in behalf of His Excellency Governor Whitman; Richard Enright, Commissioner of Police of New York City, who represented the Mayor of the city; Demetrios Verenikis, Consul General of Greece and recently appointed Minister of Greece to Japan; William Fellowes Morgan, President of the Merchants' Association, and Constantine Voicly, President of the Pan-Hellenic Union in America. The invocation was pronounced by the Rev. Demetrios Callimachos of the Greek Church.

Among those guests at the banquet, who were also present at the theater, were the Honorable Cunliffe-Owen, who presided and felicitously introduced the various speakers; the Countess Cunliffe-Owen; Baron de Sadelaer, formerly Minister of State of Belgium; General Daniel Appleton, U. S. A.; Colonel DeWitt Clinton Falls, commanding the Seventh Regiment; General W. A. White, C. B., of the British War Mission; Commodore Lionel Wells, of the Royal British Navy; General William A. Mann, U. S. A., commanding Gov-

ernors Island; Colonel George W. Burleigh, of the Governor's Staff; Captain L. Rebel, of the French Navy; J. K. Ohl, editor-in-chief of the New York *Herald;* Pay Director Charles W. Littlefield, U. S. N.; David Penny, vice-president of the Irving National Bank; Robert Grier Cooke, president of the Fifth Avenue Association; Hon. Byron B. Newton, collector of the Port of New York; J. S. Alexander, president of the National Bank of Commerce; R. C. Veit, vice-president of the Standard Oil Company; Elbert H. Gary, Samuel W. Fairchild, A. E. Stevenson, H. W. Sackett, George T. Wilson, Colonel Benda of the Italian Army, and Commodore Morrell, U. S. N.

The members of the Executive Committee of the American-Hellenic Society participated in both parts of the great celebration, which had been so ably organized and effectively carried out by Mr. Cunliffe-Owen, a member of our Committee as well as one of the Board of Governors of our Society.

The sentiment so eloquently uttered by Commissioner Enright that Constantinople, which has always been an essentially Greek city, should, at the round table of the peace delegates, be returned to Greece, was greeted with cheers and the loudest applause.

Speech of George Roussos, the Minister of Greece

There are certain anniversaries, such as that of today, that fully deserve to be celebrated, for they contain such reassuring lessons that they are justly brought into prominence.

We cannot help admiring the heroism of little Belgium, which stood out so boldly against the outrageous demand of a militaristic power that had resolved to trample upon morality, and to violate justice.

We are compelled to extol that superhuman calmness with which peace-loving France accepted the challenge

which the German Colossus launched at her, bidding her forget her sworn faith and all the principles which she had taught and which gave her her beauty.

We must honor, too, Great Britain, which, simply because, in the person of Belgium, international right had been outraged, entered into the war so gallantly at its very start, and sent her children—an act unparalleled in history—by millions to offer their lives voluntarily for the defense of the right.

The Japanese, faithful to their alliance with Great Britain, followed.

It is an indisputable fact that these countries have saved the world, for the example that they have thus given humanity was so grand and glorious that it has carried other nations with it.

There have been moments of uncertainty and doubt, in the face of the colossal strength of Germany, and the ferocity of her attacks. In view of the destruction which seemed so certain, the instinct of self-preservation, for a considerable time, dominated the peoples not immediately touched by the war.

But the cruelty of Germany and of her accomplices has finally roused all the nobler and more generous nations. One after another they have become involved, for their revulsion of feeling at her atrocities is such that it has silenced every other sentiment.

Italy was the first to set the example by turning away from an alliance, the evil aims of which had been revealed to her, and she was soon followed by Rumania.

The Great Republic of the United States, after having for a long time hoped to induce Germany to respect international treaties, has resolutely entered into the great conflict.

Greece was the last European state to enter into the fight. I say, the last, although, in fact, she really takes her place next to England. For it is a well-known fact that in August, 1914, before the battle of the Marne had taken place, at the time when the Germans were at the gates of Paris, Greece, through her government, had offered her aid: perhaps if at this moment the Allies had understood aright the situation in the Orient,

if they had taken advantage of this offer, many disasters might have been averted.

This mistaken policy on the part of the Allies permitted Germany to utilize the instruments that she had been preparing for a long time in the Orient. Two years had been lost: disasters had been piled on disasters, before the necessary measures were taken and the Greek people had become free to act according to its aspirations. There, too, we see the same reassuring results. Noble sentiments obtained the upper hand over feelings of self-interest. These feelings were so strong that they silenced the doubts and fears even of timid souls. We must recall that in June, 1917, Rumania was defeated, the Russian collapse was complete and the German armies free to turn against Greece. On the other hand, the dissension caused by German propaganda in Greece seemed so deeply rooted, that even the friends of Greece did not believe that she was capable of taking any important part in the struggle.

Under the inspiring influence of the man who knows Greece best, because he embodies all the better qualities of the Greek nature, Eleutherios Venizelos, Greece refused to see the danger; she became united and filled with an eager enthusiasm, and in less than a year her troops have obtained appreciable results.

What this renaissance cost in effort the world cannot yet know. When the facts are known, when they can be fully studied, the Greek people will receive the credit that it deserves, because what it has achieved is due only to its patriotism and self-sacrifice.

From the close of 1916, when Greece, though still divided, began the struggle, up to today, when, as a united people, she is carrying on the fight, she has sacrificed thousands of her children for the triumph of the common ideal, and is arming herself more fully day by day, to pour out her blood to the last drop in order to secure the victory for freedom and right. She is paying forth freely without having demanded anything in return.

These facts prove our superiority to our enemies. A superiority which consists in the fact that we are

fighting for principles created and imposed by a civilization which began with the beginnings of history, principles that we wish to apply even to our enemies and which, moreover, are free from any selfish motives.

It is this absence of egotism in our aims which assures our perfect union and, through this, our victory.

If you wish to appreciate the palpable difference between us and the others, look at what is today taking place in a hostile country which I refrain from naming.

Four peoples, that had formed a coalition, took from their neighbors all that they could get. Now, in dividing the spoil, because of their distrust of each other, they are taking precautions against one another. One of the peoples against whom these precautions are being taken becomes sulky and shows signs of wanting to go over to the other side, because all Dobrudja (of which a large part is acknowledged to be Rumanian by the official representative of this people in the United States) is not given to her; because all Greek Macedonia is not declared to be hers; because Serbia is not today obliterated from the map.

When people are associated in order to bring about some good result, good faith is preserved in the partnership, but when, on the contrary, an evil act is accomplished and unlawful gains are obtained, disunion necessarily results, for "honor among thieves" is, after all, extremely rare.

Permit me a parenthesis, at this point.

I have read lately with regard to this quarrel that the hope exists that this country to which I have referred may become detached from her allies and join in with us.

I am convinced that this supposition cannot be realized. I insist, however, in protesting even against the reasoning based on such an hypothesis.

Whatever may be the practical result that we can expect from the perfidy of our enemies, our feelings revolt against profiting by such treachery. Our cause is so just that it admits of no compromise.

Should the country of which I am speaking show her repentance, by restoring all that it has taken from its neighbors, it can find a place at our side. But to admit in our circle of nations one who flees from the enemy camp against which we are fighting because his part in the booty is not that which his appetite has fixed, is impossible. In fact, such an act would constitute the negation of the principles for which we are fighting.

We have no need of weakening ourselves. We are materially and, above all, morally, far superior to our enemies. We must conserve the dignity of our cause if we wish the results to be commensurate with our efforts.

This is what stands forth preëminently in the celebration of such anniversaries. They show to us that our civilizations, the Greco-Latin as well as the Anglo-Saxon, have deep roots, and that they have created conditions which are essential to our existence.

That when these aspirations thus created in us are threatened, we are willing to submit to any sacrifices, no matter how great they may be, in order to defend them.

That our ideals have conquered the greater part of the world, creating strong bonds of solidarity between the peoples who are impregnated with them, permitting us to face with confidence the creation of the league of nations which will assure to the world an era of happiness in freedom through law.

Let us continue the fight; let us win, maintaining our principles without compromise. We shall thus be sure of winning the commendation of humanity.

But we must understand that in order to achieve this result, the complete liberation of the world, we must submit to great sacrifices of men and of money.

It is the need of our making these sacrifices which are being utilized by the German propaganda in order to obtain an immediate peace which is to the Germans an absolute necessity.

Through its secret agents, she tries to convince us that in order to obtain the victory against her, our sacrifices

will be enormous, while, if we satisfy some of her aspirations, she will be ready to respect the liberty of the world.

We must close our ears to these insidious suggestions. Everything that comes from the enemy camp must arouse our distrust, for Germany wishes indirectly to obtain what she has originally sought when she let loose upon the world the dogs of war.

Russia lies prostrate, and Germany wishes to reanimate her, but to raise her with a German soul. When she has at her disposal the enormous power of Russia, organized with Prussian efficiency, a more terrible war awaits the world. The sacrifices to which we shall then be obliged to submit will be much more terrific.

If we wish to put our programme into operation, we must set ourselves to change the German mind, showing the ruins that its inhumane conceptions have accumulated, and the fall of German power that must result from it. We have to do with fanatics of a peculiar kind, whom only reality can bring to their senses. The Germans are fighting in order to impose their civilization on the world by establishing a domination like that of the Mussulmans, who have slaughtered the Christians in order to assure their happiness in the future life. If our victory is incomplete, if the liberty of the nations is not completely restored, we shall have simply an interlude between acts. The curtain will rise upon a more terrible tragedy.

Let us endeavor to see beyond the limits of the present. Let us rise to meet the emergency. The responsibility of our rulers is tremendous, but they are endowed with the necessary ability to rise to these heights.

Let them not be influenced by these crafty serpents which are subtly attempting to weaken our moral fiber, for the confidence of the leaders will maintain the strength of our peoples, which up to the present nothing has been able to affect, and which constitutes our best means to win.

Following the example of the countries that for four years have been shedding their precious blood to conquer the monster, and consenting to undergo the same sacri-

fices, we can be absolutely sure that our victory will be complete.

In the name of the Government which I have the honor to represent, I can assure you that Greece's determination to see the struggle through to the bitter end, is unshakable.

The Panama Canal

Diplomatic Documents

1913 - 1917

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Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance

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20	Mr. Theotoky	Berlin, July 22/Aug. 4	Telegram to King Constantine. An account of a conversation with Von Jagow, who confirms the Alliance with Turkey and the coöperation of Bulgaria and Roumania. He advises Greece to side with the Balkan States against Serbia and Russia.	50
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64	Mr. Passarof	Athens, May 27/June 9	Response of the Bulgarian Government to the Greek protest concerning the occupation of Roupel, etc.	92
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70	Mr. Naoum	Sofia, Dec. 5/18	Bulgarian occupation in Hellenic Macedonia. Sufferings endured by the Greek populations. Pillaging, devastation, destruction of villages, murders.	96
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72	Mr. Naoum	Sofia, Jan. 1/14	Conversation with General Taneff, Governor of Macedonia occupied by the Bulgarians, concerning the deplorable condition of the Greek populations.	99
73	Mr. Zalocostas	Athens, Jan. 5/18	Mr. Zalocostas recommends to the Minister of Greece in Sofia to follow closely the question of the Greek populations in occupied Macedonia.	99
74	Mr. Naoum	Sofia, Feb. 15/28	Report of the Greek prefect of Drama on the abnormal situation reigning in his district. Numerous deaths by starvation. He asks the Greek Government to open a credit for the support of cheap bakeries in order to prevent	100

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		1917	further deaths *en masse*. Action to that effect taken by Mr. Zalocostas.	
75	——	Germany, Mar. 9/22	Report of a superior official on the events which took place in Cavalla from the date of the Bulgarian occupation until the first days of February. The situation in Drama.	100
76	Mr. Naoum	Sofia, Mar. 27/April 9	The situation is getting worse in all parts of Eastern Macedonia occupied by the Bulgarians. Numerous deaths from starvation in Cavalla, Drama and Serres. Same situation in the villages. Energetic steps by Mr. Naoum. Annex: Note sent by Mr. Naoum to the Bulgarian Government.	105
77	Mr. Naoum	Sofia, June 1/14	The population of Eastern Macedonia occupied by Bulgarians is transferred to the interior of Bulgaria. The situation of the families thus taken away is desperate. Deaths from starvation run into the thousands. Appeal by the mayor of Cavalla to the Greek Government in favor of financial aid in the form of a loan to the municipality.	108

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS

TREATY ARRANGEMENTS DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF GREECE

PROTOCOL OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, RELATIVE TO THE INDEPENDENCE OF GREECE [1]

London, February 3, 1830

[The following clauses of this protocol were referred to in the treaty of 7th May, 1832.[2]]

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

Present: The plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, France, and Russia.

Independence of Greece

§ 1. Greece shall form an independent state, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, administrative, and commercial, attached to complete independence.

Form of Government

§ 3. The Greek Government shall be monarchical, and hereditary according to the order of primogeniture. It shall be confided to a prince, who shall not be capable of being chosen from among those of the families reigning in the states that signed the treaty of the 6th July, 1827,[3] and who shall bear the title of Sovereign Prince of Greece. The choice of that prince shall form the object of subsequent communications and stipulations.

[1] Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 841; for French version, see British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. XVII, p. 191.

[2] Printed *infra*, p. 68.

[3] This treaty was signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, for the pacification of Greece as a dependency of Turkey. Hertslet, Vol. I, p. 769.

Guarantee of three Powers

§ 8. Each of the three courts shall retain the power, secured to it by Article VI of the treaty of the 6th July, 1827, of guaranteeing the whole of the foregoing arrangements and articles. The Acts of Guarantee, if there be any, shall be drawn up separately; the operation and effects of these different Acts shall become, in conformity with the above-mentioned article, the object of further stipulations on the part of the high Powers. No troops belonging to one of the contracting Powers shall be allowed to enter the territory of the new Greek state, without the consent of the two other courts who signed the treaty.

CONVENTION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND BAVARIA ON THE OTHER, RELATIVE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GREECE.[1]

Signed at London, May 7, 1832

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, exercising the power conveyed to them by the Greek nation, to make choice of a sovereign for Greece, raised to the rank of an independent state, and being desirous of giving to that country a fresh proof of their friendly disposition by the election of a prince descended from a royal house, the friendship and alliance of which can not fail to be of essential service to Greece, and which has already acquired claims to her esteem and gratitude, have resolved to offer the crown of the new Greek state to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of his Majesty the King of Bavaria.

His Majesty the King of Bavaria, on his part, acting the character of guardian of the said Prince Otho during his minority, participating in the views of the three courts, and duly appreciating the motives which have induced them to fix their choice upon a prince of his House, has determined to accept the crown of Greece for his second son, the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria.

[1] Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 893; for French version, see State Papers, Vol. XIX, p. 33.

In consequence of such acceptance, and for the purpose of agreeing upon the arrangements which it has rendered necessary, their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the King of the French, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Bavaria on the other, have named as their plenipotentiaries, viz.:—

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a member of His Britannic Majesty's Most Honorable Privy Council, a Member of Parliament, and his Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of the French, the Sieur Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, Prince-Duke de Talleyrand, Peer of France, his said Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty, etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Christopher, Prince of Lieven, General of Infantry in his Armies, his Aide-de-Camp General, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty, etc.; and the Sieur Adam, Count Matuszewic, Privy Councillor of His said Majesty, etc.;

And His Majesty the King of Bavaria, the Sieur Augustus, Baron de Cetto, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Britannic Majesty;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

Offer of hereditary sovereignty of Greece to Prince Otho of Bavaria

Art. I. The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, duly authorized for this purpose by the Greek nation, offer the hereditary sovereignty of Greece to the Prince Frederick Otho of Bavaria, second son of His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

Acceptance of hereditary sovereignty by King of Bavaria

Art. II. His Majesty the King of Bavaria, acting in the name of his said son, a minor, accepts, on his behalf, the heridetary sovereignty of Greece, on the conditions hereinafter settled.

Title of King of Greece

Art. III. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall bear the title of King of Greece.[1]

Greece to form a monarchical and independent state, under the guarantee of Great Britain, France, and Russia

Art. IV. Greece, under the sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and under the guarantee of the three courts, shall form a monarchical and independent state, according to the terms of the protocol signed between the said courts on the 3d February, 1830, and accepted both by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte.

Limits of Greece

Art. V. The limits of the Greek state shall be such as shall be definitively settled by the negotiations which the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia have recently opened with the Ottoman Porte, in execution of the protocol of 26th September, 1831.

King of Greece to be a contracting party to definitive treaty

Art. VI. The three courts having beforehand determined to convert the protocol of the 3d of February, 1830, into a definitive treaty, as soon as the negotiations relative to the limits of Greece shall have terminated,[2] and to communicate such treaty to all the states with which they have relations, it is hereby agreed that they shall fulfil this engagement, and that His Majesty the King of Greece shall become a contracting party to the treaty in question.

Three courts to obtain recognition of King Otho

Art. VII. The three courts shall, from the present moment, use their influence to procure the recognition of the Prince Otho of Bavaria as King of Greece, by all the sovereigns and states with whom they have relations.

[1] The title of the present king is "King of the Hellenes," the change of title being made by protocols of 3d August, and 13th October, 1863. Hertslet, Vol. II, pp. 1563–4.

[2] Arrangement of 21st July, 1832. Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 903.

Royal crown to be hereditary

Art. VIII.[1] The Royal Crown and dignity shall be hereditary in Greece; and shall pass to the direct and lawful descendants and heirs of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, in the order of primogeniture. In the event of the decease of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, without direct and lawful issue, the crown of Greece shall pass to his younger brother, and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, in the order of primogeniture. In the event of the decease of the last-mentioned prince also, without direct and lawful issue, the crown of Greece shall pass to his younger brother, and to his direct and lawful descendants and heirs, in the order of primogeniture.[2]

Crowns of Greece and Bavaria not to be united

In no case shall the crown of Greece and the crown of Bavaria be united upon the same head.

Majority of Prince Otho

Art. IX. The majority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, is fixed at the period when he shall have completed his 20th year, that is to say, on the first of June, 1835.

Regency during minority of King of Greece

Art. X. During the minority of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, King of Greece, his rights of sovereignty shall be exercised in their full extent, by a regency composed of three councillors, who shall be appointed by His Majesty the King of Bavaria.

Prince Otho to retain his appanages in Bavaria, and to be assisted by King of Bavaria

Art. XI. The Prince Otho of Bavaria shall retain the full possession of his appanages in Bavaria. His Majesty the King of Bavaria,

[1] King Otho renounced his right of succession to the throne of Bavaria on the 18th March, 1836.

[2] See explanatory and supplemental article, 30th April, 1833. Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 919.

moreover, engages to assist, as far as may be in his power, the Prince Otho in his position in Greece, until a revenue shall have been set apart for the crown in that state.

Guarantee of loan by three Powers [1]

Art. XII. In execution of the stipulations of the protocol of the 20th of February, 1830, His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias engages to guarantee, and their Majesties the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the King of the French, engage to recommend, the former to his Parliament, and the latter to his Chambers, to enable their Majesties to guarantee, on the following conditions, a loan to be contracted by the Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece.

Extent of loan

1. The principal of the loan to be contracted under the guarantee of the three Powers shall not exceed a total amount of 60,000,000 of francs.

Loan to be raised by instalments

2. The said loan shall be raised by instalments of 20,000,000 of francs each.

Guarantee of interest and sinking fund by three Powers

3. For the present, the first instalment only shall be raised, and the three courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of the said instalment.

4. The second and third instalments of the said loan may also be raised, according to the necessities of the Greek state, after previous agreement between the three courts and His Majesty the King of Greece.

5. In the event of the second and third instalments of the above-mentioned loan being raised in consequence of such an agreement, the three courts shall each become responsible for the payment of one-third of the annual amount of the interest and sinking fund of these two instalments, as well as of the first.

[1] See treaty of 29th March, 1864, *infra*, p. 79.

Payment of interest and sinking fund by Greece

6. The sovereign of Greece and the Greek state shall be bound to appropriate to the payment of the interest and sinking fund, of such instalments of the loan as may have been raised under the guarantee of the three courts, the first revenues of the state, in such manner that the actual receipts of the Greek Treasury shall be devoted, *first of all*, to the payment of the said interest and sinking fund, and shall not be employed for any other purpose until those payments on account of the instalments of the loan raised under the guarantee of the three courts shall have been completely secured for the current year.

Representatives of three courts to wateh over fulfilment of engagement by Greeee

The diplomatic representatives of the three courts in Greece shall be specially charged to watch over the fulfilment of the last-mentioned stipulation.

Peeuniary eompensation to Turkey to be paid out of proeeeds of loan

Art. XIII. In case a pecuniary compensation in favor of the Ottoman Porte should result from the negotiations which the three courts have already opened at Constantinople for the definitive settlement of the limits of Greece, it is understood that the amount of such compensation shall be defrayed out of the proceeds of the loan which forms the subject of the preceding article.

Bavarian troops to be raised for King of Greeee. Evacuation of Greeee by Allied troops

Art. XIV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall lend his assistance to the Prince Otho in raising in Bavaria a body of troops, not exceeding 3,500 men, to be employed in his service, as King of Greece, which corps shall be armed, equipped, and paid by the Greek state, to be sent thither as soon as possible, in order to relieve the troops of the Alliance hitherto stationed in Greece. The latter shall remain in that country entirely at the disposal of the Government of His Majesty the King of Greece, until the arrival of the body of troops above mentioned. Immediately upon their arrival the troops of the Alliance already referred to shall retire, and altogether evacuate the Greek territory.

Bavarian officers to organize a national military force

Art. XV. His Majesty the King of Bavaria shall also assist the Prince Otho in obtaining the services of a certain number of Bavarian officers, who shall organize a national military force in Greece.

Regency to proceed to Greece without delay

Art. XVI. As soon as possible after the signature of the present convention, the three councillors who are to be associated with His Royal Highness the Prince Otho by His Majesty the King of Bavaria, in order to compose the Regency of Greece, shall repair to Greece, shall enter upon the exercise of the functions of the said Regency, and shall prepare all the measures necessary for the reception of the sovereign, who, on his part, will repair to Greece with as little delay as possible.

Declaration of three courts to Greek nation

Art. XVII. The three courts shall announce to the Greek nation, by a joint declaration, the choice which they have made of His Royal Highness Prince Otho of Bavaria, as King of Greece, and shall afford the Regency all the support in their power.

Ratifications

Art. XVIII. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 7th May, in the year of our Lord, 1832.

(L. S.) Palmerston.
(L. S.) Talleyrand.
(L. S.) Lieven.
(L. S.) Matuszewic.

(L. S.) A. De Cetto.

[An Act was passed by the German Diet, 4th October, 1832, recognizing Prince Otho as King of Greece.]

[An Act of Parliament was passed on the 16th August, 1832 (2 and 3 Will. IV, cap. 121), to enable His Majesty to carry out the above convention.]

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, ON THE ONE PART, AND DENMARK, ON THE OTHER PART, RELATIVE TO THE ACCESSION OF PRINCE WILLIAM OF DENMARK TO THE THRONE OF GREECE.[1]

Signed at London, 13th July, 1863; ratifications exchanged at London, 3d August, 1863

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

Reference to guarantee of Great Britain, France, and Russia

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity

Their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, and the Emperor of All the Russias, being anxious to smooth the difficulties which have occurred in the Kingdom of Greece, placed under their common guarantee, have judged it necessary to come to an understanding with regard to the arrangements to be taken in order to give effect to the wish of the Greek nation, which calls the Prince William of Denmark to the Hellenic throne.

His Majesty the King of Denmark, on his part, responding to the invitation of their said Majesties, has consented to afford them his coöperation with a view to that result, conformable to the interests of the general peace.

In consequence, their Majesties the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Emperor of the French, and the Emperor of All the Russias, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Denmark on the other, have resolved to conclude a treaty, and have for that purpose named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable John Earl Russell, her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, etc.,

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur John Baptist Louis Baron Gros, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron de Brunnow, his actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

[1] Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. II, p. 1545; for French version, see State Papers, Vol. LIII, p. 28.

And His Majesty the King of Denmark, the Sieur Torben de Bille, his Chamberlain, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

Acceptance of hereditary sovereignty of Greece by King of Denmark for Prince William of Denmark

Art. I. His Majesty the King of Denmark, in accordance with the Prince Christian of Denmark, acting in the character of guardian of his second son the Prince Christian William Ferdinand Adolphus George, accepts for that prince, a minor, the hereditary sovereignty of Greece, which is offered to him by the Senate and the National Assembly of Greece in the name of the Hellenic nation.

Title of King of the Greeks

Art. II. The Prince William of Denmark shall bear the title of George I, King of the Greeks (*Roi des Grecs*).[1]

Greece to form a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state

Art. III. Greece, under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark, and the guarantee of the three courts, forms a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state.

Limits of Greek Territory. Annexation of Ionian Islands to Greece

Art. IV. The limits of the Greek Territory, determined by the arrangement concluded at Constantinople between the three courts and the Ottoman Porte, on the 21st July, 1832,[2] shall receive an extension by the union of the Ionian Islands with the Hellenic Kingdom, when such union, proposed by the Government of her Britannic Majesty, shall have been found to be in accordance with the wishes of the Ionian Parliament, and shall have obtained the assent of the courts of Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia.[3]

[1] See note [1], p. 70, *supra*.

[2] Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 903.

[3] Decree 18/30th March, 1863, annexed to Protocol of 5th June, 1863. Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1539.

Union of Ionian Islands to be under guarantee of protecting Powers

Art. V. The Ionian Islands, when their union with the Kingdom of Greece shall have been effected, shall be comprised in the guarantee stipulated by Article III of the present treaty.

Crowns of Greece and Denmark never to be united

Art. VI. In no case shall the crown of Greece and the crown of Denmark be united on the same head.

Religion of King of Greece

Art. VII. In conformity with the principle of the Hellenic Constitution recognized by the treaty signed at London, on the 20th November, 1852,[1] and proclaimed by the decree of the National Assembly of Greece, of the 30th March, 1863 the legitimate successors of King George I must profess the tenets of the Orthodox Church of the East.

Majority of King of Greece

Art. VIII. The majority of Prince William of Denmark, fixed by the law of the royal family at 18 years complete, that is to say, on the 24th December, 1863, shall be considered as attained before that date, if a decree of the National Assembly should recognize the necessity thereof.

Appropriation by Ionian Islands to civil list of King of the Greeks

Art. IX. At the moment when the union of the Ionian Islands with the Hellenic Kingdom shall take place, according to the terms of Article IV of the present treaty, Her Britannic Majesty will recommend to the Government of the United States of the Ionian Islands to appropriate annually a sum of £10,000 sterling to augment the civil list of His Majesty George I, King of the Greeks (*Roi des Grecs*).

Personal dotation to King of the Greeks by protecting Powers

Art. X. Each of the three courts will give up in favor of Prince William of Denmark £4,000 a year out of the sums which the Greek

[1] Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1156.

Treasury has engaged to pay annually to each of them, in pursuance of the arrangement concluded at Athens by the Greek Government, with the concurrence of the Chambers, in the month of June, 1860.[1]

It is expressly understood that these three sums, forming a total of £12,000 sterling annually, shall be destined to constitute a personal dotation of His Majesty the King, in addition to the civil list fixed by the law of the state.

Financial engagements of Greece to be maintained. Greek loan

Art. XI. The accession of Prince William to the Hellenic throne shall not involve any change in the financial engagements which Greece has contracted by Article XII of the convention signed at London, on the 7th May, 1832, towards the Powers guarantees of the loan.

It is equally understood that the Powers will, in concert, watch over the execution of the engagement taken by the Hellenic Government in the month of June, 1860, upon the representation of the three courts.

Recognition of Prince William of Denmark by foreign Powers

Art. XII. The three courts shall, from this moment, use their influence in order to procure the recognition of Prince William of Denmark in the character of King of the Greeks (*Roi des Grecs*), by all the sovereigns and states with whom they have relations.

Arrival of King George I in Greece

Art. XIII. His Majesty the King of Denmark reserves to himself to take the measures which may be most proper for facilitating the arrival of King George I in his dominions as soon as possible.

Support to Greek Government

Art. XIV. The three courts will bring the present treaty to the knowledge of the Greek Government, and will afford to that government all the support in their power, while awaiting the speedy arrival of His Majesty the King.

[1] Hertslet, Vol. II, p. 1445.

Ratifications

Art. XV. The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 13th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, 1863.

(L. S.) Russell. (L. S.) Bille.
(L. S.) Bon. Gros.
(L. S.) Brunnow.

TREATY BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND GREECE, RESPECTING THE UNION OF THE IONIAN ISLANDS TO THE KINGDOM OF GREECE.[1]

Signed at London, 29th March, 1864; ratifications exchanged at London, 25th April, 1864 [2]

(Translation as laid before Parliament)

Reference to Treaty of 5th November, 1815

In the name of the Most Holy and Indivisible Trinity

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland made known to the Legislative Assembly of the United States of the Ionian Islands that, with a view to the eventual union of those Islands to the Kingdom of Greece, she was prepared, if the Ionian Parliament should express a wish to that effect, to abandon the protectorate of those Islands, confided to Her Majesty by the treaty concluded at Paris on the 5th November, 1815,[3] between the courts of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. Such wish having been expressed by a vote of the said Legislative Assembly passed unanimously on the 7/19th October, 1863,[4] Her Britannic Majesty consented by Article I of the treaty concluded on the 14th November, 1863,[5]

[1] Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. III, p. 1589.
[2] The Sultan acceded to this treaty on the 8th April, 1865.
[3] Hertslet, Vol. I, p. 337. [4] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1565. [5] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 1569.

between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, to renounce the said protectorate under certain conditions specified in that treaty, and since defined by subsequent protocols.

On their part, their Majesties the Emperor of Austria, the Emperor of the French, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of All the Russias, consented by the same article, and under the same conditions, to accept such renunciation, and to recognize, in conjunction with Her Britannic Majesty, the union of those Islands to the Kingdom of Greece.

In virtue of Article V of the treaty signed at London on the 13th July, 1863, it was moreover agreed by common consent between Her Britannic Majesty and their Majesties the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of All the Russias, that the Ionian Islands, when their union to the Kingdom of Greece should have been effected, as contemplated by Article IV of the same treaty, should be comprised in the guarantee stipulated in favor of Greece by the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in virtue of the convention signed at London on the 7th May, 1832.

In consequence, and in accordance with the stipulations of the treaty of the 13th July, 1863, and with the terms of Article VI of the treaty of the 14th November, 1863, whereby the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in their character of guaranteeing Powers of the Kingdom of Greece, reserved to themselves to conclude a treaty with the Hellenic Government as to the arrangements which might become necessary in consequence of the union of the Ionian Islands to Greece, their said Majesties have resolved to proceed to negotiate with His Majesty the King of the Hellenes a treaty for the purpose of carrying into execution the stipulations above mentioned.

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes having given his assent to the conclusion of such treaty, their said Majesties have named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the Right Honorable John Earl Russell, Viscount Amberley of Amberley and Ardsalle, a Peer of the United Kingdom, a member of Her Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, her Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, the Sieur Godefroy Bernard Henry Alphonse, Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne Lauraguais, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Sieur Philip Baron de Brunnow, his Actual Privy Councillor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Her Britannic Majesty, etc.;

And His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, the Sieur Charilaüs S. Tricoupi, a representative in the National Assembly of the Hellenes;

Who, after having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles:

Renunciation of Great Britain to protectorate over the Ionian Islands

Art. I. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, desiring to realize the wish expressed by the Legislative Assembly of the United States of the Ionian Islands, that those Islands should be united to Greece, has consented, on the conditions hereinafter specified, to renounce the protectorate over the Islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zante, Santa Maura, Ithaca, Cerigo, and Paxo, with their dependencies, which, in virtue of the treaty signed at Paris, on the 5th November, 1815, by the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were constituted a single free and independent state, under the denomination of "the United States of the Ionian Islands," placed under the immediate and exclusive protection of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors.

Union of Ionian Islands to Greece

In consequence, Her Britannic Majesty, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in their character of signing parties to the convention of the 7th May, 1832, recognize such union, and declare that Greece, within the limits determined by the arrangement concluded at Constantinople between the courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and the Ottoman Porte, on the 21st July, 1832, including the Ionian Islands, shall form a monarchical, independent, and constitutional state, under the sovereignty of His Majesty King George, and under the guarantee of the three courts.

Perpetual neutrality of Ionian Islands [1]

Art. II. The courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, in their character of guaranteeing Powers of Greece, declare, with the assent of the courts of Austria and Prussia, that the Islands of Corfu and Paxo, as well as their dependencies, shall, after their union to the Hellenic Kingdom, enjoy the advantages of perpetual neutrality.

Greece to maintain the neutrality

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, on his part, to maintain such neutrality.

Treaties, etc., of commerce and navigation between Great Britain and foreign Powers relative to Ionian Islands to remain in force until conclusion of new treaty

Art. III. The union of the Ionian Islands to the Hellenic Kingdom shall not involve any change as to the advantages conceded to foreign commerce and navigation in virtue of treaties and conventions concluded by foreign Powers with Her Britannic Majesty, in her character of protector of the Ionian Islands.

All the engagements which result from the said transactions, as well as from the regulations actually in force in relation thereto, shall be maintained and strictly observed, as hitherto.

In consequence, it is expressly understood that foreign vessels and commerce in Ionian ports, as well as the navigation between Ionian ports and the ports of Greece, shall continue to be subject to the same treatment, and placed under the same conditions as before the union of the Ionian Islands to Greece, until the conclusion of new formal conventions, or of arrangements destined to regulate between the parties concerned, questions of commerce and navigation, as well as questions relating to the regular service of communication by post.

Terms within which new commercial treaties are to be concluded

Such new conventions shall be concluded in fifteen years, or sooner, if possible.[2]

[1] A protocol on this subject was also signed between the five Powers on the 25th January, 1864.

[2] The Austrian and Prussian Governments assented to this arrangement.

Freedom of worship and religious toleration

Art. IV. The union of the United States of the Ionian Islands to the Kingdom of Greece shall in no wise invalidate the principles established by the existing legislation of those Islands with regard to freedom of worship and religious toleration; accordingly the rights and immunities established in matters of religion by Chapters I and V of the Constitutional Charter of the United States of the Ionian Islands,[1] and specifically the recognition of the Orthodox Greek Church as the dominant religion in those Islands; the entire liberty of worship granted to the established Church of the protecting Power; and the perfect toleration promised to other Christian communions shall, after the union, be maintained in their full force and effect.

The special protection guaranteed to the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the advantages of which that church is actually in possession, shall be equally maintained; and the subjects belonging to that communion shall enjoy in the Ionian Islands the same freedom of worship which is recognized in their favor by the protocol of the 3d February, 1830.

The principle of entire civil and political equality between subjects belonging to different creeds, established in Greece by the same protocol, shall be likewise in force in the Ionian Islands.

Provision of Ionian Islands towards the civil list of the King of the Hellenes

Art. V. The Legislative Assembly of the United States of the Ionian Islands has decreed by a resolution passed on the 7/19th October, 1863, that the sum of £10,000 sterling a year shall be appropriated, in monthly payments, to the augmentation of the civil list of His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, so as to constitute the first charge upon the revenue of the Ionian Islands, unless provision be made for such payment, according to the constitutional forms, out of the revenues of the Kingdom of Greece.

In consequence, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes engages to carry that decree duly into execution.

[1] Ratified by the Sovereign of Great Britain on the 26th August, 1817.

Relinquishment by protecting Powers of portion of the annual sums to be paid to them by Greece

Art. VI. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, agree to relinquish in favor of His Majesty King George I, each £4,000 sterling a year, out of the sums which the Greek Treasury has engaged to pay annually to each of them, in virtue of the arrangement concluded at Athens by the Greek Government, with the concurrence of the Greek Chambers, in the month of June, 1860 (No. 318).

Amounts relinquished to form personal dotation of King of Greece

It is expressly understood that these three sums, forming a total of £12,000 sterling annually, shall be destined to constitute a personal dotation of His Majesty King George I, in addition to the civil list fixed by the law of the state. The accession of His Majesty to the Hellenic throne shall not otherwise involve any change in the financial engagements which Greece has contracted by Article XII of the convention of 7th May, 1832, towards the Powers guarantees of the loan, nor in the execution of the engagement taken by the Hellenic Government in the month of June, 1860, upon the representation of the three courts.[1]

Contracts between Ionian Islands and foreign Powers to be maintained by King of the Hellenes

Art. VII. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes engages to take upon himself all the engagements and contracts lawfully concluded by the Government of the United States of the Ionian Islands, or in their name, by the protecting Power of those Islands, conformably to the Constitution of the Ionian Islands, whether with foreign governments, with companies and associations, or with private individuals; and promises to fulfil the said engagements and contracts fully and completely, as if they had been concluded by His Majesty or by the Hellenic Government. Under this head are specially included: the public debt of the Ionian Islands; the privileges conceded to the Ionian Bank, to the navigation company known under the name of the

[1] An Act of Parliament was passed on the 14th July, 1864 (27th and 28 Vict., cap. 40), to give effect to this arrangement.

Austrian Lloyds, in conformity with the postal convention of the 1st December, 1853, and to the Malta and Mediterranean Gas Company.

Pensions, etc., to British and Ionian subjects to be paid by Greece

Art. VIII. His Majesty the King of the Hellenes promises to take upon himself, —

1. The pensions granted to British subjects by the Ionian Government, in conformity with the rules established in the Ionian Islands respecting pensions.

2. The compensation allowances due to certain individuals actually in the service of the Ionian Government, who will lose their employments in consequence of the union of the Islands to Greece.

3. The pensions which several Ionian subjects are in the enjoyment of, in remuneration of services rendered to the Ionian Government.

Special convention to regulate amounts

A special convention to be concluded between Her Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of the Hellenes shall determine the amounts of these different heads, and shall regulate the mode of their payment.[1]

Withdrawal of British forces from the Ionian Islands

Art. IX. The civil authorities and the military forces of her Britannic Majesty shall be withdrawn from the territory of the United States of the Ionian Islands in three months or sooner, if possible, after the ratification of the present treaty.[2]

Ratifications

Art. X. The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London in six weeks, or sooner, if possible.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 29th of March, in the year of Our Lord, 1864.

(L. S.) Russell. (L. S.) Ch. Tricoupi.

(L. S.) La Tour D'Auvergne.

(L. S.) Brunnow.

[1] Convention of same date. Hertslet, Vol. III, p. 1596.

[2] See protocol of 28th May, 1864. Hertslet, Vol. III, p. 1606.

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTS, 1913–1917, ISSUED BY THE GREEK GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE GRECO-SERBIAN TREATY OF ALLIANCE AND THE GERMANO-BULGARIAN INVASION INTO MACEDONIA.[1]

PART FIRST

The Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance

I. Texts

No. 1

PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN GREECE AND SERBIA

Signed, April 22/May 5, 1913.

His Excellency Mr. Lambros A. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece, and His Excellency Mr. Mathias Boschkovitch, Minister of Serbia in Athens, acting on behalf of their governments and in accordance with their instructions, held a conference today and agreed as follows:

1

The Governments of Greece and Serbia bind themselves to conclude and sign a treaty of amity and of defensive alliance within the period of twenty days from the signature of the present instrument.

[1] These documents, together with the preceding Table of Contents, cited as the Greek White Book, have been translated from the French and Greek, by Mr. Theodore P. Ion, of the Bar of New York and of the District of Columbia.

Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 45, 46, 60, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, have been translated from the Greek; all others are from French originals.

The words in braekets take the place of illegible words of the texts of the telegrams. Wherever it has been impossible to complete the meaning the statement [words illegible] has been inserted.

The dates indieated in the body of the doeuments are those of the Julian ealendar. — Translator.

2

It will be covenanted in that treaty that the two governments will give mutual aid to each other in order that Greece and Serbia may have contiguous boundaries to the west of the Axios (Vardar) river and that the fixing of the new boundaries shall be done in principle on the basis of effective occupation.

The general direction of this boundary shall be as follows:

Starting from the mountain range of Kamena Planina (Kamna) which delimits the upper Schkoumbi to the southwest side of the Ochrida lake, the boundary line will pass round this lake to the south; it will reach the western shore of the Prespa lake at the village Kousko, and passing through the lake it will reach Dolni Dupliani on the eastern shore; from there it will pass eastward near Rahmanli, will follow the line of the water-shed between the Erigon (Tserna) river and the Moglenica and will reach the Axios (Vardar) river at about three kilometers to the south of Ghevgheli.

The Greco-Bulgarian as well as the Serbo-Bulgarian boundary lines shall be fixed on the basis of the principle of effective possession and the equilibrium between the three states.

The Serbian boundary line to the north of Ghevgheli will follow the Axios (Vardar) river as far as the confluence of the Bregalnitza river, which it will ascend to a point of the old Turkish-Bulgarian boundary.

The Greco-Bulgarian boundary line will run to the south of Kilkitch, to the north of Nigrita, through Orliako, and from there, by the Achinos (Tachinos) lake and the Angitis (Anghista) river, will descend to the sea a little to the east of the harbor of Eleutherai.

All these boundary lines will be fixed in a more detailed manner and will be inserted in the text of the aforesaid treaty of alliance.

3

The Governments of Greece and Serbia bind themselves to act in unison, to afford to each other constant assistance in the negotiations which will be opened in regard to the division of the territories ceded by Turkey, and to mutually support the boundary lines indicated above, between Greece and Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria, Serbia and Bulgaria.

4

Should a dissension arise with Bulgaria in regard to the boundaries above indicated and a friendly settlement become impossible, the Governments of Greece and Serbia reserve to themselves the right to propose jointly to Bulgaria that the dispute be submitted to mediation or arbitration. In case Bulgaria should refuse to accept this mode of peaceful settlement and assume a menacing attitude or attempt to impose her claims by force, the two governments, in order to secure the integrity of their possessions, bind themselves to afford to each other military assistance and not to conclude peace except jointly and together.

5

A military convention shall be concluded with the least possible delay for the purpose of preparing and insuring the necessary defensive measures in case one of the two states, without provocation on its part, should be attacked by a third Power.

6

. . . . . .

7

The Greek Government binds itself to afford all the facilities and to guarantee for fifty years the entire freedom of the Serbian export and import trade through the port of Salonika and the railway lines from Salonika to Uskup and Monastir.

8

The present instrument shall be kept strictly secret.

Done in duplicate, Athens, this twenty-second day of April in the year one thousand, nine hundred and thirteen.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece.
L. A. Coromilas.

The Minister of Serbia.
M. Boschkovitch.

No. 2

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

Signed, May 19/June 1, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Athens, June 8/21, 1913.

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of Serbia, considering that it is their duty to look after the security of their people and the tranquillity of their kingdoms; considering furthermore, in their firm desire to preserve a durable peace in the Balkan Peninsula, that the most effective means to attain it is to unite themselves in a close defensive alliance;

Have resolved to conclude an alliance of peace, of friendship, and of mutual protection, promising to each other never to give to their purely defensive agreement an offensive character, and for that purpose they have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes; Mr. John Alexandropoulos, his Minister at Belgrade, Commander of the Royal Order of the Savior, Grand Commander of the Royal Order of Takovo; His Majesty the King of Serbia; Mr. Mathias Boschkovitch, his Minister at Athens, Grand Commander of the Royal Order of Saint Sava, Commander of the Royal Order of the Savior, who, after having exchanged their full powers found in good and due form, have today agreed as follows:

Article 1

The two high contracting parties covenant expressly the mutual guarantee of their possessions and bind themselves, in case, contrary to their hopes, one of the two kingdoms should be attacked without any provocation on its part, to afford to each other assistance with all their armed forces and not to conclude peace subsequently except jointly and together.

Article 2

At the division of the territories of European Turkey, which will be ceded to the Balkan States after the termination of the present war by the treaty of peace with the Ottoman Empire, the two high contracting parties bind themselves not to come to any separate under-

standing with Bulgaria, to afford each other constant assistance, and to proceed always together, upholding mutually their territorial claims and the boundary lines hereafter to be indicated.

ARTICLE 3

The two high contracting parties, considering that it is to the vital interest of their kingdoms that no other state should interpose between their respective possessions to the west of the Axios (Vardar) river, declare that they will mutually assist one another in order that Greece and Serbia may have a common boundary line. This boundary line, based on the principle of effective occupation, shall start from the highest summit of the mountain range of Kamna, delimiting the basin of the Upper Schkoumbi, it shall pass round the the lake Achris (Ochrida), shall reach the western shore of the Prespa lake at the village Kousko and the eastern shore at Lower Dupliani (Dolni Dupliani), shall run near Rahmanli, shall follow the water-shed between the Erigon (Tserna) river and the Moglenica and shall reach the Axios (Vardar) river at a distance of nearly three kilometers to the south of Ghevgheli, according to the line drawn in detail in Annex I of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The two high contracting parties agree that the Greco-Bulgarian and Serbo-Bulgarian boundary lines shall be established on the principle of actual possession and the equilibrium between the three states, as follows:

The eastern frontier of Serbia from Ghevgheli shall follow the course of the Axios (Vardar) river up to the confluence of Bojimia-Dere, shall ascend that river, and, passing by the altitudes 120, 350, 754, 895, 571, and the rivers Kriva, Lakavitza, Bregalnica and Zletovska shall proceed towards a point of the old Turkish-Bulgarian frontier on the Osogovska Planina, altitude 2225, according to the line drawn in detail in Annex II of the present treaty.

The Greek frontier on the side of Bulgaria shall leave to Greece on the left shore of the Axios (Vardar) the territories occupied by the Greek and Serbian troops opposite Ghevgheli and Davidovo as far as the mountain Beles and the Doïran lake; then, passing to the south of Kilkitch it shall cross the Strymon river north of the Orliako

bridge and shall proceed through the Achinos (Tachinos) lake and the Angitis (Anghista) river to the sea, a little to the east of the Gulf of Eleutherai according to the line drawn in detail in Annex III of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 5

Should a dissension arise with Bulgaria in regard to the frontiers as indicated above, and every friendly settlement become impossible, the two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to propose, by common agreement, to Bulgaria, that the dispute be submitted to the mediation or arbitration of the sovereigns of the Entente Powers or the chiefs of other states. In case Bulgaria shall refuse to accept this mode of peaceful settlement and assume a menacing attitude against either of the two kingdoms, or attempt to impose her claims by force, the two high contracting parties bind themselves solemnly to afford assistance to each other with all their armed forces and not to conclude peace subsequently except jointly and together.

ARTICLE 6

In order to prepare and to secure the means of military defense, a military convention shall be concluded with the least possible delay upon the signature of the present treaty.

ARTICLE 7

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes covenants that his government shall grant all the necessary facilities and guarantee for a period of fifty years the complete freedom of the export and import trade of Serbia through the port of Salonika and the railway lines from Salonika to Uskup and Monastir. This freedom shall be as broad as possible, provided only it is compatible with the full and entire exercise of the Hellenic sovereignty.

A special convention shall be concluded between the two high contracting parties within one year from this day in order to regulate in detail the carrying out of this article.

ARTICLE 8

The two high contracting parties agree that upon the final settlement of all the questions resulting from the present war, the General Staffs of

the two armies shall come to an understanding with the view of regulating in a parallel manner the increase of the military forces of each state.

Article 9

The two high contracting parties agree furthermore that, upon the final settlement of all the questions resulting from the present war, they will proceed by common agreement to the study of a plan for a customs convention, in order to draw closer the commercial and economic relations of the two countries.

Article 10

The present treaty shall be put in force after its signature. It can not be denounced before the expiration of ten years. The intention for the cessation of its force shall be notified by one of the two high contracting parties to the other six months in advance, in the absence of which the agreement shall continue to be binding upon the two states until the expiration of one year from the date of the denunciation.

Article 11

The present treaty shall be kept strictly secret. It can not be communicated to another Power either totally or partially, except with the consent of the two high contracting parties.

It shall be ratified as soon as possible. The ratifications shall be exchanged in Athens.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty and affixed their seals.

Executed in Salonika, in duplicate, the nineteenth day of May in the year one thousand nine hundred and thirteen.

John Alexandropoulos. M. Boschkovitch.

No. 3

MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

Signed, May 1/14, 1913.[1]

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of Serbia, desiring to complete the treaty of alliance concluded between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, by a military convention, have appointed for that purpose as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, Captain John Metaxas, of the Corps of Engineers and of the General Staff of the Army; His Majesty the King of Serbia, Colonel Petar Pechitch of the General Staff, and Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch, of the Infantry, who, after having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

In case of war between Greece and Bulgaria or between Serbia and Bulgaria, or in case of a sudden attack by the Bulgarian army against the Greek or the Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other mutual military assistance, Greece with all her land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces.

Article 2

In the beginning of the hostilities, at whatever moment they begin, Greece is bound to have an army of ninety thousand fighting men concentrated in the region between the Pangaion Mountain, Salonika and Goumenitsa, and Serbia an army of one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men concentrated in the region of Ghevgheli, Veles (Kioprulu), Koumanovo, Pirot. Besides, Greece is at the same time bound to have her fleet in the Ægean Sea ready for action.

[1] The present military convention was signed ad referendum, but was not ratified. It was replaced by the military convention of May 19/June 1, 1913, printed *infra*.

Article 3

The two states are bound to transport to the zone of operations the remainder of their military forces, as soon as these shall become available.

Article 4

A decrease of the forces mentioned in Article 2, either by demobilization or the transportation of troops elsewhere, is not permitted, unless there is a written agreement to that effect between the General Staffs of the armies of the two allied states.

Article 5

The military operations against Bulgaria shall be based upon a common plan of operations. This plan of operations shall be drawn up by the respective General Staffs of the two states, or by their delegates. It may subsequently be modified in consequence of a change of the military situation by a common agreement in writing of the two General Staffs.

Article 6

After the opening of hostilities, whatever the course of the military operations may be and whatever the localities through which, during the military operations, the troops of the one or the other allied states may pass, and whatever the cities, villages or positions which may be occupied by these troops for military necessities, the occupation of the country lying beyond the boundary line between Greece and Serbia on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other, as provided for by the Greco-Serbian Treaty of Alliance, of which the present convention is a complement, is regulated as follows:

The Greek army has the right to occupy the country situated to the south and southeast of the line of Gradec, — the crest line of the Beles mountain, — summit 1800 to the northwest of Karakioi, — altitude 2194 Perelik; the Serbian army, the country lying to the north and northwest of the said line.

If during the military operations one of the two armies shall occupy part of the country, cities, or villages situated in the zone which should be occupied by the other army, it shall evacuate them as soon as the army which, according to the previous paragraph, has the right to their occupation, demands it.

ARTICLE 7

The ultimate object of the military operations of the allied Greek and Serbian armies being the destruction of the military forces of Bulgaria, if one of the two armies can not attain that object in its own theatre of operations, it is bound to accept the assistance of the other army in the same theatre of operations. Still, the army which has attained this object in its own theatre of operations is bound to go to the assistance of the other, independently of whether this assistance was asked for or not, in order that by a joint action of the two allied armies, Bulgaria may be forced to submit to the conditions which shall be laid down by the two allied states and conclude peace.

ARTICLE 8

Neither of the two allied armies can conclude an armistice of a duration of more than twenty-four hours nor can it tacitly suspend hostilities.

An armistice of a duration of more than twenty-four hours can not be concluded except upon a joint agreement in writing of the two allied states; this agreement shall at the same time determine the conditions of the armistice.

ARTICLE 9

The present convention shall be valid as long as the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, remains in force.

Article 2 of the present convention may be modified by a joint agreement in writing of the General Staffs of the two respective states, after the passing of the present crisis and the ordering of demobilization.

ARTICLE 10

The present convention shall come into force from the day of its ratification by their Majesties the King of the Hellenes and the King of Serbia, or by the respective governments of the allied states.

In faith whereof, the plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention.

Done in duplicate, in Salonika, the first day of May in the year 1913.

For Greece:
Captain J. P. METAXAS.

For Serbia:
Colonel PETAR PECHITCH.
Colonel DOUCHAN TOUFEGDJITCH.

No. 4

MILITARY CONVENTION BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF GREECE AND THE KINGDOM OF SERBIA

Signed, May 19/June 1, 1913; ratifications exchanged at Athens, June 8/21, 1913.

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes and His Majesty the King of Serbia, desiring to complete the treaty of alliance concluded between the Kingdom of Greece and the Kingdom of Serbia, by a military convention, have appointed for that purpose as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, Captain Xenophon Stratigos, of the Corps of Engineers, and of the General Staff of the Army; His Majesty the King of Serbia, Colonel Petar Pechitch, of the General Staff, and Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch, of the Infantry, who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

In case of war between one of the allied states and a third Power, arising in the circumstances provided for by the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack by important masses — at least two divisions — of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other mutual military support, Greece with all her land and sea forces, and Serbia with all her land forces.

Article 2

In the beginning of the hostilities, at whatever moment they begin, Greece is bound to have an army of ninety thousand fighting men concentrated in the region between the Pangaion Mountain, Salonika, and Goumenitsa, and Serbia an army of one hundred and fifty thousand fighting men concentrated in the region of Ghevgheli, Veles (Kioprulu), Koumanovo, Pirot. Besides, Greece is bound to have at the same time her fleet in the Ægean Sea ready for action.

Article 3

The two states are bound to bring to the zone of operations their remaining military forces, as soon as these shall become available.

Article 4

A decrease of the forces mentioned in Article 2, either by demobilization or by the transportation of troops elsewhere, is not permitted, except on a written agreement between the General Staffs of the armies of the two allied states.

But if Greece, in the case provided for in Article 1, should, at the same time, be found under the necessity of defending herself against an attack of a Power other than Bulgaria, she shall be bound to go to the assistance of Serbia, attacked by Bulgaria, by a number of troops fixed by a joint agreement at the proper time between the two General Staffs, according to the military situation and having due regard to the security of the territory of the Kingdom of Greece.

Conversely, if Serbia should be in need of defending herselfagainst an attack by a Power other than Bulgaria, she shall be bound to go to the assistance of Greece, attacked by Bulgaria, by a number of troops fixed by common agreement at the proper time between the two General Staffs, according to the military situation, and having due regard to the security of the territory of the Kingdom of Serbia.

Article 5

In case one of the contracting parties shall declare war against Bulgaria or against another Power, without a previous agreement and the consent of the other contracting party, the latter shall be released from the obligations imposed by Articles 1 and 2 of the present convention. It shall nevertheless maintain a benevolent neutrality towards its ally during the continuation of the war and shall be bound to mobilize immediately in its territory, Greece, at least forty thousand fighting men and Serbia at least fifty thousand fighting men, in such a manner as to protect its neutrality and consequently the liberty of movement of the allied army.

Article 6

The military operations against Bulgaria shall be based on a common plan of operations. This plan of operations shall be drawn up by the respective General Staffs of the two states or by their delegates. It may be subsequently modified in consequence of a change of the military situation, by a joint agreement in writing of the two General Staffs.

Article 7

After the opening of the hostilities, whatever the course of the military operations may be and whatever the localities through which, during the military operations, the troops of the one or the other of the allied states may pass, and whatever may be the cities, villages or positions occupied by these troops for military necessities, the final occupation of the country lying beyond the boundary line between Greece and Serbia on the one hand and Bulgaria on the other, provided for by the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece, of which the present convention forms a complement, is regulated as follows:

Greece has the right to occupy definitely and to annex the country lying to the south and east of the line which, starting from a point on the Vardar immediately to the north of Sehovo, passes between the villages of Bogoroditsa and Mazucovo, afterwards by the crest line between the villages of Selimli and Dautli, it proceeds towards the altitudes 535, 227, runs through the lake proceeding towards the altitude 208, and afterwards towards the altitudes 397, 1494, the crest line of the Beles mountain, summit 1800 M to the northwest of Karakioi up to altitude 2194 (Perelik).

Serbia has the right to occupy definitely and to annex the country lying to the north and the northwest of the said line.

Greece concedes that Serbia shall occupy a zone of territory of a width of ten kilometers, lying on the left shore of the Nestos-Mesta (Karassou), to the north of Xanthi and to the east of Buru-Gölü. Serbia, on the other hand, is bound to allow Greece free passage through this zone and declares that she recognizes the influence of Greece in all the territory lying to the east of this zone and recognizes that she has no claim whatever upon it.

If, during the military operations, one of the two armies occupies part of the country, cities or villages, situated in the zone which should be occupied by the other army, it is bound to evacuate them as soon as the army which, according to the previous paragraph, has the right to their occupation, demands it.

Article 8

The ultimate object of the military operations of the allied Greek and Serbian armies being the destruction of the military forces of Bulgaria, if one of the two armies can not attain that object in its own

theatre of operations, it is bound to accept the assistance of the other in the same theatre of operations. Still, the army which has attained this object in its own theatre of operations is bound to go to the assistance of the other, independently of whether this assistance was asked for or not, in order that by a joint action of the two allied armies, Bulgaria may be forced to submit to the conditions which shall be laid down by the two allied states and conclude peace.

Article 9

Neither of the two allied armies can conclude an armistice of more than twenty-four hours duration or tacitly suspend hostilities.

An armistice of more than twenty-four hours duration can not be concluded except upon a joint agreement in writing of the two allied states. This agreement shall at the same time determine the conditions of the armistice.

Article 10

The allied armies shall mutually enjoy, each on the territory of the other high contracting party, all the rights and privileges granted to the (national) armies of the country by virtue of the laws and ordinances in force, — except as to requisitions, — in regard to general maintenance, revictualling, sanitary service, transportation of the wounded and sick, burial of the dead, and the transportation of all the material and provisions destined for the use of the troops. To these ends the military and civil authorities of the two contracting parties are bound to render every assistance and service requested by the allied troops.

The payment for the purchases made for the needs of the army of one of the two allied states stationed in the territory of the other, shall be made regularly in cash, at the market price. In exceptional cases payments may be made by vouchers placed at the disposal of the allied army at its request by the proper authorities of the other ally.

The current rate of the Greek and Serbian coin or paper money shall be fixed by a joint agreement of the two allied governments. It goes without saying that in the territories taken from the enemy and occupied by the allied armies, the two contracting parties shall enjoy in regard to the maintenance and the revictualling of their troops the rights conceded by the laws of war.

Each allied army shall enjoy these privileges only in the territory which belongs to its own zone of occupation, as this is indicated in Article 6 of the present convention. The expenses for the transportation of troops, all necessary material in general, war booty, etc., by railways or ships, shall be borne by the contracting state in whose territory such transportations shall be effected.

Article 11

The war booty shall belong to the allied army which captures it.

In case the booty is captured in a common battle of the allied armies, on the same battle-field, it shall be divided in proportion to the number of fighting men of the two armies who participate in it.

Article 12

The present convention shall be valid as long as the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, of which it forms a complement, remains in force.

Article 2 of the present convention may be modified by a joint agreement in writing of the General Staffs of the two respective states, after the passing of the present crisis and the ordering of demobilization.

Article 13

The present convention shall come into force from the day of its ratification by their Majesties the King of the Hellenes and the King of Serbia, or by the respective governments of the allied states.

In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention.

Done in duplicate, in Salonika, the nineteenth day of May in the year 1913.

For Greece:

X. Stratigos.

For Serbia:

Colonel Petar Pechitch.

Colonel Douchan Toufegdjitch.

II. Negotiations

No. 5

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

Athens, *May 10/23, 1913.*

We have just received your telegram about the note which the Serbian Government will send to Sofia. Notwithstanding the Bulgarian attack, which is becoming general at Pangaion, we did not wish to take the offensive and march against Serres — which would have compelled the Bulgarians to change their attitude — in order not to find ourselves unexpectedly in a state of war. But the situation can not be protracted, because it is very dangerous and we should come to a decision. The time for the signature of the treaty expires on the 12th of May (O. S.) and it is necessary that it should be signed in Belgrade. You have by telegram the text of the full powers which we shall send to you by special courier. You can sign before it reaches you.

In regard to the modifications to be made in the secret treaty, which are mentioned in your telegram of the 9th instant, accept in Article 5 after the words "to mediation or arbitration" the insertion of the words "of the sovereigns of the Entente Powers or the chiefs of other states." Accept equally the omission of the words "as soon as possible." In the same article instead of the wording "the two high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to propose, etc." we prefer the original wording "the two high contracting parties will propose, etc." As I informed you by my communication of April 30, the change of the verb "will propose" to "reserve to themselves" was due to the omission of the words which we now accept. We also accept that the second paragraph of Article 4 should be worded as follows: "The eastern frontier of Serbia from Ghevgheli shall follow the Axios river, etc."

In regard to the modifications of the military convention, Article 1, according to your telegrams, should be worded as follows: "In case of war between the two allied states and another state, entered into under the circumstances provided for in Article 5 (the number

is missing in your telegram) of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other —— (up to:) all her land forces." We accept it in the above wording.

In regard to the provisions of Article 6 of the convention, we give you full liberty to negotiate on them, trying to improve them and at last to accept them, if there is no way of doing otherwise. You will have in that the aid of Captain Stratigos. Try to finish as soon as possible.

Offer our thanks to the Serbian Government for its step at Sofia. As soon as it presents a note for the revision, we can accelerate our joint steps, in order to hasten the negotiations of partition.

COROMILAS.

No. 6

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BELGRADE, *May 10/23, 1913.*

I communicate the following telegram drawn up by Captain Stratigos:

After an understanding with the President of the Ministerial Council and in the presence of Colonel Toufegdjitch, who signed the military convention in Salonika, the Minister of Serbia at Athens handed to us a memorandum containing the modifications proposed by the Serbians in Articles 1 and 6 of the military convention signed in Salonika. He wishes urgently to have an answer on these propositions.

In regard to Article 1, the Serbians propose to modify it as follows: "In case of war between one of the two allied states and a third Power, entered into under the circumstances provided for by Article —— of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack." The remainder is not modified. This article as it was worded at Salonika, is from the military point of view much more advantageous to us, while as it is now worded, it serves only the interests of Serbia. The strictly defensive character of the alliance is to the advantage of the Serbians, who do not claim from the Bulgarians more than what they now possess, while it deprives us of the right to claim all the territory which has been

defined in the protocol to the south of the Kilkitch-Orliaco line, occupied now entirely by the Bulgarians, inasmuch as an advance on our part with the view of occupying these points might be interpreted by the Serbians as a provocation. Besides, this strictly defensive character contributes to leave to Bulgaria every initiative and liberty of action, which from the military point of view is very disadvantageous. The extension of the alliance not only against Bulgaria but also against any third Power is, from the military standpoint, detrimental to our interests and favorable only to the Serbians. In fact, the latter have but land frontiers and have as neighbors more states than we have with whom they could at a given time come into conflict, in which case we would be obliged to assist them; on the contrary, it is only with Bulgaria that we can come in conflict by land and it is in that case only that the help of Serbia could be useful to us. For our eventual differences with other Powers who could attack us by sea, the assistance of Serbia would amount to nothing. So, in order to bring into harmony Article 1st of the military convention with the respective provisions of the treaty of alliance, we venture to suggest that it would perhaps be more advantageous to modify the respective provisions of the treaty of alliance according to the exigencies of our military interest.

As for Article 6 of the military convention the Serbians demand that it be modified as follows:

After the beginning of the hostilities, whatever the course of the military operations may be and whatever the places through which, during the military operations, the troops of one or the other of the allied states pass and whatever may be the cities, villages or localities which may be occupied by these troops for the sake of military necessity, the occupation of the territories situated to the east of the Serbian frontier on the Vardar (Axios) river, as it is determined by the treaty of alliance between Serbia and Greece, of which the present convention forms a complement, is regulated as follows:

The Greek army has the right to occupy the territories situated to the south and the southeast of the line, which, starting about three kilometers to the south of Ghevgheli on the Vardar, proceeds towards the east between the villages Bogoroditcha and Mazucovo, to the north of the village Selimli, to the south of Dautli, and from there ascends up to the altitude 535, it proceeds towards the altitude 420, by Hissar-Tepe; altitude 127, altitude 217, altitude 490, altitude 576, from there by the mountain range of the Kroussa Balkans up to the altitude 645 [to] the Butkova lake and reaches the Strouma river, from which it [words illegible] towards the altitude 1800, to the north of Karakioi, altitudes 2194, 4038, 8994, 8475. The Serbian army has the right to occupy the territories situated to the north of the same line. If during the course of the operations . . . etc.

The Serbians claim this line, as fixed above, alleging that in case of a successful war against Bulgaria, we shall be sufficiently compensated by an extension of our frontier to the east. Such a proposition — which in every other circumstance may be debatable —

should now be rejected, not so much because we shall be deprived of a sufficiently large extent of a rich country, but especially for purely military reasons; for by accepting the line proposed by the Serbians we shall find ourselves, even after a successful war against Bulgaria, deprived of natural and strong boundaries to the north of Salonika, such as Mount Beles would constitute. Mount Beles and, to the east, the narrow pass of Demir Hissar in the hands of another state would give to her the advantage of being able to concentrate against us her army in the valley of Strouma and to advance without hindrance toward the plain of Serres and Salonika. Our occupation of Milovitsa and the narrow pass would oblige it on the contrary to concentrate itself much more to the north and delay greatly its advance, which would be an incalculable benefit and greatly favor a possible operation in that region. Another very great inconvenience offered by the proposed line is that it would deprive us of an entire portion of the Salonika-Serres Railway line, from Kilindir to the Hani-Derven Bridge, on the Strouma. The building of a new railway line from Salonika to Serres beyond the proposed boundaries, would meet great difficulties on account of the very configuration of the ground.

ALEXANDROPOULOS.

No. 7

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BELGRADE, *May 13/26, 1913.*

I communicate to you the following telegram of Captain Stratigos:

The modifications of the military convention, which the Serbians demand, as a result of a study by their General Staff, are as follows:

Article 1. In case of war against one of the two states, entered into, in the circumstances provided for in Article 1 of the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia, or in case of a sudden attack of important masses of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states, namely Greece and Serbia, promise to each other mutual support, Greece by all her land and naval forces and Serbia by all her land forces.

They demand that this formula should be final, and insist that this article should be connected not with the fifth article of the treaty which has in view a war against Bulgaria alone, but with Article 1, which extends the alliance against other states, adding that if it referred only to Bulgaria they would not have needed our alliance. Furthermore, in consequence it seems of the last engagements they add the words "important masses." It seems to me that we can accept this

latter point, provided a clear formula be found capable of avoiding al misunderstanding. As to the connection of this article either with the first or fifth articles of the treaty of alliance, as this constitutes a capital question, I shall await your instructions.

Article 2. They demand that the Greek army shall be increased from 90,000 to 100,000 fighting men. I think that we can accept this modification.

Article 3 unchanged.

Article 4. The Serbians add a second paragraph which is as follows:

> But if Serbia, in the case provided for in Article 1, finds herself at the same time under the necessity of defending herself against an attack on the part of another Power than Bulgaria, she will be bound to go to the assistance of Greece, attacked by Bulgaria, with all her available military forces. Conversely, if Greece finds herself under the necessity of defending herself against the attack of a Power other than Bulgaria, she will be bound to go to the assistance of Serbia, attacked by Bulgaria, with all her available military forces.

This addition is acceptable in principle. I have proposed that it should be formulated in a manner insuring a proper use of the military forces according to military necessity and in a manner so as to avoid every cause of abuse.

After this article they propose an article 4 bis:

> In case one of the contracting parties should declare war against Bulgaria or against another Power, without the previous agreement and consent of the other contracting party, the latter will be freed from the obligations imposed by Articles 1 and 2 of the present convention. Still, it should observe a benevolent neutrality towards its ally throughout the duration of the war and be bound to mobilize immediately at least 50,000 fighting men and to concentrate them in a manner so as to protect the freedom of movement of the allied army.

I think that it suits our purpose to accept this article up to the words "throughout the duration of the war."

Articles 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 unchanged.

The discussion on Article 6 will take place tomorrow.

At the end of the convention we shall add: first an article concerning the revictualling, the sanitary service, the transportation of the wounded, the burial of the dead, the transportation of material and provisions, the manner of the payment of the expenses, the exploitation of the resources of the occupied territories, and the manner of regulating the expenses of transportation by sea and railway; and secondly an article concerning the manner of the distribution of the booty

In order to gain time we shall discuss the above articles with the military delegates and will agree upon a final formula under the reservation of your approval.

ALEXANDROPOULOS.

No. 8

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *May 14/27, 1913.*

We reply to the two telegrams of Captain Stratigos dated May 10 and 13.

Article 1 of the military convention. We conclude that this article has been finally worded as follows:

> In case of war against one of the two states, entered into under the circumstances provided for by their treaty of alliance, or in case of a sudden attack of important masses ("forces" preferably) of the Bulgarian army against the Greek or Serbian army, the two states promise to each other mutual support, Greece with all her land and sea forces and Serbia with all her land forces.

Captain Stratigos had telegraphed that he would define in a clearer manner the words "important masses" in order to avoid all misunderstanding, but he has not communicated to us the modification announced by him. We accept the article in its final formulation under the reservation of formulating more clearly, if necessary, the words "important masses."

Article 2. We have replied that the number of 90,000 for the Greek army should be kept.

Article 3 unchanged.

Article 4. As to the second paragraph "But if Serbia . . ." up to the end "by Bulgaria, by all her available military forces," we accept it in principle, but we would prefer that you give us a better formula insuring a proper utilization of the military forces.

Article 4 bis: "In case one of the two contracting parties should declare war against Bulgaria or against another Power, without the previous agreement and consent . . ." up to ". . . throughout the duration of the war."

Captain Stratigos has telegraphed that it was not to our interest to accept what comes after this, namely, "and shall be obliged to mobilize immediately at least 50,000 fighting men and to concentrate them in a manner so as to protect the liberty of movement of the allied

army," but he did not inform us what the Serbians had finally accepted. We think that the words "shall be obliged to concentrate —— fighting men," etc., might well be placed instead of to "mobilize, etc."

The number of fighting men shall be fixed by the General-in-Chief, taking into consideration that our army will be more numerous in future.

Article 5 unchanged.

Article 6. We have noticed that Captain Stratigos has succeeded in obtaining in our favor an improvement of the line of the military occupation proposed by the Serbians, but he should have fixed it more in detail. We insist that the line, as it shall be finally fixed, shall constitute the eventual frontier between Greece and Serbia. Besides, the Serbians seem to accept it, provided the matter is kept secret, but as compensation for this line they demand that from Karakioi, Serbia may claim a strip of territory along the Nestos of a width of 10 kilometers maximum in order to acquire a port and a railway line of her own to the Ægean Sea. This would constitute a very great advantage for Serbia and in return for this she would perhaps cede to us half of the Doiran lake. This question, too, is worthy of great attention and I shall give you supplementary instructions as to this point.

The other articles unchanged.

We accept in principle the questions dealt with in the two additional articles and are awaiting their formulation.

COROMILAS.

No. 9

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Majesty the King, at Salonika.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *May 14/27, 1913.*

I communicate to Your Majesty a telegram sent to Belgrade. I suppose that the Serbian delegates will come to Salonika and that the content of the said telegram may be of use to Captain Metaxas.

I call the attention of Your Majesty to the new demand of Serbia for an outlet to the Ægean. I think that we can accept it on con-

dition that we shall be insured the freedom of passage and the right of way for our railways. The strip of territory should, at any rate, be fixed so as to pass between Xanthi, Yenidje and Gioumouldjina, leaving these three cities outside the Serbian strip [of territory].

COROMILAS.

No. 10

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *May 17/30, 1913.*

As the situation is aggravated in consequence of the continued attacks of the Bulgarians, and we are unable to confront them without attacking them elsewhere, the President of the Ministerial Council, in agreement with His Majesty, telegraphs to you to conclude and to sign, if possible, today. If Serbia still insists on the strip of territory, you should accept it as follows:

A strip of territory, of a width of not more than ten kilometers, starting from a point to be fixed on the line Karakioi-Perelik up to the Ægean Sea, passing between Xanthi and Gioumouldjina, is ceded to Serbia, which is to insure to Greece the free passage through it, as well as all the facilities.

Answer at once.

COROMILAS.

III. INTERPRETATION

No. 11

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, at Trieste.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *July 11/24, 1914.*

The Chargé d'Affaires of Germany called upon me and read strictly confidentially a telegram from his government, according to which, as the course of events do not seem to exclude a conflict between Austria and Serbia, the Imperial Government will be at the side of its ally. Bulgaria would probably take advantage of such

a situation. It is not known if Turkey will remain indifferent. It would be desirable that Greece should break away from Serbia in time; that, under such circumstances, the conclusion of an alliance with Turkey now would seem to be impracticable, but an arrangement for mutual neutrality would seem to be indicated.

Before I gave an answer to these suggestions, I reserved to myself the right to communicate with Your Excellency and His Majesty whom I shall see this afternoon. I have, however, given assurances that the Royal Government will not fail to act in the sense of the maintenance of peace and, at the same time, I have pointed out the difficulty of our situation in case of the participation of Bulgaria which might perhaps attack Serbia, both in consequence of the obligations assumed [by us] and in view of [the danger of] our being isolated if a similar situation should subsequently present itself to Serbia in a Greco-Bulgarian conflict.

STREIT.

No. 12

Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade, to Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, at Munich.

(Telegram)

BELGRADE, *July 12/25, 1914.*

The President of the Council has just begged me to ask you: "Whether the Serbian Government can count on armed aid on the part of Greece: 1st, in case Serbia is attacked by Austria, 2nd in case Serbia is attacked by Bulgaria." A similar question will be put to the Royal Government by the Minister of Serbia in Athens.

The President of the Council has told me that Montenegro will range itself with Serbia in both contingencies, and that Rumania is taking steps to adjust the situation in order to prevent the war between Austria and Serbia, and that she will come to a decision later in case of a European War. His Excellency has added that, according to their last advices from Petersburg, the Ministerial Council in Russia has decided to support Serbia militarily, but that they are awaiting the decision of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

ALEXANDROPOULOS.

No. 13

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *July 12/25, 1914.*

I have just had a very long interview with Von Jagow, who told me that, as soon as he saw that the relations between Austria and Serbia were taking a critical turn, he instructed the representative of Germany at Athens to inform Your Excellency of this situation, and to give us the advice to draw away as much as possible from Serbia, even in case Bulgaria should participate in the Austro-Serbian conflict, which is most probable. I replied that I had knowledge of that communication, having been just informed about it by the President of the Ministerial Council from Munich,[1] and I added that Mr. Venizelos had informed me that in case Bulgaria should think it proper to intervene, Greece could not permit it and that we would also immediately intervene. Von Jagow insisted in a very particular manner on the dangers which he foresaw in the case of the intervention of Greece in order to check Bulgaria. These dangers consist, according to him, in the possibility of seeing Turkey act against us, inasmuch as Serbia would be engaged in fighting Austria, and, on the other hand, the possibility, on which he seems to be counting, of the abstention of Rumania from any interference [in favor] of Serbia, even though attacked by Bulgaria, because Rumania has always tacked about in the waters of the Triple Alliance and she would not at this moment be willing to find herself opposed to Austria and to the Triple Alliance. I insisted on the impossibility of our permitting Bulgaria to change the equilibrium established by the Treaty of Bucharest, and I explained to him that if we permitted such an aggrandizement of Bulgaria, we ran the risk of seeing this Bulgaria become stronger than ourselves and attack us a few years from now. I said at last to Von Jagow that if he wished very much that none of the Balkan States should intervene, he should act at Sofia in order to compel Bulgaria to keep quiet.

I must advise you that from the reserve which I noticed in the language of Von Jagow concerning the action of Bulgaria, I carried

[1] See document No. 11.

away the impression that Austria must have concluded some sort of an agreement with Bulgaria about a common action.

Von Jagow admitted that he fully understood the extremely delicate position in which we would be placed, but he repeated again his advice about abstention and neutrality, even in the case of Bulgarian intervention.

The Minister, reverting to the disposition of Turkey, told me that he was informed from various sources that the military party in Turkey always had far from friendly dispositions towards Greece, and that we should not lose sight of this circumstance.

THEOTOKY.

No. 14

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

MUNICH, *July 12/25, 1914.*

In regard to our attitude in case of an armed conflict between Austria and Serbia, reserving entirely our opinion on the application of the treaty of alliance, it would be necessary not to leave any doubt in the mind of those with whom you converse about our decision that we shall not stand with crossed arms in the presence of a Bulgarian attack against Serbia. It would be impossible for us to tolerate such an attack, which might result in an aggrandizement of Bulgaria and bring in question the Treaty of Bucharest. It is not only our duty as the ally of Serbia, but an imperative necessity imposed upon us for our own self-preservation.

VENIZELOS.

No. 15

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Belgrade.

(Telegram)

MUNICH, *July 13/26, 1914.*

In regard to the communication made by the President of the Ministerial Council[1] please tell His Excellency that before I give

[1] See document No. 12.

a precise answer, I must come to an understanding with His Majesty the King and the Royal Government.

But, I authorize you to say to His Excellency that I transmitted to you my personal views, authorizing you to speak to him about it in a strictly confidential manner. These are my views: First, as for the contingency of a war between Austria and Serbia, I have the firm hope that such a war, which would be a real calamity for all of us, may be avoided, thanks to the well-known conciliatory spirit of His Excellency, strengthened by the advice of Russia and by that of all the real friends of Serbia; but if, by misfortune, the war broke out, we would take a decision as soon as we became cognisant of all the elements, taking into account the efficiency of our aid. Second, in regard to the contingency of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria, I am resolved to propose to His Majesty the King and to the Royal Government to array all our forces against Bulgaria, in order to relieve Serbia from every anxiety about the Bulgarian danger and to insure the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest.

VENIZELOS.

No. 16

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *July 15/28, 1914.*

Referring to your telegram of the 12th instant[1] I have the honor to inform you that I have had a conversation with the Chargé d'Affaires of Germany, in the course of which I have explained to him that a possible interference of Bulgaria in the Austro-Serbian conflict would create for Greece the duty to oppose this by all means. If, in fact, Bulgaria, notwithstanding the declarations of Mr. Rodoslavof, should be led to take advantage of the position of Serbia in order to attack her, there would follow a real upsetting of the equilibrium of the forces in the Balkans and Greece would be in danger of being encircled and exposed to attack on the first occasion. The most elementary sentiment of self-preservation and security impels Greece not to tolerate an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria in order to reopen questions which have already been solved by the Treaty of Bucharest.

[1] See document No. 12.

Please take advantage of the first opportunity which presents itself to speak to this effect to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

STREIT.

No. 17

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

MUNICH, *July 16/29, 1914.*

At the moment when the declaration of war by Austria obliges us to face serious contingencies, I think that I must indicate to you certain guiding views.

If in a war localized between Serbia and Austria, we can remain neutral, we should not forget that our alliance obliges us to mobilize immediately forty thousand men. Still, it is in the common interest of Serbia and Greece not to proceed immediately to such a step which might provoke the general mobilization of Bulgaria and greatly risk the precipitation of some very grave events. Please give at once the necessary instructions to our minister so that he may explain to the Serbian Government the reasons for our attitude and give to it the repeated assurance of our firm resolution to mobilize immediately in case of a Bulgarian mobilization. He should add that our attitude corresponds absolutely to that which the Serbian Government had decided to take, in the common interest, at the time of our crisis with Turkey.

I am at the same time of the opinion that the coöperation of Greece and Rumania should have an immediate manifestation at Sofia, by an identical declaration of the two Cabinets that they are resolved to mobilize without delay in case of Bulgarian mobilization. Please come to an understanding with Bucharest in order that joint instructions may be given to the above effect to the respective ministers.

Besides, we should consider the possibility of a generalization of the war in order to determine beforehand our policy. My well considered opinion is that, in such a contingency, the Royal Government could at no price whatever, be induced to range itself with the camp opposed to Serbia and coöperate with her enemies against her; that would be contrary to the vital interests of Greece, the

good faith of the treaties and the dignity of the state. I shall under no pretext whatever deviate from this policy.

VENIZELOS.

No. 18

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexdropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nisch (Serbia).

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *July 20/August 2, 1914.*

In regard to the questions put by the Serbian Government concerning the attitude which the Royal Government intended to take in the Austro-Serbian conflict,[1] please make the following declaration to the President of the Ministerial Council, a copy of which you are authorized to leave with him should he request you to do so:

Without entering into an examination of the obligations resulting from its alliance with Serbia, the sole consideration that the independence and territorial integrity of Serbia are an essential factor in the Balkan equilibrium as established by the Treaty of Bucharest, to the maintenance of which Greece is firmly and resolutely attached, is sufficient to dictate to the Royal Government the decision which it should take, at least for the present, in order to come more effectively to the aid of the friendly and allied nation.

The Royal Government is convinced that it fully discharges its duty as friend and ally by the decision that it has taken to maintain towards Serbia a most benevolent neutrality and to be ready to repel every attack on the part of Bulgaria of which Serbia might be the object.

In fact, the participation of Greece in the war which is being waged, far from being useful to Serbia, would in fact be very prejudicial to her. Greece by becoming belligerent would offer to her ally but very feeble forces in comparison with the power of her adversary, while she would necessarily condemn Serbia to see Salonika, the only open port through which she [Serbia] is revictualled, become the object of the resolute attacks of Austria.

Furthermore, the entrance of Greece into the war would fatally weaken the force of her army, which it is important in the common interest to maintain intact in order to hold Bulgaria in check.

[1] See document No. 12.

The Royal Government is convinced that the Serbian Government will recognize that its decision is inspired by real anxiety for their common interests and that it bears the stamp of the greatest wisdom.

The Royal Government repeats that it is ready to face the danger of a Bulgarian attack. It has already taken all the proper steps to facilitate, if the case requires, the mobilization of its army. If it has not yet mobilized, it is only in order not to provoke in Bulgaria a similar measure, which would undoubtedly precipitate events by complicating the present state of affairs without any advantage. Besides, the Greek mobilization will be finished, when the time comes, if not sooner, at least simultaneously with that of Bulgaria.

The Royal Government hopes that its views on this subject agree absolutely with those of the Serbian Government, which, if the case requires, will kindly communicate to us its opinion.

STREIT.

No. 19

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, at Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *July 22/August 4, 1914.*

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany has just telegraphed to me asking me to go and see him immediately. As soon as I was ushered in, His Majesty handed me a telegram to read which he had just received from Your Majesty transmitted by the Chargé d'Affaires of Germany. His Majesty the Emperor asked me to telegraph at once to Your Majesty the following:

The Emperor informs Your Majesty that an alliance has been today concluded between Germany and Turkey; that Bulgaria and Rumania are equally ranging themselves on the side of Germany; that the German ships which are in the Mediterranean will be joined with the Turkish fleet in order to act together. From the above Your Majesty will see that all the Balkan States have sided with Germany in the struggle which has been undertaken against Slavism. His Majesty in bringing these considerations to the knowledge of Your Majesty begs you, appealing to a comrade, a German Marshal,— of whom the German army felt proud when that title was bestowed upon you,— and to a brother-in-law, and reminding you that it was thanks to the

support of His Imperial Majesty that Greece retained Cavalla definitely, to be pleased to order the mobilization of your army; to place yourself at the side of the Emperor and to march together, hand in hand, against Slavism, the common enemy. The Emperor added that he is making this last and earnest appeal to Your Majesty, at this most critical moment, and that he is convinced that Your Majesty will respond to his appeal. If Greece does not side with Germany then there will be a complete break between Greece and the Empire.

Finally, His Majesty told me that what he asks of you is to put into execution what Your Majesty and he had so many times discussed. He observed to me that since the Bulgarians, to whom the Emperor and Germany had never been very [favorable], are siding with Germany, he can still hope that Greece will likewise do so.

I think I must add that the Emperor appeared to me absolutely determined in what he told me.

THEOTOKY.

No. 20

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, at Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *July 22/August 4, 1914.*

After having seen the Emperor I had a long conversation with Von Jagow, who confirmed to me, under the seal of absolute secrecy, the conclusion of an alliance between Turkey and Germany. The Turkish troops will be under the high command of the Sultan and the Turkish generals, but General Liman will intervene in their direction. Bulgaria and Rumania will fight on the side of Germany. Between Turkey and Bulgaria there exists a sure understanding, thanks to which these two countries will fight against every state which does not follow the same policy. Von Jagow is of opinion that our security [imposes] upon us to fight with the other Balkan States against Russia and Serbia. On my pointing out to him the danger of a *coup de main* on the part of England to which we are exposed by reason of our geographical situation, he replied that he did not think that England would act against us.

From what I have been able to understand, the negotiations with Bulgaria are conducted in Vienna. In regard to compensations, I

have gained the impression that these are to be looked for in Serbia and Albania in case Italy maintains the reserve which she is now observing. I do not think that Vienna and Sophia have exactly agreed on the compensations which will be accorded to Bulgaria in case of success, and I have reason to believe that these have been simply outlined by the general term of "countries upon which Bulgaria has historical and ethnological rights."

If we decide to accede to the appeal of the Emperor, I think that we ought, after declaring that, in principle, we are ready to comply with that appeal, to demand precise statements as to what they wish us to do, and as to what they would secure for us in case of success. I have the impression that they would not object at all to see us aggrandized at the expense of Serbia.

I beseech you to weigh in a most careful manner the immense consequences, for the present and for the future, which a refusal on our part to accede to the appeal of the Emperor would entail.

THEOTOKY.

No. 21

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece in Berlin.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *July 25/August 7, 1914.*

I communicate to you the following telegram of His Majesty the King:

Please transmit the following, in answer to your telegram of July 22[1]:

The Emperor knows that my personal sympathies and my political views draw me to his side. I shall never forget that it is to him that we owe Cavalla. After mature reflection, however, it is impossible for me to see how I could be useful to him, if I mobilized my army immediately. The Mediterranean is at the mercy of the united fleets of England and France. They would destroy our fleet and our merchant marine, occupy our islands and especially would prevent the concentration of my army which can only be effected by sea because there does not yet exist any railway. Without being able to be useful to him in anything, we would be wiped off the map. I am necessarily of opinion that neutrality is imposed upon us, (and this could also be useful to him), with the assurance that I shall not touch his friends, my neighbors, as long as they do not touch our local Balkan interests.

CONSTANTINE R.

[1] See document No. 19. STREIT.

No. 22

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *July 25/August 7, 1914.*

The news which you give me from Constantinople may be accurate as far as the present is concerned, but this does not preclude that, notwithstanding the assurances which the Turks now give concerning their mobilization, they are pursuing the object indicated by my telegram to His Majesty. One should not lose sight of the fact that Turkey needs a whole month in order to mobilize and that she must do everything possible not to be disturbed in that. Her situation in the Balkans will present itself, as I had the honor of describing it to you, namely: Bulgaria will at a given moment march against Serbia. She will not be prevented by Rumania and will be insured against a possible attack by Turkey, so that, if Germany and Austria are victorious over Russia, it is incontestable that Bulgaria will be aggrandized at the expense of Serbia, and Rumania at that of Russia. That being so, have we an interest in watching this aggrandizement, which we can not prevent, without trying to aggrandize ourselves also? I do not think so. The only way to succeed would be to attack the Serbians together with the Bulgarians, and, if Germany and Austria are victorious, the Serbians will be so reduced that they will never be able to recover. We must try to come to an understanding for that purpose with the Bulgarians, to remain neutral as long as they also do so and to act as soon as they act. If we try to find [illegible words] we shall run the risk of being supplanted by all the others.

I think that such a policy would be perfectly comprehensible here, where they have no reason whatever to spare Serbia, which has today declared war against Germany. Furthermore, in view of the attitude which Italy maintains towards Germany and Austria, I am of opinion that, if an understanding is reached with Vienna, Berlin would have no objection whatever to our receiving compensations in Albania, for with a non-existing Serbia, the reasons which have contributed to its [Albania's] creation and maintenance will cease to exist for Austria.

Of course, I fully understand the scruples which such a policy

would inspire in you in regard to the relations that we have with Serbia; but it is now a question of our existence, and of our profiting as much as possible from the general upheaval.

THEOTOKY.

No. 23

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to His Majesty the King, at Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *July 27/August 9, 1914.*

I transmitted through Von Jagow to His Majesty the Emperor of Germany the telegram which Your Majesty has done me the honor to send under date of July 25.[1] Von Jagow told me that he thinks that the Emperor will understand the necessity indicated by Your Majesty to maintain neutrality for the present. The minister repeated to me the advice which he gave the day before yesterday, that we should come to an understanding, as soon as possible, with Sofia and Constantinople, and added that Serbia was now considered "the bear's skin."

THEOTOKY.

No. 24

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *July 29/August 11, 1914.*

I have just had a long interview with Mr. Zimmermann, which may be summarized as follows:

The Under Secretary of State thinks that Rumania does not care about the Treaty of Bucharest except in so far as that treaty concerns her. Bulgaria and Turkey are already linked together. Bulgaria will act at the favorable moment against Serbia. As for Turkey, he counts on her acting against Russia. Mr. Zimmermann does not exclude the possibility of Turkey and Bulgaria attacking us also, if we attempt to check the attack of Bulgaria against Serbia. As you see, we are isolated.

[1] See document No. 21.

Mr. Zimmermann expresses also the opinion that we must try to come to an understanding with Sofia and Constantinople, although the thing seems to him to be very difficult. If an understanding can be reached, we must remain neutral as long as the others remain so and act as soon as they act, having Serbia as the objective. If this is not done, the only thing left to us is to maintain neutrality. The Under Secretary is of opinion that as soon as the German troops have achieved one or two great victories against France, the Balkan States will act.

THEOTOKY.

No. 25

Mr. G. Streit, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *July 30/August 12, 1914.*

I have the honor to inform you that the Minister of Germany came today to speak to me again about the possibility, which His Excellency considered as being imminent, of an attack by Bulgaria against Serbia, and of the attitude which Greece should from now on take in order that she may release herself from Serbia. His Excellency furthermore demanded that Greece should, in any case, maintain neutrality and not come to the assistance of Serbia; that, in case Bulgaria while attacking Serbia was attacked by Greece, he would be obliged to demand his passports and to leave his post in order to show that he considers such an action of the Royal Government as hostile.

I replied to the Minister of Germany that I should have to consider the declaration about the possibility of the rupture of the relation with Greece as not corresponding to the present situation, because such a contingency has not yet presented itself, and that according to our information, there is not yet even a Bulgarian mobilization. If Bulgaria mobilized, we would also do so immediately, and that independently of the attitude which we would take, because otherwise Bulgaria could take advantage of it in order to attack us.

I developed afterwards at length the point of view which you know, and according to which, if we impose upon Bulgaria the maintenance of neutrality, this action has only in view our primordial right of self-preservation, has a purely Balkan character, and is not directed against the two Central Powers, one of which, namely, Ausrtia-Hungary, has

today declared to us that she is exercising in the same sense a pressure at Sofia.

I added as my personal opinion that it seemed to me that the Bulgarian mobilization should be avoided in the interests of the Central Powers themselves, because Bulgarian duplicity being known, the probability is not at all excluded that Bulgaria, once mobilized, may be carried away by the Russophile current to take sides with the Triple Entente, finding it to her interest to come to an understanding with Serbia.

Please add these arguments to the ones I have already communicated to you in my previous dispatch, and do not lose sight of the fact that the German Government, in approving our neutrality, does not demand from us at this moment to march with Bulgaria against Serbia.

Please ascertain also if the above declaration about the rupture of the relations with Greece reflects in fact the view of the German Government.

STREIT.

No. 26

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations in the countries of the Entente Powers and in Bucharest.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *August 31/September 13, 1914.*

The Minister of Germany came to see me in order to tell me that an agreement has been definitely reached between Bulgaria and Turkey. The latter will lend Bulgaria two army corps, with a view to a joint attack against Serbia, and will maintain four army corps in Thrace by way of threat against a possible attack of Rumania upon Bulgaria. The Minister of Germany told me that neither Bulgaria nor Turkey intended to attack Greece.

I replied to the Minister of Germany that, as I had already declared to him, it would be impossible for Greece to be a passive spectator of an attack by Turkey and Bulgaria upon Serbia, and that apart from her interests, her obligations as ally oblige her to go to the defense of Serbia in case the action announced should be realized.

It is not impossible that the Minister of Germany made this communication to me in order to obtain a promise of neutrality on the part of Greece, which the German Government would utilize at Sofia

in order to ask Bulgaria to come to an understanding with Turkey for the purpose of a joint attack against Serbia.

Please make the above known without delay and confidentially to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and telegraph to me his impression.

VENIZELOS.

No. 27

Mr. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *October 18/31, 1914.*

This morning I had a conversation with Mr. Zimmermann, which may be summarized as follows:

The German Government seems to be satisfied that events have obliged Russia to declare war against Turkey, for it hopes that the state of war, which will necessarily extend to France and England, will contribute, on the one hand, to the diversion of the Russian forces from their principal objective, namely, Germany and Austria, and on the other hand, it hopes that owing to the state of war, Turkey will be able to declare a sacred war in Asia, in India and in Africa, and that the rising of the Islamic world will embarrass France and particularly England, which might fear for her position in Egypt and India.

In regard to us, the Under Secretary of State gave me again the most categorical assurance that Turkey is not thinking of attacking us and that the German interests require that Turkey should limit herself to waging war against Russia. He therefore advises us to remain passive spectators in this struggle.

As for Bulgaria, Mr. Zimmermann thinks that she will not intervene for the present and he expressed the opinion that, even should Bulgaria intervene later against Serbia, we would have every interest not to intervene. Having observed to him that we have a treaty with Serbia, he answered that today treaties have very little value, and he mentioned the small importance which the treaties binding Germany and Austria to Italy and to Rumania have exercised on the attitude which these last two Powers have followed from the beginning of the war. "Try to make," concluded the Under Secretary of State, "your links with Serbia as loose as possible."

THEOTOKY.

No. 28

Communiqué of the Gounaris Cabinet given to the press on February 25/March 10, 1915, the day that it assumed power.

Greece, after her victorious wars, had the imperative need of a long period of peace in order to work for the prosperity of the country. The organization of the public services, of the land and sea forces, and the development of the public wealth would have guaranteed her against any attack on what she had acquired at so much sacrifice. They would also have permitted her to put into execution a program serving the interests of the state and to adopt a policy in conformity with the national traditions.

Under these circumstances, neutrality from the beginning of the war was a necessity for Greece. She had and always has the absolute duty to carry out her obligations of alliance and to pursue the satisfaction of her interests, without however running the danger of compromising the integrity of her territory.

The Greek Government, conscious of its duty thus to serve the interests of the country, is convinced that the patriotism of the people will insure the entire preservation of these interests.

No. 29

Mr. G. Christaki-Zographos, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nish (Serbia).

(Telegram)

Athens, *February 28/March 13, 1915.*

After the official communiqué which was published on the assumption of power by the new Cabinet,[1] I instructed our representatives at London, Paris and St. Petersburg, to give to the respective governments categorical assurances that the new Cabinet would follow the policy inaugurated by Greece from the beginning of the present war, and that in no way was it intending to deviate from a line of conduct traced by its traditional sentiments, the bonds which unite her with the Protecting Powers and her vital interests. The divergences which brought about the recent crisis had to do with the dangers of an im-

[1] See document No. 28.

mediate action, but do not touch the basis of our policy. I have expressed the same opinion to the Minister of Serbia at Athens, adding that the Royal Government is thoroughly conscious of the community of interests existing between the two allied and friendly countries and that it has always been faithfully attached to the treaty of alliance between Greece and Serbia.

Please see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and speak to him to this effect in order to dispel any uneasiness which may have arisen in his mind in consequence of the change of government in Greece.

ZOGRAPHOS.

No. 30

Mr. P. Psychas, Minister of Greece at Bucharest, to Mr. D. Gounaris, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BUCHAREST, *July 17/30, 1915.*

My English colleague has told me that according to positive information, Germany has given formal assurances to the Government of Sofia that the neutrality of Greece was definitely secured, even in case of an attack on Serbia by Bulgaria.

PSYCHAS.

No. 31

Telegraphic Circular of Mr. D. Gounaris, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome, Petrograd, Nisch (Serbia), Berlin, Vienna and Sofia.[1]

ATHENS, *July 20/August 2, 1915.*

I communicate to you herewith a telegram of our Bucharest Legation[2] and I beg you, in case similar language is used to you to repeat what we have so often declared, that a Bulgarian attack against Serbia could not leave us indifferent, and that the Bulgaro-Turkish agreement will only strengthen the bonds between the two countries.

GOUNARIS.

[1] This circular was communicated to the Minister of Greece at Bucharest.
[2] See document No. 30.

No. 32

Mr. E. Venizelos, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *August 21/September 3, 1915.*

The prospect of a possible attack against Serbia by the combined Austro-German forces continues to preoccupy intensely the Royal Government and this on account of the more and more evident *rapprochement* between Bulgaria and the Central Empires. If this *rapprochement* had no other effect than to insure to the Teutonic forces a free passage through Bulgaria, we would have no reason whatever to be alarmed. But if, taking advantage of the arrival of Teutonic forces, Bulgaria should undertake to attack Serbia, we could not remain indifferent to the prospect of a probable crushing of our ally by Bulgaria. Independently of the extent of our obligations of alliance, our vital interest would compel us to do everything in order to forestall a Bulgarian victory, of which we would become, sooner or later, the first victims.

The German Government will undoubtedly have in view these various contingencies in deciding upon the expedition through Bulgaria, but you would do well to seize a favorable opportunity in order to give again an explanation of these views in your private character, by saying that they represent the opinion predominating in the country. We think that the German Government has no interest in seeing the outbreak of a Balkan War and will continue to wish that Greece may not abandon her neutrality. We may therefore hope that, in any case, even in case the eastern expedition is organized, it will use all its influence to check Bulgaria, dissuading her from any attack on Serbia in order to insure the maintenance of peace on our own frontiers.

Please transmit without delay the result of your steps.

VENIZELOS.

No. 33

Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Legations.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *September 25/October 8, 1915.*

The new Cabinet, having studied the various aspects of the exceedingly complicated international situation before which it now finds itself, is in a position to affirm that its policy will rest on the same essential bases as the policy followed by Greece from the beginning of the European War. Greece, in order the better to insure her vital interests, will remain in a state of armed neutrality and will adapt herself to events, the evolution of which the new Cabinet will follow with unabated attention.

Please be guided by the above both in your diplomatic conversations and interviews with the representatives of the press.

ZAÏMIS.

No. 34

Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Alexandropoulos, Minister of Greece at Nish (Serbia).

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *September 29/October 12, 1915.*

The Minister of Serbia left with me a copy of a telegram from his government, which, considering that the expectation of an impending attack of the Bulgarian forces against the Serbian army constitutes the *casus foederis* provided for by our alliance, requests us to inform it at once if, in accordance with our agreements, the Greek army will be ready to act against Bulgaria, and if the Royal Government will be disposed to give to the General Staff the necessary instructions to come to an understanding with the Serbian Staff in order to determine the details of the plan for a coöperation against Bulgaria.

The Royal Government regrets exceedingly that it can not accede to the demand of the Serbian Government formulated in that manner.

In the first place, it considers that in the present circumstances, the *casus foederis* does not arise. In fact, the alliance which was concluded in the year 1913 in anticipation of a Bulgarian attack and with the view of establishing and maintaining an equilibrium of forces between the States of the Peninsula after the partition of the territories obtained by joint conquest from the Ottoman Empire, has, according to the very preamble of the treaty, a purely Balkan character, imposing in no way the application of the treaty in the contingency of a general conflagration. In spite of the generality of the terms of article first, the treaty of alliance and the military convention which completes it, prove that the contracting parties had in view only the hypothesis of a singlehanded attack by Bulgaria directed against one of them. Article 4 of the military convention furnishes in itself the proof of this, because being intended to limit the aid of one of the allies already occupied elsewhere, it does not foresee any other *casus foederis* but the attack of Bulgaria against the other ally. Nowhere is there any question of a combined attack of two or more Powers. On the contrary, no matter how broad the general provision of the first article of the military convention may be in its terms, it is limited to the hypothesis of a war between one of the two allied states and a single other Power. And it could not have been otherwise; it would have been an act of foolish conceit in the event that one of the parties would be at war with several states at the same time, to stipulate the granting of an evidently feeble and ridiculous assistance of the military forces of the other party.

It is therefore beyond question that exactly this hypothesis now presents itself. If the Bulgarian attack feared by the Serbian Government takes place, it will be due to an agreement made with Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. It will be carried out in combination with the attack already undertaken against Serbia by the two Central Empires. It will appear as an incident of the European War. The Serbian Government itself has already recognized that this was the character of the attack by breaking her diplomatic relations with Bulgaria in order to follow the example of the Entente Powers, her European allies, without previously coming to an understanding with Greece, her Balkan ally. It is therefore evident that the attack will be found to be outside the provisions as well as the spirit of our alliance.

But the Royal Government is not only convinced that under these

circumstances it is not bound by any contractual obligation, but it is also persuaded that its military assistance offered spontaneously at such a time would badly serve the common interest of both countries. It is on account of this interest that it has remained neutral in the European War, believing that the best service which it could render to Serbia was to hold Bulgaria in check, preserving its forces intact and its communications free in view of a possible attack on her part. It was always ready to face the Bulgarian danger even in case it should appear in the course of the European War, although Serbia was already struggling with two great Powers. For that reason, it hastened immediately to answer the Bulgarian mobilization by a general mobilization of its army. But it had always in view a Bulgarian attack undertaken separately, even though in connection with the other hostilities undertaken against Serbia. The hypothesis of an attack concerted with that of other Powers was and ought to be outside of its anticipations; because Greece, intervening in such a case, would have been lost, without having the least hope of saving Serbia. Evidently, Serbia can not desire such a result. The common interest requires, on the contrary, that the Greek forces should be kept in reserve for a better use of them subsequently. It is therefore of importance that Greece should remain neutral and under arms and should follow attentively the march of events, with the resolution always, and by the most appropriate means, to watch over the preservation of her own vital interests and the protection of the interests which she has in common with Serbia.

The Royal Government, being convinced that the Serbian Government will recognize the correctness of the reasons which prevent Greece, in the present circumstances, from promising its armed assistance to Serbia, and feeling a profound regret for the actual impossibility, for the present, of doing more for Serbia, wishes to assure her, that faithful to their friendship, she will continue to give her all the aid and facilities compatible with her international position.

Please read the above to Mr. Pachitch, leaving with him a copy if he asks for it.

ZAÏMIS.

No. 35

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to all the Royal Legations.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *October 26/November 8, 1915.*

The new Cabinet intends to follow in foreign affairs exactly the same policy as its predecessor. I am referring, in regard to this, to the dispatch of my predecessor of September 25th.[1] In your diplomatic conversations with the representatives of the press, please be inspired by the declarations therein contained.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 36

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. J. Panourias, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Mitrovitsa (Serbia).

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *October 26/November 8, 1915.*

In speaking to the Serbian Government, please give the most categorical assurances of the sentiments of sincere friendship with which we are animated toward Serbia, as well as of our firm resolution to continue to afford her all the facilities and every support compatible with our vital interests.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 37

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *October 26/November 8, 1915.*

In speaking with the Minister for Foreign Affairs please give on my behalf the most categorical assurance of our firm resolution to continue our neutrality with the character of the sincerest benevolence

[1] See document No. 33.

towards the Entente Powers. Please add that the new Cabinet adopts as its own the repeated declarations of Mr. Zaïmis about the friendly attitude of the Royal Government towards the Allied troops in Salonika; that it is too conscious of its real interests and of what it owes to the Protecting Powers of Greece to deviate in the least from this line of conduct. It therefore hopes that the sentiments of friendship of these Powers for Greece will not at any time be influenced by the malicious and misleading news which is circulated intentionally in the vain hope of impairing the good relations of the Entente with Greece.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 38

Mr. J. Panourias, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece in Serbia, to Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

MITROVITSA, *November 2/15, 1915.*

I duly spoke to the President of the Ministerial Council according to the import of your telegram of the 26th ultimo [1] received late yesterday evening, telling him of the declarations contained in the telegram of September 25th.[2] I developed again the arguments supporting our point of view. The President of the Council thanked me for the communication and added that the vital interests of Greece are identical with those of Serbia, that the aggrandizement of Bulgaria would be the ruin both of Serbia and of Greece, that the victory of the Austro-Germans could by no means guarantee the vital interests of Greece, and that he has the firm hope that Greece will intervene at the last moment.

I also had a conversation to the same import with the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, who told me nearly the same thing as the President of the Council, and communicated to me, — justifying himself for the delay due to the march of events, — the reply of the Serbian Government given by [illegible words] on the foreign policy of the Zaïmis Cabinet.

Here is the text of this reply:

[1] See document No. 36.

[2] See document No. 33.

"At the end of September last, the Minister of Greece in Serbia delivered to the Serbian Government a copy of a telegram from his government[1] in which Greece, in reply to the appeal made to her by Serbia at the moment when the Bulgarian attack against Serbia was impending, declared that she regretted that she was not able to give a favorable answer to our appeal to intervene against Bulgaria as soon as the latter should attack Serbia.

The reasons given by Greece in that reply were, that she considered that such a possible attack by Bulgaria at the present moment came under the contingencies of the European War and that in no case could it constitute a *casus foederis,* the Greco-Serbian alliance having a purely Balkan character.

The Serbian Government, being solely inspired by the solidarity of the vital interests of Greece and Serbia in the face of the Bulgarian danger, — the importance of which is also recognized by Greece in her reply, — considers that it is its duty to submit to the Greek Government the arguments which militate in favor of immediate action by Greece against Bulgaria. The spirit of the treaty of alliance, which guarantees the territorial integrity of each of the contracting states in case of attack, as well as its text, in which no mention is made that the treaty will cease to have binding force if Bulgaria is in alliance with another Power, prove in a clear and logical manner that Greece is bound to come to the assistance of Serbia, if the latter, without provocation on her part, is attacked by Bulgaria or another Power. The Serbian Government has not the slightest doubt that Bulgaria is attacking Serbia solely for the purpose of taking away from her the territories which she acquired by the Treaties of London and Bucharest, and in order to prevent Serbia and Greece from having contiguous frontiers. The object of the treaty of alliance with Serbia is to guarantee the situation which was created after the wars in the Balkan Peninsula, and this treaty has the character of a treaty of mutual guarantee of the integrity of Serbia and Greece. (Article 1st) This article, in fact, does not state that Serbia and Greece must be attacked by one enemy only and not by many; it speaks of an attack in general and not of the number of the attacking Powers. To suppose that the treaty foresaw the case of the attack of one Power only and not of more, would mean that the treaty was intended to guarantee Greece and Serbia against the lesser danger but not against the greatest dangers. It therefore results from this interpretation that the application of the treaty would cease to have binding force precisely at the moment when it was most necessary.

The attack of Bulgaria against Serbia shows, according to the opinion of the Serbian Government, the evident intention of changing the existing situation in the Balkans. But even if it had been only

[1] See document No. 34.

an incident in the present European War and not an event of a preëminently Balkan character, the important question would have been not to know what is the character of this war, but what is its object and what are the consequences which may result from it? Whether the territorial *status quo* in the Balkans is changed through a purely Balkan war, or through a combined European and Balkan war, amounts to the same thing. In either case the Greco-Serbian interests are equally injured. [The disadvantage offered by the possibility] of a combined attack of Germans and Bulgarians against Serbia is [counterbalanced] by the military aid of the Powers of the Triple Entente, who have as their object the maintenance of the situation which was created and guaranteed by the Treaty of Bucharest.

Serbia in breaking diplomatic relations with Bulgaria without previously coming to an understanding with Greece, did not wish to recognize the European character of the possible Bulgarian attack; she wished only to characterize the Bulgarian mobilization as being directed against Serbia and [to consider it as] a menace to her existence. She did not come to an understanding with Greece in regard to the breaking of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria for the simple reason that she did not have the choice and it did not depend upon her to break or to maintain those relations. The rupture became inevitable on account of the aggressive attitude of Bulgaria. Therefore, we think that Greece, having ordered without a previous understanding with Serbia the general mobilization of her army immediately after the Bulgarian general mobilization, has [acted] in the same [manner as Serbia].

Greece herself recognizes that the present Serbo-Bulgarian war may endanger her own interests, and for that reason she promises to intervene at a favorable time, as much for the guarantee of our common interests as for her own special interests; but, according to the opinion of the Greek Government, this intervention, in order to become effective, must be made at a favorable time. The Greek Government then admits that it may intervene in the present war against the Bulgarian danger, which might present itself during the European War; it [admits] consequently the [possibility] of an intervention against two adversaries of Serbia, but only if their attack against Serbia is simultaneous and not combined, which from the military standpoint is the same thing. Whether therefore her adversaries are allies or not, Serbia is bound to fight on two fronts and the military difficulties for Greece are the same.

[However], the Greek Government recognizing the possibility of its intervention during this war, considers that this intervention, should take place at the apportune moment. It is more than evident that Serbia and Greece, joining their forces, could defeat the Bulgarians even if the latter were aided by the Germans, more easily than Greece, if isolated, could defeat a Bulgaro-German coalition, to which she would have previously given time to defeat Serbia.

Greece by her present attitude gives to this coalition the opportunity of subduing first Serbia and afterwards Greece, while it is certain that it could not vanquish them simultaneously.

Having in view all the above [arguments] and the common [Greco-Serbian] interests, [the Serbian Government] begs to draw the attention of the Greek Government to the fact that Greece has repeatedly given to us the assurance that she would take part in the war, under the reservation only that Bulgaria must first attack Serbia. [The very interest] of Greece imposes upon her the duty of beginning operations immediately against Bulgaria with all her forces, even if no Greco-Serbian treaty of alliance existed. Any delay in the intervention of Greece may become fatal not only to Serb a but also to Greece. The Serbian Government therefore makes a final appeal to the Greek Government in order that this intervention may be effected immediately."

PANOURIAS.

No. 39

Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris, to Mr. E. Skouloudis President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, *March 28/April 10, 1916.*

I have the honor to inform you that the rejection by the Royal Government of the proposals of the British and French Ministers concerning the question of facilitating [the passage] of the Serbian army through our territory, which came to the knowledge of the Ministry many days ago, has disposed the French Government very unfavorably toward us. Mr. Briand told me that under these conditions there could no longer be any question of furnishing to us an advance of 150 millions asked for by the Royal Government. The commissary officer Bonnier told me the same thing in regard to the army supplies. For three days the newspapers, particularly the *Echo de Paris*, have published very violent articles, and news suggesting a blockade and other coercive measures on account of the attitude of Greece in general, without referring to the question of the passage of the Serbian troops. I have asked a well informed journalist, an acquaintance of mine, the reason for this campaign. He told me that this language of the French press is due to our refusal to allow the passage to the Serbians. They avoid, however, for the moment, speaking about the question of the passage of the [Serbian army], because, if the public were informed

about it, there would be a general reprobation of us and the French Government would perhaps be obliged to adopt an attitude which is repugnant to Mr. Briand, who desires to maintain friendly relations between the two countries. The President of the Council would like to have the Serbians transported by sea around the Matapan promontory, but the Minister of Marine is opposed to it, because he considers the passage as dangerous and difficult on account of the submarines. It can not be denied that if a Serbian transport were sunk, public opinion would throw the responsibility for it upon us.

ROMANOS.

No. 40

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Romanos, Minister of Greece at Paris.[1]

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *March 29/April 11, 1916.*

I can not but be painfully surprised by the declaration of Mr. Briand that, on account of the point of view of the Royal Government in the matter of the passage of the Serbian army, there can no longer be any question of giving to us the advance of the 150 millions which we had asked. In fact, we did not ask this advance as a price for the violation of neutrality, to which we never thought of consenting, and nothing in our attitude can permit the French Government to attach such a meaning to our request. We asked the financial assistance of the Western Powers, thinking rightly that it could not be a matter of indifference to them to see Greece weakened militarily and disorganized financially. This point of view was certainly preoccupying the Powers because they did not oppose to our request any refusal of acceptance in principle. Under these circumstances, the difficulty which has now arisen does not seem to be of a nature to alter the position of the financial matter, unless Mr. Briand intends to set aside deliberately considerations of a general and permanent order, in order to inflict upon Greece a sort of punishment for her refusal to consent to a serious violation of her neutrality. This conclusion is so illogical and iniquitous that it is impossible that it can be definitively

[1] This telegram was communicated to the Royal Legations at London, Rome, and Petrograd.

reached by a mind so penetrating and liberal as that of Mr. Briand, and this all the more because he is too keen not to perceive that, if Greece, wishing to remain neutral, is obliged to repulse energetically every new violation of her neutrality, she does not possess the necessary means to resist the pressure of a coalition of great Powers. There are many things that Greece has had to submit to or endure because she could not help herself and the Powers already know this, from long experience. There are others which, on account of the rapidity of their execution and the fact that they are less annoying to our country, escape the action and even the vigilance of the authorities. Thus, in the very matter which had so excited the Powers, something has just happened which confirms the experience of the past, because Sunday evening the French transport *Jean Corbiere*, carrying Serbian detachments from Corfu to Salonika, passed through the canal of Corinth, almost completely unobserved, thanks to its innocent exterior.

Please be guided by the above, and have a semi-official and friendly conversation with Mr. Briand, in which you will not have any trouble in making him understand that Greece, being placed between two groups of Powers, is obliged to submit to the recriminations, the protests and the bad humor of the one, whenever her neutrality is in fact violated in favor of the other, and that, under these conditions, it is impossible for the Royal Government to maintain officially an attitude different from her present attitude.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 41

Note-verbale of the Serbian Government to the Hellenic Government communicated by Mr. J. Balougdjitch, Minister of Serbia at Athens.

ATHENS, *April 7/20, 1916.*

In order that the transportation to Salonika of the Serbian troops, now in Corfu, may be effected as soon as possible (which is undoubtedly also the desire of the Greek Government) and with the least possible risk (this being the principal anxiety of the Serbian Government) it is necessary that the transportation should be done by land from Patras.

The Serbian Government appeals first of all to the sentiments of humanity of the Hellenic Government, and begs that it may permit this passage; because, although there are other ways in Greek territory through which this transportation can be effected, the Serbian

Government insists on the above mentioned road simply for the sake of avoiding the sinking of any of its transports. The losses sustained by Serbia during this war are so great and so much out of proportion to her real forces, that the Serbian Government considers it has the right to find the means of avoiding at least unnecessary losses which are not connected with the operations.

This desire seems to it the better founded as the Hellenic Government, by permitting to the Serbian army this passage through its territory, would in no way help the military operations and, consequently, would not be suspected of departing from the neutral conduct which it has observed up to the present. It would simply perform an act of friendship and of benevolent neutrality towards Serbia, upon which the Serbian Government hopes to be able to count by reason of the very spirit of the Greco-Serbian treaty, independently of the interpretations which may be given to its various provisions.

Awaiting with confidence the decision of the Greek Government, the Serbian Government considers it to be its friendly duty to call its attention to the disagreeable consequences which might result to Greco-Serbian relations, from a possible accident which might happen to a transport of Serbian troops, in consequence of the refusal of the Greek Government to permit their passage by land.

No. 42

Mr. E. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris and London.[1]

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *April 8/21, 1916.*

The Minister of Serbia came to see me yesterday and handed to me a note[2] by which Serbia, appealing to Greece as an ally, begs her to consent to the transportation of the Serbian troops now at Corfu to Salonika, via Patras and the railway. The reason given is that any other means of transportation incurs the risk of the destruction of the ships carrying these troops by enemy submarines.

In my answer, I declared to the Minister that I had already replied to the representatives of the Entente that the transportation of the Serbian troops by land could not possibly be permitted by the Royal

[1] This telegram was communicated to the Royal Legations at Rome and Petrograd.

[2] See document No. 41.

Government and that, consequently, I could not enter into any new conversation on this subject.

I called to the Minister's attention that my declaration was categorical and could in no way be modified, but that I had no objection to having a study of an absolutely private nature made into the question but that it could in no case, however, have a political result or influence the declarations which we have already made. The Minister said that he would telegraph to this effect to his government.

I communicate the above to you for your exclusive guidance and beg you not to make any use of it in your conversations, unless the Minister for Foreign Affairs first brings up the question of this step of the Serbian representative.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 43

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at London, Rome and Petrograd.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *April 14/27, 1916.*

Continuing my telegram of the 8th instant,[1] I have the honor to inform you that on Tuesday the Ministers of France and England came and declared to me that their governments had instructed them to support the step taken by the Minister of Serbia on April 7, and to give me the assurance that in using our railway the Serbian troops would not stop at Athens or anywhere else, except to change trains.

I replied that these declarations were to no purpose, since the Royal Government persisted resolutely in its refusal, expressed from the very beginning, to permit any transportation of foreign troops by our railways.

As Monsieur Guillemin said in reply that he had learned from the Minister of Serbia that I was negotiating with him, I answered that that was a serious error. I told him what had passed between the Minister of Serbia and myself, according to the statement contained in my above mentioned telegram of the 8th instant, and I affirmed that, according to our opinion, the exchange of views between the respective officers could in no way modify our decision to oppose energetically the passage by land of the Serbian troops.

[1] See document No. 42.

I gave the same explanation to the Minister of Serbia, who came to see me after his colleagues of France and England, and to the Ministers of Russia and Italy, who came on Wednesday to make the same representation as the other [two ministers].

As the Ministers of the Entente, and particularly Monsieur Guillemin, do not seem to have well understood the very serious and absolutely legitimate reasons for our refusal, I consider it necessary to record them here, requesting you to explain to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the hope that, realizing the gravity of the situation, he will be good enough to use all his influence at Paris to persuade the French Government to renounce the plan of having the Serbian army pass through our territory.

Such a passage would constitute the most flagrant and the most serious violation of our sovereignty and neutrality, which the other belligerent group would consider as a hostile act on the part of Greece, because it would amount to a grip on the very heart of our country. It would fatally create an unbearable derangement of the transportation of persons and goods over the principal railway of the kingdom. It would result, notwithstanding all assurances to the contrary, by the very force of circumstances, in the establishment of encampments of foreign troops in proximity to our principal cities and up to the very suburbs of the capital, thereby causing inevitable friction with the local authorities, inconveniences for the revictualling of our own populations, and serious dangers to the preservation of order and public health. It would finally lead to constant interferences of foreigners in the administration of the public services and to numerous arbitrary acts and restrictions upon personal liberty, of which we are constant spectators and have had sad experience at Salonika and Corfu.

It is because public opinion has immediately perceived the real danger to which the independence of the country would be thus exposed, being threatened in its most vital activities, that it rose indignantly against the plan of the passage by land and is resolved to demand from the Royal Government to use all its power in order to prevent its realization. Public opinion although bearing hard the numerous violations which have already taken place, has submitted to them with a resignation which hardly concealed its emotion, whenever it was possible to excuse them on the ground of military necessity. But this time its patience is exhausted and its indignation, aroused to

the point of leading it to commit desperate acts, is justified because the Entente can not allege any necessity for the passage of the Serbians by land, since their transports navigate the Mediterranean in all directions from Alexandria to Salonika, from Salonika to Marseilles, from Marseilles to Corfu, without suffering much from the attacks of the enemy submarines. Therefore, it can not seriously be contended that there exists a greater danger to the transportation of the Serbians by sea, particularly since the canal of Corinth and the Straits of Euboia, the use of which we tolerate, allow the voyage to be limited to very small areas outside of our narrow seas. On the other hand, it can not be denied that the Serbians themselves were transported from Albania to Corfu, without any accident, notwithstanding the submarines and the mines in the Adriatic.

Under these circumstances, the civilized world will unanimously justify the legitimate resistance of the Royal Government, just as it would unanimously condemn as a monstrous abuse of power any attempt of the Entente Powers to ignore our refusal.

Please telegraph at once the result of your conversation.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 44

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *April 14/27, 1916.*

I communicate to you the following telegram [1] which I have just sent to London, Petrograd and Rome, by which please be guided in your conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs about this serious matter in a purely private character and in your own name. I am really of opinion that, in view of the obstinacy shown by the French Minister, who claims to interpret faithfully the instructions of his government, every official discussion is not only useless but may embitter the relations which, on our part, we continue to wish to be sincere and friendly.

SKOULOUDIS.

See document No. 43.

PART SECOND

The Germano-Bulgarian Invasion in Macedonia

No. 45

Lieutenant General Baïras, Commander of the 6th Division, to the General Staff of the Army, Athens.

(Telegram)

Serres, *April 27/May 10, 1916.*

A Bulgarian major, who met one of our officers, declared to him that by reason of an agreement entered into between Mackensen and our government, the Germano-Bulgarians were permitted to occupy any point situated [up to] two kilometers of the frontier which might be considered suitable from a strategical and tactical point of view, and that, relying on this authorization and in consequence of an order from the Commander-in-Chief, he had occupied the hills dominating Lehovo; that all the boundary line was at our disposal, except the occupied points, that the entrance of Bulgarian troops into Lehovo had been forbidden and that [he expected] a friendly settlement of the question.

Baïras.

No. 46

Lieutenant General Yannakitsas, Minister of War, to the IV Army Corps, at Cavalla.

(Telegram)

Athens, *April 28/May 11, 1916.*

The agreement entered into between the Germans and the Bulgarians stipulates that in the section Ali Boutous — Seïmen-Kayassi we shall retire one to two kilometers from the boundary line, while the Germans and the Bulgarians may reach the boundary line without crossing it, in order that a neutral zone may be formed to our disadvantage, since the Germano-Bulgarians are defending themselves

against the English and the French established in our territory. Consequently, both the slight advances to the north of Vetrina as well as the advance made near Lehovo constitute a violation of our agreement. Inform the Bulgarian major of Lehovo that he is mistaken about the agreement. Explain to him what is really going on and tell him that the dispute will be settled by the governments. Add that, not doubting his good faith and in order to maintain friendly relations between the two states, you will not use force against him, and that he can stay where he is until the question now pending is settled by the government, but that you will prevent by force any new advance on his part or on the part of any other detachment. All this you will tell him as coming from you. The 3rd Army Corps should, in what concerns it, conform itself to the contents of the present order.

YANNAKITSAS.

No. 47

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *April 29/May 12, 1916.*

Bulgarian troops have occupied certain points in our territory to the north of Vetrina and the heights of Lehovo. A Bulgarian major explained to one of our officers of the boundary region that these occupations were made in accordance with the agreement entered into between Marshal Mackensen and the Royal Government, according to which the Bulgarians have acquired the right to occupy any point which might be useful for their operations in a zone of two kilometers on this side of the frontier. This is an evident mistake. What we have consented to is only that the Bulgarians should not be bound to respect the neutral zone of one kilometer on each side of the frontier which was established in fact in the beginning of our mobilization, and that in the sector of Ali Boutous—Seïmen-Kayassi we would withdraw our troops to a distance of one to two kilometers on this side of the frontier; the Germano-Bulgarians can, therefore, carry on operations there up to the frontier, but without crossing it. Consequently, the Bulgarian advance to Vetrina and Lehovo,

far from being in accordance with the agreement, is an evident violation of it. Our officer on the boundary line explained to the Bulgarian major his mistake and [told him] that he tolerated temporarily, pending a friendly settlement between the two governments, the occupations which have been wrongly effected, but that he would oppose by force any new advance.

Please explain the above to the Minister for Foreign Affairs begging him kindly to see that orders are given to the Bulgarian troops operating on the frontier to evacuate the points occupied in our territory and to respect strictly the agreement entered into, in order to avoid incidents the consequences of which might be very regrettable.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 48

Letter sent by Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, *May 9/22, 1916.*
(Received May 10/23, 1916.)

Mr. President of the Council:

In consequence of the aggressive measures recently undertaken by the troops of the Entente, Germany and her Allies are obliged to enter Greek territory in order to insure the free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel. This is a purely defensive measure which is due exclusively to the movements of the military forces of the Entente, and which will be maintained within the limits dictated by purely military interests.

Proceeding from this point of view, the Imperial Government of Germany does not hesitate at all to give to the Royal Hellenic Government the following assurances:

(1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely respected.

(2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist.

(3) Greek sovereignty will be respected.

(4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious conditions will be respected.

(5) Any damage caused by the German troops during their stay in Greek territory will be indemnified.

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly manner towards the population of the country.

Please receive, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high consideration.

MIRBACH.

No. 49

Letter sent by Mr. G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria at Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, *May 9/22, 1916.*
(Received May 10/23, 1916.)

Mr. President of the Council:

Bulgaria and her Allies are obliged, on account of the aggressive movement of the troops of the Entente, to insure to themselves the free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel and for that object to effect the advance of their troops in Greek territories. It is merely a purely defensive measure which has been rendered necessary by the actions of the Entente, and which will be strictly limited to the military necessities.

The Royal Government of Bulgaria begs furthermore to make to the Royal Government of Greece the following declarations:

(1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely respected.

(2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist.

(3) Greek sovereignty will be respected.

(4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious conditions will be respected.

(5) Any damage caused by the Bulgarian troops during their stay in Greek territory will be indemnified.

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly manner toward the population of the country.

Please receive, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high consideration.

G. PASSAROF.

No. 50

Letter of Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at Athens.

ATHENS, *May 10/23, 1916.*

Mr. Minister:

I have received the communication under yesterday's date which Your Excellency honored me by transmitting in order to inform me that

in consequence of the aggressive measures recently undertaken by the troops of the Entente, Germany and her Allies are obliged to enter Greek territory in order to insure the free passage of the very important narrow passes of Roupel; this is a purely defensive measure which is due exclusively to the movements of the military forces of the Entente, and which will be maintained within the limits dictated by purely military interests; that proceeding from this point of view, the Imperial Government of Germany does not hesitate at all to give to the Royal Hellenic Government the following assurances:

(1) The territorial integrity of the kingdom will be absolutely respected.

(2) The Allied troops will evacuate the Greek territory as soon as the military reasons requiring this action shall cease to exist.

(3) Greek sovereignty will be respected.

(4) Personal liberty, private property and the existing religious conditions will be respected.

(5) Any damage caused by the German troops during their stay in Greek territory will be indemnified.

(6) The Allies will conduct themselves in an absolutely friendly manner toward the population of the country.

I take note of all the assurances contained in this communication, and beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of my high consideration.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 51

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria at Athens.

(Letter)

ATHENS, *May 11/24, 1916.*

Mr. Minister:

Acknowledging receipt of your communication of yesterday's date, I have the honor to bring to your knowledge that I take note of all the declarations contained therein.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurance of my high consideration.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 52

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *May 13/26, 1916.*

I have reasons which make me believe that we must count on the possibility of an approaching advance of the Germans and Bulgarians in the narrow passes of Roupel.

THEOTOKY.

No. 53

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Berlin, Vienna and Sofia.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *May, 14/27, 1916.*

Yesterday afternoon German and Bulgarian detachments crossed our boundaries at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which resorted to force in order to hold its position. Other detachments, consisting of 25,000 men, coming down this morning from the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina, occupied the heights toward Demir-Hissar and the bridge over the Strouma. They also took possession of the wooden bridge of Demir-Hissar. The population of this region is panic-stricken and is preparing to emigrate *en masse,* for it still retains the sad memory of the Bulgarian persecutions of 1912 and 1913.

This irruption into Greek territory is contrary to the agreement entered into between the German and Bulgarian military authorities and our own, according to which their troops, having been released from the obligation of observing the neutral zone established since the mobilization, could advance up to the boundary line but not cross it. In face of the excitement caused by the above mentioned invasion, not only among the populations of the invaded regions but also on public opinion throughout Greece, the Royal Government is bound to protest in the strongest manner to the Imperial German Government and to the governments of its Allies, and to insist that

orders be given to evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territory invaded by the German and Bulgarian troops.

Please proceed without delay to a firm representation to the above import to the government to which you are accredited and acquaint me immediately with the result.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 54

Letter sent by Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, (1) to Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany, (2) to Mr. J. Szilassy, Minister of Austria-Hungary, (3) to G. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria, City.

ATHENS, *May 15/28, 1916.*

Mr. Minister:

On the afternoon of the day before yesterday German and Bulgarian detachments crossed our frontier at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which was obliged to resort to force in order to hold its position. Other German and Bulgarian detachments, consisting of nearly 25,000 men, penetrated yesterday the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina and occupied the heights towards Demir-Hissar, as well as the bridges of Strouma and Demir-Hissar.

This sudden irruption of important forces into Greek territory not only constitutes a violation of neutrality, but is also contrary to the agreement entered into between our military authorities and those of the German and Bulgarian armies, according to which the troops of the Central Powers, having been released from the obligation of observing the neutral zone established since the mobilization, could advance up to the Greek boundary line but without crossing it.

In face of this violation of neutrality and the lively emotion caused by it, not only among the populations of the invaded regions but also on public opinion throughout Greece, I must address to Your Excellency the strongest protests of the Royal Government, begging you to transmit them to your government, and I must insist that the German and Bulgarian troops evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territories invaded by them.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my high consideration.

S. SKOULOUDIS.

No. 55

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome, Bucharest, Petrograd and Constantinople, and the Consulate General at Berne.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *May 16/29, 1916.*

I have the honor to inform you that on the afternoon of the 13th of this month, German and Bulgarian detachments crossed our frontier at Koula, to the north of Demir-Hissar, and attempted to occupy the fortress of Roupel, the garrison of which was obliged to resort to force in order to hold its position. Other German and Bulgarian detachments, consisting of nearly 25,000 men, penetrated next day the sectors of Tsingheli and Vetrina and occupied the heights towards Demir-Hissar, as well as the bridges of Strouma and Demir-Hissar.

In face of this violation of Greek territory, the Royal Government addressed yesterday evening to the Governments of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria a strong protest and demanded that the German and Bulgarian armies evacuate as soon as possible the Greek territories invaded by them.

You may communicate the above in your next conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but without calling on him specially or giving him a copy.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 56

Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

BERLIN, *May 17/30, 1916.*

A communiqué of the General Staff announces only today the advance of the German and Bulgarian troops to the narrow passes of Roupel as follows:

German and Bulgarian forces, in order to insure themselves against the sudden attacks which the troops of the Entente were intending to undertake, occupied the complex of the narrow passes of Roupel, near the Strouma. The weak Greek outpost withdrew before superior numbers. The sovereign rights of Greece have been respected.

THEOTOKY.

No. 57

Mr. L. Coromilas, Minister of Greece at Rome, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

ROME, *May 17/30, 1916.*

I have seen some persons of importance since the telegrams from Greece and Sofia have announced that the Bulgarians with fifes and drums, have entered our territory occupying our outposts and villages, on the heels of our soldiers who withdrew without resistance. The impression which it made here is deplorable. For they recall our recent declaration that we would never allow our hereditary enemy, — from whom we can expect nothing but misfortunes and ruin, — to cross our frontier and to tread as conqueror the soil of Greece. Many persons ask what our assurances are worth; and the Italians are ready to believe that, as in Macedonia, so also in Epirus, we shall retreat before the Bulgarians, with or without the Austrians, and that it is better that no account whatever be taken of us, of our deceitful promises, and of our imaginary guarantees. Bulgaria, having at the head a German Marshal, who is her own king, invaded Greece under auspices such as she could never have dreamed of; she will never depart from there, unless we have the force to throw her out of our territory, and this force they do not see either in our will or in our army. If she is defeated, she will be defeated by others than us; if victorious, she will again and firmly erect her flag on the very spots which she has drenched with Greek blood in her old massacres, and very delusive is the hope that she will be dislodged in favor of those who have not fought.

COROMILAS.

No. 58

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, *May 19/June 1, 1916.*

The impressions of the French Government on the invasion of Greek Macedonia were communicated to me by the Director of Political Affairs in a long conversation with him, which is as follows:

Mr. Margerie told me that public opinion was under the impression that the events which have taken place during these last days are the result of an agreement between Greece and the Central Powers. Furthermore, information from German sources proclaims it. As for the French Government, it was disposed to accept the explanation that considerations of defense had led the Bulgarians to occupy strategical positions such as the narrow passes which the fortress of Roupel commands, but the advance of the Bulgarian army into the interior of Greek Macedonia, the occupation by it of the environs of cities coveted by Bulgaria, the possible march of the Bulgarians on Cavalla, must necessarily lead it to draw the natural conclusion that Greece must have received assurances guaranteeing the restitution of these regions, of the value of which assurances she ought not to have the slightest illusion.

In any case, the situation has just changed radically by reason of the Bulgarian advance. In fact, Greece, by her passive attitude in the face of an invasion which might weaken the military situation of the Allies, appears to be abandoning her policy of benevolent neutrality, and, consequently, the Entente can not but resume the necessary freedom in order to insure the preponderance of its armies acting in the Balkans. This freedom has reference as much to military operations as to measures of internal police, and General Sarrail has to that effect received orders giving him an extent of action larger than heretofore.

In my conversation with Mr. Margerie, I did not fail to make use of the information transmitted to me by your telegram.[1]

CACLAMANOS.

No. 59

Mr. D. Panas, Minister of Greece at Petrograd, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PETROGRAD, *May 21/June 3, 1916.*

The Director of Political Affairs, speaking to me on the situation in Greece, told me today that in France and in England there is much irritation against us and that in official circles here there is the impres-

[1] See document No. 55.

sion, if not the conviction, that the occupation of Roupel and the advance of the Bulgarians in Macedonia, to which Greece has consented, prove the existence of a preliminary agreement with Bulgaria. They combine with these facts, upon which they comment very fully, the interview of General Dousmanis, published in April by a Swedish newspaper, a telegraphic summary of which, by a surprising coincidence, was only transmitted here yesterday. I hastened to explain to the Director that there was no truth in all this, and that one could not base a judgment as to the policy of a government on mere suppositions and attribute to it a design which it never had. As the words of the General have probably been distorted by the newspaper, I think it would be proper to make, as soon as possible, a categorical denial of the declarations attributed [to him].

I understand that the withdrawal of the guarantees which were given to us at the time of the temporary occupation of our territories is now the subject of an exchange of views between the Entente Powers and we may expect coercive measures.

I must add that the Director is in constant touch with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and reflects in his conversations the views of his chief.

PANAS.

No. 60

MINUTES OF THE BOULÉ OF THE HELLENES

53d Session, May 23/June 5, 1916.

(Extract)

The sitting having been resumed, Mr. S. Skouloudis, the President of the Government, addressing the Boulé, made the following communication:

"Since the suspension of the labors of the Boulé, serious events have taken place in our country which may be thus narrated:

"On the 13th of May at 12 o'clock noon, the Ministry of War received from the commander of the 4th Army Corps at Cavalla, a telegram according to which the 6th Division reported to the 4th Army Corps at 11:45 A.M. that a column of Germans and Bulgarians had informed our battalion near Roupel that it would enter our territory. The 4th Army Corps added, that in accordance with the previous orders of the Ministry, the 6th Division ordered our detachments at Roupel to resist by force the advance of the Germans and Bul-

garians. The same hour, at 12 noon, the Ministry of War received a telegram from the 3d Army Corps stating that the outposts of the company of Vetrina (in the narrow pass of Roupel on the other shore of the Strouma) reported that a detachment of the German army, led by German officers, had surrounded our outposts and declared that it would enter our territory in order to occupy important positions. In answer to the reply of our men that they had orders to resist, the commanding German officer declared that he would occupy the heights at any cost, and at the same time other German detachments were crossing the boundaries with convoys. At 1:20 P.M. another telegram was received from the 4th Army Corps according to which two Bulgarian or German regiments had taken up their positions opposite Hodjogo (to the north of Roupel) and German troops had entered our territory in the sector of Topolnitsa, but from a telegram of the commander of the Roupel fortress which did not reach here until 11 at night, it appeared that the German and Bulgarian forces who crossed our frontier had commenced to appear at 9:45 A.M. At 5:40 P.M. of the same day, on the 13th of May, the Ministry of War received a telegram from the commander of the fortress of Salonika, according to which the Germans and Bulgarians, throwing the responsibility for what might happen on the Greek army, had crossed the boundary line at 2:30 P.M. and proceeded to the slopes of the fortress Roupel. The fortress fired twenty-four artillery shots at them. At the same time a telegram was received from the 4th Army Corps, according to which the covering infantry had also commenced to fire against the invaders, who came to a stop.

At 1:00 o'clock in the morning of the 13th to the 14th a telegram was received from the 6th Division, according to which the commander of the Germano-Bulgarian troops opposite Roupel declared to the commander of the fortress that it must be evacuated during the night because it would at all events be occupied by them. Under these circumstances, the government, seeing on the one hand the determination of the invaders to occupy the fortress, and, on the other hand, that the continuation of armed resistance which might at any moment be transformed into a general clash would lead to the abandonment of the policy of neutrality — which it does not intend to abandon, — ordered, through the Ministry of War, first, the cessation of resistance, and later that a declaration should be made to the German commander that in the face of a general invasion of the German army in the narrow

pass of Demir-Hissar, inside of which the fortress is located, the garrison of the fortress was obliged to withdraw, carrying with it all the war material in the fortress. Since the evening of May 13th our military authorities had lodged protests against the Germans and Bulgarians. On May 15th, at 2:00 P.M. the Ministry of War received a telegram from the commander of the fortress of Salonika, bearing date of the previous day, according to which on May 14th, at 9:45 A.M., namely, twenty-four hours after the first appearance of the invaders, our commander had departed from Roupel; that the garrison had taken with it the heavy guns and all the field guns, except two from which they had removed and carried away the breechblocks, a considerable quantity of rifle cartridges, all the sanitary material, and the gun sights, regulators, the tools of the engineering [corps], the dynamite, the gun-powder and the quick firing guns. A German officer by the name of Thiel occupied the fortress and drew up a protocol for the remaining material and the two field guns, which are to be restored. A more recent telegram from the 6th Division, dated May 15, reported that the war material of the Roupel fortress had been transported to Serres.

On May 14 the government hastened to protest, in the strongest manner, to the Governments of Germany and her Allies against these occurrences. The same day that this protest had been sent, a telegram was received from the Minister of Greece at Berlin, dated the previous day at 8:00 P.M., namely, the 13th day of May, in which the Minister informed the government that "he had reasons to believe that we should have in view the probability of an impending advance of the Germans and Bulgarians in the narrow passes of Roupel." [1] From this telegram it is seen that the fact of the invasion, which commenced on the morning of May 13th, had not been communicated to the minister at Berlin up to the evening of the same day.

On May 17th, the following official communiqué of the German General Staff was published in Berlin:

> German and Bulgarian forces, in order to insure themselves against sudden attaeks from the Entente troops, oecupied the complex of narrow passes of Roupel, near the Strouma. The weak Greek garrisons withdrew before superior numbers. The sovereign rights of Greeee have been respeeted.[2]

The documents exchanged between our officers and the invaders, the protests and protocols, as well as the detailed reports of our

[1] See doeument No. 52.

[2] See doeument No. 56.

officers, have not yet been received on account of the interruption of safe communications, which interruption also made telegraphic communication difficult during those days.

It was in this way that the occupation of the narrow passes of Roupel took place. This report proves the groundless nature of the rumors, which were intentionally circulated in order to slander Greece, as having acted perfidiously towards the interests of the Entente and partially toward its adversaries. In view of such reports, I must declare and affirm in the most categorical manner that what happened was not due to an understanding with the Greek Government and that the Greek Government did not acquiesce in nor tolerate it, the proof of which is that the fortress of Roupel fired against the invaders.[1]

The reports maliciously circulated that the General Staff or any other branch of the government, had, as was alleged, come to a previous understanding with the Germans and Bulgarians to the end that Roupel should be surrendered to them, are unworthy of denial or even of any answer. Neither the General Staff, nor any other branch of the government, acts without proper direction, but all act under the orders and responsibility of the government. (Applause.)

On the other hand, I ought not to omit to say that the character of the action of the Germans and Bulgarians who invaded Greek territory, according to the declarations which were made as to this, permits the government to give the assurance that it is an act which has been done with an absolutely military object in view and which does not in the least endanger the integrity or interests of the country. (Applause.)

No. 61

Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legations at Paris, London, Rome and Petrograd.

(Telegraphic Circular)

ATHENS, *May 24/June 6, 1916.*

From the time of the occupation of Roupel by the Germano-Bulgarian detachments, although the surrender of this fortress was a necessity imposed by the policy of neutrality followed by Greece, —

[1] See documents Nos. 48, 49, 50 and 51.

a policy which in no way implied armed resistance when, as was the case here, detachments belonging to the Powers hostile to the Entente decided to occupy the positions which seemed to them to be necessary, — the most malicious reports have begun to be circulated in regard to our attitude in this matter. The opponents of the government and foreigners who are interested in seeing the relations between Greece and the Entente Powers embittered have not hesitated to affirm that the surrender of Roupel fortress was agreed upon beforehand between the Royal Government and the enemies of the Entente, in order to injure from a military point of view the security of the army of General Sarrail or the success of his future operations.

For that reason I have deemed it necessary to refute these slanders by the declarations which I made yesterday in the Chamber, and of which a summary in extenso was transmitted by telegraphic agencies.[1]

Please take advantage of your first conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in order to repeat to him the official assurance, that it is absolutely false that the Germano-Bulgarian troops occupied Roupel in consequence of any agreement whatever; that on the contrary, the garrison in the beginning resisted by force the advance of the detachments in question, and that it was only in consequence of the declaration made by their chief to the commander of our fortress that if he did not withdraw during the night, Roupel would be occupied by force, that the government, in order to avoid an armed conflict which would have resulted in the abandonment of neutrality by Greece, gave the order for the evacuation of the position. You will add that the governments of the Entente should not allow themselves to be deceived by these slanderous maneuvers, against which both my predecessors and myself have been obliged to contend. Thus, under the Zaïmis Ministry, the Royal Legations at Bucharest and at London had advised us that in diplomatic and press circles the report was persistently circulated that an agreement had been made between Greece and Bulgaria about the cession of Ghevgheli and Doiran, and on other questions. Mr. Zaïmis had hastened to deny these reports and to denounce these maneuvers which were intended to compromise Greece in the eyes of the Entente. Several times the Bulgarian and Austrian newspapers have published similar news, trying to compromise the members of the Royal Government or the Greek representatives abroad, by publishing so-called interviews which were said to have

[1] See these declarations in No. 60.

been given by these persons to their correspondents, but which were a tissue of lies. The Allied Governments were finally on each occasion convinced of the falseness of these rumors, which were certainly inspired by malice. I hope that this time also the same results will follow the declarations made by the Royal Government before the Chamber, which you are herewith instructed on its behalf to communicate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SKOULOUDIS.

No. 62

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, *May 24/June 6, 1916.*

I have just had a long conversation with Mr. Briand, to whom I handed a note formulating the protest which was contained in your telegram and stating our point of view as to the interpretation given by us to our benevolent neutrality towards the Entente. I have also verbally explained to the President of the Council that a neutrality, no matter how benevolent it may be towards anyone, can not involve military [action] against the adversaries of the latter, because it would cease then to be neutrality. The President of the Council, after having carefully read the note which was handed to him, entered into a discussion which may be summed up as follows:

The proclamation of martial law in Salonika was the result of the decision [of Greece] not to oppose the invasion of her territory by the Bulgarian army, for it is only the Bulgarian army that is in Greece, the Germans not having available forces for that purpose. In taking this step, General Sarrail informed General Moschopoulos that the holiday of His Majesty the King could be celebrated as usual, and it was the latter who revoked the order for the celebration. As for the want of previous notification to the Royal Government, the latter had often been advised of this before, and in any case, the communication of Mr. Guillemin took the place of such notice.

Mr. Briand repeated to me that the attitude of Greece surprised him the more inasmuch as the Royal Government had often declared that it had received assurances that the Bulgarians [would not invade] Greece. He took special note of our express denial that there had

been a previous agreement between Greece and the Great Central Powers for the occupation of the fortress of Roupel. He added that, if the Bulgarians advance, General Sarrail "would take all the further measures which would seem to him to be proper in order to guarantee the security of the troops under his command." The President of the Council could not tell me what these measures would be, but said that in no case could the Allied troops be exposed to danger [words illegible] by reason of the passive attitude of Greece. According to Mr. Briand [words illegible], the aim of the Bulgarians was only too evident. Holding Serbian Macedonia, they wished also to hold [words illegible] in Eastern Macedonia in order to arrange "combinations" in the future. He assured me that for some time past, they had attempted through various agents to lure the Powers of the Entente into negotiations. Holding the keys of the gates which lead to Serres, Drama and Cavalla, they [the Bulgarians] may get there whenever they consider the moment favorable. If they do not advance now, it is because their flank would be exposed to the attacks of the Allies.

CACLAMANOS.

No. 63

Mr. D. Caclamanos, Chargé d'Affaires of Greece at Paris, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

PARIS, *May 24/June 6, 1916.*

The serious phase into which our relations with the Entente have entered, imposes upon me the duty to summarize as briefly as possible the situation as it is here regarded, and as developed from my official and other conversations, as well as to [transmit to you] the articles published in all the newspapers during these days, in order that Your Excellency may have all the elements necessary for the understanding of the sentiments of official circles and public opinion in France.

First of all, one should note that the attitude of Mr. Briand is dictated by considerations both of an external and of an internal character. In fact, since the invasion of Greek territory by the Germano-Bulgarian forces without any effective resistance on our part and the consequent conviction which has been formed here that an agreement exists between Greece and the Central Powers, the President of the

Council seems to be haunted by the memory of previous discomfitures at the hand of the Bulgarians, and to believe that he may be exposed to similar disappointments from us. In order, therefore, to defend himself against any subsequent charge of having shown too much benevolence towards Greece, he is beginning to take the initiative in rigorous measures to which I fear the proclamation of martial law in Salonika is only the prelude. The phrase uttered by a journalist, "if Ernest Renan were watching over the Acropolis, all that would not have happened," is sufficiently characteristic, and official organs do not cease to expatiate on the subject that only the Germans know how to show themselves strong, and that the Orientals are only impressed [by] force.

As to the belief that the occupation of the Roupel fortress was agreed upon between Greece and the enemies of the Entente this was not accredited to the telegrams of the "Exchange" agency, which you instructed me to deny simultaneously with the denials transmitted directly from Athens through the agencies and published in the French press, but to information which appeared in the *Neueste Nachrichten* of Munich which alleged that an agreement between Greece and Bulgaria existed not only on the question of the invasion of Greek territory, but also on the other disputed questions between the two countries. To this information Mr. Margerie also alluded during our conversation the other day,[1] and the officious *Wiener Allgemeine Zeitung* has just published news which is considered here as a confirmation of it.

I will add that the French Government, although all but certain that Greece could not have opposed by force the invasion of her territory by the Bulgarians, really hoped, as I positively know, that she would have prevented the invasion through diplomatic means because of the excitement which such action would cause in Greece. Disappointed in this hope, he was forced to conclude that Greece was bound to the Central Powers by such important and definite agreements that even the occupation by the Bulgarian army of the Macedonian regions coveted by Bulgaria could not disturb her. We should not overlook that the excitement of a portion of the Italian press is not without effect. Thus, its charge that the new loan furnished by the National Bank was only made possible through the assistance of German-American financiers, is beginning to receive wide publication here and naturally it does not fail to excite French public opinion still more.

[1] See document No. 58. CACLAMANOS.

No. 64

Mr. J. Passarof, Minister of Bulgaria in Athens, to Mr. S. Skouloudis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, *May 27/June 9, 1916.*

Mr. President of the Council:

In reply to Your Excellency's letter dated May 15th last, concerning the occupation by the German and Bulgarian troops of the fortress of Roupel, the heights and the bridge of Demir-Hissar, as well as of the bridge on the Strouma, the Royal Legation of Bulgaria, in the name of its government, has the honor to bring to the knowledge of the Hellenic Government that these military operations have been imposed as a measure of security and legitimate defense resulting from the considerable advance of the troops of the Entente on Greek territory in the section opposite the above mentioned places, an advance which will evidently be followed by an attack.

The Royal Government of Bulgaria declares that imminent danger has compelled it to act thus in the circumstances, and that the measure which was adopted will in no way impair the sovereign rights of Greece.

Please accept, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high consideration.

PASSAROF.

No. 65

Memorandum of the General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, *June 7/20, 1916.*

The official documents of the Bulgarian Government which have come into the possession of the Ministry concerning the surrender of the Roupel fortress make no mention of restitution. They are limited to the declaration that this occupation will not impair the sovereign rights of Greece. But, as the President informed me that he is in possession of documents pledging the restitution of the fortress by Germany and by Bulgaria, I begged him a few days ago to place these documents in the official files of the Ministry. The President answered me that he would do so in due time. Today I reminded him again of the necessity of such filing, as well as the recording of the protocol of the surrender of the fortress Roupel, a protocol which has not yet been received in the office. The President again repeated the promise that he would file these documents.

No. 66

Letter of Mr. S. Skouloudis to Mr. N. Politis, General Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, *June 8/21, 1916.*

Dear Mr. Politis:

I am sending you, herewith attached, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two documents dated May 9/22 ultimo, the one from the German, the other from the Bulgarian, Legations here, and my answer to them.[1] As you will notice, the said Legations in presenting these documents characterized them as secret; but afterwards, at my request, the Minister of Germany informed me, by order of his government, that the characterization of secrecy was withdrawn and that we could make use of the said documents whenever we wished.

With high esteem,

S. SKOULOUDIS.

No. 67

Extract from the Confidential Record of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the year 1916.

Number of order	Entered		Date of recording	Forwarding authority	Summary of document entered
	Date	Number			
7242	August 9	7147	9 August	German Legation	That the Germano-Bulgarian troops will not enter in the cities of Drama, Serres and Cavalla.[2]

[1] See documents Nos. 48, 49, 50 and 51.

[2] This document was not found in the archives of the Ministry.

No. 68

Letter sent by Count Von Mirbach-Harff, Minister of Germany at Athens, to Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

ATHENS, *August 15/28, 1916.*

Mr. President of the Council:

Referring to the communication which Mr. Caradja was pleased to make to me in your name last Tuesday, I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that the situation in the district of Cavalla has since been modified by the fact that the Greek troops voluntarily surrendered to the Bulgarians the forts and batteries in question. An inventory of the material found there on that occasion was made by both parties.

The Bulgarians have been stationed around the city but outside of its suburbs. General Jekoff has proceeded to take the necessary steps to insure the revictualling of the population as well as the Greek troops.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high esteem and devoted and sincere sentiments.

MIRBACH.

No. 69

Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Troupakis, Commander of the Gendarmerie in Macedonia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Bureau of Political Affairs), Athens.

SALONIKA, *August 28/September 10, 1916.*

I have the honor to report that, after the invasion of the Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia and its occupation by them, both postal and telegraphic communication were interrupted, and consequently my office has not been able since the 5th ultimo to communicate with the police precincts of Serres and Drama, which are under my office, and is ignorant of what has happened and is happening in the jurisdiction of said precincts to the injury of the inhabitants and that of the military and other authorities.

Only yesterday the police volunteers of the second class, namely, Joannes Tsikrikontis, Apostolos Chrysafides, and Apostolos Boyadjis, of the police precinct of Drama, having arrived here via Cavalla and Thasos, appeared before me and reported that the Bulgarians are

committing outrages against the Greek authorities, omitting no opportunity to show their hostile disposition and criminal instincts, and that, briefly stated, the Bulgarians have committed the folowing acts:

(1) On the night of the 6th to the 7th ultimo, the Turkish inhabitants of the district of Doxato, encouraged by the Bulgarian troops who had invaded that district, and infuriated against everything Greek, rebelled and attacked the Greek inhabitants and the men of the flying column under the command of Adjutant Constantine Limberi. An encounter followed which caused the death of two Turks and the capture of twenty-eight, of whom, however, thirteen were freed by force from the prisons by the Bulgarian soldiers of Doxato. Sergeant Panayotis Demetracopoulo of the flying column was slightly wounded in the left foot.

(2) On the night of the 8th to the 9th of the same month, seven gendarmes of Sarnitz Post and Sergeant Tryphon Yannari, the chief of the post, and an equal number of men from the Yenikioi post including Sergeant Stamatios Chrysafides their chief of post, were killed by the rebel Turks and the Bulgarian *comitadjis*.

(3) At Oxilar, four gendarmes whose names are not known were killed, together with eleven soldiers and a sergeant with their lieutenant.

(4) On the 10th ultimo, the gendarme Demetrios Papas with his comrade Athanasios Amaxopoios of the police sub-precinct of Sarissaban, while accompanying the public treasurer of Keramiti, were attacked by Bulgarian soldiers, and in this attack Papas was killed and Amaxopoios severely wounded in the shoulder-blade, as I reported also in my letter of the 12th ultimo.

(5) The gendarmes of the flying column of Prosotsani and the commander of the flying column, Adjutant Constantine Gali, were disarmed and insulted by Bulgarian soldiers; having been re-armed by the police precinct of Drama, they were again disarmed and, after being beaten, were ordered to return to Drama.

(6) The Turks of the district of Moustratli, immediately after the invasion of the Bulgarians, armed themselves and attacked the men of the police post, whom they would have killed had these not succeeded in escaping. The Turks entered Doxato and proceeded to plunder and exterminate the Greek inhabitants, and this provoked an encounter with the gendarmerie, as is mentioned in the first paragraph of the present report.

(7) The refugee inhabitants of Yenikioi and Dariovi, in order to escape the fury of the Bulgarians, fled to Cavalla, but on their way they were robbed by the Turkish rebels.

(8) The gendarmes of all the sub-precincts and posts of the police precinct of Drama were disarmed and those who were not killed were beaten and sent to Drama in wretched condition.

(9) Three gendarmes of the police sub-precinct of Pravi, while escorting to Cavalla two Turks accused of robbery, were attacked on their way by Bulgarian soldiers. Their fate is unknown.

(10) The Bulgarians sent word from Drama to Cavalla, where there was a dearth of provisions, that fifty carts should be sent to them, in order to receive these provisions, which were sent in the custody of three gendarmes and three soldiers. The Bulgarians cut off the fingers of both hands of one of the soldiers, and disarmed the gendarmes and sent them to Cavalla.

(11) The chief, Comitadji Panitsa, at the head of *comitadjis*, goes about freely in the District of Drama, robbing, killing, etc.

(12) All the Bulgarian and Turkish inhabitants of Eastern Macedonia, assisted by the Bulgarian army, are killing the Greek inhabitants, and plundering and destroying their properties; the latter, in face of the danger which hangs over them, flee panic-stricken to Cavalla and from there to Thasos, leaving everything at the mercy of the murderers and persecutors, the Greek authorities not being in a position to afford them the slightest help. Thus Eastern Greek Macedonia is at the absolute disposal of the hereditary enemies of the nation.

TROUPAKIS.

No. 70

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia; to Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

SOFIA, *December 5/18, 1916.*

I am informed by a subordinate official of ours who came from Serres, that many prominent men have been either imprisoned or expelled from there, and that Bulgarian night-patrols have entered into houses and plundered them. The population is suffering from the terribly high prices and the harshness of the Bulgarians, and there is not a single German officer to supervise the Bulgarian administration. The

roofs of the military barracks and of the School of Agriculture have been removed in order to furnish timber for the construction of trenches. It is said that after the deportation of the population of the district of Bairacli-Djoumaya because of military necessity, Bulgarian soldiers, according to the orders they had received, plundered houses and carried to an unknown place the spoils of their plundering. The above mentioned city was completely destroyed by the bombardment and the population was transferred to Pozarevitch. I am informed from Drama that the Greek authority exists only in form. Taneff, the military governor, dismissed the Greek mayor of Cavalla, with all the municipal council, and replaced him by a Turk. Lastly, the mayors of the villages were dismissed and Bulgarians and Turks were appointed in their places. In some villages the churches and schools were taken possession of, and the teaching of the Bulgarian language has been begun. Many plunderings and violent requisitions without payment have taken place and it is said that the village of Nea Midia was completely destroyed and the inhabitants murdered. Many of our compatriots from Drama and Cavalla [words illegible] are detained as prisoners. The native Turks in the beginning plundered many villages and killed a good many of the Christian inhabitants. It seems that now some kind of order has begun to be established, but on account of the high prices of the provisions and the insufficiency of bread the population of the occupied places is suffering much. Plunderings have not taken place in Drama, but in Cavalla all the houses have been forcibly entered into, and the movable property will soon be transported to Sofia by special trains. The refugees of the district of Serres were taken by force to Drama, where they suffer intensely from hunger, and [words illegible] deaths from hunger were noted. The above mentioned refugees will be transported to Serbia for residence there. I have taken the indicated steps with the Prime Minister concerning the above situation, and have telegraphed to the Royal Legation in Berlin in order that proper action may be taken.

NAOUM.

No. 71

Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *December 13/26, 1916.*

From the telegram of our minister at Sofia dated the 5th instant [1] you are informed about the horrible situation in which the inhabitants of our provinces occupied by the Bulgarians are found. Plunderings, thefts, destruction and even murders are the order of the day. Our people, reduced to misery and starvation, are decimated. The Greek churches and schools have been taken possession of by the Bulgarians, while the prominent men of our cities and villages have been thrown into prison.

We earnestly beg the German Government to take the most serious steps in order to put a stop to this deplorable state of affairs; particularly to take away from the Bulgarians the administration of the country and to entrust it to German officials.

You should tell the German Government that it is inconceivable that, after having occupied or left to be occupied Eastern Macedonia, which is, indirectly, it is true, the cause of all the misfortunes from which Greece now suffers, after not keeping the express promises given in writing not to occupy the three large Macedonian cities and to respect individual liberty, private property and the religious *status quo*, it now leaves the Bulgarians free to exterminate the Hellenic element in Macedonia.

You should add that we have the right to expect from the Imperial Government radical steps for the security of our nationals in Eastern Macedonia, and of their properties, as well as of those belonging to the State.

Please take immediately the above mentioned step and communicate the result to me. Be guided by the present telegram without leaving a copy of it.

ZALOCOSTAS.

[1] See document No. 70.

No. 72

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

SOFIA, *January 1/14, 1917.*

In continuation of my telegram of December 5th,[1] I have the honor to inform you that General Taneff, the military Governor of the occupied territories in Eastern Macedonia, has just arrived in Sofia. In the course of the visit which he paid me today, I explained to him at length the sad situation of our nationals, as I had already done in a note presented to the Bulgarian Government. General Taneff attributed some of the excesses which have been committed to the bad conduct of the Turks towards our people, and some to the disorder resulting from the entrance of foreign troops into our territory, but he nevertheless admitted that most of my remarks were well founded and promised to take all the necessary measures for the amelioration of the situation.

I shall not fail to follow as closely as possible, all that concerns our nationals in occupied Eastern Macedonia, and to make, from time to time, the necessary representations.

NAOUM.

No. 73

Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia.

(Telegram)

ATHENS, *January 5/18, 1917.*

I thank you for the information contained in your telegram of the 1st instant.[2] Please follow closely this very serious question and report to me from time to time.

ZALOCOSTAS.

[1] See document No. 70.

[2] See document No. 72.

No. 74

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

SOFIA, *February 15/28, 1917.*

The Prefect of Drama telegraphs that economic distress having arisen among the laboring classes on account of the anomalous situation created in his district and the want of work, [illegible words] many deaths are noted from starvation in Cavalla and in other parts of the province. In order to remedy this situation, I proceeded to establish in the principal places of the Province economical bakeries in order to distribute gratuitously bread at least to the hungry people; but, since in the district of Drama, apart from the families without work, there have flocked thither thousands of refugees from those that had been installed by the Greek Government in the district of Serres, who were forced by the Bulgarians, for military reasons, to leave that region, the maintenance of these economical bakeries by private initiative alone becomes impossible on account of the steady rise of prices of provisions. The Prefect, therefore, begs that the Royal Government approve a credit of at least 200,000 drachmas for their maintenance, in order to avert numerous deaths from starvation, particularly among those families to many of whom an allowance was being given by the Commission for the Establishment of Refugees.[1]

NAOUM.

No. 75

Report of a high public official of Eastern Macedonia dated March 9, 1917, transmitted from Germany through the Royal Legation at Berlin, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have the honor to report the following facts which, during my forced residence in Cavalla, I personally witnessed or heard reported by reliable persons occupying high social positions.

[1] This telegram was transmitted on February 25 to the Ministry of the Interior, which returned it on March 1st with a note that the question should be submitted to the Ministerial Council. The Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote on the returned document: "[Action deferred] until more favorable financial conditions. For the present to be filed."

On Tuesday, August 30 (O. S.), 1916, the day following the departure of the Greek troops which were in Cavalla for Drama and Germany, a company of the Bulgarian Army stationed along the line of the fortresses of Cavalla entered the city. Immediately upon their entrance, the Commander of the company, assuming at once the duties of military governor of the city, placed sentinels at the doors of the public buildings and particularly at those of the military depots of war material; likewise, the inhabitants who had gathered on the shore intending to leave Cavalla were ordered to return to their homes, and to bring back with them, at the same time, their furniture and other things which were piled up on the shore for shipping, the departure from the city of any person and all communication with the shore being strictly forbidden. The Greek flag which was waving on the fortress was hauled down and torn to shreds by the Turkish populace, which, immediately after the entrance of the Bulgarians, had to a man renounced the Hellenic State and from motives of self-interest had received the Bulgarians as the Allies of the Ottomans in the present pan-European War. All the inhabitants, through a public crier, were most strictly ordered to remain in their homes from sunset to next morning with all lights extinguished. These matters being thus arranged, there began, without delay, the systematic emptying of the public stores of war material and its transportation by night outside the city by the Bulgarian officers of the Commissary Department who had come there for this purpose.

Likewise, the Bulgarian Military Governor of the city having appointed Hamdi Bey, a Turk, to the vacant place of Mayor (he at once formed a Municipal Council composed of Turks, the Greek members of the Council having been, for some time, treacherously imprisoned with this very object in view, as being suspects), there began an implacable robbery of the properties of the Greeks by the Bulgarians and Turks through false requisitions of the goods in their stores, through extortions of money, through arbitrary plundering from the houses and shops of all material which was useful or salable, and through a skillful and shameful increase in the price of provisions and articles of first necessity.

Although nobody's life was at that time threatened, the Bulgarian terrorism of the first months purposely held the fear of death steadily over the heads of the Greek inhabitants of the city. Nevertheless, order was always preserved in Cavalla by Bulgarian patrols, and except for a few murders which were committed at night for purposes of

robbery, and which were attributed to Bulgarian and Turkish soldiers (the Turkish inhabitants in spite of their claim to Hellenic citizenship being impressed into the army by the Bulgarians and forming a separate Turkish corps), full security prevailed. There existed, however, a great distrust, during the first months, on the part of the Bulgarians toward the Greeks, (particularly the Greek military men) whom they considered as Venizelists, or at all events as suspects. As soon as such persons were discovered by the Bulgarians, they were imprisoned for many days and after various privations and humiliations were taken out of Cavalla to Drama or Sofia (such was the fate of Eustathios Pharaclas, a retired colonel of the Commissary Department and bookkeeper of the storehouse of material for fortifications in Cavalla and of J. Botagas, Second Lieutenant of the Infantry Reserve, etc.). Likewise, the Greek officials of posts and telegraphs of Cavalla were removed from there as suspects and sent to Drama, where they still remain.

Since there were no Greek authorities in Cavalla, the interests of the city were intrusted to Hamdi Bey, the Turkish Mayor, who, with his Municipal Council, which was composed exclusively of Turks, played great havoc not only with the public property of the city but also with the private property of its Greek inhabitants. On account of the Turks' lust for robbery and the complete indifference of the Bulgarian military authorities in the city to the horrible consequences of their acts, there was created a scarcity of bread, provisions, and things of prime necessity, unprecedented and unheard of even in the annals of cities long besieged. This caused a great moral and material upheaval and a terrible famine, with deaths, from starvation, of 10 to 15 persons a day, on an average. All these things took place with the toleration and utter indifference of the military authorities of the city, who busied themselves only with the emptying of the public warehouses and the big commerical shops of the city which had been abandoned by their owners. This was followed by a downright looting of private houses in broad daylight under the pretext of a search for government military supplies, which had not been turned over to them by the inhabitants, as they had been repeatedly called on by the public crier to do.

As a consequence of the complete indifference of the Bulgarians, nay, of their coöperation (for they had imported from Bulgaria various articles of first necessity in order to resell them for a sordid

gain), the cruel and wild cupidity which was carried on by the Turks and Hebrews of the city has raged and is raging still, till it has raised the prices per okka as follows:

The price of bread (a miserable mixture of wheat, in imperceptible quantities, of maize, of rye, of barley and of various impure substances) went up to 8–10 lebs (leb, a Bulgarian drachma, forced by the Bulgarians into circulation in the market of Cavalla and arbitrarily made equivalent to the Hellenic drachma), the price of meat and of dried beans to 8–12 lebs, that of cheese to 24–36 lebs, of butter or fat to 40–50 lebs, of salt to 12–30 lebs, of sugar to 60–80 lebs, of rice to 24 lebs, of vegetables to 4 lebs, of potatoes to 6–8 lebs, of wine to 8 lebs, of milk, always unscrupulously adulterated, to 4 lebs, of barley to 10 lebs, of eggs to 60–80 centimes each, of leeks to 1 leb the bunch (three leeks to a bunch), of charcoal to $1\frac{1}{2}$ lebs an okka, etc., etc.

After the Bulgarians had emptied the public warehouses, they proceeded, under the pretext of commandeering, arbitrarily to empty all the large shops (that of Mr. Rakidji, e.g.), the groceries (that of Mr. Sertsos, e.g.), the hardware stores, whose owners were absent through fear, having left Cavalla a little before the Bulgarian occupation of that city and also to search all the private houses, most systematically. This was carried out by Bulgarian officers and sub-lieutenants, at the head of a squad or platoon by order of the Bulgarian city authorities. On this occasion, in addition to the small number of things for military use, which were thus found (rifles, revolvers, blankets, canteens, etc.), the Bulgarian officers seized and carried away, without giving any receipt whatever, all the uniforms, howsoever found by them, of the Greek officers of the garrison of Cavalla, who, on departing hastily on the 28–29th of August 1916 (O. S.) had left them to be cared for in the houses or hotels where they resided, as well as all other articles of military character and the furniture and other valuable things belonging to them and to their families, such as e.g. the property of Lieutenant General Ghennadis, the Commander of the IVth Army Corps (in the upper part of the house where the officers of the Army Corps were) that of Division Commander Colonel I. Hatzopoulos (in the house of the former Mayor of Cavalla, Mr. N. Serdaroglou), that of J. Costaki, Major of Artillery, and of Majors G. Kortsa, C. Capodistria, J. Coumoundouros, Infantry officers who stayed at the Grand Hotel of Cavalla, as well as that of numerous superior and inferior officers, who lived in Cavalla either alone or with their families. Even in the very streets

of the city, any inhabitant wearing anything of military character, or similar to it, was stripped of it by the first Bulgarian or Turkish soldier who chanced to meet him, and such property was delivered to the appropriate Bulgarian or Turkish storehouse, the sale of articles of this nature being strictly forbidden in the city.

After this search, the plundering of Cavalla as above described having been as far as possible completed, Mr. Anghelof, the Bulgarian sub-lieutenant of Reserves, was appointed Governor of the city. He dismissed the Turkish Mayor and appointed the Greek Serdaroglou and a Municipal Council composed of Greeks. Thanks to the energetic action of Mr. Serdaroglou, the scanty importation of flour (once or twice a week), which during the mayoralty of the Turk had been begun in order to prevent the entire annihilation of the Greek population of Cavalla by starvation, through distribution of bread cards at the bakeries was considerably increased. The quality of the bread was somewhat improved, the poor of the city were well cared for (distribution of bread and food were gratis) and generally the city of Cavalla began to be greatly relieved from the evils from which it had been suffering for many months. Still, a great number of the houses of the city, which were left vacant on account of the speedy departure of their owners, were plundered, during the first months, by the Turks, Jews and refugees, with the toleration of the Bulgarians, and whatever could be taken away was plundered (tiles, timber, windows, ceilings, doors, glass, things of iron, etc.), so that only the walls are now standing.

Finally, the large military depot at Kioutsouk-Orman containing material for entrenchment was, in the early days of the Bulgarian occupation, completely pillaged by the Bulgarian Army, which utilized all this material for the various works of entrenchment constructed in and outside of Cavalla, and along the line of the fortifications of the city. It also took away all the wood contained in the warehouse belonging to the city of Cavalla, which was to be used for housing of the refugees, and generally the Bulgarians carried away arbitrarily and without giving a receipt whatever would be in the least useful to them, no matter whether it belonged to the Greek Government or to the city of Cavalla, or to individuals, whose goods were, to be sure, commandeered, but were appraised — those that had such good luck — at the twentieth of their actual value.

In Drama, where from the beginning there was a Greek Governor (Mr. N. Bakopoulos) and a Greek Mayor (Mr. Phessas), and some

other Greek officers, as I was accurately informed, during my residence there for a few days (9–18 February), there were committed far fewer arbitrary acts and plunderings of the properties of the Greeks and of the Greek officers of the garrison of the city, by Bulgarians and Turks, and the populations suffered less from the dearth of provisions and were much less decimated by starvation, the Greek authorities having taken their measures in time. However the Bulgarians gave free vent there too to their cupidity, for their own advantage, having repeatedly brought from Bulgaria various things of prime necessity and sold them at exorbitant prices in the market of Drama, prices which differed only a little from those in the market of Cavalla.

No. 76

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. E. Zalocostas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

Sofia, *March 27/April 9, 1917.*

I have the honor to submit to you, herewith attached, a copy of a more recent document, sent, on March 23d, to the Prime Minister, concerning the critical situation created in Macedonia by reason of the total lack of provisions and particularly of bread.

In Cavalla, in consequence of the difficulties of transporting provisions from Drama and the lack of every care on the part of the Bulgarian military authorities for the organization of more or less regular communication between Cavalla and Drama, the inhabitants have for months suffered from the insufficiency of provisions, and particularly of bread, which was even sold at from 10 to 15 drachmas the okka. In the beginning such hardships were noticeable only in Cavalla, where a good many deaths occurred from starvation. But recently, and particularly during the last month, the crisis has extended generally to all parts of Eastern Macedonia, a great many deaths occurring from starvation not only in Cavalla, but also in Drama and Serres. Undoubtedly the same situation prevails in the various villages where the situation is unknown because the villagers are forbidden for military reasons to go from the villages to the cities, which certainly aggravates the crisis in provisions which was felt only in the cities. During the last forty days alone, 1,800 persons have died from starvation in Cavalla, according to official and reliable information which I have received from there, and thirty persons a day, on an average, die in Drama. Two months ago the Bulgarian Government sent to

Eastern Macedonia a quantity of wheat for the needs of the native population, and although that was not enough, it did suffice to relieve the situation somewhat.

The wheat which was furnished was not given gratuitously, but the administration of Drama each time paid the price to the Bulgarian Government. But, for nearly two months now, the quantity furnished has been gradually decreased, until it has been reduced to 60 grams of bread daily for each person. Other things of first necessity are either totally wanting or are sold at exorbitant prices, which even the richest inhabitants can not afford to pay. Therefore, during these last two months the situation in Eastern Macedonia has become critical and, in fact, desperate on account of the large number of deaths from starvation which have occurred, [particularly] amongst the Grekes, because the Turkish army has furnished provisions to the Mussulmans and the Bulgarians to the Slavic-speaking villages. In Drama and in some other cities, thanks to the initiative of the Greek Prefect and the praiseworthy financial aid of the rich, soup kitchens were established for the relief of the poor, but unfortunately these kitchens can not be operated regularly because provisions can not be purchased.

Concerning this desperate condition created in Eastern Macedonia, I have up to the present day repeatedly made, both in writing and verbally, strong representations to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs here and to the Prime Minister, to whom I have addressed a strong protest against the destruction carried on in Eastern Macedonia. I reminded him of the express promises given to Greece for the safeguarding of the lives and properties of the inhabitants and called his attention to the deplorable impression which the policy of the Bulgarian Government would create in Greece, since it could not but influence public opinion there and the existing friendly relations between the two countries. Not satisfied with these steps, I called also on Mr. Dobrovitz, the Director of the Political Office of His Majesty, to whom I explained in the most detailed manner the deplorable situation in Eastern Macedonia, and begged him to bring all these facts to the notice of the King, in the hope that His Majesty would intervene energetically with the Bulgarian Government for the amelioration of the situation. I protested strongly to Mr. Dobrovitz against the indifference shown in this matter by the Bulgarian Government and emphasized the fact that if this continues, it could not but considerably influence the relations between the two states. Mr. Dobrovitz pretended a com-

plete ignorance of the situation but promised to transmit to His Majesty the King all that I said to him.

I also took similar steps with the official German circles here and asked our Royal Legation at Berlin to take this matter up with the German Government.

NAOUM.

APPENDIX

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Dr. V. Radoslavoff, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria.

SOFIA, *March 23/April 5, 1917.*

Mr. President of the Council:

The Legation of His Hellenic Majesty has repeatedly, by verbal and written representations, called the serious attention of the Royal Government of Bulgaria to the critical situation in the part of Hellenic Macedonia occupied by the Bulgaro-German troops, caused by the want of provisions and particularly of bread, and insisted on the absolute necessity of taking without delay the necessary steps to remedy a really deplorable situation.

Unfortunately, up to the present time all these representations have brought no practical result, and, according to accurate information which I have received, more than 1,800 persons have died in Cavalla from starvation within forty days; in Drama, about thirty persons die daily from the same cause, and the same deplorable occurrences are repeated in all the other centers of occupied Greek territory. Last month, hardly 60 grams of bread were daily distributed to each of the unfortunate inhabitants, who totally lack any other food.

Reminding Your Excellency of the express obligations undertaken at the time of the entrance of Bulgaro-German troops into Hellenic Macedonia, I consider it my duty to inform you that, if this situation continues unabated and if no radical and urgent steps are soon taken, all the Hellenic population of the occupied places will be exterminated either from starvation or by epidemic diseases.

In the presence of this desperate situation, I must raise my voice against these proceedings and these cases of neglect which daily cause the death of a great number of Hellenic citizens and will cause more in the future, and, placing the entire responsibility upon the Bulgarian Government, must insist with all my energy that, independently of all

other considerations, be it only for reasons of humanity, steps finally be taken and strictly carried out to put an end to a situation which, I am sure, Your Excellency is the first to deplore.

Please accept, Mr. President of the Council, the assurances of my high esteem.

NAOUM.

No. 77

Mr. A. Naoum, Minister of Greece at Sofia, to Mr. A. Zaïmis, President of the Ministerial Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Athens.

(Telegram)

SOFIA, *June, 1/14, 1917.*

The Bulgarian authorities in Eastern Macedonia recently notified the inhabitants who desire to go to the interior of Bulgaria in order to be established there, or to find work, that they should enter their names in special registers. A large part of the population, suffering from want of food and dying from starvation, accepted the proposal and the transportation of them with their families to the interior of Bulgaria has begun, they being temporarily established at Tatar-Bazardjik, Kara-Bachli, Philippopoli, northern Bulgaria and in Dobroudja. The refugees who are arriving in large numbers are in a desperate condition on account of privations. It is said that in the registers of Drama alone 10,000 [words illegible] have been registered, a step taken to render the population less dense in order to facilitate the revictualling of Macedonia and also to increase the laborers in the cities and villages of Bulgaria, where there is now a great dearth of laborers, but perhaps this measure is intended as a systematic removal from Macedonia of the Hellenic population, for hidden political reasons, namely, to destroy the present Hellenic character of the country. It is not known whether Slavophones have emigrated, but about 5,000 Mohammedans have arrived in Bulgaria and some in Sofia. In consequence of the action of the Turkish consul at Philippopoli, they are to be sent to Turkey.

According to an official report, up to the 15th of April (O. S.) 6,000 persons had died from starvation in Cavalla, and in Drama and Serres the situation is the same. The condition of the people is literally lamentable, for, apart from the reduction of the population owing to the thousands of deaths from starvation, the economic situation of the inhabitants has become desperate on account of the exorbitant rise in the prices of the things of prime necessity. The mayor of Cavalla, in order

to save the population, begs the Royal Government to send him aid in the form of money as a loan to the city, assuming the obligation to repay it on the reëstablishment of the former situation.

I am proceeding to make the proper representations concerning the transportation of the population to the interior of Bulgaria, and am asking for explanations and the affording of protection by the local authorities to the families which are being thus deported.

NAOUM.

Publication No. 1.

THE GREEK QUESTION

By AUGUSTE GAUVAIN

Formerly Minister Plenipotentiary of France, and now Political Director of the *Journal des Débats*

TRANSLATED BY

CARROLL N. BROWN, Ph.D.

The College of the City of New York

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